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Africa’s economic performance has been encouraging over the last cou-
ple of decades. The continent’s economic growth was above the global 
average for most of the 2000s and poverty declined significantly. Africa is 
also modernizing as urbanization increases, a middle class emerges, and 
the digital economy opens new windows of opportunity. At this junc-
ture, it is crucial to determine how these positive trends can be leveraged 
to further reduce poverty and generate better quality jobs for the conti-
nent’s fast-growing working-age population.
While there is a general recognition that the informal sector is the key-
stone of African economies, there is limited information about what is 
known as “the grey economy” and how it could help shape more inclu-
sive growth via the creation or consolidation of existing enterprises and 
jobs. In Francophone Africa, formal wage employment is responsible for 
only 5% of the total labour force, while small informal businesses make 
up more than 97% of all private businesses in some countries. The infor-
mal sector is likely to remain the most important job-providing sector in 
the foreseeable future in African economies. Africa’s cities’ attractiveness 
and competitiveness are primarily shaped by the informal sector, which 
provides most of the jobs and influences urban habitats, transportation 
systems, and the overall structure of the urban economy.
For the last 50 years, IDRC has contributed, through the policy-
oriented research it supports, to bringing about inclusive growth and 
curbing poverty in low-income settings. The research IDRC supports 
focuses on innovation, solutions, and evidence-based policy to generate 
change related to today’s challenges and build multi-stakeholder part-
nerships to help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. IDRC also 
supports research infrastructure and capacity, including that of young 
and female researchers. An in-depth understanding of the informal 
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economy is an important step toward apprehending the overall business 
environment and employment patterns in Africa. 
This book makes an important contribution to the analysis of the 
informal sector and how it affects business environments, jobs, institu-
tions, and structural transformation in Francophone Africa. It provides 
an understanding of the landscape of private entrepreneurship in Africa 
through its consideration of both formal and informal firms. The authors 
refute the traditional formal/informal duality hypothesized in the main-
stream literature and undertake a thorough analysis of the wide spectrum 
of private entrepreneurship, between the extremes of complete formality 
and complete informality. This approach to informality as a continuum 
provides useful insights into the following issues: How do formal and 
informal firms cooperate or compete in various value chains, and how 
does this shape jobs, social protection, and productivity? What are the 
magnitude and sources of the productivity difference between formal 
and informal firms, and do the characteristics of firms help to explain 
this gap? What are the barriers to growth for formal and informal firms, 
and how can policy contribute to overcoming them? How do the labour 
regulations, to which formal firms are subjected, affect the share of infor-
mal sector jobs? How can policy contribute to nurturing a greater synergy 
between formal and informal firms?
In Africa, female participation in the labour market and their overall 
economic contributions are largely underestimated because they oper-
ate mainly in the informal sector. The book contributes to filling the 
existing gap observed in recent research. While most analyses of gen-
der in Africa refer to culture, institutions, and the labour market, the 
findings presented in this publication address female entrepreneurship 
and the peculiar challenges and opportunities women face. The detailed 
information collected on women in entrepreneurship, and the in-depth 
analysis thereof, brings an important perspective on how the gender gap 
is playing out in terms of income generation and inequality. In doing so, 
the volume sets the groundwork for the formulation of gender-targeted 
policy actions that will support overall growth, be more inclusive, reduce 
inequality and poverty, and empower women. 
Regional integration has grown in Africa, through customs unions, har-
monized fiscal and legal systems, macroeconomic surveillance systems, 
and some harmonized business law. While showing limited effectiveness 
in spurring official trade flows in Central and West Africa, this integration 
is boosting cross-border trade through ethnic, kinship, and other kinds 
of networks within and between the regional blocks of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest 
Africaine – UEMOA) and the Central African Economic and Monetary 
Union (Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale – 
CEMAC). These networks play a central role in shaping the institutional 
framework in which businesses operate. They influence the functioning 
of informal businesses as well as the cross-border trade with countries 
within and outside UEMOA and CEMAC.
An important policy debate regarding the informal sector is whether 
governments should seek to formalize informal firms through sanctions 
or assist these firms to increase their contributions to employment and 
income while remaining informal. While it is a source of income and 
employment, the informal sector is also a provider of inexpensive con-
sumer goods and services to households with limited financial means, 
and these are often of low quality and can be dangerous. However, there 
are opportunities to create jobs, raise productivity, promote growth, and 
increase fiscal revenues. Informality is linked to low productivity, low 
wages, and jobs without protection, while development requires reducing 
and formalizing the informal sector over time. There is thus a dilemma 
between boosting the sector and shrinking it.
This volume makes an important contribution to this debate by 
recom mending policies that can assist small informal firms to improve 
their performance while encouraging large informal actors to modernize. 
Policy reforms that intend to support small informal actors in consolidat-
ing and upgrading the quality of their products and services are critical. 
The book provides detailed recommendations regarding the type of assis-
tance that will support small informal firms and jobs, including financing 
and training actors as well as designing and/or adapting business regula-





This book is the culmination of several major research projects on the 
informal sector in Francophone Africa. It builds on Benjamin and Mbaye 
(2012) which focused on West Africa, mainly Benin, Burkina Faso, and 
Senegal. The present volume draws on the data collected for Benjamin 
and Mbaye (2012) and some additional fieldwork in these three countries 
in West Africa, as well as a major data collection project in Central Africa 
on Cameroon and Gabon. As in the earlier study, the research presented 
in this volume involved a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to gain insight into the complex nature and processes of 
the informal sector, which by its nature is difficult to apprehend. The 
quantitative dimension is based on firm surveys in the major cities of 
five countries: Cotonou (Benin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Dakar 
(Senegal), Douala and Yaounde (Cameroon), and Libreville (Gabon). 
In each of these cities, 200 to 300 firms were surveyed with a sampling 
strategy designed to include a wide range of firms, from fully formal to 
completely informal. The firm surveys have provided a wealth of detail 
about the characteristics, operation, and challenges facing the private 
sector in Africa, and the overwhelmingly informal nature of these firms.
In addition to surveying firm managers about their enterprises, we 
also administered questionnaires to employees of these firms. To supple-
ment our survey data, we carried out semi-structured interviews with a 
subset of the sampled firms and with focus groups. We also consulted 
secondary sources and available data sets. This diversified set of sources 
and methods enabled us to obtain a deeper understanding not only of the 
firms themselves but also the institutional environment that shapes them, 
the working conditions and living standards of employees, and appropri-
ate policy measures to promote development of the private  sector and 
economic progress.
A major theme in our previous work, extended here, is the diversity 
of the informal sector. We have identified and measured seven criteria 
of informality, none of which subsumes the others. Most firms sat-
isfy some but not all the criteria of informality, implying a spectrum 
of informality rather than a dichotomous distinction between formal 
xxiv  Mbaye, Golub, and Gueye
and informal firms. For example, in Libreville around 70% of sampled 
firms maintain reasonably accurate accounts whereas only 30% provide 
social insurance to their employees. In much of the analysis, we catego-
rize firms into three groups: formal, large informal, and small informal 
as first proposed by Benjamin and Mbaye (2012). While not capturing 
the full range of informality, this classification recognizes the crucial 
distinction between large and small informal firms. Large informal 
firms, while less numerous than small informal firms, are a distinctive 
feature of the economies of West and Central Africa. These large infor-
mal firms are similar to formal firms in terms of sales volume but their 
organizational structure and behaviour are much more like their small 
informal counterparts. In particular, they maintain falsified accounts 
and thus do not pay the regular income taxes that formal firms must.
While similar to Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) in terms of method-
ology and emphasis on the informal sector as a continuum rather than 
a binary distinction between formal and informal operators, the pres-
ent study advances understanding of the informal sector in several other 
ways. First, as mentioned above, we also investigate informal employ-
ment, thus shedding light on the participation of women, the prevalence 
of self-employment, the severe precariousness of employment, the nature 
and extent of worker training, etc. Our findings in these regards largely 
confirm those of previous studies of informal employment. Second, the 
present volume covers Central Africa, particularly Cameroon and Gabon, 
enabling a comparison to the three West African countries covered in 
Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal). Third, 
a number of topics are new or discussed in greater detail: the nature of 
interactions between formal and informal firms, assistance programs to 
small informal firms, the role of gender, and a greater focus on the role 
of the business climate. On the general topic of the institutional envi-
ronment, there are chapters on the role of labour-market regulations in 
impeding formal employment creation and the effects of the interaction 
of infrastructure and governance on informal trading. Fourth, we feature 
case studies of particular sectors in which the informal sector is heavily 
involved, such as used cars, smuggled petroleum products, distribution 
of cell phone credits, and garbage collection. These case studies are based 
on close observation and interviews, mainly in Benin and Cameroon, 
and illuminate the operation of the informal economy in vivid detail.
The new data gathered for this study in Cameroon and Gabon have 
involved many individuals and institutions whose help was invaluable. 
Universities and their Departments of Economics played a particularly 
important role. The teams were led, respectively, in Gabon by Professor 
Jean-Jacques Ekomié, assisted by Stevy Mbaollo, of the University Omar 
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Bongo of Libreville, and in Cameroon by Professors Georges Kobou of 
the University of Yaounde 2 and Dontsi of the University of Douala. The 
researchers in their institutes were involved throughout the data collec-
tion process (October 2012 to November 2014).
We are also grateful for the major contributions of the National 
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CHAPTER 1
Overview and Summary
Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Stephen S. Golub, and Fatou Gueye
This book examines the operation, causes, and effects of the informal 
sector on Francophone West and Central Africa’s economies. While the 
informal sector has received increasing attention in recent years, less is 
known about its role in Francophone Africa. In this regard, the book is 
a sequel to Benjamin and Mbaye (2012). There are similarities between 
the two books in terms of methodology and topics, but the present work 
breaks new ground in some important respects. As in Benjamin and 
Mbaye (2012), the analysis is based on a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to comparing formal and informal enterprises. 
This is a relatively novel approach, as most previous studies of informal-
ity in Africa focus on employment rather than firms, e.g., Filmer and Fox 
(2014), Cling et al. (2014), Chen (2012), and Roubaud and Torelli (2013). 
The quantitative analysis is largely based on original survey data gathered 
in the capital cities of the countries under study that cover formal, large 
informal, and small informal firms. This survey data is complemented by 
extensive interviews enabling a deeper understanding of the functioning 
of informal firms. Furthermore, the research involves extensive collabora-
tion between African and Western researchers.
While sharing some analytical and topical similarities, this book 
goes beyond Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) in significant respects. First, 
the analysis is extended to countries in Francophone Central Africa, 
Gabon and especially Cameroon. This enables comparison with the 
three West African countries, Senegal, Benin, and Burkina Faso. The 
two Francophone regions have quite similar institutions, as summa-
rized below, but differ in terms of economic structure. The Central 
African countries are resource-rich whereas the West African coun-
tries are resource-poor. As is well known, resource abundance can be 
more of a ‘curse’ than a benefit, and, as a result, macroeconomic stabil-
ity and governance tends to be weaker in Central Africa than in West 
Africa. Given that the informal sector arises at least in part from institu-
tional weaknesses, it is to be expected that the informal sector could be 
different. Comparisons to informal sectors in other countries in Africa 
and elsewhere are also included in several chapters.
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Second, based on experience in carrying out the first set of surveys in 
West Africa, the survey questionnaire was refined. In particular, the new 
surveys add a stronger focus on the role of women in informal enter-
prises and more detail on perceptions of the institutional environment. 
The survey data are complemented by detailed case studies of a num-
ber of sectors in Benin and Cameroon, including used cars, smuggled 
gasoline, urban transport (moto-taxis and minivans), used clothes, and 
garbage recycling. These case studies together with the analysis of sur-
vey data provide an in-depth understanding of the operation, causes, and 
consequences of widespread informality.
Third, the range of topics covered in this volume is broader. Many of 
the issues analyzed in Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) feature in this work as 
well, including a composite definition of informality, recognition of the 
role of ‘large’ informal firms, detailed comparisons of the characteristics 
of formal, large informal and small informal firms, and informal cross-
border trade with countries outside Francophone Africa. To these topics, 
this work adds analysis of several new ones, including the nature of inter-
actions between formal and informal firms, assistance programs to small 
informal firms, the role of gender, and a greater focus on the role of the 
business climate. On the general topic of the institutional environment, 
there are chapters on the role of labour market regulations in impeding 
formal employment creation and the effects of the interaction of infra-
structure and governance on informal trading.
The remainder of this chapter begins with a brief review of the signifi-
cance of the informal sector in Francophone Africa and the nature of 
official and unofficial institutions in the region. We then summarize 
the objectives and methodology of the book, provide summaries of the 
 chapters, and conclude with a synthesis of the findings.
The Importance of the Informal Sector
The informal sector is a major source of income and employment in 
all developing countries, particularly in Africa. In Africa’s low-income 
economies, the informal sector typically accounts for about half of aggre-
gate output, according to National Accounts data.1 Figure 1.1 shows the 
informal sector as a share of GDP for countries of focus in this book, 
1The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2017) provides estimates of the size of the informal sec-
tor in individual African economies based on combining multiple indicators. The IMF estimates 
of the informal sector are in the same range as the National Accounts data (i.e., averaging about 
50% of GDP).
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categorized by major economic activities: agriculture (primary), industry 
(secondary), and services (tertiary). Agriculture is overwhelmingly infor-
mal in African low-income economies. For non-agricultural sectors, the 
share of the informal sector is more variable, ranging from about 30% 
to 70% of GDP. For resource-rich economies in Central Africa, where oil 
plays a significant role, the formal sector is somewhat larger.
The informal sector is even more important in terms of employ-
ment, accounting for at least 90% of total employment in low-income 
African countries, based on household surveys. That is, wage employ-
ment in the public and formal private sectors are both typically around 
or below 5% of the labour force.2 Our primary focus is on the urban 
informal sector, which is growing quickly and accounts for a large 
share of total informal employment. Table 1.1 shows estimates of 
urban informal employment as a share of total urban employment in 
the 1980s and 2010s in the five countries in West and Central Africa 
that we focus on. The table shows that, even within urban areas, 
employment is predominantly informal and in fact the proportion of 
informal employment is growing. Urban informal employment in the 
2010s is higher in the West African  economies at well over 80% than 
in Central Africa where it is around 70%. For Benin, this figure is a 
2Golub and Hayat (2015) and Fox, Haines, Muñoz, and Thomas (2013) provide estimates of the 
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staggering 96%, reflecting Benin’s special role as a regional entrepot 
for informal trading activities in West Africa.
As stressed in Benjamin and Mbaye (2012), there is no consensus on 
the definition of informality due to the considerable diversity among 
informal firms and the range of features that differentiate informal and 
formal businesses (size, registration, tax status, access to credit, falsified 
accounts, etc.). As most firms satisfy only some of these criteria, informal-
ity is a matter of degree. Perhaps most significantly, some large informal 
firms operate alongside a multitude of microenterprises.
Formal and Informal Institutions in Francophone Africa
The Francophone African nations share a certain number of formal 
socioeconomic and institutional characteristics largely determined by 
their French colonial legacy and the continued, albeit reduced, French 
presence in the region. This includes the use of French as the official 
language and an unusually high level of formal institutional integration 
arrangements, including a common currency, the FCFA. Africa’s franc 
zone represents about 20% of the continent’s area and more than 30% of 
the African population (about 140 million people in 2016).
Francophone Africa consists of two major groupings with parallel 
and very similar structures in Central and West Africa, respectively: the 
Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) 
and the Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA). 
UEMOA and CEMAC each have their own, nearly identical, version of 
the FCFA currency and corresponding central banks: Banque Centrale 
des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) and the Banque des États de 
l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC). The FCFA in each region was initially pegged 
Table 1.1
Share of urban informal employment in total urban employment (percent), 
selected West and Central African economies
 1980s 2010–2015
Benin NA 96.2




sub-Saharan Africa average 67.3 73.3
Source: Charmes 2019
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to the French franc and subsequently to the Euro, although with contin-
ued support from the French government. The 1994 devaluation of the 
FCFA and related structural reforms marked an important period in the 
history of the franc zone.
In addition to having a single currency, Francophone countries in 
West and Central Africa have pursued deep regional integration through 
customs unions, harmonized fiscal and legal systems, and multilateral 
surveillance systems. Import duties and domestic taxes are harmo-
nized within UEMOA and CEMAC, with minor differences between 
the two groups. In both the UEMOA and CEMAC areas, business law 
is governed by the dispositions of the Francophone Organization for the 
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) treaty. Chapter 8 
provides additional details on OHADA and its influence on formal and 
informal businesses.
Informal firms are affected by these formal institutions but, by their 
very nature, operate largely outside of them. Yet they are often part of 
highly organized networks based on ethnic and kinship relations that 
predate the colonial era. These kinship ties provide a kind of shadow 
institutional structure that is in some respects more powerful and effec-
tive than official institutions. Chapter 4 includes some analysis of the 
role of kinship groups in the functioning of informal businesses. Kinship 
groups are particularly important in organizing informal cross border 
trade with countries outside of UEMOA and CEMAC, as shown in West 
Africa in Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) and extended here to Cameroon’s 
informal trade, particularly with Nigeria, in Chapter 10.
Objectives and Methodology
The main objectives of this book are to:
1. Develop a better understanding of the behaviour, practices, and 
motivation of the informal sector in Francophone Africa, particu-
larly Central Africa;
2. Assess the causes of the spread of the informal economy;
3. Investigate its effects on employment, income, and growth;
4. Develop policy recommendations in light of the previous analysis.
Many but not all, of the chapters draw on our surveys and inter-
views. The sampling methodology for the surveys is described in 
Chapter 2 and the findings feature in Chapters 4, 6, and 9. Several other 
chapters also use results from other firm or individual surveys. In parti-
cular, Chapter 5 uses firm-level data from the World Bank Investment 
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Climate Assessments (ICA). The ICA database differs considerably 
from the surveys we carried out, in particular as it has limited coverage 
of small informal firms. The resulting different definition of small ver-
sus large firms in the ICA database explains some of the discrepancies 
in the findings between Chapter 5 and other chapters. Chapter 7 uses 
data from the World Bank Doing Business database on labour market 
regulations.
The qualitative dimension of our research is based on semi-structured 
interviews with informal sector business managers, traders,  government 
officials, and other stakeholders or observers, mainly in Benin and 
Cameroon. There is a particular focus on Cameroon in a number of 
chapters.
Chapter Summaries
Part I. Comparative Analysis of the Informal Sector in Francophone 
Africa and Elsewhere: Measurement, Causes, and Effects
Part I of the book discusses the methodology and findings of the surveys 
and contains comparative analyses of the informal sector in Francophone 
West and Central Africa. It presents findings on the characteristics of for-
mal, large informal, and small informal firms; the productivity of these 
firms; some of the causes and consequences of informality; and policy 
implications.
Chapter 2. Conceptualizing the Informal Sector: Analysis and Application 
to Francophone Africa (Ahmadou Aly Mbaye and Fatou Gueye)
This chapter summarizes our methodology for defining and assess-
ing informal sector firms, accounting for their large heterogeneity. We 
elaborate on Benjamin and Mbaye’s (2012) argument that the informal/
formal sector distinction should be viewed as a continuum rather than a 
binary choice. This view inspires a seven-part definition of informality: 
firm size, registration status, tax status, access to formal finance, honesty 
of accounts, social security coverage, and permanence of the workplace. 
Firms often exhibit varying levels of informality, satisfying some but not 
all of these criteria. Additionally, this chapter distinguishes between large 
and small informal firms. It also discusses a stratified sampling strategy 
to arrive at roughly similar numbers of formal, large informal, and small 
informal firms within three main sectors: commerce, other services, and 
manufacturing. Non-parametric tests confirm that no criterion  subsumes 
the others.
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Chapter 3. Informal Sector Value Chains: Evidence from Case Studies 
(Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Stephen S. Golub, Fatou Gueye, Yves Momo 
Ngapgho, and Dominique Sébastienne Salla)
In this chapter, the drivers of the rise of the informal sector in devel oping 
countries, in particular in Africa, are assessed. This is mainly done by com-
paring the most important drivers featured in the literature and the ones 
derived from our own survey data and observations from the field. The 
chapter then uses industry case studies to understand the informal sector, 
featuring both competitive and cooperative interactions between formal 
and informal firms. The patterns of interaction between formal and infor-
mal firms are complex, encompassing both cooperation and competition, 
with important effects on firm performance. Sectors where competition 
between formal and informal firms dominates include gasoline, used cars, 
and clothes. In prepaid cell phone cards, garbage collection, and urban 
transport (moto-taxis and minivans), however, the informal sector mostly 
serves market segments that the formal sector neglects. The chapter begins 
with a review of the literature on the underlying causes of the informal sec-
tor and the nature of formal/informal firm interactions. The chapter then 
summarizes some common features of the  organization and functioning 
of informal value chains, illustrating them with examples from the case 
studies. The operation of each of the case studies is then described briefly. 
These discussions use specific examples that reveal the causes and conse-
quences of the informal sector. An ambiguous view of the informal sector 
emerges. On the positive side, the informal sector is a source of income and 
employment and a provider of inexpensive consumer goods and services 
to households with limited means. On the negative side, informal sector 
workers have low wages, no job security, and little or no access to official 
social insurance programs; further, the goods and services supplied by the 
informal sector are often of low quality and even dangerous.
Chapter 4. The Informal Sector in Francophone Africa: Dominant 
Characteristics, Scope, and Trends from Our Survey Data (Jean-Jacques 
Ekomié, Fatou Gueye, Dominique Haughton, Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, and 
Ibrahima Tall)
This chapter uses original survey data to assess some of the same 
issues raised in Chapter 3. The survey findings from the six major cities 
covered by the study show that the characteristics and operation of busi-
nesses differ between formal, large informal, and small informal firms. 
Large informal firms were found to generally have intermediate features 
between those of the other two groups. The chapter presents detailed 
information on the three categories of firms, including the gender of 
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managers and employees, access to finance, perceptions of the busi-
ness environment, use of new technologies, membership in professional 
 organizations, and more. The chapter also continues the investigation 
begun in the previous chapter on the complex relationship between for-
mal and informal firms in Francophone Africa, and how institutions, in 
particular the business environment, are critical in explaining the rise of 
the informal sector in Africa.
Chapter 5. Characteristics and Consequences of Informality: African 
Firms in Comparative Perspective (Dominique Haughton, Jonathan 
Haughton, and Ahmadou Aly Mbaye)
This chapter compares formal and informal firms in Francophone 
Africa with firms in other African countries and other developing 
countries, using data from World Bank ICA Surveys. The definition of 
informal firms differs from that in Chapter 4 due to limited data avail-
ability in the ICA surveys. Informal firms are defined by their size and 
access to credit, unlike the focus on a broader set of characteristics in 
the previous chapter. Furthermore, since the ICA surveys do not include 
many microenterprises, the size threshold for informality is higher in this 
chapter than the previous one. Informal firms as defined here have lower 
value added per worker and lower wages, confirming the findings from 
our surveys reported in Chapters 4, 6, and 9. On the other hand, informal 
firms do as well as, if not better than, formal firms in terms of growth. 
This relatively favourable finding reflects the fact that informal firms, as 
defined in this chapter, are larger than those in Chapter 4. Barriers to 
growth are analyzed for formal and informal firms. The findings that 
electricity, access to finance, and taxation are among the most severe 
obstacles businesses face are largely consistent with the findings of the 
previous chapter.
Chapter 6. The Failure of Structural Transformation in Francophone 
Africa and the Rise of the Informal Sector (Nancy Claire Benjamin and 
Ahmadou Aly Mbaye)
In many developing countries, rapid economic growth and poverty 
reduction have been the result of successful structural transformation—
the shift of resources and production from low to higher productivity 
sectors, mainly agriculture to manufacturing. In sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), the much-improved growth performance over the last two decades 
has not been accompanied by a corresponding gain in formal employ-
ment and poverty reduction. This reflects the fact that in SSA, much 
of the counterpart of the declining share of output and employment in 
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agriculture is the rise of the urban informal sector. This chapter attempts 
to address the reasons for SSA’s stunted structural transformation. The 
authors argue that formal sector jobs remain limited by high formal sec-
tor wages relative to productivity and an unwelcoming business climate, 
and rent-seeking. The chapter draws attention to policies that concen-
trate rents into a small number of hands and high factor costs for formal 
firms that reduce the incentives for modern, international firms to pro-
vide an engine of modernization for the informal economy.
Chapter 7. The Role of Labour Market Regulation in Deterring Formal 
Employment, with a Focus on Senegal (Stephen S. Golub, Ahmadou Aly 
Mbaye, and Hanyu Chwe)
The nature and consequences of labour market regulations in Africa, 
using both qualitative and quantitative methods, are analyzed in this 
chapter. We show that labour market regulations are very restrictive in 
many Francophone African countries. However, a number of studies, 
including Chapter 5, find that labour market regulations are not viewed 
as one of the most significant obstacles to business in Africa. The implica-
tions of labour market regulations for employment creation and worker 
well-being in formal and informal sectors are probed further through a 
case study of Senegal, which has one of the most highly regulated labour 
markets in the world. Our interviews reveal that firm managers do view 
these labour market regulations as a significant barrier to raising formal 
sector employment in Senegal, even if they are perceived as less burden-
some to business than others such as access to finance and electricity 
supply, consistent with the findings of Chapter 5.
Chapter 8. What Policies Can Support Small Informal Businesses in 
Africa? (Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Félix Zogning, and Fatou Gueye)
This chapter examines policy reforms to enhance the informal sector’s 
role in economic development, focusing on assistance to entrepreneur-
ship, especially for micro-, nano-, and household enterprises which 
constitute the bulk of informal firms and jobs. It further describes how 
some aspects of the business environment, such as access to financing, 
training, and business regulations, are particularly failing small informal 
enterprises. The role of technical assistance, professional organizations, 
and institutional structures, such as business incubators and accelerators, 
are explained. The chapter provides examples of successful  government 
programs, discussing the lessons learned and their applicability to 
countries in Africa. The role of the Francophone legal system OHADA 
(Organisation pour l’Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique) in 
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shaping institutional structures and laws toward the informal sector is 
also covered.
Part II. The Informal Sector in Central Africa, with a Focus on 
Cameroon
Part II analyzes some of the issues concerning the informal sector in 
Central Africa, and in particular the case of Cameroon, an important 
country in the region. The topics addressed include productivity of firms, 
the cross-border dimensions of informality, the effects of road infrastruc-
ture on trade, and the role of gender.
Chapter 9. The Informal Sector in Cameroon: Practices and Productivity 
(Nancy Claire Benjamin, Fatou Gueye, Dominique Haughton, Ahmadou 
Aly Mbaye, Romain Tchacouté, and Joël Maturin Tinga Yepdo)
This chapter examines the statistical relationships between produc-
tivity and the characteristics of various categories of firms in Cameroon 
using data from our firm surveys. The results indicate that, in Cameroon, 
productivity is higher among large informal firms than among small 
informal firms, and it rises with the degree of formality along the contin-
uum, like in West Africa. The connection between productivity and 
various firm characteristics is investigated using parametric and non- 
parametric approaches. The statistical and econometric analysis supports 
the survey findings that productivity is highest among formal firms and 
lowest among small informal firms, even after controlling for other firm 
characteristics, although the differences are much smaller than what has 
been found for West Africa.
Chapter 10. Cameroon’s Informal Cross-Border Trade (Stephen S. Golub 
and Georges Kobou)
This chapter discusses Cameroon’s informal cross-border trade with 
its five neighbouring countries, with particular attention to Nigeria, 
the largest economy in the region. Using original data  collection, on-
site interviews, and secondary sources, the chapter documents the 
 organization, magnitude, and composition of cross-border trade. 
Differential import taxes and subsidies are important determinants of the 
pattern of informal trade between Cameroon and its neighbours, similar 
to informal trade in other countries. The role of kinship groups, partic-
ularly the Igbo, the Bamiléké, and the Fulani-Haussa, in cross- border 
trade is also highlighted. The chapter provides historical background 
on these groups, their social organization, and modes of trading. These 
factors help in explaining the smuggling of rice from Cameroon into 
Nigeria and of petroleum products from Nigeria to Cameroon.
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Chapter 11. Road Infrastructure, Corruption, and Cross-Border Trade: 
The Case of the Mamfe-Ekok Road Linking Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Stephen S. Golub, Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Dominique Sébastienne Salla, 
and Marina Tsikouras)
This chapter studies the effects of a road improvement project in the 
North-West region of Cameroon connecting Cameroon to Nigeria. The 
road from Mamfe to Ekok is a well-known major corridor for formal and 
informal trade between Cameroon and Nigeria, but, until recently, trade 
was hampered by the poor condition of the road, particularly in the rainy 
season. The recently refurbished road has substantially lowered transport 
costs and travel times and thus boosted trade. Unexpectedly, however, 
the growth in trade has been dampened by the emergence of additional 
checkpoints manned by customs officials, police, and other government 
agencies. These checkpoints are de facto pretexts for demanding bribes 
from traders. Our interviews suggest that traders switched to alternative 
routes with higher transport costs to avoid paying bribes. The chapter 
proposes the hypothesis that the additional roadblocks are the result of 
the government exploiting the lower transport costs to extract additional 
rents from traders, in effect deterring traders from formalizing. This 
finding highlights an important policy conclusion that improvements in 
physical infrastructure, such as roads, have limited effects in boosting 
formal trade if social infrastructure is weak and corruption is pervasive, 
illustrating the importance of the institutional environment stressed in 
Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Chapter 12. Gender and the Labour Market in Cameroon (Jacques 
Charmes and Rosalie Njonkam)
Although sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has one of the highest rates 
of female participation in the labour market in the world, women’s 
economic contributions are largely underestimated as their activities 
are often informal. In this chapter, the contribution of women to the 
labour market in Cameroon, in both the formal and informal sectors, 
is closely examined using various labour market, household, and firm 
surveys. The chapter finds that Cameroon is fairly typical of SSA in 
terms of a relatively high female labour force participation rate as well 
as high gender gaps in unemployment and underemployment rates. 
There is also a gender gap in entrepreneurship in the sense that female- 
managed enterprises are informal in almost all regards, more so than 
for male-managed firms. These gender disparities thus provide addi-
tional support for the findings in Chapter 4 that informality in Central 
Africa is even more pervasive for women than men, both as workers 
and entrepreneurs.
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Synthesis and Conclusions
As noted above, the book aims to address four issues about the informal 
sector in Francophone Africa: description of its operation, the causes of 
its pervasiveness, its consequences, and policy recommendations that 
flow from the other three.
Key features of the informal sector
Our analysis of survey data and case studies illustrates the heterogene-
ity of informal sector firms. Informality is a continuum rather than a 
binary distinction. We focus much of the analysis on three types of firms: 
formal, large informal, and small informal. Chapters 3 and 4 provide 
detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of the informal sector, using 
case studies and surveys.
The survey results reported in Chapter 4 provide insights on the char-
acteristics and operation of informal firms and how they differ from 
formal firms, regarding the socio-demographic features of managers and 
workers, their perspectives on their business prospects, access to finance, 
use of information and communications technologies, membership in 
professional associations, etc. In general, large informal firms have char-
acteristics that are intermediate between small informal firms and formal 
firms.
There is a particular focus on the gender of the manager in the surveys. 
Women tend to be concentrated in the small informal sector and have 
even more precarious jobs and lower incomes than men in the same sec-
tor (Chapters 4 and 12). Informal firms managed by women tend to be 
smaller and more informal in all regards than those managed by men. 
Yet, female managers are in some respects more resilient and indepen-
dent than their male counterparts. Chapter 12 provides a case study on 
the participation of women in the labour market in Cameroon.
Chapters 3 and 4 provide in-depth analysis of the interactions between 
formal and informal firms. Formal firms often complain, with some jus-
tification, about unfair competition from informal firms, but we show 
that, in many instances, informal firms may serve as subcontractors and 
clients for formal firms to the mutual benefit of both. Chapter 3 provides 
case studies of industries where formal and informal firms are alterna-
tively competitive or complementary and Chapter 4 uses our survey data 
to further assess competition and cooperation between the two types of 
firms.
As in other African countries, the informal sector transcends national 
borders. Chapter 10 discusses Cameroon’s informal cross-border trade 
and in particular the role of kinship groups in organizing this trade.
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Causes of the pervasiveness of informality
A number of hypotheses have been advanced to explain the spread of the 
informal sector. As explained in Chapter 3, these include:
1. Historical traditions. In this view, the informal sector embodies 
traditional pre-modern economic practices at the village level. The 
continuing role that kinship groups play in the informal econo-
mies of Africa is consistent with this view.
2. An unfavourable business environment due to state failures. 
Entrepreneurs assess the costs and benefits of being informal based 
on the business environment. On the benefit side, being informal 
avoids high taxation and cumbersome regulations. The downside 
is loss of access to public services and government contracts as well 
as exposure to crackdowns. Thus, the worse the business climate in 
terms of red tape and poor public services, such as infrastructure 
provision, the greater the incentive to go informal.
3. Trade liberalization and macroeconomic contraction. This view 
asserts that the informal sector is the result of insufficient rather 
than excessive government involvement in the economy. In gen-
eral, this perspective is more favourable toward the efficacy of 
government regulations and import protection than the previ-
ous hypothesis, although both recognize the detrimental effects of 
inadequate public investment in infrastructure.
4. Labour supply-demand imbalance resulting in a paucity of ‘good’ 
jobs. This view is sometimes referred to as the ‘dualist’ approach, 
with an insufficient demand for labour in the ‘modern’ sector to 
absorb underemployed labour in subsistence agriculture and the 
urban informal sector. The reasons for lack of formal employment 
creation may in turn be due to either too much or too little govern-
ment intervention, and thus is a corollary of hypotheses 3 and 4.
The general discussion and case studies in Chapter 3 suggest that the 
rise of the informal sector in Francophone Africa, as in the rest of the 
continent since the 1980s, reflects all of these factors. These countries 
experienced economic crises in the 1980s followed by austerity and trade 
liberalization under the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). These 
programs entailed large-scale reductions in public employment and 
salaries. The 1994 devaluation of the FCFA further lowered living stan-
dards. These SAPs were intended to spur the creation of private sector 
investment and employment, but the growth of formal sector jobs has 
been far too slow to absorb the reductions in public employment and 
the growing labour force, in Francophone Africa as in the rest of SSA. 
In hindsight, it seems clear that trade liberalization without provisions 
14  Mbaye, Golub, and Gueye
for creating alternative sources of employment is an important factor, as 
illustrated by the demise of the cloth and clothing sectors in Francophone 
Africa. In this sense, there is some validity to hypothesis 3.
These economic difficulties spurred the informal sector on both the 
supply and demand sides. The demand for inexpensive consumer goods 
expanded, boosting purchases of items such as used clothes. On the sup-
ply side, the unemployed and new labour market entrants sought out 
new sources of income in the informal sector, in industries such as dis-
tribution of used or artisanally produced goods. Furthermore, the fiscal 
crises entailed the cutback of public services such as urban transport 
and refuse disposal. As illustrated in Chapter 3, informal sector alter-
natives to public services have emerged in the form of moto-taxis and 
minivans for transport, and informal operators are increasingly involved 
in the disposal and recycling of refuse. Many of these informal sector 
activities have low barriers to entry, with little capital or specialized skills 
necessary. This validates hypothesis 4 insofar as the informal sector has 
resulted from economic crises and austerity by absorbing underem-
ployed labour, while also providing inexpensive low-quality products for 
these same workers and their families.
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 10, the continuing role of kinship 
groups in organizing the informal sector, the importance of commerce 
relative to modern industry, and the reliance on financing structures 
such as tontines indicates the influence of traditional business practices, 
and thus supports a role for hypothesis 1.
Most importantly, this book provides evidence for hypothesis 2, 
that the informal sector ultimately results from an unfavourable busi-
ness  climate for formal enterprise, supporting the findings of our earlier 
work in Benjamin and Mbaye (2012). Chapters 4 and 5 provide survey 
 evidence on firms’ negative perceptions on the institutional environ-
ment, using different datasets. Structural transformation in Africa has 
therefore been stunted by policies favouring well-connected firms and 
unions, as explained in Chapter 6. Chapters 7 and 11 focus on specific 
features of the institutional environment impeding formal sector devel-
opment: labour market regulations, infrastructure, and corruption.
Consequences of the informal sector
A general finding in the literature is that informal firms are less pro-
ductive than formal firms, with the implication that informality retards 
growth. Chapters 4 and 9 assess this issue, using differing data sets. Both 
chapters confirm a negative correlation between informality and produc-
tivity, but the results are nuanced. Chapter 5, using the World Bank ICA 
survey data, finds that informal firms tend to have lower productivity 
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than formal firms and pay lower wages, but grow just as fast as for-
mal firms. This could be due to their greater flexibility and evasion of 
regulations. Somewhat similarly, analyzing our survey data with non- 
parametric relational techniques, Chapter 9 finds that the differential 
in productivity between formal and informal sectors is quite small. Our 
results, therefore, suggest that effects of informality by itself on economic 
growth are not strongly negative. This is consistent with the view that 
informality is a symptom of deeper institutional failures rather than the 
underlying cause of lagging economic growth.
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 12 also assess the consequences of the informal 
sector for employment, incomes, and living standards. The case studies 
of Chapter 3 bring out the critical role of the informal sector in providing 
employment of last resort to many people, as well as delivery of inexpen-
sive and convenient goods and services such as used clothes and motor cycle 
taxis. The flexibility and ingenuity of entrepreneurs and consumers in 
adapting to very difficult circumstances is remarkable. At the same time, 
there are serious downsides. Chapters 4, 5, and 12 show that incomes in the 
informal sector are often very low. Furthermore, the jobs offer no security 
and are often dangerous. The products of the informal sector are of low 
quality and there is virtually no regulation ensuring safety and reliability. 
Moreover, the situation of women, both as workers and entrepreneurs, is 
even more precarious than for men, as previously noted.
The informal sector’s evasion of tax and regulatory obligations is 
often thought to entail unfair competition as formal firms must abide by 
regulations, which impede growth of the formal economy. Our studies 
of formal-informal firm interactions in Chapters 3 and 4 certainly con-
firm cases where the informal sector undermines formal production. The 
most dramatic case is distribution of smuggled gasoline from Nigeria into 
Benin and Cameroon that has posed an existential threat to official state 
petroleum distributors. In other cases, however, informal firms serve as 
subcontractors or customers of large formal firms. Street sales of prepaid 
mobile phone cards are a prominent example. Moreover, the informal sec-
tor often fills the gap left by the failures of the formal economy, such as 
public transport and garbage disposal.
Policy implications
The starting point for policy toward the informal sector is to recognize 
its diversity, and especially the distinction between large and small infor-
mal firms. Large informal firms could quite easily formalize, but choose 
not to do so. Whereas small informal firms are often barely able to sur-
vive yet provide employment of last resort for many people. Thus, policy 
should be differentiated between large and small firms, with the former 
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being sanctioned if they evade their tax and regulatory obligations, while 
the latter should be assisted. Too often African governments seek to 
tax small firms rather than assisting them, while politically connected 
large informal operators benefit from favourable treatment and evade 
tax and social obligations with impunity. The extent to which govern-
ments should sanction and formalize informal firms versus assisting 
these firms to increase their contributions to employment and income 
while remaining informal is fundamentally debated. The heterogeneity 
of informal firms suggests that policy should be flexible and be adapted 
to firm- specific features, particularly firm size.
Chapter 8 provides an assessment of programs to assist small infor-
mal firms. Business incubator and accelerator programs, whereby the 
government, NGOs, or donors bring together a number of small firms 
to provide coaching and various types of support, have proven effective 
in developed countries. While data is lacking on their effectiveness in 
Africa, there is reason to believe they can be even more beneficial due 
to the severe constraints facing entrepreneurs. Professional associations 
can also play a larger role in gathering information about the small infor-
mal sector and coordinating assistance programs. Chapter 8 illustrates 
the successful implementation of such initiatives in Morocco. African 
governments should work with the private sector in their countries to 
explore and implement such measures.
The first priority for governments should be to continue to improve 
the business climate. This will benefit formal and informal firms alike, 
and gradually induce some of the latter to formalize. Francophone 
African countries have unusually stringent labour market regulations, as 
shown in Chapter 7. These regulations contribute to high unit labour 
costs, which discourage formal hiring in manufacturing and thus blocks 
structural transformation, as explained in Chapter 6. Lack of infrastruc-
ture and corruption are also well-known problems. The interaction of 
governance and infrastructure provision is highlighted in Chapter 11, 
where a new road linking Cameroon to the Nigerian border had the 
unintended effect of boosting the number of checkpoints and bribes col-
lected from traders by government officials.
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Introduction
The informal sector can be defined and categorized in a variety of ways. 
Economic literature provides different definitions of informality, as 
economists have different understandings of the term. The only con-
sensus that we as economists have reached on informality is a lack of 
consensus. As Fields (2011, p. 1) puts it:
Quite remarkably and unaccustomedly for our profession, the 
widespread discussion about informality is proceeding without 
an agreed-upon definition of the term. Even more astonishingly, 
the field seems to have reached agreement that informality means 
different things to different people. Empirical studies show only 
a limited degree of overlap between those workers classified as 
informal according to the various definitions.
Due to the variety of criteria used to measure informality, theoretical 
and empirical studies use different definitions of the concept. As Kanbur 
(2009) notes, economists analyzing the informal sector must start by stat-
ing what their definition is. This lack of consensus on the definition of 
informality is not without consequences. Very little data on the informal 
sector is comparable over time and location, and very few conclusions 
obtained from analyses of the informal sector can be generalized to apply 
to all circumstances in which this phenomenon occurs (Gasparini and 
Tornarolli 2007).
Even international organizations continue to use differing con-
cepts and definitions of the informal sector. The International Labour 
Organization (ILO), focusing on the labour market, emphasizes house-
hold and own-account enterprises (ILO 2013). Some International 
1 Dominique Haughton provided the non-parametric test results presented in the chapter.
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Monetary Fund (IMF) studies, to the contrary, exclude household 
enterprises, focusing instead on the ‘shadow’ economy, i.e., unreported 
economic activities intended to avoid regulatory oversight (Medina 
and Schneider 2018). The 2017 IMF African Economic Outlook (AfDB, 
OECD, and UNDP 2017, p. 49), acknowledging the variety of alternative 
approaches to defining informality, used two main characterizations of 
the informal sector:
(1) household enterprises that have some production at market 
value but are not registered and (2) more broadly, underground 
production, where productive activities may be concealed from 
the authorities to avoid compliance with regulations or the pay-
ment of taxes, or are simply illegal.
Furthermore, economists increasingly recognize the heterogeneous 
nature of informality and the importance of using multiple criteria to 
define it (Fu et al. 2017; Charmes 1993; Grimm, Knorringa, and Lay 2012; 
Henley et al. 2006; Steel and Snodgrass 2008; Benjamin and Mbaye 2012, 
2014). Steel and Snodgrass (2008) thus conclude, “[T]here is a contin-
uum of different degrees of formality in terms of different characteristics 
such as nature of registration, payment of taxes, management structure, 
contractual arrangements with employees, market orientation, etc.” Fu 
et al. (2017, p. 3) add “… a consensus has emerged on the fact that there 
are degrees of formality and informality along a continuum rather than 
mutually distinct sectors… Therefore, using a single indicator is likely to 
capture only partially the formal character of the firm.”
Chen (2012) has developed a multi-criteria model of informal 
employment based on a classification of status in employment, with 
six categories: informal employers, informal employees, own account 
operators, casual wage workers, industrial outworkers or subcontracted 
workers, and unpaid but contributing family workers. Chen (2018) notes 
that informal employment in formal firms is increasingly included in 
measures of overall informal employment.
If the analytical approaches to informality are divergent, the criteria 
used to measure it are even more so. Heintz (2012) and Benjamin and 
Mbaye (2012, 2014) have identified the most common criteria used to 
define the informal sector. In his review of criteria defining informal-
ity, Heintz (2012) argues that the most important criteria are size, which 
is meant to capture the scale of operations; registration status or recog-
nition by a government agency, which is meant to indicate whether 
the enterprise would be subject to government regulation; employer/
enterprise social-security contributions; legal form of the organization; 
and character (sincerity) of financial accounts. Similarly, Benjamin 
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and Mbaye (2012, 2014) select workplace mobility, access to finance, 
non-payment of taxes, and the applicable tax regime as additional char-
acteristics for identifying informal activities in Francophone African 
countries. Grabrucker et al. (2018), likewise recognizing the impor-
tance of multiple criteria in defining informality, use size, registration, 
payment of taxes, ease of entry, and use of traditional and/or labour- 
intensive technologies, overlapping substantially with Benjamin and 
Mbaye (2012, 2014).
Henley et al. (2006) investigate the congruence between their three 
definitions of informality based on employment-contract registration, 
social security protection, and the characteristics of the employer and 
employment using Brazilian household-survey data for 1992–2001. They 
find very little overlap between firms classified as informal using differ-
ent criteria.
The definition of informality can shape the findings of empirical analy-
ses of the effects of informality. For example, an important question 
concerns the effects of informality on productivity. Benjamin and Mbaye 
(2012), using multiple criteria of informality, find that large informal 
firms are more productive than smaller informal firms in Francophone 
West Africa. On the other hand, Islam and Amin (2015), measur-
ing informality by registration alone, find that smaller firms are more 
productive. Chapter 9 of this book, using a similar definition to Benjamin 
and Mbaye (2012), confirms that in Cameroon formal firms have higher 
productivity, but with a lesser gap than in West Africa. Chapter 5, using 
a narrower definition of informality than Chapter 9 that is applicable 
to the World Bank Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) database, also 
finds that informal firms are less productive than formal firms in Africa, 
yet have similar growth potential.
Despite the increasing recognition that informality is a matter of 
degree, most empirical analyses of informality remain predominantly 
dichotomous (formal/informal) and classify activities that do not lend 
themselves to the same analytical approaches or do not respond in the 
same way to policy stimulus or regulation under the same umbrella. To 
date, only a few studies (Benjamin and Mbaye 2012; Mbaye et al. 2015; 
Fu et al. 2017) have attempted to implement an empirical methodology 
that fully considers the heterogeneity of informality. McKenzie (2017) 
noted a category of businesses in West Africa with profiles resembling 
formal firms and which could be ‘pushed’ toward formalization.
The rest of this chapter covers the following issues: explanation of the 
main criteria for informality, which forms the basis of our definition of 
informality and our data collection strategy; overview of the tax regimes 
applicable to private enterprises in Francophone Africa; description of 
24  Mbaye and Gueye
our analytical approach to informality and explanation of our data col-
lection strategy; and an overview of the data. The chapter ends with a 
short conclusion.
revisiting the Main Criteria for Defining  
the Informal Sector
As a result of the multiple defining factors for informality, we suggest that 
a composite definition is the most appropriate. We propose seven crite-
ria to define informality: size of the business, registration of the business 
with a local or national government agency, non-payment of tax or the 
tax regime applied to the firm, the keeping of accurate accounts, mobility 
of the workplace, access to bank credit, and social security coverage for 
employees. Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) provide a more detailed review 
of these criteria as well as their limitations. In what follows, we offer a 
brief summary. A notable addition to the list in Benjamin and Mbaye 
(2012) is the criterion of social security coverage provided to employees 
by formal enterprises and not by the informal sector.
Size of the enterprise
The criterion most widely used to define the informal sector is the size 
of the business. Size is alternatively defined as the number of employ-
ees or the level of sales. This criterion is mainly derived from the ILO 
approach (ILO 2002), which defines an informal enterprise as unreg-
istered, owned by an individual or a household with assets inseparable 
from those of the business, and for which no reliable accounts exist. 
It is clear from the United Nations accounting system that only fam-
ily enterprises operating in the household sector fulfill this definition 
(United Nations 2013).
The rationale underlying the size criterion is that small-scale activi-
ties tend to be informal because their operators lack the institutional and 
organizational capacity to obtain the accounting and financial documents 
required by tax authorities, the national statistical agency, and other gov-
ernment agencies. It should be noted that empirically even analyses that 
do not consider size as a defining criterion observe a strong correlation 
between size and informality. The problem with this criterion is that some 
businesses classified as informal are in fact not small. Many informal com-
panies in West Africa are at least as large as some firms in the ‘modern’ 
sector. This is what we refer to as ‘large informal businesses’, which, in 
terms of sales, are similar to their formal counterparts (Mbaye et al. 2014). 
Conversely, some businesses in the formal sector are small (as measured by 
the number of employees). This is the case for law firms, notaries, customs 
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brokers, etc. Therefore, the size criterion cannot alone be used to define an 
informal enterprise and must be combined with other criteria.
Registration
Registration with a government agency is another commonly used cri-
terion for defining informality (McKenzie 2017). However, it is unusual 
for enterprises not to be registered with at least one government agency. 
Ultimately, this means that most enterprises, even informal ones, are reg-
istered somewhere (Mbaye et al. 2015), either with the tax authority, the 
ministry of commerce, or another central administration. Very few busi-
nesses that are classified as informal according to most of the definitions 
used in the literature do not have an expressed recognition of some kind 
with a given administration (Fox and Sohnesen 2012). Consequently, 
the criterion of absence of official recognition is of limited use in many 
countries because, even though they are not always registered at the cen-
tral level, informal enterprises are often registered with the municipalities 
where they also pay indirect taxes.
Taxation
As discussed in more detail below, there are two types of fiscal regimes in the 
OHADA region,2 which includes both the countries of the Union Économique 
et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) and those of the Communauté 
Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC). These systems 
are the ordinary corporate income tax and the lump-sum presumptive tax. 
Firms with annual sales amounting to around 100 000 USD are subject to 
the former, while those that fall short of this threshold pay the presumptive 
tax. Thus, the latter targets small informal enterprises, which are considered 
unable to provide detailed documentation and precise estimates of income. 
In practice, however, many small businesses do not pay direct taxes and, in 
the majority of cases, they are not registered with the tax authorities at all. 
Conversely, some large informal enterprises with sales well above the thresh-
old significantly under-report their income and pay the presumptive tax. As 
a result, the key distinction to be made in these countries is not whether com-
panies are registered with the tax authorities, but under which tax regime 
they operate and whether or not they pay their taxes.
Reliable accounting
The majority of informal enterprises do not maintain regular and 
 up-to-date accounts that give an accurate picture of their operations, 
2Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, a legal system applied in all 
Francophone African countries. See Chapter 8 for further discussion.
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which makes monitoring and taxing these enterprises particularly diffi-
cult (INS Cameroun 2011). The criteria for accurate financial statements 
follow the same underlying principles as those for regular business 
income taxation. Indeed, only companies able to provide reliable finan-
cial statements are taxed under that scheme. Many other enterprises 
operate under the presumptive lump-sum regime, even though they are 
clearly identified by the tax authorities as large enough to pay the regu-
lar income tax. The problem with this criterion is that it is difficult to 
establish the veracity of the financial statements produced by the busi-
nesses. In practice, many companies, especially the large informal ones, 
are adept at producing misleading financial statements.
Mobility of the workplace
Many informal activities are characterized by the lack of a fixed workplace. 
This includes street vendors, hawkers, etc. as well as small mechanics, 
carpenters, metal workers, and anyone engaged in petty trades. They 
generally do not have their own premises, nor do they rent their work-
space. Instead, they occupy unused properties and are displaced as soon 
as the owners need the space. It is for this reason that some researchers 
conflate the informal sector with a precarious or mobile workplace and 
even go so far as to use this criterion to define informality. In our view, 
although it is appropriate to classify most itinerant activities as informal, 
it is nonetheless true that many other informal activities are conducted 
in fixed workplaces. Therefore, this criterion only identifies part of the 
informal sector.
Access to bank credit
Low access to bank loans is also a distinctive feature of the informal 
economy. This is because banks require certain financial and adminis-
trative documents before examining loan applications. As it is difficult 
for those involved in the informal sector to obtain these documents, it 
is almost impossible for them to obtain a bank loan. However, in Africa, 
many companies, even formal ones, are excluded from formal bank credit 
for other reasons (Diop et al. 2011). Therefore, the criterion of access to 
bank credit is not sufficiently discriminating to identify informality.
Social security coverage of employees
This criterion is certainly the one most frequently used to determine 
the status of employment (Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur 2006). It 
was not included in Benjamin and Mbaye (2012); our unit of analy-
sis was the business rather than the employee. We have decided to 
include this factor in the present study for two main reasons. First, in 
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this study, to a greater extent than in its predecessor, we consider the 
informal employee in parallel with the informal enterprise. Second, we 
believe that the integration of this factor could significantly improve 
our grasp of the informal sector. However, care should be taken not to 
infer the formal status of the firm from this criterion, as a large propor-
tion of people working in formal firms work under informal conditions 
as noted in Chapter 7.
Our approach to Defining Informality
The previous discussion suggests that businesses should be classified as 
formal or informal according to a diverse array of criteria. Data collected 
in Francophone African countries and presented in Chapter 2 confirms 
this point and reveals that none of the criteria used to define informal-
ity appear to subsume the others. For example, in Libreville, about 70% 
of the companies surveyed keep regular accounts, while only about 30% 
 operate a social security plan for their employees. In other words, only 
30% of the firms in Libreville would be classified as informal according 
to the criterion of account keeping; however, 70% of the surveyed com-
panies would be informal by the social security criterion. Similarly, the 
portion of firms in Cotonou (Benin) considered informal would be 47% 
according to the size criterion (ILO 2002), but this drops to 35% accord-
ing to the criterion of failing to keep accounts. This is also true in Burkina 
Faso, where informal companies account for 70% of the total based on 
the size criterion, while this proportion is reduced to 28% according to 
the criterion of failing to keep accounts.
Acknowledging the difficulty in defining informality based on a single 
criterion, national statistical institutes in Africa increasingly combine 
two to three criteria to determine the formal or informal status of enter-
prises. While an improvement, limiting the number of criteria to two or 
three still does not do justice to the complexity of the informal sector.
Using a single or small number of criteria has several disadvantages. 
First, if the criteria change, the resulting classifications change too, and 
a robust measure of informality cannot be obtained. Second, the selec-
tion of the criteria used to make these classifications is usually arbitrary. 
Third, this process obscures the heterogeneous nature of the informal 
sector, which includes participants with very different characteristics and 
modes of operation.
Some empirical studies have implemented a multi-criteria approach 
to defining informality based on Benjamin and Mbaye (2012, 2014). For 
example, Fu et al. (2017), using such an approach, found that informal 
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firms differ from formal firms in several respects, including productivity, 
innovation, firm age, and entrepreneurial skills. The World Bank (2019) 
applies the Benjamin and Mbaye (2012, 2014) approach to studying 
employment patterns in Africa.
Our approach to the informal sector involves several stages. First, we 
divide the companies in our sample into eight groups according to the 
number of the seven listed criteria that they fulfill.
The informality criteria described in the preceding section are sum-
marized as follows:
•	 Criterion 1: The business employs fewer than five people. This crite-
rion captures the size of firms, with fewer than five employees being 
characteristic of small enterprises. This can be further broken down 
to several levels: own-account workers are those with one employee 
(the owner), nano-enterprises are those with two to three employ-
ees, and small enterprises are those with four to five employees.
•	 Criterion 2: The business is not registered with any public authority. 
Several modalities of registration are considered: registration with 
tax authority, registration with the department of commerce, and 
registration as importer/exporter.
•	 Criterion 3: The company does not pay any tax or is not taxed on the 
basis of its actual revenue. This criterion encompasses the following 
modalities: the firm is subjected to presumptive tax, the firm pays 
no direct taxes, or the firm pays no municipal taxes.
•	 Criterion 4: The company does not maintain regular, accurate 
accounts and financial statements. There are no certified statements, 
no annual accounts, and no registry of revenue or expenditure.
•	 Criterion 5: The company does not operate from fixed business 
premises. It uses a vehicle such as a car, a bicycle, or a motorcycle; 
uses a public space; is itinerant, or uses the operator’s home as the 
work premise.
•	 Criterion 6: The company has not received a bank or microfinance 
loan within the last five years.
•	 Criterion 7: The company has not registered its employees with a 
social security scheme. It does not provide health coverage, a retire-
ment plan, or industrial accident coverage.
Using these seven criteria, we define a business’s level of informality 
according to the number of criteria it fulfills. We distinguish eight levels 
of informality. Totally formal firms, which meet none of the criteria, are 
classified Level 0. For every criterion fulfilled, the business rises in level 
of informality. For example, businesses meeting three of these criteria 
are classified as Level 3. Those meeting all seven are classified as Level 7 
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table 2.1
Scoring informality based on the seven criteria
Criteria of informality Weights Scores
Criterion 1: The business employs fewer than five people  1/7
1 employee (the owner) 1/4 1/7*1/4
2 employees 1/4 1/7*1/4
3 employees 1/4 1/7*1/4
4 employees 1/4 1/7*1/4
Criterion 2: The business is not registered with any public authority  1/7
No tax identification number 1/4 1/7*1/4
Not in commerce department registry 1/4 1/7*1/4
No official professional affiliation 1/4 1/7*1/4
Not in municipal registry 1/4 1/7*1/4
Criterion 3: The company does not pay any tax or is not taxed on an 
actual-revenue basis
 1/7
Pays presumptive tax 1/3 1/7*1/3
Does not pay any direct taxes 1/3 1/7*1/3
Does not pay any local taxes 1/3 1/7*1/3
Criterion 4: The company does not maintain regular accurate accounts and 
financial statements
 1/7
Does not have certified financial statements 1/3 1/7*1/3
Does not have any annual statements 1/3 1/7*1/3
Does not have any register of revenue or expenditure 1/3 1/7*1/3
Criterion 5: The company does not operate from fixed business premises  1/7
Uses a vehicle (car, bicycle, motorcycle, etc.) 1/4 1/7*1/4
Public place 1/4 1/7*1/4
Itinerant 1/4 1/7*1/4
Home 1/4 1/7*1/4
Criterion 6: The company has not received a bank loan within the last five 
years
1/7
No loans from banks 1/2 1/7*1/2
No loans from microfinance 1/2 1/7*1/2
Criterion 7: The company has not registered its employees with a social 
security scheme
1/7
No health coverage 1/3 1/7*1/3
No retirement coverage 1/3 1/7*1/3
No industrial accident coverage 1/3 1/7*1/3
Total 1 1
Source: Authors
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and are considered totally informal. In a second step, we assign formal-
ity/informality scores to individual businesses so that they can be ranked 
on a zero to one scale, assigning equal weight to each criterion (i.e., 1/7 = 
approximately 0.1428). The higher the score, the more informal the firm. 
A score of 0 would mean formality, while a score of 1 would indicate total 
informality. In between, there are varying levels of informality.
In much of the subsequent analysis in this book, we aggregate firms 
into three major groups: formal, large informal, and small informal 
firms. The coexistence of small and large informal enterprises is one 
of the defining characteristics of the West African and Central African 
informal sector. Large informal enterprises are comparable in size to 
those of the modern sector, but they behave informally in other respects. 
They meet most of the criteria for formality except that their accounts 
are inaccurate and deliberately misleading. Additionally, their organiza-
tional structure is more akin to a small informal firm than a formal firm.
Table 2.2 matches the seven criteria to the three types of firms. Formal 
firms are defined as those that satisfy all the criteria of formality described 
above except sometimes for size and access to bank credit, as occasion-
ally formal firms can be very small and many formal firms do not have 
access to bank credit in Africa, given the dysfunctionality of the financial 
system. All other firms are defined as informal. The firms that we classify 
as small informal exhibit characteristics that are quite similar to those 
obtained from surveys of informality using the dichotomous approach, 
such as the 123 Surveys. However, some of these firms have substan-
tial sales. We define large informal firms are those with estimated sales 
greater than 50–100 million FCFA (about 100 000 to 200 000 USD) that 
still pay the presumptive lump-sum tax. These larger informal firms tend 
to satisfy fewer of the informality criteria.
Most of these criteria are widely used to define informality in devel-
oping countries, particularly size of business, registration, and social 
table 2.2
Criteria of informality satisfied by the three categories of firms
Criteria Formal Large informal Small informal
Less than 5 Employees Very Rarely Yes Yes
Non-Registration No Sometimes Sometimes
Lump-Sum Tax Regime No Yes Yes
Lack of Accounts No Almost never Yes
Lack of Fixed Workplace No Usually not Usually
No Access to Bank Credit Sometimes Sometimes Yes
No Social Security Coverage No Sometimes Yes
Source: Authors’ surveys
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security coverage. Our use of accounting, mobility of the workplace, 
and access to credit are not as widely used but important in defining the 
informal sector. In addition, in Francophone Africa, there is a particular 
tax regime that is key to shaping the informal sector, the lump-sum tax 
regime mentioned above. The tax regime is also central to our empiri-
cal definition of the large informal sector. In the following section, we 
describe this regime in greater detail.
Overview of the Business tax regime in Francophone 
africa: Specific cases of Cameroon and Gabon
As mentioned above, there are two main tax regimes that apply to busi-
nesses in Francophone Africa: the regular business income tax system 
and the presumptive lump-sum tax regime. The regular business tax 
regime is contingent on the availability of reliable financial statements 
that enable taxation assessment based on objectively verifiable documents 
such as systematic accounting and financial statements. This regime also 
imposes certain obligations on eligible companies. Furthermore, within 
the regular business tax regime, the largest enterprises must present more 
detailed financial statements than smaller ones. In particular, large enter-
prises have to provide a Tableau Financier des Ressources et des Emplois 
(TAFIRE) statement providing details on accounts and employees for 
the year in question. Moreover, in almost all Francophone countries, 
there is a separate division within the tax office exclusively responsible 
for processing the documentation for these large companies.
In the regular business tax regime, both for ordinary and large com-
panies, credible financial statements are required for tax assessment in 
contrast to the presumptive tax regime applied to informal firms. The 
presumptive tax regime is based on the assumption that eligible com-
panies do not have the institutional and organizational capacity to 
prepare reliable financial statements that can be used as a basis for tax 
assessment. The businesses concerned are therefore only required to 
keep a ledger summarizing receipts and expenditure. They are taxed on 
a lump-sum basis, in which a single payment discharges all tax liabilities, 
based more on the assumed level of their activities than on objectively 
verifiable accounting data.
It should be noted that although this dual fiscal system exists in all 
members of OHADA, there are significant variations, particularly 
the eligibility thresholds for regular business tax regimes (République 
Gabonaise 2013). The cases of Cameroon and Gabon illustrate, in more 
detail, the functioning of fiscal and customs activities in the Francophone 
area, each with its own nuances and idiosyncrasies.
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In Cameroon, the companies under the regular business income tax 
regime generate at least 90% of the total tax revenue. The taxable amount 
is determined based on the declared annual revenue, which presupposes 
that the respective company maintains regular accounts. The threshold 
for being subject to this regime in Cameroon is 100 million FCFA in 
 pre-tax revenue and 80 million FCFA in Gabon. The large companies 
under this regime with revenue of at least three billion FCFA undergo 
more stringent reporting procedures. They must provide the above- 
mentioned TAFIRE to the Large Companies Department (Direction des 
Grandes Entreprises/DGE). The regular business income tax regime also 
covers legal entities, self-employed professionals regardless of their pre-
tax income, and intercity passenger transport operators with either 50 or 
more seats regardless of the number of vehicles, or fewer than 50 seats 
but more than 5 vehicles.
Under the presumptive tax regime, a distinction is often made between 
the withholding, or basic, tax regime for smaller firms and the simplified 
regular business income tax regime. The simplified regime encompasses 
businesses whose sole proprietors have pre-tax revenue within a given 
range. In Cameroon, this range is between 10 and 100 million FCFA, 
while in Gabon it is between 20 and 80 million FCFA. Sole proprietor-
ships with pre-tax revenue below the specified range are subject to the 
lump-sum tax system. These companies are subject to minimum book-
keeping obligations, and, as such, the tax authority estimates the tax 
liability owed at a single rate based on the size of the respective business. 
However, some businesses may be formal regardless of the level of their 
sales, including professions such as lawyers and customs brokers, as well 
as subsidiaries of foreign companies. Those firms must comply with the 
regular business tax regime.
In both Central and West Africa, the proportion of enterprises 
taxed according to the regular business tax regime is relatively low: 
33% in Douala, 27% in Yaounde, and 21% in Libreville. For all other 
companies not subject to the regular business income tax regime, the 
transparency required for the tax authority to effectively determine 
the taxable income of the firm does not really exist. As a result, the 
highest levels of direct tax collection in these countries are obtained 
from the minority of enterprises subject to the regular business 
income tax regime, and especially those subject to the large company 
regime.
In Francophone Africa, informal enterprises avoid paying the numer-
ous taxes imposed on formal enterprises. The latter are subject to 
various forms of taxes and levies, beyond the regular business income tax 
described above, including a wage tax, a tax on fixed assets, a tax on land, 
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a surtax and levies on undeveloped or partially developed land, registra-
tion fees, stamp duties, sales taxes on certain products, special levies on 
motorized vehicles, licensing fees, and many more. Most of these taxes 
are cumulative and can absorb a significant proportion of a formal enter-
prise’s revenue. On the other hand, informal enterprises are ineligible 
for exemptions or deductions that in principle reduce the tax burden on 
formal enterprises. For example, the value-added tax (VAT) on business 
inputs is only deductible for formal enterprises. However, in many cases 
formal firms have difficulty obtaining the tax refunds they are entitled to 
by law.
In addition, to be authorized to clear their products through cus-
toms, importers must be registered with the tax authorities and have 
a tax identification number. In Cameroon, this number is the Numéro 
d’Identification Fiscale (NIF), also referred to as a Taxpayer Number. 
However, a special dispensation enables individuals to import as a group. 
Participants in the informal sector form groups to import in bulk and 
thus frequently benefit from more favourable customs clearance terms. 
In short, there is a clear lack of tax fairness, with the tax burden dispro-
portionately falling on a minority of companies.
Our Sampling Strategy
The surveys were carried out on formal and informal enterprises in six major 
cities of West and Central Francophone Africa: Cotonou, Ouagadougou, 
Dakar, Douala, Yaounde, and Libreville. While our surveys were completed 
only in the capital cities of Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Gabon, we 
considered two cities in Cameroon: Yaounde, the administrative capital of 
Cameroon, and Douala, its business centre. Given the economic importance 
of Douala, we sampled more firms in Douala (60% of the total Cameroon 
sample) than in Yaounde.
The sampling strategy was designed to ensure that all categories of 
enterprises were included. This short explanation supplements the more 
detailed methodological description provided in Benjamin and Mbaye 
(2012) and Mbaye et al. (2014). The surveys were conducted by the 
national statistical agencies under the direction of the research team, as 
described in the Preface.
Table 2.3 shows the size and composition of the sample by type of firm 
in the six cities. For each city, around 200–300 firms were surveyed for 
a total of over 1500. Most of the firms sampled are small informal ones. 
However, the share of informal firms in the sample (about two-thirds) 
is far below the actual share of over 95%. We deliberately oversampled 
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formal and large informal firms to enable comparisons between the three 
types of firms.
Sample frame and sample size
We used censuses of firms and tax directories as the basis for selecting 
firms to be surveyed. We followed different approaches for sampling 
formal and large informal firms than for small informal firms. In the 
case of Cameroon, for example, the surveyed formal and informal enter-
prises are derived from the General Census of Enterprises (Recensement 
Général des Entreprises/RGE) of 2009. The sample for the survey of 
small informal enterprises was selected using the concentration zones 
for commerce, industry, and services identified in the 2009 Survey of 
Employment and the Informal Sector (EESI).
The sample of formal and large informal enterprises is stratified by 
sectors of activity. All the sampled businesses are in three sectors of 
 operation—manufacturing, commerce, and other services— constituting 
the first level stratum. Sub-sectors in each of these three groups formed 
a second level stratum. The share of GDP accounted for by each sub- 
sector was used to assign the sample in each stratum. The sample then 
was drawn separately in each stratum.
For small informal firms, the research teams performed a preliminary 
study in each city to identify zones of concentration of various informal 
activities. Based on this preliminary study, the sample was divided by site. 
In each city, the sample is allocated proportionally to subsectors using 
the sectoral distribution of the informal production units determined 
from the EESI 2 (Deuxième Enquête sur l’Emploi et le Secteur Informel 
au Cameroun). For Gabon, a similar procedure was used, except that the 
tax directory of firms was used as a sample frame for formal and large 
informal firms.
table 2.3
Size and composition of sampled firms in six cities
City Formal Large informal Small informal Total
Dakar 74 50 184 308
Cotonou 68 45 182 295
Ouagadougou 40 33 227 300
Douala 108 18 145 271
Yaounde 61 10  93 164
Libreville 50 19 172 241
Total 401 175 1,003 1,579
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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the Heterogeneity of the Informal Sector: Evidence from 
Our Survey Data
In this section, we illustrate the continuum approach to the informal sec-
tor using our survey data. Subsequent chapters 4, 6, and 9 use the survey 
data to analyze characteristics, causes, and effects of the informal sector 
in the countries under study.
Our results confirm those of Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) and 
Mbaye et al. (2015) on the heterogeneity of the informal sector. 
Table 2.4 shows the extent to which firms satisfy various criteria of 
informality differs considerably by city. It can be observed that the 
majority of firms in most cities are of small size, are subject to lump-
sum taxation, lack access to bank credit, and their employees lack 
social security coverage. On the other hand, in all five cities, more 
than half of firms are registered with at least one government agency. 
However, the extent to which firms have regular financial account-
ing and have a fixed workplace differs considerably between cities. 
Thus, the share of firms classified as informal varies considerably 
depending on the criteria used, illustrating the importance of defin-
ing  informality as a continuum.
Interdependence of Informality Criteria:  a Directed 
acyclic Graph
To better understand these interdependencies among the seven criteria 
defined above, we constructed Figure 2.1, a directed acyclic graph (Pearl 
2009), using the Tetrad IV algorithm (Spirtes et al. 2000). The Tetrad 
table 2.4
Share of firms that satisfy various criteria of informality within each city (percent)
City







Lack of  
Regular  
Accounts
Lack of  
Fixed  
Workplace
Lack of  
Access to  
Bank Credit




Dakar 68.5 11.7 76.0 33.8 66.5 81.8 66.9
Cotonou 47.1 43.0 77.3 35.6 72.9 71.9 56.9
Ouagadougou 69.7 11.3 86.7 27.7 58.0 76.0 70.7
Douala 57.6 28.4 66.8 32.5 29.5 74.9 59.0
Yaounde 61.6 25.6 72.6 53.0 20.7 78.7 59.8
Libreville 68.9 22.8 79.2 53.1 15.3 90.0 68.5
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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IV methodology begins with the correlation matrix of all seven criteria, 
and initially assumes that any pair of criteria is linked. Links are then 
removed according to the non- significance of tests of zero correlation 
or partial correlation (the latter conditioned on other criteria). Surviving 
links are then oriented based on the details described in Spirtes et al. 
(2000) or on the Tetrad IV Carnegie Mellon website (http://www.phil.
cmu.edu/tetrad/).
It appears from this chart that while some criteria are correlated with 
many others, none of them totally subsumes the others. The criteria on 
‘maintaining honest accounts’ and ‘compliance to tax regulation’ are the 
most connected (with five arrows reaching to or from them). They are 
followed by ‘the social security criterion’ with four arrows. The ‘registra-
tion’ and ‘size’ criteria display three arrows while other criteria display 
fewer. Therefore, classifying firms into formal and informal categories 
is likely to yield different outcomes if any one of these criteria is applied 















A directed acyclic graph of the connection among seven criteria of informality for Cameroon
Source: Authors
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Patterns of Informality: a Latent Class  
Cluster analysis
In order to reveal informality patterns in our sample, we performed a 
cluster analysis of firms on the basis of informality criteria via a latent class 
model, particularly well suited in this case where all criteria are binary 
(yes/no) variables, and came up with four different clusters (Table 2.5). 
Firms in cluster 1 are prototypes of informality, meeting fewer criteria 
of formality than firms in other clusters. Less than a fourth of them hold 
sincere bank accounts, about 5% have received bank loans, 2.6% provide 
some type of social security coverage to their employees, less than 1% are 
subject to the regular business tax regime, and less than 15% have more 
table 2.5
Latent class model (cluster analysis) for Cameroon (proportion)
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Cluster size 0.47 0.26 0.22 0.05
Honest accounts
Yes 0.23 0.99 0.93 0.97
No 0.77 0.01 0.07 0.03
Access to credit
Yes 0.05 0.38 0.24 0.36
No 0.95 0.62 0.76 0.64
Social security
Yes 0.03 0.90 0.35 0.72
No 0.97 0.10 0.65 0.28
Registration
Yes 0.57 1.00 0.99 0.09
No 0.43 0.00 0.01 0.91
Tax status
Regular business 0.01 0.94 0.07 0.00
Lump sum 0.99 0.06 0.93 1.00
Size
Less than 5 employees 0.86 0.22 0.71 0.19
5 employees or more 0.14 0.78 0.29 0.81
Fixity of workplace
Without fixed location 0.55 0.15 0.53 0.87
With fixed location 0.45 0.85 0.47 0.13
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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than five employees. Here also, registration and mobility of workplace do 
not tend to be correlated with other criteria defining informality, since a 
majority of firms in this cluster are registered and only a very few of them 
meet other formality criteria.
Conclusion
Recent research suggests that informality is a matter of degree rather 
than a binary choice. To that end, we have identified seven criteria of 
informality to arrive at a composite definition that reflects the multifac-
eted nature of informal firms. We have implemented this approach to 
informality in detailed surveys carried out in six major cities in West 
and Central Francophone Africa. Furthermore, we focus on three major 
categories of firms—formal, large informal, and small informal—to 
 recognize a crucial feature of the informal sector in this part of the world: 
the existence of large informal enterprises that are comparable in size to 
formal firms yet underreport their income and behave much like infor-
mal firms in other important respects. A non-parametric analysis of our 
survey data shows that none of the criteria subsumes the others. We will 
use the results of these surveys throughout this book.
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CHAPTER 3
Informal Sector Value Chains: Evidence 
from Case Studies
Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Stephen S. Golub, Fatou Gueye, Yves Momo 
Ngapgho, and Dominique Sébastienne Salla
This chapter presents our analysis of informal sector value chains, mainly 
in Dakar (Senegal), Cotonou (Benin), and Douala (Cameroon), based on 
interviews and field research carried out in these cities as well as review of 
secondary literature. This qualitative analysis is augmented by quantitative 
analysis of survey data in the following chapter. The chapter begins with 
a review of the literature on the underlying reasons for the emergence of 
the urban informal sector and its key characteristics to provide a broader 
historical and institutional context for the case studies. We then turn to an 
overview of our findings on the structure and common features of informal 
sector value chains, and illustrate the ways in which they reflect the deeper 
forces underpinning the growth of the informal sector. Next, we split the 
case studies into three groups: those where the relations between the formal 
and informal sectors are primarily competitive, those where cooperation 
between informal and formal operators predominate, and intermediate 
cases where there are aspects of both competition and complementarity. 
The cases of competition include imports and distribution of gasoline, used 
cars, and used clothes. The cases of collaboration include refuse disposal, 
information technology services, mobile phone cards, and real estate. Both 
competition and complementarity are prevalent in urban transport (moto-
taxis and minivans) and fabric distribution. We use the case studies to 
describe the complex relationships between formal and informal firms and 
evaluate the positive and negative consequences of informality at a micro 
level. The conclusion provides an overall assessment of the causes and con-
sequences of the development of urban informal value chains.
Drivers of Informal Sector Activity
The pervasiveness of the informal sector in Africa is beyond dispute 
and well documented as noted in Chapter 1. The relative importance 
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of the drivers of informality is much debated, however. There are sev-
eral alternative perspectives that can be classified in various ways (Chen 
2018; Collins 2015; Schneider 2002; Matsongoni and Mutambara 2018). 
Chen (2018) refers to four schools of thought: dualist, structuralist, 
 legalist, and voluntarist. Matsongoni and Mutambara (2018) expand 
Chen’s list to seven, essentially by sub-dividing some of Chen’s four 
categories. Collins (2015) provides a three-part categorization of per-
spectives: modernist, neo-liberal, and political economy. The neo-liberal 
seems to be an amalgam of Chen’s legalist and voluntarist rubrics while 
the political economy perspective seems roughly similar to Chen’s struc-
turalist perspective. Taking these together, we believe that the following 
four hypotheses best capture the alternative views of the above authors 
and others.
1. Historical traditions. This corresponds to Collins’ modernist view-
point. According to this hypothesis, the informal sector embodies 
pre-modern traditional economic practices that existed for centu-
ries and continue to influence contemporary business practices in 
the informal sector.
2. Unfavourable business environment. This subsumes Chen’s legal-
ist and voluntarist views, which ultimately are both based on 
rational choice by businesses considering the constraints they face. 
Entrepreneurs assess the costs and benefits of being informal based 
on the business environment. On the benefit side, being informal 
avoids high taxation and cumbersome regulations interventions. 
The downside is loss of access to public services and government 
contracts as well exposure to crackdowns. Thus, the worse the busi-
ness climate in terms of red tape and poor public services, such as 
infrastructure provision, the greater the incentive to go informal.
3. Excessive liberalization and macroeconomic contraction. This 
view asserts that the informal sector is the result of insufficient 
rather than excessive government involvement in the economy. 
In  general, this perspective is more favourable toward the efficacy 
of government regulations and import protection than the previ-
ous hypothesis, although both recognize the detrimental effects of 
inadequate public investment in infrastructure.
4. Formal labour supply-demand imbalance (sometimes referred to 
the ‘dualist’ approach). This view stresses the gap between grow-
ing labour supply due to demographic factors and slow formal 
employment creation. The reasons for lack of formal employment 
creation may in turn reflect either too much or too little govern-
ment intervention, depending on the authors’ views.
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These four perspectives are not necessary mutually exclusive; in fact, 
they all certainly play a part in the generally accepted narrative below of 
the rise of the informal sector in Africa, although the weight placed on 
various factors can be debated.
The rise of the informal sector in Francophone Africa, as in the rest 
of the continent since the 1980s, reflects similar and generally accepted 
historical evolution. In the first decades after independence, to varying 
degrees, Francophone as well as other African countries had a rudi-
mentary industrial base. However, these local firms were often woefully 
inefficient, producing for the domestic market under high import pro-
tection, and increasingly undermined by smuggling (Golub and Mbaye 
2009). They collapsed with the austerity and market liberalization of 
the structural adjustment era. Most African countries experienced 
economic crises in the 1980s followed by austerity and trade liberali-
zation under Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). These programs 
entailed large-scale reductions in public employment and salaries. The 
1994 devaluation of the FCFA further lowered living standards. These 
SAPs were intended to spur private sector investment and employment, 
but the creation of formal sector jobs has been far too slow to absorb the 
reductions in public employment and the growing labour force. These 
economic difficulties spurred the informal sector on both supply and 
demand sides.
On the supply side, the paucity of formal sector employment oppor-
tunities leads to a relentless search for any income-earning opportunity, 
even if offering low pay and no security or benefits. On the demand side, 
the prevalence of low-income consumers spurs an equally relentless 
search for lower-priced items even if quality is poor, e.g., used clothes, 
used cars, smuggled gasoline, and recycled refuse items.
Furthermore, fiscal crises entailed the cutback of public services such 
as urban transport and refuse disposal. Informal sector alternatives to 
public transport have emerged in the form of moto-taxis and minivans, 
and informal operators are increasingly involved in the disposal and 
recycling of refuse, as our case studies of these sectors illustrate. Many 
of these informal sector activities have low barriers to entry with little 
capital or specialized skills necessary.
What does this story say about the various hypotheses on the rise of 
the informal sector? In hindsight, it seems clear that trade liberaliza-
tion without provisions for creating alternative sources of employment 
(hypothesis 3) played a part, as illustrated by the demise of the cloth and 
clothing sectors in Francophone Africa. Dualism (hypothesis 4) is more 
of a corollary than an independent cause in the sense that the informal 
sector has grown relative to the modern sector in part due to economic 
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crises and austerity and the failure of the private sector to thrive due to 
institutional weaknesses (hypothesis 2).
Hypothesis 1, about the role of business culture and organization, is 
also valid. Our case studies in this chapter, as well as in Chapters 4 and 10, 
note the continuing role of kinship groups in organizing the informal 
sector, the importance of commerce relative to modern industry, and the 
reliance on traditional financing structures such as tontines.
Ultimately, however, this book, along with our previous work in 
Benjamin and Mbaye (2012), suggests that the most critical driver of the 
informal sector is the unfavourable business climate for formal enterprise 
(hypothesis 2). While excessively rapid trade liberalization and fiscal aus-
terity undoubtedly played a role in the decline of formal industry and 
public services throughout Africa, the demise of formal manufacturing 
was also due to the inefficiency of African firms. Lack of competitiveness 
was masked in the first decades of independence by very high protection 
and weakened by smuggling before trade liberalization was instituted 
(Golub and Mbaye 2002, 2009). The failure to develop competitive 
export industries outside of primary commodities is also telling. Formal 
firms that remain in business largely benefit from monopoly power and 
continued protection, e.g., the sugar industry in Senegal (Mbaye, English, 
and Golub 2015). The underlying problem is an adverse business climate 
that does not encourage formal entrepreneurship and investment as 
shown in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11 of this book.
Informal firms largely escape tax obligations, labour market regula-
tions, and other government interventions (Chapter 7; Mbaye and Gueye 
2018). On the other hand, these enterprises are less likely to have access to 
public services (e.g., water, electricity) and are ineligible for value-added 
tax (VAT) deductions (MCC 2017; Perry et al. 2007). There are therefore 
offsetting competitive advantages favouring one set of firms or the other. 
In practice, however, the lower costs associated with tax and regulatory 
avoidance usually outweigh the benefits of access to public services, given 
the burdensome nature of many regulations and the typically low quality 
of public services in African countries. Thus, there are strong incentives 
for firms to opt for informal firm status and for formal firms to stay away 
unless protected from competition.
The theoretical literature in economics provides support for the argu-
ment that informality is a result of rational cost-benefit calculations 
when the investment climate is poor. One significant contribution is 
from Azuma and Grossman (2002). Their model explains informality as 
an outcome of excessive state extraction of revenues from formal firms 
under imperfect information. The government is unable to closely assess 
underlying features such as knowledge, skills, reputation, connections, 
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access to finance, and market power, as well as incomes accruing from 
these assets. Under these assumptions, the state cannot adjust the 
amounts that it extracts from producers in the formal sector according 
to each producer’s ability to pay and thus may sometimes extract too 
much and alter the cost/benefit calculus of formal versus informal sta-
tus for some firms. This is predicated on informal firms avoiding most 
costs associated with taxes, corruption, and bureaucratic hassles but 
being excluded from public services (mainly property rights) and infra-
structure services (roads, sewage, electricity, potable water). Excessive 
rent extraction could also be fostered by short horizons for government 
officials who realize that their time in office is limited (Acemoglu 2003). 
Also, cronyism, characterized by firms with political connections, can 
explain why such firms are less subject to excessive rent extraction than 
firms without political clout. All these considerations are consistent with 
Gelb et al.’s (2009) theory according to which limited state enforcement 
capacity, along with a poor business environment, is a major driver of 
informality.
To test the relative importance of these hypotheses, most authors have 
used macroeconomic approaches, in particular the MIMIC/DYMIMIC 
method (Multiple Indicators –Multiple Causes, DY stands for dynamic). 
This method considers many possible causes of informality along with 
numerous indicators of the informal sector. Collins (2015) is a good 
example. These macroeconomic approaches have some limitations that 
the authors acknowledge, and thus it is not surprising that they have dif-
fering findings (Matsongoni and Mutambara 2018). Our approach is 
instead to use results from our surveys to assess the importance of vari-
ous institutional and social factors.
Empirical analyses using survey data have corroborated the rational 
choice approach to informality. Previous work by some of the authors of 
this chapter has found that a major cause of informality is avoidance of 
onerous regulations and red tape (Mbaye and Gueye 2018). Grimm et al. 
(2012) also find support for the importance of the business environment.
In a related vein, Ali and Najman (2019) provide a good illustration of 
the role of cronyism in explaining the expansion of the informal sector 
in Egypt. They highlight the ample privileges of firms with connections 
to either the army or government officials compared to non-connected 
firms. The differential in terms of trade protection, preferential access 
to finance, energy subsidies, tax advantages, barriers to entry, etc. is 
such that firms without political clout must become informal to survive. 
Furthermore, connected firms are sheltered from competition from the 
informal sector. Using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 
they find that connected firms represent around 11% of the sample 
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total employment. Due to their marginalized status, informal small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) receive little help from the government 
in addressing the constraints they face: lack of access to finance, weak 
management and entrepreneurial skills, poor location and networking, 
poorly defined legal and regulatory framework, and weak technological 
capabilities. Government support agencies for SMEs are underfunded 
and ineffective.
To summarize, institutions, and in turn the business climate, are an 
important driver of the informal sector in developing countries. This 
relates to the important question of whether and how to formalize the 
informal economy. Different observers have different notions of what 
formalization of the informal economy means. To some, it means shift-
ing informal workers to formal wage jobs—but this requires creating 
more formal wage jobs. To others, it means registering and taxing infor-
mal enterprises. Evaluations of such formalization efforts have found 
that they are usually failures (Daniels 1998, 2003). Providing access to 
legal and social protection as well as support services (e.g., skills or busi-
ness training) and improving the overall business climate are critical, as 
discussed in Chapter 8.
Formal/Informal Interactions
In some sectors, as noted in the previous section, the ability of informal 
firms to escape tax and regulatory burdens leads to a playing field that 
is not level in areas where formal and informal firms compete, which is 
almost always in favour of informal firms. In other areas, however, the 
differential regulatory treatment and competitiveness of informal firms 
offers opportunities to cooperate with formal firms. Our case studies 
described below reveal instances of both competition and cooperation 
between formal and informal firms. In this section, we briefly review the 
literature on this topic.
Informal firms often serve as distributors of formal firms’ products or 
source raw materials from formal firms (Mbaye and Gueye 2018; Chen 
2012). These transactions are typically mediated through a “network of 
commercial relationships or a value chain of subcontracted  relationships” 
(Chen 2012). However, the smallest and most marginalized informal 
firms operate largely in isolation from the formal economy.
The scant research on formal and informal firm interactions uses 
standard sources, such as the Afristat-Dial’s 123 databases and the World 
Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys. While there are 
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some questions in these surveys about interactions between formal and 
informal enterprises, they are not specific enough to enable a full analysis 
of these complex relationships. In most cases, the competition that for-
mal firms face from their informal counterparts is common knowledge, 
but many aspects are not fully understood.
No clear conclusions emerge from the literature on the overall effects 
of the interactions between formal and informal firms. Using the results 
from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, González and Lamanna (2007) 
found that competition from the informal sector has negative effects on 
the productivity of the formal sector. Some enterprises appear to be more 
affected than others, depending on firm characteristics and the environ-
ment in which they operate. By contrast, Böhme and Thiele (2014), using 
the 123 databases, found that formal businesses in the countries surveyed 
have backward and forward linkages with informal businesses.
Subcontracting to SMEs is increasingly encouraged in Francophone 
African countries. Many of them have implemented national and 
regional subcontracting exchanges with support from the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, managed directly by the 
private sector, in partnership with the government. These exchanges are 
intended to encourage large enterprises to subcontract smaller enter-
prises, by helping small enterprises meet the quality and punctuality 
requirements of large enterprises. Unfortunately, subcontracting efforts 
have had little success. Limited funding precludes adequate staffing for 
the exchanges, and their scope is restricted to industry, leaving out agri-
culture and services.
Labour regulations are a major impediment to subcontracting in 
Francophone African countries. As discussed in Chapter 7, these 
countries inherited one of the most stringent legislation systems in the 
world from France, with severe restrictions on dismissals, the number 
of temporary contracts permitted, the number of days of paid leave, 
the minimum wage, etc. In principle, the labour law applies to all 
employees. In practice, however, labour regulations are almost never 
applied upon informal employment—the vast majority of the work-
force. For obvious reasons, it is much easier for officials to enforce the 
law upon formal firms than their informal counterparts. The labour 
laws stipulate that subcontracting firms are liable for any violations by 
subcontractors. Thus, a formal firm is exposing itself to risk when it 
engages in a subcontracting relationship with an informal firm that, by 
its nature, does not comply with labour legislation. Clearly, this inhibits 
large formal firms from trying to take advantage of lower labour costs 
by outsourcing to smaller firms.
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The Organization of the Informal Sector Value Chains
Our case studies reveal that sectors involving formal and informal firms 
tend to have some common organizational structures. For goods that 
are imported, there are large importers, wholesalers, semi-wholesalers/
distributors, and retailers of varying size. For services, there is a paral-
lel structure with some large operators contracting smaller distributors. 
There are also specialized agents for particular sectors, such as customs 
clearance agents, brokers, drivers, and mechanics. The players at the 
top of the value chain are often formal or large informal firms, whereas 
retailers are almost always small informal firms.
The relationships between value chain participants are based on trust 
rather than formal contracts. For example, for clothing, when semi-
wholesalers sell to retailers, they mark up the price by 30–100%. But 
when the quality of the clothes is below what was advertised, the retailer 
may be entitled to partial compensation, depending on the relationship 
with the wholesaler, for example whether they are members of the same 
kinship group.
Importers and wholesalers
Large importers and wholesalers can be either government or private, 
formal or informal, with the degree of informality varying. For instance, 
in Cameroon, motorcycles from China are imported by licensed eco-
nomic operators. These companies must meet certain administrative 
requirements, such as maintaining appropriate physical offices, having a 
clearly defined administrative structure, maintaining accurate accounts, 
and registering with the Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale (CNPS) 
[National Social Security Fund], Cameroon’s national social insurance 
fund. They have access to significant capital. In many other cases, informal 
importers and wholesalers epitomize the ‘large informal’ firms described 
in Chapter 2 (i.e., their business structure is quite similar to small firms in 
that it usually revolves around a single person and management practices 
are informal). They underreport sales, pay minimal taxes, and are largely 
unregulated. In the case of smuggled gasoline from Nigeria, wholesalers 
are divided into two categories in Benin and Cameroon. The first group 
serves as agents for powerful government and military officials involved 
in trafficking (Mbaye and Gueye 2015). The second group includes large 
informal wholesalers, who are established mostly in villages and towns 
located on either side of the Nigerian border.
In a related vein, informal importers of used textiles and shoes in 
Cameroon must have an import licence. They import clothes, miscellane-
ous household textile items (tablecloths, sheets, curtains, towels, etc.), bags 
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(school, travel, and sport), and footwear in containers. They are of various 
nationalities, mainly Cameroonian (about 90%) and some Nigerian and 
Malian. Our interviews revealed that the Cameroonians controlling the 
business are overwhelmingly from the Bamiléké ethnic group described in 
Chapter 10. For generations, the Bamiléké have conducted this business 
within families. They generally sell entire containers to wholesalers. Their 
staff include young university graduates who work in modern offices 
in markets or shopping malls. This staff are well-paid and have social 
security coverage. Some of them travel to Europe and North America to 
purchase and package the bales of second-hand items and ship them to 
Cameroon. Wholesalers purchase in large quantities from the import-
ers. They generally pay before the delivery of the goods. They have very 
close relationships with the importers. Some of these wholesalers repack-
age the bales they purchase from the importer. Occasionally, they act as 
importers themselves. Wholesalers have large warehouses in the open-air 
markets, and in the low-income neighbourhoods of Douala. Some of the 
used clothing is resold in neighbouring countries. Like the importers, they 
have modern offices and an educated and well-paid staff.
Semi-wholesalers and distributors
Semi-wholesalers also purchase from importers and wholesalers but on 
a smaller scale, either because of their limited financial resources or their 
lack of connections. They are mostly registered with the tax authorities 
and with the municipality they operate in. However, they do not keep 
proper financial accounts and do not pay regular business income taxes. 
They have small warehouses in all the major open-air markets where 
they sell at the retail stalls. Their employees consist of family members 
(wives, children, and cousins) or others who are close to them. These 
semi-wholesalers have varying levels of education and substantial expe-
rience in the business. Many of them started out as street peddlers, then 
took on lower-level tasks in the stores such as unpacking, and eventually 
became semi-wholesalers.
In the case of used clothing, there is considerable competition 
among wholesalers and semi-wholesalers, so they jockey for posi-
tion to obtain the best products before the containers are unloaded. 
Some even offer to pay in advance of delivery. The goods arrive in a 
wide range of packaging. The value of the products is based on several 
criteria: type of good (single or mixed variety), weight, and quality, 
with a lot of variation. On the other hand, particularly reliable whole-
salers can remit payment after they sell their goods, with only a small 
advance deposit required. It is easy to identify the importer or whole-
saler based on the packaging (colour, weight, and shape of the bale).
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Distributors of motorcycles are numerous and active primarily in 
poorer districts and those located on the periphery of urban centres. 
They work closely with and have representatives at the importers’ prem-
ises. They set up shops consisting of a showroom and a storeroom in the 
back. They sometimes generate substantial sales, especially near the end 
of the year. In addition to depositing some of their revenue in banks, they 
also contribute to tontines from which they often borrow money to meet 
their commitments to the importers/suppliers. Wholesalers assemble the 
imported motorcycles.
Retailers, drivers, and others at the bottom of the value chains
In the case of goods, retailers range from shops in markets to street 
 vendors or sidewalk sellers, such as for smuggled gasoline sold from 
stands by the side of the road. Retailers buy from wholesalers/importers 
or semi-wholesalers through a complex distribution chain. In general, 
retail is an activity of the small informal sector that involves a single 
individual or a family, and where men, women, and children alike work. 
Retailers are typically informal in all respects. Each vendor also tends to 
specialize in a given type of product. For example, footwear retailers may 
specialize in sports shoes, men’s or women’s dress shoes, among others. 
To avoid taxation, they use warehouses that are located far away from 
their point of sale. In the case of services, the distribution depends on 
the nature of the activity. For transport services (moto-taxis and mini-
vans), there are numerous small informal operators serving as drivers 
and ancillary service providers such as repair or parking lot attendants. 
In the case of refuse recycling, scavengers scour the dumps seeking reus-
able items. Some of them live in the dumps. In general, incomes are very 
low, but higher for those with small shops compared to street vendors. 
However, as they develop their skills and capital, some can move up the 
value chain. For example, street vendors of used clothes can become 
employees in stalls and hotels, and even eventually open up their own 
new and used-clothing shops (Cavé 2011).
For sectors such as gasoline distribution, and motorcycle and minivan 
transport, retailers and drivers are usually young, unmarried men with a 
substantial level of education, usually at least the equivalent of Grade 5. 
The preponderance of men (over 90%) is due to the perception that these 
jobs are too dangerous for women, unless they operate out of their home. 
Women are more prevalent in the sale of used clothes and fabric.
For example, gasoline retailers purchase fuel in barrels of 100 to 
200 litres or large cans of 40 litres. The traders then transfer their gaso-
line into jerrycans of 10 to 50 litres. The only other equipment necessary 
for entry into selling are a funnel and a cloth to filter impurities, resulting 
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in total capital outlay of about 15 000 FCFA (about $30). Given the low 
barriers to entry and high level of competition, profit margins are quite 
small. Nevertheless, these earnings can substantially exceed those in 
alternative occupations, particularly for those that handle large volumes 
(Mbaye and Gueye 2015).
Retailers sell recycled products directly in open-air markets or by 
delivering them to shops and stalls. For direct sales, distributors go to 
neighbourhoods and markets and sell the goods themselves, using 
rickshaws or carrying items on their heads or shoulders. Prices are set 
through bargaining (Badiang et al. 2013).
Specialized agents by sector
In some sectors with more differentiated or complex goods or services, 
specialized agents play a key role. For example, in real estate there is a 
network of formal and informal brokers who work together. Likewise, 
motorcyles and minivans require a network of repair services. Some spe-
cialized skills are also often involved. For example, informal recyclers 
of refuse transform the objects collected by scavengers into finished or 
semi-finished products. They often have a fixed location, some limited 
capital, and professional qualifications. In some cases, these recyclers 
come from a tradition of craftsmanship that they adapt to a new urban 
setting (Hugon 1980). For example, Dogon migrants with a long history 
of metalworking in Mali have significantly contributed to the develop-
ment of the ‘macocotte’ pot business in Cameroon and are the main 
producers, as they have few viable alternative occupations (Cissé 2009).
The used car distribution chain is a particularly large source of 
diversified employment opportunities with varying levels of skill and 
remuneration.
•	 Brokers help bring together buyers and sellers. Used cars are highly 
differentiated, and potential buyers have specific preferences and 
ability to pay, making matching difficult. Most of these brokers 
are independent operators with no fixed location. They search for 
potential clients, help them identify appropriate vehicles for their 
needs, and negotiate prices. They are paid with a commission from 
either the seller, the buyer, or both. Sometimes, they negotiate a 
price with the importer, then demand a higher price from their cli-
ent and pocket the difference.
•	 Customs clearance agents can be either formal or informal. Formal 
agents are registered with customs, while informal brokers, who are 
not licensed, work with their formal counterparts to put customs 
declarations through for their clients. Licensed customs clearance 
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agents can directly access customs’ electronic platform and submit 
customs declarations online. This means all transactions are moni-
tored by customs officers. Informal agents help individual or infor-
mal importers to declare their goods and clear customs. They can log 
in to customs’ platform using their formal counterparts’ credentials. 
Formal customs clearance agents work on behalf of government, 
multinationals, and large domestic enterprises, who rarely deal with 
informal agents. All the remaining importers transact with informal 
operators. Several of the formal firms we interviewed acknowledge 
that up to 80% of their business is obtained through informal agents 
acting on behalf of smaller importers. Formal agents charge more 
because they have higher operating and fixed costs. Informal agents 
have no fixed office; they settle in improvized ‘offices’, usually made 
up of a simple table and chair, set up somewhere around the parks 
or wherever their services are in demand. Thus, they use an open 
space, go from one park to another, and are constantly using their 
mobile phones. They follow the customs clearance process until the 
transaction is finalized. Formal agents compete with each other for 
the business of informal agents. Informal agents can process up to 
20 imported cars per day.
•	 Other actors in the used car value chain. These include guards, driv-
ers and the park administration personnel. At the border, handlers 
unload and transfer all the merchandise onto domestic trucks. 
Drivers are hired to bring cars from the port to the park and to drive 
to neighbouring countries, particularly Nigeria and land-locked 
countries such as Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger. For the latter, 
one driver brings the car to the border and another takes over from 
there. There are also washers, painters, sheet metal workers, and 
loaders, who are paid by the task. Most imported cars are older both 
because they are inexpensive and also because African workers lack 
the skills to repair the increasingly complex electronic controls in 
newer cars.
Key Characteristics of Informal Firm Operations
In this section, we review the key characteristics of informal firms 
involved in informal sector value chains.
The extent of informality
As noted in the previous section, our case studies involve both large and 
small informal firms. These firms display the characteristics of informality 
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described in Chapter 2. Most small operators are not registered. Some 
pay minimal taxes when they operate market stalls. For example, used 
clothes sellers working in the markets are subject to a municipal tax 
of 100 to 200 FCFA per day, in addition to a rental fee of roughly the 
same magnitude they pay to the managers of the market. Participation 
in official social security systems is minimal. Informal social insurance 
mechanisms are more common. For example, since 2014, informal sec-
tor minivan operators in Cameroon may apply for CNPS insurance to 
receive CNPS benefits. Very few have actually done so. There were no 
CNPS social insurance beneficiaries among our interviewees. Instead, 
they make daily deposits of 1000 FCFA into a revolving fund to assist 
each other in case of accidents or the death of a family member.
Access to financing
For both large and small informal firms, financing usually is either 
from their own funds, family members, or informal financial institu-
tions such as tontines, whereby members make regular monthly deposits 
and are then eligible for loans. For example, based on our interviews 
with motorcycle drivers, the main source of financing to purchase their 
motorcycles is loans from tontines or a number of microfinance entities. 
In Cameroon, informal financial services are largely controlled by the 
Bamiléké ethnic group from Western Cameroon, mentioned previously, 
who have a long tradition of tontines and entrepreneurship. Around 
90% of the motorcycle taxi drivers with whom we spoke said that they 
were members of one or more tontines and almost none had accounts 
with formal banks, which require excessive paperwork even for opening 
a savings account and view lending to motorcycle owners to be high risk. 
Drivers make daily contributions of 500 to 3,000 FCFA or correspond-
ing weekly or monthly contributions. Through their savings, drivers can 
become motorcycle owners, purchase land, and build homes. Very few 
use accounts in banks.
Larger operators sometimes finance smaller ones. For example, 
motorcycle purchases can be made either by direct purchase or through 
lease-purchase. In a direct purchase, the investor purchases the motor-
cycle from a distributor in his or her own name. These investors are 
generally public- or private-sector workers seeking to supplement their 
income. Under a lease-purchase arrangement, a driver becomes the 
owner of a motorcycle over time by paying a weekly or monthly fee until 
the full amount is paid. This amount varies depending on the purchase 
price, interest rate, and other factors. In Douala, for example, based on 
our interviews with members of the industry, a motorcycle purchased 
for 350,000 FCFA may be leased for a total of 500,000 to 600,000 FCFA 
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over a six- to eight-month term. Collateral is required for most contracts. 
In some cases, a guarantor agrees to repay the agreed amount should 
the driver be unable to honour the contract. However, it is also possible 
to find individuals seeking or offering lease-purchase contracts through 
unions and associations.
In the case of used clothes, the main sources of start-up capital are fam-
ily gifts or inheritances, personal savings and tontines, microfinancing, 
and more rarely formal banks. In the early stages in the 1980s, second-
hand clothing businesses were family enterprises, and, although this is 
not always the case now, it remains common. Many retailers still receive 
their initial capital from their family or kinship group. Wholesalers and 
semi-wholesalers have access to loans from banks and microfinance 
institutions although the interest rates they borrow at are often very high. 
Interestingly, however, even the large importers and wholesalers partici-
pate in tontines, although the amounts involved are much greater than 
those for retailers.
Precarity
The informal value chains are quite organized but also quite vulnerable 
to external shocks and changes in government stances. The moto-taxi 
sector is a case in point. The 1990s were a period of massive investment 
in the motorcycle taxi industry, such that some operators controlled 
fleets of more than 30 motorcycles in Cameroon and even more in 
Benin. A fleet of 30 vehicles generated approximately 75,000 FCFA a 
day, or 2,500 FCFA per vehicle. With the arrival of Chinese motorcy-
cles, the purchase price of motorcycles dropped to half that of the used 
Japanese motorcycles that had previously dominated the market. This 
made it possible for new, smaller-scale operators to enter the market 
with the objective of becoming their own bosses, forcing out some 
major operators. In our interviews with motorcycle drivers, we found 
few cases of owners with more than three motorcycles. In addition to 
greater competition, the demise of larger operators was attributed to 
the increasing ‘dishonesty’ of drivers, even when they are relatives, and 
higher risk of motorcycle theft due to increased criminality in recent 
years (suffocating or drugging drivers, holding them up at knife or gun-
point, etc.).
Benin’s entrepot role in the informal distribution of used cars in the 
region, particularly for smuggling into Nigeria, generates as much as 10% 
of Benin’s GDP. However, the sharp decline in used car imports into 
Benin due to the economic crisis in Nigeria, along with more vigorous 
border enforcement, reveals the vulnerability of Benin’s informal car dis-
tribution chain to the vagaries of Nigeria’s unstable economy.
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Kinship networks
Kinship networks are a source of social capital and trust throughout the 
informal sector and particularly in cross-border trade as described in 
Chapter 10. These groups provide training, connections, and  employment 
opportunities to new entrants. The important role of the Bamiléké in 
Cameroon was noted above. The predominance of Malians, especially 
the Dogon, in pot manufacturing in urban Cameroon is another exam-
ple. When they arrive in the city, Malian migrants, like all West Africans, 
are welcomed into kinship networks based in a region or  village, which 
assist them with housing and employment. Malian migrants in Douala 
and Yaounde form a reconstituted group based on the model of village 
organization. The Dogon mosque in Douala and the Dogon Community 
Centre in Yaounde are centres where newcomers can meet a relative or 
native from their village. The main employers of the newly arrived labour 
force are from the same village who are already established, although 
they are not always wealthy (Cissé 2009).
Trade associations and unions
Many informal sector firms are members of trade associations or unions, 
usually by sector. Trade associations provide multiple services to the 
informal operators they represent, including negotiations with the gov-
ernment in cases of dispute, assistance with access to credit, and help 
in times of personal crisis. For example, waste recyclers in Cameroon 
set up a union, SYNETMEFCAM, the Syndicat national des travail-
leurs pour l’environnement et l’exploitation des métaux et déchets ferreux 
et non ferreux du Cameroun, or National Trade Union of Workers 
for the Environment and the Exploitation of Metals and Ferrous and 
non-Ferrous Wastes in Cameroon. There is also an association specifi-
cally for scavengers at the municipal landfill in Douala that works with 
SYNETMEFCAM.
Unions in the minivan sector in Cameroon negotiate with the govern-
ment and organize the business. Most drivers are members of the union 
to which they contribute 200 to 300 FCFA prior to each departure. The 
union representative in turn acts as a dispatcher for the minivans. The 
union also defends the sector’s interests vis à vis the government. For 
example, if a driver is arrested, the union representative will defend him in 
court. Prior to 2014, each minivan route had its own workers’ representa-
tive, but their great number made negotiations with the government and 
municipalities unwieldy. In 2017, the government decreed that only offi-
cially registered transport union federations could represent the minivan 
industry and negotiate with the municipality of Douala. Operators in the 
sector became affiliated with a major union, the Littoral regional office 
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of the Confédération générale des syndicats des transports du Cameroun 
[General Confederation of Transport Unions of Cameroon].
There are several unions representing moto-taxi drivers in Benin, with 
strong political clout (Marchais 2009). The unions were very powerful 
in the 1990s and worked with the government to collect taxes and lev-
ied union fees on drivers. The unions were weakened in the late 1990s 
when corruption scandals discredited them, but they remain influential. 
A number of unions are federated under the umbrella of the Collectif 
des syndicats de conducteurs de taxis-moto du Benin [Association of 
Moto-Taxi Driver Unions of Benin]. Unions tend to be affiliated with 
various political parties. Although motorcycle taxi drivers in Cameroon 
reported understanding the importance of unions, fewer than 20% said 
they belonged to a union. Many drivers said they suspected that the 
unions pursued their own interests rather than those of their members. 
Regardless, the unions remain an important presence for drivers, provid-
ing advice, coordinating provision of credit, training drivers on traffic 
regulations, and helping them prepare for driver’s licence tests. In discus-
sions between drivers and the government, they are officially recognized 
as middlemen, and they bargain with other entities to obtain services for 
their members.
Relations with government
In principle, the informal sector value chains are subject to government 
regulations, with a stringency that varies between sectors and over time. 
However, government often lacks the capacity to regulate effectively. 
Moreover, government officials and politicians are often involved in or 
benefit from informal activities. The ambiguous role of government is 
well illustrated by its stance on smuggling, which features in some of our 
case studies and Chapter 10 (used cars, gasoline, cloth, and used clothes). 
Government policy oscillates between collusion, crackdowns, and indif-
ference. For example, in the case of gasoline imported into Benin and 
Cameroon from Nigeria, high level military officials in Nigeria are widely 
known to be involved (Golub and Mbaye 2019). High-level officials and 
traders make arrangements to allow the smugglers to cross the border at 
designated times in large trucks. Smaller-scale traders pay fees that are 
negotiated with border officials. Sometimes officials pursue conflicting 
strategies, with some cracking down while others are colluding.
The minivan sector in Cameroon is another illustration of the vari-
ous pressures affecting government policy toward the informal sector. 
Initially lax, minivan regulation was ramped up in the aftermath of the 
attention received following a serious accident in 2014 in Douala. Both 
the central and municipal governments oversee the sector, creating a 
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complicated patchwork of rules and regulations with the main result of 
spurring extortion. Police are supposed to enforce driving and parking 
rules and frequently stop drivers ostensibly to check that their pub-
lic transit permits and driver’s licences are valid. In practice, however, 
 drivers frequently complain that even if all their documents are in order, 
they are extorted with a 500 to 1,000 FCFA bribe by the police, which 
they pay to avoid wasting a lot of time being hassled. Some union officials 
report that they pay police and state troopers weekly dues to avoid being 
stopped en route.
Sectors where Competition between Formal  
and Informal Firms Predominate
This section provides brief descriptions of sectors where the informal 
and formal segments tend to be in competition. The following two sec-
tions address other sectors where relationships of cooperation dominate 
and then situations when both competition and complementarity are 
both present.
Smuggled gasoline in Benin and Cameroon
The informal sale of petroleum products in Africa often involves 
intense competition between the formal and informal sectors. This 
activity is particularly prevalent in Benin and to a lesser extent in 
Cameroon. Street corners lined with tables displaying various sized 
vases and bottles containing the brown/yellow liquid are ubiquitous 
throughout Benin and some regions of Cameroon. The gasoline is 
known by the evocative nicknames of ‘kpayo’ meaning ‘fake’ in Benin 
(Cessou 2016) and ‘fédéral’, ‘zoua-zoua’, ‘bush wine’, and ‘funge’ in 
Cameroon (Herrera 1997). In Benin, there are an estimated 50,000 
jobs involved in the informal fuel circuit, which is more than half the 
number of the country’s government officials (Igué 2011; Houssou et 
al. 2013). Some estimate a much higher number (Cessou 2016).
As discussed in the case of Cameroon in Chapter 10, both countries 
mainly import their petroleum products illegally from Nigeria, due to 
much lower retail prices. In Benin and Cameroon, petroleum products 
are distributed through both formal and informal circuits. The official 
import and distribution of fuel is overseen by state agencies in both 
countries, the Société nationale de commercialisation des produits pétro-
liers [National Petroleum Products Marketing Company] (SONACOP) 
in Benin and the Société nationale des hydrocarbures [National 
Hydrocarbons Company] in Cameroon. In Benin especially, the official 
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distribution circuit has come to be dominated by the informal circuit. 
In 2009, there were around 267 service stations (i.e., one per 429 km2 or 
31,855 inhabitants) and another 87 formal sellers. In Cameroon, the situ-
ation varies more by region.
Competition from the informal sector is a major reason for the 
losses incurred by SONACOP. These losses have been of the order of 
125 billion FCFA in recent years—equal to about half the public sec-
tor payroll (Igué 2011). The dominance of the informal distribution of 
gasoline in Benin is illustrated in Table 3.1, showing the proportion of 
official and unofficial imports in 2013. The table is consistent with other 
estimates that informal sales account for 80 to 90% of gasoline sales in 
Benin and a large share of other petroleum products (Houssou et al. 
2013; Cessou 2016).
The informal distribution of fuel is similar in Benin and Cameroon 
(Montcho 2009). Large-scale Nigerian exporters and domestic importers 
play important roles in both countries. On the Benin and Cameroonian 
sides, major importers have large amounts of capital and often operate 
illegally and through intermediaries, though they may have a formal 
façade. High-level military officials are heavily involved in Nigeria. 
They control border warehouses with large underground 200 litre vats. 
Tanker trucks frequently fill up at Nigerian service stations, driving 
across the border with impunity, while others often collect gasoline ille-
gally at Nigerian official refineries or clandestine refineries scattered all 
over the country. Thus, soldiers posted in oil-producing regions “are all 
 millionaires”, according to one anonymous soldier (Houssou et al. 2013).
The truckers deal in large volumes and account for a considerable 
amount of traffic. Some of these trucks double, or even triple the capacity 
of their vehicles’ tanks. Some are employed by the government, but also 
engage with the informal sector, mixing legally imported and smuggled 
gasoline. These trucks supply all types of retailers along interstate high-
ways. Often, large importers bring gasoline by boats of various sizes and 
then transfer it to motorcycles specially modified for this purpose. These 
are originally two-wheeled vehicles that are modified to make tricycles, 
Table 3.1
Informal share of petroleum products in Benin, 2013





Source: Mbaye and Gueye (2015)
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specially designed to allow the transport of large quantities of liquids 
over long distances.
As reported by the vendors of smuggled gasoline themselves, these 
products are of very dubious quality. Mixtures that are made of differ-
ent petroleum products are not subject to any control or inspection. The 
fuel is often adulterated and the frequent use of containers for different 
kinds of products leads to dangers, even if there is no deliberate mixing of 
incompatible products. Using a low-quality, adulterated, or inappropri-
ate fuel damages engines, increasing maintenance costs. The petroleum 
products are also handled in the open air, which results in significant 
pollution. Moreover, as petroleum products are highly flammable and 
very little precaution is taken in handling them, tragedies involving 
explosions and fires in ships, motor vehicles, and tricycles are common. 
Frequent spills also lead to chemical residues seeping into the ground 
and destroying fauna and flora.
Used cars
Used car imports have largely supplanted imports of new cars, due to 
their greater affordability. Although new and used cars are imperfect 
substitutes, there is substantial competition between formal and infor-
mal distributors. The sale of used vehicles began in the 1980s, and 
was tentative at first, but immense used car parks gradually appeared 
in many countries as the business took off. African students living in 
Europe introduced this idea to local businessmen, who recognized it as a 
profitable activity and entered the used-car market. The number of used 
vehicles imported into Cameroon has increased over time, rising from 
under 20,000 in 2007 to over 40,000 in 2014.
In Benin, much more dramatic trends have been observed due to 
its special role as an entrepot for the region, mainly to Nigeria, where 
used car imports are severely restricted. Used car imports peaked at over 
300,000 per year in 2012–2014 before falling sharply to about 100,000 in 
2016–2017 due to the recession in Nigeria (Golub and Mbaye 2019).
Importers buy used vehicles in various developed countries. Sprawling 
parks have been built for the trade of used vehicles. These parks are com-
pletely controlled by informal actors and have a very light administrative 
structure. There are over 100 used-vehicle parks in Cotonou. Vehicles 
imported for re-export to neighbouring countries leave for the border 
twice a week. This semi-illegal activity is openly acknowledged in Benin 
and even regulated by customs, which provides escorts to convoys of 
used cars on their way to the Nigerian border.
Most cars imported into Benin are declared in a customs transit 
regime rather than for domestic use, with a stated destination of Niger 
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rather than Nigeria. It is common knowledge, however, that more than 
90% of cars imported in transit in Benin wind up in Nigeria. Unlike rice, 
as described in Chapter 10, there is apparently no significant re-export 
trade of cars from Cameroon to Nigeria.
Used clothes
Used clothes imported from developed countries are ubiquitous in low-
income Africa. The used-clothing sector is a canonical case illustrating 
the drivers of informality discussed above and the ambiguous mix of 
costs and benefits that it brings.
Used clothing is a boon to low-income households and to informal 
importers and retailers, but contributed to the demise of domestic tex-
tile and clothing production. African countries such as Senegal and 
Cameroon had sizable but inefficient textile and apparel production in 
the 1970s, producing for the domestic market with high levels of pro-
tection (Golub and Mbaye 2002). These domestic firms have largely 
disappeared with little but artisanal production remaining. Smuggling 
from neighbouring countries with lower tariffs, e.g., The Gambia into 
Senegal, began the process of unravelling domestic textile sectors (Golub 
and Mbaye 2009). The recessions in the 1980s and subsequent trade 
liberalization exacerbated the demise of formal textile and apparel pro-
duction, as used clothes imports surged. As a result, many relatively 
well-paying jobs were lost. Second-hand clothing imports and distribu-
tion, previously banned and confined to the poorest consumers, evolved 
into one of the most important African industries in terms of sales and 
employment. Used clothes compete with cheap Asian imports, increas-
ingly from China (Bredeloup and Lombard 2008; Brooks and Simon 
2012; Zollman 2013).
Some thought that Chinese imports would spell the end of the used- 
clothing trade. Chinese clothing in Africa is sold at low prices, making it 
competitive with the used clothes. However, our interviews revealed that 
consumers often prefer second-hand to new items imported from Asia, 
particularly China, even when the Chinese goods’ prices are competitive 
because of the perceived higher quality of the former.
In Cameroon, official imports of used clothes were banned until 1992 
and importers had to smuggle goods into Cameroon from Cotonou 
in Benin, using canoes or trucks. The liberalization in the early 1990s 
resulted in legalization of this business and hence new entrants and more 
competition, often in the form of Bamiléké extended families sending 
more of their members into the business. To boost their competitive edge, 
some families sent their children to foreign and national universities to 
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improve their capabilities. The less capable go out of business. The used-
clothing business is present all over Cameroon, but it is booming in the 
city of Douala. Indeed, this city is the hub for distribution of second-
hand items in the country and demand is particularly high in Douala 
due to its high concentration of low-income residents. The sector is well 
organized. Products are either sorted or packed in bulk. For example, 
there can be a bale of just sheets or a bale of sheets, curtains, and towels. 
The colour of the packaging indicates the identity of the importer.
Sectors where Complementarity between Formal and 
Informal Firms Predominate
Refuse collection and recycling
Recycling and reuse of discarded items has long been a feature of African 
societies but has become a much more pressing issue due to the adoption 
of Western consumerism, rapidly growing populations, and rural-urban 
migration. More than 90% of kitchen equipment (pots, wood stoves, cut-
lery, etc.) in Africa is manufactured from discarded metal. Furthermore, 
people often lack knowledge about modern garbage disposal and pro-
cessing methods.
Formal waste management systems in Africa are largely dysfunctional. 
Mbaye (2008) analyzes the Dakar case in detail. To some extent, it reflects 
inadequate funding, which is to be expected in a poor country. More 
importantly, however, the key obstacles are organizational. Jurisdiction 
for refuse collection is often unclear between local and central levels of 
government and sometimes privatized firms. Also, there is an utter lack 
of organized recycling programs and a public sense of environmental 
responsibility. For example, a large volume of household waste is simply 
sand that could easily be dumped outside the house (Mbaye 2008). Given 
the failures of formal collection systems, a range of informal professions 
have gradually sprung up in Africa operating throughout the value chain, 
including informal recycling of discarded household items.
Waste is dumped in municipal landfills and illegal dumps. The city 
of Douala has three municipal landfills, but they are grossly insufficient 
and thus a great deal of waste is taken to the multiple illegal dumps in 
neighbourhoods that are not served by Cameroon’s official disposal 
services.
There is a growing market in the resale of recovered household objects 
in Africa. In Cameroon, Fodouop (1991, 2000) shows that informal recy-
cling is particularly developed in Yaounde and Douala for items such 
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as glass and plastics. A number of informal sectors processing recycled 
materials are active in Douala, such as:
•	 Reusing plastic bottles to bottle water and other drinks
•	 Repairing umbrellas
•	 Dyeing used clothing
•	 Repairing and manufacturing leather goods (leather slippers, san-
dals made from belt straps)
•	 Using tires to manufacture other rubber items, for cars and other 
products
•	 Scrap metal working (e.g., barbecues)
•	 Forging aluminium ‘macocottes’ (pots)
•	 Manufacturing vegetable graters from tin cans
Resellers buy objects such as kitchen utensils, shoes, handbags, electronic 
and electrical household appliances, barrels, plastic and glass bottles, and 
resell them without any processing beyond washing and minimal repairs. 
Reusing items also gives used products a second life. Examples include 
grocery bags reused as garbage bags and paint cans or detergent barrels 
as water storage containers.
Informal recyclers tend to specialize and locate in distinct neighbour-
hoods of Douala: barbecue manufacturers and bottled water vendors 
congregate at the entrance of Castel Hall at the place called ‘Mobil 
 Njo-Njo’; the Makéa neighbourhood near the Marché Central is the place 
to find ‘macocotte’ pots; tire reconditioning occurs in the Camp Yabassi 
neighbourhood; home appliance recyclers are located at the entrance to 
the Marché New Deido; and umbrella manufacturers are near Bepanda 
Omnisports stadium.
In addition to recyclable materials, garbage also contains a consid-
erable number of toxic items including car batteries, batteries, and 
accumulators from electrical and electronic equipment, pharmaceuti-
cals, and pesticides (Müller et al. 2012). Garbage pickup and handling 
make no provisions for dangerous materials in Cameroon as in Africa 
in general. Further, in Cameroon, as elsewhere, garbage collection and 
management is a low-status job (Guitard 2015; McKay et al. 2015). In 
addition, as in other African countries, recyclers and resellers work in 
deplorable sanitary conditions without any effective government over-
sight. Thus, workers are exposed to very serious hazards, including 
contamination from pathogens through needles, blood bags from blood 
transfusion centres, and other contaminated sharp objects, that are 
mixed in with household waste. Scavengers are also constantly exposed 
to harmful fumes and landslides from ‘garbage mountains’ or offload-
ing dump trucks. Likewise, aluminum smelters, like scrap metal workers, 
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work without protective gear and are exposed to pulmonary pathologies 
and cuts that lead to infections. Using rickshaws, the scrap metal workers 
load, transport, and unload pieces of scrap, with their bare hands, over 
long distances.
Like incineration, recycling requires some effort and investment to work 
properly, such as sorting, distribution of colour-coded bins for the various 
types of recyclables, pickup schedules, and sensitizing people to environ-
mental concerns. Thus, recycling imposes costs (collection, sorting, and 
transport) which must be at least partly offset by the proceeds of recycled 
products. Therefore, the resulting goods must be of adequate quality.
Cement factories in Benin and Senegal
Cement factories offer an example of cooperation between formal and 
informal firms. There are four formal cement factories in Benin and three 
in Senegal. In the past, these cement factories had depots spread across 
the country. However, they are increasingly using informal distributors 
to sell their products. Most of these wholesalers purchase in cash and 
very little on credit. Our interviewees explained that the manufacturers 
rely on the services of wholesalers to lower storage costs. In addition, the 
distributors can reach a broader clientele all over the country due to their 
trading networks and flexibility. Cement factories have trucks to transport 
their output to the depots, but increasingly rely on private transporters 
and most of them are informal. The cement makers request only mini-
mal identification from transporters (e.g., the tax identification number 
and proof of registration with the Commerce Department), making it 
relatively easy for informal firms to participate. However, maintenance is 
not subcontracted; firms often have an in-house operations department 
responsible for maintenance. The firms have an internal department to 
handle mechanical and electrical systems, although they may call on out-
side contractors for some tasks. The firms work with a consulting firm 
that visits every three to four months to assist with tax compliance and 
accounting. In general, they generate their own electric power due to the 
poor quality and unreliable supply of power from the national grid. For 
personnel recruitment, very few of them call on temporary employment 
agencies; instead, their own human resource departments handle this 
responsibility.
Prepaid phone cards
Prepaid phone credit sales is another example of division of labour, 
involving large telecommunications enterprises and informal actors in 
nearly all African cities. In Benin and Senegal, the large formal telecom-
munications enterprises, including MTN, ORANGE, Bénin Télécoms, 
66  Mbaye, Golub, Gueye, Ngapgho, and Salla
Expresso, Tigo, and Move, are served by informal retail distribution of 
prepaid phone cards and phone credits sold by street vendors. Values of 
pre-paid cards can be as low as 100 FCFA (20¢ US).
As in other informal retailing, such as smuggled gasoline or used 
clothes, the sale of phone credits requires minimal capital investment. 
The main costs are purchasing communications credits from the big 
 companies and paying a tax for the temporary occupation of a public 
highway.
Although official statistics are not available on the number and sales 
of telephone credit retailers, it is clear from observing urban and rural 
activities that the amounts are substantial and the sector is an important 
source of employment. A 2014 report put total revenues from telecom-
munications activities at 535 billion FCFA (nearly a billion USD), 65.6% 
of which are derived from the mobile sector. Since nearly all mobile 
sales involve prepaid cards, one can infer that street sales of credits are 
over 300 billion FCFA. In the same report, the company estimated the 
employment in these activities at 100,000, nearly equal to the total num-
ber of employees in the entire Senegalese public sector.
Real estate brokerage
Real estate brokers facilitate sales or rentals of buildings and land for 
home or commercial use in exchange for a negotiated commission. We 
distinguish formal brokering, which consists of recognized agencies, 
from informal brokering by individuals.
African cities have experienced a demographic boom that poses enor-
mous housing challenges. The causes of the boom include rapid national 
population growth and significant rural to urban migration, especially to 
the major cities. The resulting rises in demand are driving up land own-
ership costs, thereby pushing rental costs up drastically. For example, 
between 2000 and 2008, the rental cost in the Plateau neighbourhood in 
Dakar increased six-fold.
Formal brokers often rely on informal ones to maintain and expand 
their clientele. Informal brokers are more flexible, closer to their 
 consumers, and can help match buyers and sellers more effectively than 
the larger companies. Both customers and building owners pay fees to 
the informal brokers.
Subcontracting in the IT sector
The information technology (IT) sector has enormous potential for 
subcontracting. In fact, with internet cabling and the development and 
management of software programs, the multinational telecommunica-
tions companies often find it advantageous to subcontract with local 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). An interviewer in Dakar stated 
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that local IT firms are particularly involved at the port and with law firms. 
They often have one-year renewable service delivery contracts. Among 
others, they help install programs to assist management, sell IT mate-
rials, perform IT cabling, and manage IT networks. These SMEs often 
complain that large operators do not provide them with enough work. 
Instead, the big companies often prefer having technicians from the par-
ent company travel to the site. Most SME managers that we met expressed 
their frustration about lack of access to these markets. According to these 
managers, there is also a serious corruption problem with bribes, both 
in public and in private sector contracts. These bribes can absorb up to 
30% of the contract. They also note that politicians often win contracts, 
but have no capacity to deliver the expected services so they outsource to 
smaller companies at paltry rates.
For their part, large companies complain about the inadequate skills 
and poor quality control of small operators and thus prefer to keep much 
of the work in-house, even if the cost is substantially higher. Another 
reason for the lack of subcontracting is that many of the largest contracts 
involve public sector projects, which often rule out the involvement of 
informal firms that do not abide by labour market and other regulations.
To assist SME development, countries set up support structures 
such as the Centres de normalisation comptable (CNC) [accounting 
standards- setting commissions] and the Centres de gestion agréés (CGA) 
[management support agencies]. The role of the CNCs includes ensuring 
that training programs for accountants are accredited, accounting prac-
tices meet professional standards, and that the UEMOA and OHADA 
standards are implemented. In addition to these two types of agencies, 
there is the Guichet unique de formalisation des entreprises (GUFE) in 
Benin, which entitles SMEs to credit from two banks (West African 
Development Bank and Orabank). There are numerous other agencies 
ostensibly promoting similar goals such as microcredit, youth employ-
ment, female empowerment, quality norms, etc. The problem is that 
these agencies are often ineffective due to underfunding, overlapping 
mandates, staff with little private sector experience and networks, and 
lack of accountability.
Sectors where Competition and Complementarity  
between Formal and Informal Firms are Balanced
Urban transport: Moto-taxis and minivans in Benin  
and Cameroon
As major cosmopolitan cities with rapidly growing populations, Douala and 
Cotonou are desperately in need of affordable and flexible transport systems. 
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Demand is driven by the failure of governments to provide functional public 
transportation systems and paved roads, the low incomes of the vast majority 
of the population, rural-urban migration, urban sprawl over vast distances, 
and massive under-employment. In Cameroon, for example, the public 
busing system is dysfunctional (SITRASS 2004). In addition, government 
funding of road maintenance ceased after the economic crisis in the 1990s. 
From the time of its creation in 2000, the private Société Camerounaise de 
transport urbain (SOCATUR) [Urban Transport Company of Cameroon] 
experienced difficulties because of numerous vehicle breakdowns in turn 
due to poor road conditions. Buses, when available, often do not run in off-
peak times. Into this gap stepped entrepreneurs that purchased motorcycles 
and minivans and hired unemployed young men to operate them.
Each form of transportation has its own niche while also competing 
somewhat with the others. Motorcycles are the cheapest form of trans-
port and most suited for short distances, emergencies, and the lowest 
income customers. Taxis are preferred for medium distances, having 
greater comfort and security, but of course cost more. Municipal buses 
work well for anyone not in a hurry. Minivans are an intermediate solu-
tion, especially suited for long distances at a low cost.
The emergence of these alternative modes of transport was facilitated 
by a lack of regulation in the public transportation sector (Diaz Olvera 
et al. 2007). Relations with law enforcement are often tense (Amougou 
and Bernard 2010); the urban chaos that motorcycle taxi drivers help 
create leaves a bitter taste in the mouths of municipal officials. Whenever 
drivers engage in a protest, they block traffic, burn tires, and get mer-
chants upset. The slightest altercation with a driver can lead to a swarm 
of drivers ready to lynch the perpetrator.
While the authorities acknowledge the importance of these modes of 
transportation in urban settings, they also see the need for some regula-
tion. The sheer number of motorcycle drivers makes them a considerable 
political force. An interviewer reported that on the eve of an election, 
a government official in Douala once advised motorcycle taxi drivers 
to “just do your job and stay out of political matters that could create 
unnecessary problems for you.” The government views these young peo-
ple, with their many grievances and easy vulnerability to manipulation 
by politicians, as virtual powder kegs on wheels.
Moto-taxis
Moto-taxis emerged in Benin in the 1980s where they are known as 
zemidjan in Benin, which in the local language means ‘get me there 
quickly’ (Agossou 2004). They have become ubiquitous in Benin. The 
number of moto-taxis in Benin grew steadily from about 30,000 in 1990 
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to 100,000 in 2000 (Marchais 2009) and is now about 250,000. As a result 
of increased entry and competition, incomes of drivers have dropped 
considerably, though they still exceed incomes in other informal and 
even some formal occupations in Benin.
Motorcycle taxi service in Douala began in the 1990s, a time of social 
tension arising from public demands for greater political openness. A 
strike referred to as Opération ville morte [Operation Dead City] blocked 
public and private transportation vehicles, but left room for motorcycle 
taxis to slip through. Moto-taxis are called benskin, the name of a tradi-
tional dance in Western Cameroon performed by bending forward with 
a stooped back, like a motorcycle rider.
Moto-taxi drivers work 8 to 12 hours a day in pouring rain or sti-
fling heat, breathing polluted air from their own and other vehicles, at 
risk of life-threatening accidents, to earn what is considered relatively 
good incomes of about $10 per day. In their rush to raise their take-home 
pay, they take risks such as passing on the left, speeding, making illegal 
U-turns, and ignoring traffic signals. Accidents are common. Kaffo et al. 
(2007) note that they sometimes drive without a licence, thereby invali-
dating any insurance coverage they may have when an accident occurs.
The government stance toward motorcycle taxis differs somewhat 
in the two countries. In the early 1990s, the city of Cotonou attempted 
to establish regulations, such as wearing a helmet, having a licence, and 
paying a registration fee to open a business. However, these rules have 
not been effectively enforced by the authorities or respected by drivers 
(Marchais 2009). In Cameroon, moto-taxis are somewhat more restricted 
and are mostly limited to Douala.
Minivans
Minivans were one of the most widespread forms of public transport 
in the city of Douala until a fatal accident in 2014 led to a temporary 
shutdown. Minivans are a popular method of commuting for many low-
income people because they take on enough passengers to keep the cost 
low per traveller while being smaller and thus more flexible about routes 
and schedules than municipal buses (SITRASS 2005). These minivans 
carry passengers between designated points in the city centre and dis-
tant suburbs. Workers use this form of transportation to commute and 
students use them to go to and from school. The bulk of passengers are 
informal sector workers and students.
The minivans are used freight transportation vehicles that have been 
remodelled for passenger use. Until 2014, 90% of minivans were old 
imported Mercedes MB 100s; the remaining 10% were Renaults, Toyota 
Hiaces, and other models. All of these vehicles are run-down with very 
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tight seating to accommodate a maximum of passengers, for whom com-
fort and security are secondary to affordability. While inexpensive and 
convenient, their dilapidated and overcrowded state makes these vehicles 
more prone to traffic accidents.
An estimated 300–400 minivans were operating in Douala, with 
roughly 1,000 direct jobs before minivans were temporarily banned on 
October 29, 2014, following the traffic accident that resulted in several 
deaths. Since January 2017, minivans have gradually resumed operations 
with more modern vehicles.
As usual, these informal sector solutions to state failures to provide 
adequate urban transport have both pros and cons. The fares are very 
low, and drivers are readily available to carry passengers regardless of 
road conditions or time of day. The motorcycles offer cheap transport 
and are equipped to handle unpaved roads and traffic jams. The compet-
itive advantage of the zemidjan is complementary to that of kpayo—the 
informal sale of cheap smuggled gasoline described above. On the down-
side, drivers often drive unsafely, are involved in many accidents with 
resulting injuries and deaths, and are constantly breathing fumes from 
traffic. Moto-taxis also contribute to the high level of pollution in cities. 
As a result, their life expectancy is well below the average of 54 years for 
Benin (Marchais 2009). The minivans are also quite dangerous, as was 
unfortunately illustrated by the fatal accident in 2014.
Fabric distribution in Benin
Wax fabrics with very vibrant colours that appeal to African con-
sumers are a major household item in all African countries. Like the case 
of clothing described above, fabrics were largely produced in African 
countries until the crises of the 1980s. In most of these countries, almost 
all domestic manufacturers have gone bankrupt and wax fabrics are now 
nearly all imported from China. There are still three textile factories 
operating in Benin that manufacture unbleached fabric and thread, but 
they are operating at very low capacity, if at all, due to competition from 
the much cheaper Chinese fabric. Chinese fabrics are imported by infor-
mal wholesalers that are very difficult to monitor. They generally import 
in groups and carry out all their customs operations together.
Vlisco, a Dutch company with factories in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, 
is an exception. Its most well-known wax products are GTP, Woodin, 
and Uniwax. Vlisco wax products are almost always more expensive 
than Chinese imports, but their quality is also superior. Vlisco does 
not produce in Benin, instead importing from its parent company in 
Holland or from its subsidiaries in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. It sells its 
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products to wholesalers that resell them to retailers. This cooperation 
with informal distributors is crucial to Vlisco’s ability to compete with 
Asian imports.
The government establishes a list of about 200 certified wholesal-
ers and importers by decree, updated every quarter. This restricted list 
of fabric importers was initially intended to protect what remained of 
Benin’s textile industry, but it is widely evaded. Each wholesaler has a 
network of approved retailers with which it works regularly, but it also 
deals with more irregular purchasers. One of our interviewees explained 
that Chinese importers sell counterfeited Vlisco products, damaging 
Vlisco’s legitimate business. Sales of these fake Vlisco products are in 
principle illegal, but the rules are not enforced as police and customs col-
lude with the Chinese importers. Nigerian firms (ABS, Nichem) are also 
in the market, offering similar products that are not counterfeited but are 
of much lower quality.
Conclusions
There are multiple explanations for the rise of the informal sector: the 
appeal of traditional modes of doing business, the loss of formal sector 
jobs following structural adjustment programs, and the rational choice of 
entrepreneurs to become informal when the business climate is adverse 
and state enforcement capacity is weak. We argue that these explana-
tions all have some validity but that the most important factor is the 
institutional environment that dissuades formal enterprise. As a result, 
African economies, including those in Francophone West and Central 
Africa, have become increasingly dualistic, with booming urban informal 
sectors.
The sector descriptions and analysis in this chapter bring out all the 
complexities and dilemmas posed by the informal sector in African 
economies. On the positive side, the informal sector is a crucial source 
of employment in a situation where formal sector jobs are few and far 
between. For young graduates who cannot get jobs in the government, 
farmers barely able to survive in subsistence conditions, and numerous 
others without viable alternatives for earning a decent living, the infor-
mal sector is their only recourse. Earnings are low but well above those 
in subsistence agriculture. Ease of entry in most informal activities keeps 
incomes low but also means that jobs are readily available. Furthermore, 
the informal sector provides goods and services to low-income con-
sumers where the government and formal economy fail. For example, 
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moto-taxis and minivans in Benin and Cameroon meet the urgent trans-
port needs of the population in the sprawling metropolises of Cotonou, 
Douala, and other cities with insufficient or unreliable public transport 
systems. In some instances, the informal sector provides complementary 
services to the formal sector, as in the distribution of pre-paid phone 
cards. Informal operators contribute to recycling the huge volumes of 
garbage generated by major cities.
There are, however, serious downsides. The smaller players, such 
as street hawkers, are poorly paid and have no social security benefits, 
yet may be required to pay municipal taxes as well as bribes in order to 
operate. Meanwhile, large informal wholesalers understate their sales 
and pay next to nothing in taxes. Lack of regulation poses grave dangers 
to safety and health both for providers and users. In the case of crucial 
services such as public transport and waste management, ceding provi-
sion to informal, unregulated operators is particularly problematic.
Competition between formal and informal firms can inhibit or even 
destroy the formal sector. The most extreme case is probably in petro-
leum products distribution, where the prevalence of smuggled gasoline 
from Nigeria threatens national petroleum distributors in Benin and 
Cameroon with bankruptcy. Illicit sales of gasoline and other petroleum 
products lower fiscal revenues significantly.
Further, the prevalence of overtly illegal activities undermines the 
legitimacy of official institutions. The oscillation between violent crack-
downs by the state and tacit collusion, or even participation by officials at 
all levels, damages the credibility of the government while creating insta-
bility and insecurity for informal sector operators. Government officials 
may be in alliance with large informal operators while making life miser-
able for the smallest informal firms with multiple demands for bribes and 
destruction of their property when they don’t comply.
What should be done given this mix of positive and negative effects of 
informal activity? Banning informal sector operations is neither practical 
nor desirable. In an economic environment of underfunded and inef-
ficient public transport systems, safety and low cost represent a difficult 
trade off that is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. The authorities must 
find a balance between regulation and the need for affordable and easily 
accessible services.
As a general principle, as argued throughout this book, particularly in 
Chapter 8, the government should seek to formalize the larger informal 
operators while assisting smaller firms at the margins of survival, rather 
than predating on them. In an environment of weak governance, find-
ing the right balance between assistance and enforcement is a daunting 
challenge.
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CHAPTER 4
The Informal Sector in Francophone  
Africa: Dominant Characteristics, Scope, 
and Trends from Our Survey Data
Jean-Jacques Ekomié, Fatou Gueye, Dominique Haughton, Ahmadou  
Aly Mbaye, and Ibrahima Tall
Introduction
By its very nature, it is difficult to obtain accurate information about 
the informal sector. This applies to firm structure, sales, job types and 
quality, productivity, client and supplier relationships, the participation 
of women in management and employment, etc. Benjamin and Mbaye 
(2012) applied the methodological framework outlined in Chapter 2 to 
survey data to analyze the informal sector, its definition, scope, dominant 
traits, and trends in Francophone West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, and 
Senegal). This chapter extends the analysis to Cameroon and Gabon in 
Central Africa. Surveys were conducted in Cameroon’s cities of Douala 
and Yaounde, and Libreville in Gabon, between 2013 and 2014. These 
findings complete data previously collected in West Africa from 2007 
to 2009 and enable comparison between the two regions. Despite their 
similar Francophone institutions, the economies of the two regions differ 
substantially in terms of resource abundance, governance, and macro-
economic stability. The Central African countries have higher average 
income due to resource revenues, but the standard of living of most peo-
ple is still very low. The survey instrument was updated to encompass 
an increasingly broad set of issues regarding business organization and 
employment. Therefore, some information is only available for countries 
that underwent more recent surveys and for which additional modules 
were added to the standard questionnaire. All the data for the tables and 
figures presented in this chapter are derived from these surveys.
In this chapter, we focus mainly on the classification of firms as for-
mal, large informal, and small informal to compare these three major 
types of firms, primarily in the three Central African cities (Douala, 
Yaounde, and Libreville) with some comparisons to the three cities in 
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West Africa (Cotonou, Dakar, and Ouagadougou). The next section 
discusses the socioeconomic characteristics of formal and informal man-
agers and employees. The following section focuses on firms managed by 
women. We then turn to an analysis of firms’ views on the institutional 
environment and return to the issue of formal-informal firm interactions 
discussed in the previous chapter. Our results provide considerable sup-
port to the hypothesis that weaknesses in the business environment are 
an important source of informality.
Socioeconomic Characteristics of Formal versus Informal 
Managers and Employees
This section describes the characteristics of informal compared to formal 
firms, examining factors such as managers’ age and education, and com-
pensation of employees.
Using the 0–1 informality measure from Chapter 2, where 0 is com-
pletely formal and 1 is completely informal, Figure 4.1 shows that size 
is very much correlated with informality, since those firms with lower 
levels of sales (below 50 million FCFA) tend to be more informal than 
firms with larger annual sales.
Figure 4.1
Informality scores according to the level of annual sales of 50 million FCFA or more and less 
than 50 million FCFA (0–1 scale where 0 is completely formal and 1 is completely informal)
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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Table 4.1
Manager’s average age by status of firms (percent of all managers by sector)
City Status of the firm Less than 25 Between 25 and 35 More than 35
Douala Formal 0.9 17.6 81.5
Large informal 0.0 38.9 61.1
Small informal 11.0 61.4 27.6
Yaounde Formal 1.6 21.3 77.0
Large informal 20.0 40.0 40.0
Small informal 18.3 51.6 30.1
Libreville Formal 4.0 22.0 74.0
Large informal 10.5 52.6 36.8
Small informal 30.9 55.3 13.8
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Table 4.1 shows that the proportion of business managers who are 
under 25 years old is very low in the surveyed enterprises. In the three 
Central African cities, the average manager’s age is highest in the for-
mal sector (more than 70% of firms have managers over 35 years old), 
 considerably lower in the small informal sector and in-between for the 
large informal firms.
Firms managed by people with no education or with a primary level 
of education are found to be more informal than those with more highly 
educated managers, using the 0–1 scale for composite informality 
(Figure 4.2). Surprisingly, in Libreville, this figure also shows that firms 
managed by people that achieve a secondary level of education have 
similar levels of informality to those with managers who only attended 
Koranic schools. This illustrates both the weaknesses of the formal edu-
cation system and the entrepreneurial spirit of Koranic school graduates.
Table 4.2 shows further detail on managerial education by city. Over 
90% of managers in all countries and segments of the informal sector are 
literate. Of the managers in the small informal sector, 21.5% in Libreville, 
11.7% in Douala, and 28% in Yaounde reached higher educational levels. 
More strikingly, a majority of managers in the small informal sector have 
a secondary level of education: 50.6% in Libreville, 69% in Douala, and 
52.7% in Yaounde.
Another striking feature of informal work in Central Africa is the 
level of self-employment, which is higher than 70% among small infor-
mal firms in the three cities of Central Africa (Figure 4.3), but much 
lower in Cotonou and Dakar. Among formal firms, it is usually less 
than 20%.
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Figure 4.2
Informality scores according to the level of education of the business manager (0–1 scale where 
0 is completely formal and 1 is completely informal)
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Table 4.2
Literacy and educational background of business managers (percent)
City Status of the firm
Have been 
to school
Can read  
and write 
in French Primary Secondary
Higher  
education
Douala Formal 97.2 99.1 1.9 26.9 68.5
Large informal 100.0 100.0 5.6 66.7 27.8
Small informal 99.3 99.3 18.6 69.0 11.7
Yaounde Formal 98.4 98.4 4.9 32.8 60.7
Large informal 100.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 50.0
Small informal 100.0 100.0 19.4 52.7 28.0
Libreville Formal 90.0 100.0 6.0 10.0 74.0
Large informal 73.7 94.7 0.0 26.3 47.4
Small informal 84.9 98.8 12.8 50.6 21.5
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Table 4.3 illustrates the considerable monthly wage differences between 
the formal and informal sectors for the five cities. In almost all cases, 
formal sector wages are the highest and small informal sector incomes 
the lowest, with large informal firms somewhere in the middle, although 
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with varying differentials. Notably, Gabon has the highest average wage 
levels of the formal sector yet the lowest wage levels of the informal sec-
tor. The average wage level in formal firms is about 10 times higher than 
for small informal firms in Libreville, while it is only 3.2 times higher 
in Yaounde, 2.5 in Dakar, and 2.4 in Ouagadougou. Higher income 
inequal ity in Gabon, due partly to the dominance of oil in the economy, 
may explain this difference. The differences in compensation between 
formal and large informal firms is smaller than with small  informal ones 
in all countries except for Benin.
Our findings indicate that social connections play a preeminent role in 
employment. In the three Central African cities studied, a large majority 
of employees did report a kinship relationship with the manager in the 
small informal sector. Only 17.6% of employees in Douala in the small 
Figure 4.3
Self-employment (percent of total employment)
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Table 4.3
Average monthly salary in 1,000 FCFA
City Formal Large informal Small informal
Dakar 467.3 265.8 182.5
Cotonou 324.8 62.2 79.3
Ouagadougou 326.5 319.8 134.0
Douala 364.4 168.4 103.0
Yaounde 272.2 541.6 85.7
Libreville 656.3 204.8 67.5
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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informal sector did not have a kinship connection; the corresponding 
figures are 22% in Yaounde and 39.2% in Libreville. The role of kinship 
is considerably less in the formal and large informal sectors although not 
insignificant (Table 4.4).
Our findings concerning surveyed employees’ working conditions 
tend to confirm the general conclusion drawn by previous literature 
on Africa’s labour market. The working conditions in the informal 
sector are often precarious and are far worse than in the formal sec-
tor (Table 4.5). It appears that most informal sector employees do not 
receive a pay slip, unlike their formal sector counterparts. In Libreville, 
83.5% of formal sector employees and only 18.9% of small informal 
sector employees receive a pay slip. Similarly, in Yaounde, only 2.4% 
of small informal sector employees receive a pay slip; whereas, 85.3% 
do in the formal sector. Working hours are also harsher in the small 
informal sector. The average daily working hours for workers in small 
informal firms is 12 in Douala, 11.2 in Yaounde, and 12.2 in Libreville, 
compared to the formal sector’s 8 in Douala, 6.4 in Yaounde, and 7 
in Libreville. Employees stated that these long hours help them make 
ends meet. Most small informal sector employees had no social security 
coverage (pension or social security benefits): 15.4% in Libreville, only 
3.4% in Douala, and 2.9% in Yaounde. In contrast, in the formal sector, 
the majority of employees have social security coverage. Likewise, the 
majority of formal sector employees receive paid vacation, while very 
few do in the small informal sector. Formal sector working conditions 
are better than in the informal sector in other dimensions not shown in 
the table. Few enterprises in the formal or informal sectors offer a year-
end bonus or profit sharing. Holding multiple jobs is another factor that 
is more common in the informal sector. Further, in the small informal 
sector, most employees are paid the minimum wage or less, as discussed 
below. However, it should be noted that some formal sector employees 
work in precarious conditions too, reflecting the fact that informal jobs 
exist even within formal entities.
The situation is more varied for the share of employees who have 
an employment contract (Table 4.6). In Libreville, most firms, even 
small informal ones, have work contracts, with the majority being 
permanent even for informal firms; this reflects Libreville’s small 
population and the country’s large wealth. In Douala and Yaounde, 
however, the situation for formal and informal firms differs sharply, 
with the vast majority of employees in formal firms having perma-
nent contracts; whereas, very few informal firms, especially smaller 
ones, have such contracts.
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Table 4.5
Working conditions according to the firm’s status (percent, unless specified)








Douala Formal 93.0 8.0 47.1 78.7
Large informal 32.7 11.5 21.4 10.9
Small informal 2.0 12.0 3.4 2.7
Yaounde Formal 85.3 6.4 52.6 69.3
Large informal 23.3 9.8 28.0 15.3
Small informal 2.4 11.2 2.9 3.5
Libreville Formal 83.5 7.0 79.3 66.5
Large informal 44.4 10.1 31.1 53.3
Small informal 18.9 12.2 15.4 11.2
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Table 4.6
Proportion of employees with a work contract (percent)
City  Status of the firm Permanent Temporary Other None
Douala Formal 87.4 3.4 7.0 2.2
Large informal 25.4 13.2 38.0 22.7
Small informal 3.3 18.2 10.1 68.2
All firms 54.0 8.9 16.5 20.5
Yaounde Formal 64.5 7.2 20.7 7.6
Large informal 18.6 8.7 41.3 31.3
Small informal 4.0 3.2 25.2 67.5
All firms 37.2 6.7 27.7 28.4
Libreville Formal 67.0 26.8 4.3 1.8
Large informal 13.3 33.3 46.7 6.7
Small informal 6.3 12.6 20.3 60.8
All firms 35.5 21.9 16.2 26.4
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Profile of Female Entrepreneurship in Central Africa
An analysis of the profile of female entrepreneurship in Central Africa 
reveals contrasting trends. On the one hand, female entrepreneurs seem 
more confined to small informal activities and thus more excluded from 
basic social services (e.g., training, financing, and ICT use). On the other 
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hand, women seem to be more resilient when facing a hostile environ-
ment. For example, despite their very informal status, the female loan 
repayment level is higher.
The predominance of women in the small informal sector is an obvi-
ous reality in all the cities studied. Figure 4.4 shows the overall informality 
score for male- and female-headed firms on the 0–1 scale explained in 
Chapter 2, where 1 is completely informal. The figure shows consider-
ably higher overall informality for female-managed firms. Turning to 
individual cities in Central Africa in Table 4.7, in Douala, the propor-
tion of enterprises led by females is merely 10% in the formal sector and 
6% in the large informal sector. However, in the small informal sector, 
this proportion rises to 83%. In Yaounde, the percentage of female-led 
small informal firms is 80, compared with 17% in the formal sector. In 
Libreville, 12% of formal firms are managed by women, compared with 
78% in the small informal sector. The greater presence of females in the 
small informal sector was also documented in our interviews. Women 
are found more frequently in retail, self-employed hairstyling, prepaid 
phone card marketing, and restaurants. Similarly, our analyses on cross-
border trade show that in some socio-religious networks, women play 
Figure 4.4
Informality scores by gender of the business manager
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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an important role as commercial intermediaries, often in activities con-
nected to their spouses.
Table 4.7 also presents the extent to which female-managed firms 
manifest some of the seven criteria of informality. It appears that in the 
three cities, the majority of female-operated firms do not have reliable 
accounting systems. Only 45% of female managers use formal accounting 
in Douala, 36% in Libreville, and 27% in Yaounde. Similarly, firms man-
aged by women are much less likely to have a fixed workplace than their 
same-status male counterparts. The proportion of women without a fixed 
workplace is 39% in Yaounde and 33% in Libreville, but higher in Douala 
at 56%. Sometimes, however, women have fixed locations as retail vendors 
in the open-air markets or street stands of African cities. The registration 
criterion reveals that between 40% and 48% of female- managed firms are 
registered, well below that of men. During our interviews, we observed that 
women engaged in very small informal activities, such as selling peanuts, 
sometimes had tax records. The factor that is most strongly correlated to 
female entrepreneurship is the size of the business. Most women engage 
in activities of very small size (fewer than 5 employees). Female-managed 
firms comprise 72% of businesses in Libreville, 84% in Yaounde, and 
86% in Douala in this category of microenterprise.
The share of female-managed firms with social security coverage of 
employees is very low, at 15% in Douala, 23% in Yaounde, and 18% in 
Libreville; the rate of coverage for male-managed firms is higher at 49%, 
48%, and 34%, respectively (Table 4.8). Additionally, in all three cities, 
employees’ average monthly income is lower for enterprises managed by 
women than men.
Another dominant characteristic of entrepreneurship in Africa is 
financial exclusion (i.e., lacking access to bank credit), from which 
Table 4.7





Status of the firm
Accounting









Douala Male 49.3 6.8 43.9 74.6 21.0 71.2 48.3
Female 10.6 6.1 83.3 45.5 56.1 40.9 86.4
Yaounde Male 46.0 8.0 46.0 55.8 12.4 77.0 51.3
Female 17.7 2.0 80.4 27.5 39.2 45.1 84.3
Libreville Male 22.1 7.7 70.2 48.6 12.5 81.7 68.3
Female 12.1 9.1 78.8 36.4 33.3 48.5 72.7
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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Table 4.8
Distribution of enterprises according to social security coverage and access to bank 
financing by manager’s gender (percent)
City Manager’s gender Social security Bank loan Repayment difficulty
Douala Male 48.8 27.5 25.4
Female 15.2 18.2 39.4
Yaounde Male 47.8 26.6 32.7
Female 23.5 9.8 19.6
Libreville Male 33.7 9.6 30.0
Female 18.2 12.1 25.0
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
not even the formal sector can fully escape. Not surprisingly, female- 
managed firms have weaker access to credit than male-managed ones. 
Libreville is the only city where the share of women with access to bank 
credit is higher than for men, at 12% versus 9% (Table 4.8). By contrast, 
in Douala, 18% of women have access to bank credit, compared with 
28% of men; in Yaounde, 10% of women have access to bank credit, 
while the same is true for 27% of men. A significant number of people 
of both genders experience some difficulties in repaying loans, with no 
systematic differences between men and women.
A larger proportion of firms managed by women have a sales volume 
of below 50 million FCFA when compared with firms managed by men, 
at 86% versus 76% (Table 4.9).
Female-managed firms are more consistently excluded from infra-
structure services such as water, electricity, and telephones, and make 
less use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The 
shares of female-managed enterprises in Douala with an email account 
and a website are only 9% and 1.5% in Douala; the corresponding figures 
for male-managed firms are much higher, at 42% and 26%, respectively. 
In Yaounde and Libreville, these shares are a bit higher, but a significant 
gap between male- and female-led firms is still observed. A similar pat-
tern emerges for access to infrastructure.
Table 4.9
Proportion of firms by sales volume according to the manager’s gender, average of 
Douala, Yaounde, and Libreville (percent)
Manager’s gender
More than 50 million 
FCFA
Less than 50 million 
FCFA Total
Male 24.2 75.8 100
Female 13.9 86.1 100
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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On the other hand, women tend to have fewer problems with 
unions and the government. and they are as optimistic as men about 
the future of their business (Table 4.10). For example, only about 20% 
of firms managed by women in Douala report experiencing problems 
with the government, versus close to 80% for their male-operated 
counterparts. In Yaounde, these numbers are 14% for female and 86% 
for male enterprises. When we look at the share of enterprises who 
note having trouble with unions, it is also much lower for female-led 
enterprises than for male-led enterprises.
There is also a strong correlation between sectoral activity and gen-
der of managers (Table 4.11). Female-led businesses are more present 
in the trade and other service sectors, and they are much less repre-
sented in manufacturing and construction. For example, in Douala only 
Table 4.10










Douala Male 78.7 83.3 79.5
Female 21.3 16.7 20.5
Yaounde Male 69.1 75.0 86.1
Female 30.9 25.0 14.0
Libreville Male 86.8 100.0 82.5
Female 13.2 0.0 17.5
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Table 4.11
Firms’ sector of activity by the manager’s gender (percent)
Sector
Douala Yaounde Libreville
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Manufacturing 23.4 12.1 33.6 23.5 22.1 15.2
Trade 34.2 36.4 33.6 41.2 41.8 42.4
Construction 4.4 0.0 6.2 0.0 5.8 0.0
Non-Financial market service 30.2 42.4 18.6 25.5 27.4 39.4
Financial and insurance services 0.5 1.5 0.9 0.0 1.4 0.0
Non-market services 2.9 6.1 4.4 9.8 1.0 3.0
Other services 4.4 1.5 2.7 0.0 0.5 0.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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12% of female-managed enterprises are in manufacturing, versus 23% for 
male enterprises, and there are no female-managed enterprises in the 
construction sector in any of the three cities.
In summary, female-managed enterprises exhibit the symptoms of 
informality and precariousness to a greater extent than male-managed 
firms. Therefore, female-managed firms are more vulnerable, and in 
greater need of assistance, than those of their male counterparts.
The Business Environment and the Informal Sector
Access to public services
Our surveys confirm that weaknesses in the business environment are 
costly for all enterprises, but particularly so for informal enterprises and 
female-managed enterprises. Access to water, electricity, telephone, and 
other communication services illustrates these issues. For example, in 
Douala only 18% of female-managed enterprises have access to water, 
against close to 50% for male-managed enterprises. In Yaounde, 57% of 
female-run enterprises have access to electricity, versus 79% for male-
run firms (Table 4.12). The same is true for access to communication 
technologies such as email, website, and mobile phones.
Informal firms also suffer from other aspects of public service delivery, 
including interruptions of service and long delays in obtaining connec-
tions for water, electricity, and fixed-line telecommunications.
Access to financing
Access to formal financing is a pervasive problem in African countries, as 
previously noted. Much of current investment is financed with personal 
Table 4.12





Communication technologies Infrastructure services
Email Website
Mobile 
phone Water Electricity Telephone
Douala Male 42.0 26.3 63.9 49.8 81.5 64.9
Female 9.1 1.5 42.4 18.2 63.6 34.9
Yaounde Male 36.3 19.5 63.7 51.3 78.8 66.4
Female 13.7 11.8 54.9 37.3 56.9 47.1
Libreville Male 26.9 15.9 NA 61.5 84.6 38.9
Female 18.2 3.0 NA 69.7 81.8 36.4
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
92  Ekomié, Gueye, Haughton, Mbaye, and Tall
funds and retained earnings (Table 4.13). Even for formal firms, only 
about 15–20% have received bank loans in the various cities. Access 
to bank credit is even lower for small informal enterprises, below 10% 
in all cases except Cotonou where it is 15%. For large informal enter-
prises, access to bank credit is somewhat more variable, reaching 20% in 
Yaounde, where it actually exceeds the share of formal firms with bank 
credit. Enterprises rely instead on other types of financing (e.g., personal 
savings, retained earnings, family loans, gifts, and legacies) to fund their 
investment. Notably, more than 85% of small informal enterprises and 
70% of large informal enterprises in Douala, Yaounde, and Libreville 
receive gifts and inheritances as a main source of financing.
Firms in West Africa and Central Africa face high loan interest rates, 
particularly informal enterprises. Formal enterprises generally can bor-
row at about 12% interest (Table 4.14 and Benjamin and Mbaye 2012). 
Table 4.13
Enterprises’ method of financing (percent)
City Status of the firm
Method of financing
Internal funding or 
retained earnings Bank credit





Dakar Formal 64 20 4 12
Large informal 62 16 8 14
Small informal 64 8 2 26
Cotonou Formal 76 15 7 2
Large informal 64 8 14 14
Small informal 68 15 0 16
Ouagadougou Formal 67 19 14 0
Large informal 55 14 23 9
Small informal 56 8 20 16
Libreville Formal 27 21 9 43
Large informal 7 7 26 59
Small informal 3 4 18 74
Douala Formal 30 17 8 46
Large informal 5 5 15 75
Small informal 1 3 18 79
Yaounde Formal 23 14 9 54
Large informal 0 20 10 70
Small informal 2 5 9 84
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
The Informal Sector in Francophone Africa  93
Small informal enterprises confront rates of about 28% in Libreville, and 
about 20% in Yaounde and Douala. These higher rates paid by informal 
enterprises are justified in part by the high level of risk associated with 
these loans and the high operating costs of the microfinance institutions 
that are their main lenders.
In the three West African cities, all types of surveyed enterprises 
admitted to having considerable loan repayment difficulties, with peaks 
of 80% for formal firms in Cotonou and 87% for large informal firms in 
Ouagadougou. In general, firms in Douala and Yaounde seemed to have 
fewer such difficulties, at peaks of 28% for formal firms in Yaounde and 
39% for large informal firms in Douala. Formal enterprises reported hav-
ing fewer loan repayment difficulties than small informal enterprises for 
all the cities in the sample, except Cotonou.
Other aspects of the business environment
Formal enterprises are more likely than small informal enterprises to 
be members of a professional organization. As depicted in Table 4.15, 
the figures are 35% for formal enterprises and 13% for small informal 
enterprises in Cotonou, 30% and 19% in Dakar, and 18% and 7% in 
Ouagadougou. In Central Africa, informal enterprise membership in 
professional associations is relatively low, at less than 5% in the three 
 cities; whereas for the formal sector, it is at 40%, 15%, and 20% in Douala, 
Yaounde, and Libreville, respectively.
The informal sector and business taxation in Central Africa
The role of business taxation in fostering competitiveness and growth 
is widely recognized and documented. In the countries under study, 
the tax system is regarded as a significant obstacle to development. 
According to many authors, the pervasiveness of the informal economy 
results, in part, from a tax policy aimed at maximizing revenue col-
lection rather than promoting development (Loayza 1997; Mbaye and 
Gueye 2018).
Table 4.14
Loan interest rates charged by banks
City Formal Large informal Small informal
Douala 12.1 16.0 21.8
Yaounde 11.8 30.0 19.4
Libreville 12.8 27.0 28.5
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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Business leaders have a fairly negative perception of the tax system; this 
holds true for both formal and all categories of informal enterprises.1 The 
length of the wait time for tax settlement is considered unacceptably high 
by most company managers. Generally, the methods of tax settlement are 
considered ineffective, as is the quality of the collection service. Similarly, 
tax rates on businesses are considered high by many companies. There 
are, however, some positive perceptions of the efficiency of the collection 
service. A majority of respondents affirm the ease with which their taxes 
1Our interviews suggested that tax administration, rather than tax rates, is the primary prob-
lem, consistent with the World Bank Doing Business 2019 findings. This differs from older survey 
results from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, to which Chapter 5 refers.
Table 4.15
Proportion of firms affiliated with a professional association (percent)
City Formal Large informal Small informal
Dakar 29.7 40.0 19.0
Cotonou 35.3 28.9 13.0
Ouagadougou 18.0 21.2 7.5
Douala 39.8 11.1 4.1
Yaounde 14.8 30.0 2.2
Libreville 20.0 5.3 2.3
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Table 4.16
Perceptions of the administration of the tax system (percent)













of social safety 
net rules
Douala Formal 83.3 82.4 47.2 82.4
Large informal 83.3 94.4 55.6 88.9
Small informal 95.2 96.5 66.9 93.1
Yaounde Formal 83.6 85.2 52.5 78.7
Large informal 70.0 80.0 50.0 80.0
Small informal 87.1 89.2 57.0 93.5
Libreville Formal 52.0 42.0 44.0 44.0
Large informal 68.4 52.6 42.1 73.7
Small informal 70.4 58.7 41.3 75.0
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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can be declared and they encounter few barriers in the registration pro-
cess. Moreover, a large number of both formal and informal businesses 
find that it is not always advantageous to remain in the informal sector 
because of the impossibility of deducting the value-added tax (VAT) and 
thus gaining access to international public contracts.
Our findings indicate a very low level of confidence in how govern-
ments use tax revenues. Many managers of formal firms report tax 
harassment, i.e., repeated demands for fees, inspections, documents, etc. 
(Table 4.16). Finally, the low tax collection levels can be explained by the 
limited capacity of government. This negative view of the taxation sys-
tem may contribute to tax evasion in these countries.
Analyzing Interactions between Formal and  
Informal Firms
The relationship between formal and informal firms is much debated. 
The predominant view is that informal firms have an unfair competitive 
advantage due to avoidance of tax and regulatory obligations and thus 
undercut formal firms. There are certainly important instances of a play-
ing field that is not level for formal and informal firms. However, there 
are also many cases of complementary and cooperative relationships 
between the two categories of firms. This section addresses the following 
issues:
•	 The value chains and number of people who are involved, their 
impact on growth and employment, the obstacles to their develop-
ment, etc.
•	 The patterns of competition between formal and informal firms: sec-
tors which are affected, impact on formal firm productivity and overall 
performance, and impact on market structure and job creation.
•	 Understanding the policy implications of the interplay between 
these categories of firms.
Sourcing
In this section, we use our survey data to analyze the relationships 
between the formal and informal sectors, focusing on competition 
and collaboration. Transactions between formal and informal actors 
are common. Table 4.17 shows that 52.5% of firms in Dakar and 31% 
of enterprises in Cotonou trade with firms of a different size than 
themselves. Also, the table shows that large enterprises in Dakar tend 
to trade more with other large enterprises; whereas, in Cotonou large 
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firms tend to trade more with smaller firms. The table further shows 
that in Dakar most large firms expect to transact more with firms of 
different size than themselves in the future whereas in Cotonou the 
majority of such firms view such transactions as stable.
Table 4.18 shows the distribution of subcontracting by sector. Not 
surprisingly, wholesale and retail trade are major participants, account-
ing for almost 21% in Dakar and 30% in Cotonou of reported cases of 
distribution of formal sector products, mainly manufactured goods. 
Frequently, large informal wholesalers procure supplies from formal 
firms to sell to small informal retailers. In some cases, these wholesalers 
Table 4.17
Share of firms doing business with different size counterparts (percent)
 Dakar Cotonou
Firms using different size counterparts as clients 52.5 31.0
Decomposition of large firms’ sales, by 
category of client firm:
Big enterprises 49.2 41.7
Small enterprises 22.2 47.2
Medium enterprises 28.6 11.1







Proportion of informal firms involved in subcontracting of 
formal sector goods and services (share by sector in percent)
Sector goods and services Dakar Cotonou
Wholesale/retail trade 21.4 29.9
Construction 10.2 16.4




Kitchen utensils 2.0 0.0
Carpentry 0.0 1.5
Catering/restaurants 0.0 1.5
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receive goods on credit and sell them to small informal firms, only after 
which they pay the formal supplier firms. Construction is another impor-
tant sector where subcontracting is observed, particularly in Cotonou 
(16.4%). In this industry, the large enterprises have the financial strength 
and expertise to tender for big projects, and they then subcontract to 
smaller, mostly informal, firms.
We also examined smaller firms’ perceptions about doing business 
with larger firms. In general, the level of satisfaction is quite high, both in 
Dakar and in Cotonou. These results remain robust to different criteria 
to categorize the small informal businesses. A proportion between 80 and 
100%, depending on the criterion of informality, expressed great satisfac-
tion with the timeliness and level of professionalism of the relationship.
Table 4.19 examines whether the source of relationships with out-
sourced enterprises is personal or professional. About 34.7% of enterprises 
in Dakar and 67.5% in Cotonou are subcontracting based on friendships. 
This personalization of business relationships is quite understandable 
given the level of risk associated with the informal sector and difficulties 
in enforcing contracts in Africa. Kinship and other networks substitute 
for the rule of law (Golub and Hansen-Lewis 2012).
The informality of transactions between enterprises is also obvious in 
financial relationships shown in Table 4.20. Few informal firms have the 
working capital to pay cash for purchases. This is particularly marked in 
Cotonou, which is noted for its pervasive informality: 97.5% of transac-
tions with informal commercial partners are on credit rather than cash. 
Most of the credit extended is not in kind but rather in cash, with loans 
having short maturities of a month or less. Generally, lenders are satis-
fied with the level of repayment.
Table 4.21 shows that larger firms (formal and large informal) that 
do business with small informal firms tend to be less productive than 
Table 4.19




Same kinship network 4.1 2.5
Same religious network 2.0 5.0
Strictly professional 57.1 12.5
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 4.20
Financing of transactions with informal sector partner (percent)
Dakar Cotonou
Share of transactions on credit 41.9 97.5
Type of loan In cash 88.9 100.0
In kind 11.1 0.0










Productivity (sales per worker) of formal and large informal firms according to whether they 
subcontract with small informal firms, as a ratio to average productivity by sector (percent)
City Status of the firm
Trade with small 
informal firms
No trade with small 
informal firms
Dakar Formal 35 165
Large informal 46 154
Cotonou Formal 19 181
Large informal 98 102
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 4.22
Share of firms that export and do not export among those who do business with small informal 
firms (share of all firms within group in percent)
City Status of the firm Export Do not export
Dakar Formal 10.0 90.0
Large informal 9.5 90.5
Cotonou Formal 28.1 71.9
Large informal 18.8 81.3
Source: Authors’ calculations
those that do not transact with smaller firms. Likewise, among formal 
and large informal exporting enterprises, a clear and intuitive result 
emerges. Few exporting firms have business relations with the informal 
sector (Table 4.22). Exporting firms must meet very high standards and 
cannot take risks by outsourcing to informal firms.
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Competition between formal and informal firms
Additionally, we examined competition between the formal and informal 
firms in different sectors and its effects on the formal sector. Firms that 
compete with small informal firms tend to have much lower productivity 
than firms that do not compete with smaller firms (Table 4.23). Similarly, 
Table 4.24 reveals that large firms (formal and large informal) that export 
are less subject to competition from small informal firms than large firms 
that do not export. Overall, this suggests that the largest firms, and espe-
cially those that export, tend not to face significant competition from 
informal firms; instead smaller formal firms are those most affected by 
competition from informal firms. Thus, the impact of unfair competition 
from informal firms may be greatest for less established formal companies. 
There are some important exceptions to this general trend, however, as 
we show in the case studies. For example, the national petroleum distribu-
tors in Benin and Cameroon are severely damaged by smuggled gasoline 
imports from Nigeria, as discussed in the previous chapter.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the results of our surveys in West and 
Central Africa on the characteristics of firms, the interactions among 
Table 4.23
Productivity (sales per worker) of formal and large informal firms according to whether or not 
they compete with small informal sector, as a ratio to average productivity by sector (percent)
City Status of the firm
Compete with  
small informal firms
Do not compete  
with small informal firms
Dakar Formal 54 140
Large informal 42 174
Cotonou Formal 27 148
Large informal 41 155
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 4.24
Share of firms that export and do not export among those competing with small informal firms 
(share of all firms within group in percent)
 City Status of the firm Export Do not export
Dakar Formal 16.2 83.8
Large informal 14.3 85.7
Cotonou Formal 31.7 68.3
Large informal  5.0 95.0
Source: Authors’ calculations
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different types of firms, and the drivers of informality. Given the sim-
ilarity of the surveys carried out in the various countries, we are able 
to compare the structure and operation of firms across countries in 
 considerable detail. We illustrate the complexity of the informal sector 
and contrast three kinds of firms: formal, large informal, and small infor-
mal. Our results largely confirm those of Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) in 
terms of the similarities and differences between these three types of firms. 
Our results show that small informal firms suffer from various forms of 
social exclusion and an adverse business environment to a greater extent 
than formal firms and even large informal firms. The socio-demographic 
characteristics of the three types of firms differ considerably. The aver-
age level of educational attainment is higher for managers in the formal 
sector than in the informal sector. Self-employment is much more preva-
lent in the informal sector. Personal connections to the firm manager are 
much more prevalent among employees in the informal sector than the 
formal sector. Our findings in Central Africa go further than the previous 
ones in West Africa in illustrating the precarious nature of the informal 
economy. Women are more frequently present in the small informal sec-
tor than in the formal sector. The new results of this research highlight 
that firms managed by women are more likely to be informal than firms 
managed by men, i.e., less likely to have a fixed workplace, have lower 
access to bank loans, participate less in social security systems, and pay 
their employees less.
Our results also shed light on the debates on the driving causes of 
widespread informality, discussed in the previous chapter. Our results in 
this chapter shed light on two hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3:
1. the informal sector reflects pre-modern business culture; and 
2. the adverse business climate and weak state authority induce firms 
to make a rational choice of going informal. 
We find some support for both of these factors. The first is supported by 
the predominance of kinship group ties in informal firms, whereas they 
are largely absent from formal firms. The second hypothesis is validated 
by the responses of firms regarding their perceptions of the institutional 
environment, which are generally negative. This is the case both for pro-
vision of public services such as water, communications, and electricity, 
and the widespread negative view of the administration of taxation and 
enforcement of regulations.
We further examine another topic addressed in the case studies of the 
previous chapter: the nature and significance of interactions between 
formal and informal firms. Most firm surveys, including ours, show 
that many formal firms complain of unfair competition from informal 
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firms, and it would clearly be in their interests to have informal firms 
removed from markets where they compete. The view of unfairness is 
readily understood because of informal firms’ lack of obligation to pay 
formal taxes and regulated wages, or to not comply with other regula-
tions. However, in other respects, the playing field is not necessarily 
unlevel. The productivity advantage of formal firms, given their access to 
better technology, intermediate goods, import and export markets, and 
to formal, large-scale consumers, often means the markets are segmented 
in a way that reduces the impact of informal competition.
The very same reasons why the informal sector struggles to grow and 
modernize also explain why informal businesses fail to enter organized 
and complex value chains. To mainstream outsourcing in business rela-
tionships, African governments should seriously consider relaxing the 
labour code, and thus enable larger firms to diminish labour and related 
costs through subcontracting. Likewise, improving training and support 
services could provide more positive interactions between formal and 
informal firms.
References
Benjamin, N., and Mbaye, A.A. (2012). The Informal Sector in Franco-
phone Africa: Firm Size, Productivity, and Institutions.  Washington, 
DC: World Bank and Agence Française de Développement.
Golub, S.S., and Hansen-Lewis, J. (2012). Informal Trading Networks in 
West Africa: The Mourides of Senegal/The Gambia and the  Yoruba 
of Benin/Nigeria. In N. Benjamin and A.A. Mbaye (Eds.), The 
Informal Sector in Francophone Africa: Firm Size, Productivity, and 
 Institutions, 173–193. Washington, DC: World Bank and Agence 
Française de Développement.
Loayza, N.A. (1997). The Economics of the Informal Sector: A Simple 
Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Latin America. Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 1727. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Mbaye, A.A., and Gueye, F. (2018). The Competitiveness Challenge of 
the Formal Sector in Francophone Africa: Understanding the Role of 
the Informal Sector and the Business Environment. In I.  Adeleye and 
M. Esposito (Eds.), Africa’s Competitiveness in the Global  Economy, 
25–51. AIB Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Series. Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan.

Characteristics and Consequences of Informality  103
CHAPTER 5
Characteristics and Consequences of  
Informality: African Firms in Comparative 
Perspective1
Dominique Haughton, Jonathan Haughton, and Ahmadou Aly Mbaye
Introduction
From a public policy standpoint, the standard view is that it is preferable 
for businesses to operate in the formal, rather than informal, sector. Not 
only are formal sector firms more likely to pay taxes, but it is believed 
that they have better access to finance, land, and services such as electric-
ity, which enables them to grow faster and larger, be more productive, 
and pay higher wages (Ingram et al. 2007).
In sub-Saharan Africa, an estimated 74% of non-agricultural employ-
ment is in the informal sector, defined as workers not covered by social 
protection, comparable to the 70% rate in South and Southeast Asia, 
but above the 56% rate that prevails in Latin America (OECD 2009). 
Estimates indicate that 64% of GDP (49% of non-agricultural Gross 
Value Added) in sub-Saharan Africa is generated by the informal sector, 
double the rates seen in Latin America (OECD 2009). By any standard, 
the informal sector in Africa, and most of the developing world, is large.
One possible explanation for the high importance of the informal sec-
tor is that the investment climate favours the informal. Thus, it is possible 
that the investment climate facing formal firms is not favourable enough 
to encourage firms to transition to formal status.
Ultimately, firms have a choice between becoming formal or remaining 
informal. Retaining their informal status could mean facing potentially 
lower taxes and charges, thus finding it cheaper and easier to hire and fire 
1We would like to thank the World Bank for funding for this research. We are very grateful for 
research assistance from Sophie Faye, Fatou Gueye, and Olomayokun Soremekun; for help-
ful comments and encouragement from Nancy Benjamin and Louise Fox; and for suggestions 
related to the organization of the material from Steve Golub.
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workers and having more flexibility to work around regulations. These 
benefits may outweigh the costs to the firm of being formal.
In this chapter, we examine the links between informal status 
 (‘informality’), the investment climate, and performance, putting the 
African experience into comparative perspective. The database and 
definition of informality we use differ from the previous chapter and 
elsewhere in this book which is based on original survey data. We first 
discuss our data sources and the manner in which we define informality, 
and then summarize some of the key characteristics of informal firms. 
This allows us to turn to an examination of the relevance of informality 
for firm performance, including growth, productivity, wages, and invest-
ment. After summarizing the barriers and perceived constraints bearing 
on informal and formal firms, we end with concluding remarks.
Data and Definitions
As the preceding chapters show, the definition of informal varies consid-
erably from author to author. For instance, in their study of informality 
in six African countries, Ingram et al. (2007) considered all firms with 
more than 10 employees to be formal, defining the remaining firms as 
either ‘partially formal’ (if officially registered) or informal (Benjamin 
and Mbaye 2012).
Our definition of informality is constrained by the data. In this chapter, 
we use information from the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys 
of 51,262 firms in 92 countries between 2005 and 2009. The ICA survey proj-
ect has been supported by the World Bank. The data collected are relatively 
consistent across surveys and include both objective measures, such as sales 
and employment, as well as perceptual measures related to the investment 
climate, such as whether access to finance is seen as a problem.
We have divided the ICA data, which are collected from individual 
firms, into three country-related groups:
•	 Our sub-Saharan African (‘African’) sample, which covers 18 coun-
tries; the full list is provided in Appendix 1.
•	 A group of 28 non-African ‘comparator’ countries that have levels of 
development similar to those of the African sample, which serves as a sort 
of control group. The group includes Bolivia, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
India, and Vietnam, but not China (see Appendix 1 for the list).
•	 A residual group of ‘other countries’ that are typically either transi-
tion economies in Eastern Europe or mid-to-upper-income coun-
tries that may be less directly comparable to the African sample.
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In a few tables, we provide separate data for the eight Francophone 
sub-Saharan African (‘Francophone African’) countries in the African 
sample; these countries are marked with an asterisk in Appendix 1.
Most of the ICA surveys focus on firms with at least five employees. 
However, ICA surveys in a handful of countries have focused just on 
microenterprises with five or fewer employees. Statistics for these firms 
for eight such countries in Africa, covering 912 firms, are presented sepa-
rately in the tables below; the countries are listed in Appendix 1.
The ICA data do not have sufficiently complete information on 
whether firms are officially registered, whether employees pay social 
contributions, or whether the business pays taxes for us to be able to 
use these variables to define informality. Instead, we measure informal-
ity based on the answers to two questions: Does the firm have a bank 
account? And does the firm have audited accounts? If the answer is yes in 
both cases, the firm is formal. If the answer is no in both cases, the firm is 
informal. In all other cases, the firm is considered semi-formal. Our defi-
nition of informality is the result of a more detailed exploratory analysis.
Using our definition, 41% of the firms in our total sample were formal, 
11% informal, and the remaining 48% semi-formal (Table 5.1). These 
proportions hardly vary between Africa, the non-African comparators, 
and other countries, although informality appears to be slightly more 
prevalent in Francophone Africa than elsewhere. Not surprisingly, the 
proportion of African microenterprises that are informal is relatively 
high (24%), but it is noteworthy that one in five small firms is formal in 
the sense of having a bank account and keeping proper accounts.
Table 5.1
The incidence of informality by region
Region
Percentage Breakdown
Informal Semi- formal Formal Total No. of firms
African sample 11.1 44.7 44.2 100.0 7,907
Non-African comparators 11.0 48.2 40.9 100.0 19,021
Other countries 11.0 49.0 40.0 100.0 21,653
Total 11.0 48.0 41.0 100.0 48,581
Memo items
Senegal/Burkina/Benin 12.6 51.0 36.5 100.0 1,188
Francophone African sample 14.2 50.7 35.1 100.0 3,119
African micro-enterprise sample 23.7 55.6 20.7 100.0 907
Source: ICA surveys. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding. Missing values are excluded 
from the calculations.
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Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) found that a relatively high proportion 
of large firms in Dakar, Cotonou, and Ouagadougou were still operat-
ing as informal businesses. There is a sizable variation among firms that 
have annual sales of at least 500,000 USD and are formal (using our cri-
teria of formality). In Laos and Algeria, fewer than 10% of large firms 
are formal, and, at the other extreme, almost all the surveyed firms in 
Nepal and Ecuador are formal. The low proportion of large firms that 
are formal in Peru (37%) is noteworthy, as this is the country from which 
Hernando de Soto (1986) drew inspiration in his classic book, El Otro 
Sendero [The Other Path], which detailed the ways in which rules and 
regulations discourage firms from becoming formal, thereby serving as a 
drag on economic growth.
Characteristics of Informal Firms
In this section, we summarize some of the most important character-
istics of informal firms, including sector, size, ownership structure, 
and the characteristics of managers. In the final part of the section, 
we use TreeNet, a data-mining technique, to help us understand what 
variables are most closely associated with whether a firm is in the 
formal sector.
Sector
From our data, we are able to distinguish four sectors for which the 
sample sizes are large enough: manufacturing (except garments), trade 
(wholesale and retail), services, and garments. The sectoral pattern of 
informality, broken down by geographic region, is shown in Table 5.2. It 
is clear that the degree of informality does not vary much across sectors 
and varies only modestly across regions/samples. However, two points 
are worth noting. First, the garment industry in the African sample is 
more likely to be informal, and less likely to be formal, than elsewhere. 
This suggests a clear difference between the industry in Africa, where 
it is small-scale and domestically oriented (as shown later), and other 
regions, where a substantial fraction of the industry consists of large, 
export-oriented firms.
The second point is that African manufacturing is more likely to be 
formal, and less likely to be informal, than elsewhere. If there is a pro-
gression from informal to semi-formal to formal, then the shortage 
of informal firms—those at an early stage of their life cycle— suggests 
that manufacturing in Africa risks lagging behind the rest of the 
world.
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Size based on employment
One measure of firm size is the number of employees. This has the advan-
tage of being less sensitive to the problem of exchange rate  conversion 
encountered when trying to compare measures of sales or value added 
across countries. Most employees are full-time and permanent, but a sig-
nificant number of firms hire large numbers of workers on a part-time 
basis—for instance, to process a harvest or deal with a holiday season. 
We have incorporated the effect of part-time workers by including the 
full-time equivalent of the part-time workers. Information on the aver-
age time worked by temporary employees is missing for some firms; for 
these cases, we substituted countrywide mean values.
The distribution of firm size (as measured by employment) is skewed 
to the right, so mean values are larger than medians, which is why we 
Table 5.2






 Manufacturing 9.5 40.1 50.4 2,764 28
 Trade 11.1 48.9 40.0 2,299 23
 Services 10.5 42.6 46.9 2,200 12
 Garments 20.3 55.7 24.0 697 5
Non-African comparators
 Manufacturing 14.8 45.3 40.0 9,370 66
 Trade 6.7 51.9 41.4 3,427 71
 Services 6.5 48.6 45.0 4,139 98
 Garments 9.9 44.2 45.9 1,492 12
Other countries
 Manufacturing 10.8 48.2 41.0 8,211 163
 Trade 11.3 52.3 36.5 6,512 304
 Services 10.6 46.9 42.4 6,824 127
 Garments 15.2 49.3 35.6 688 16
African microenterprise sample
 Manufacturing 19.0 63.3 17.8 381 5
 Trade 13.0 57.6 29.4 270 0
 Services 16.1 59.2 24.7 110 0
 Garments 30.5 52.1 17.5 33 0
Source: ICA surveys
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Table 5.3
Number of employees (full-time equivalents)






 Mean 10.4 19.1 81.3 46.0 7,485 8.2
 Median 7.0 9.0 22.0 12.0
Non-African comparators
 Mean 15.2 50.2 121.6 72.8 16,272 12.6
 Median 7.0 14.0 23.0 15.0
Other countries
 Mean 15.7 31.5 103.9 58.8 21,008 10.0
 Median 8.0 12.0 23.0 14.0
Total
 Mean 14.6 36.5 105.6 61.7 44,765 10.6
 Median 7.0 12.0 23.0 14.0
Memo items
 Percent large 1.8 6.5 19.7 11.2
African microenterprise sample
 Mean 2.1 2.8 3.1 2.7  729 —
 Median 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Source: ICA surveys
Note: ‘Large’ firms are those with 100 or more full-time equivalent employees.
present both sets of numbers in Table 5.3. Additionally, the rightmost 
column shows the percentage of firms that are large (defined as having 
100 or more full-time equivalent employees). Two very clear patterns 
emerge from the results summarized in this table. First, formal firms 
everywhere are larger than informal or semi-formal enterprises. Second, 
firms in our African sample are smaller than elsewhere, in any given 
category.
Size based on sales
Firm size may also be measured by the volume of annual sales. As the 
ICA data are in local currency units, we converted these to US dollars 
using the average exchange rates reported in the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators for the relevant years, and then adjusted to 2009 
prices using the United States consumer price index.
The pattern in Table 5.4 is clear: the greater the degree of formality, 
the larger a firm’s sales. This is true whether we use the mean values of 
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Table 5.4
Mean sales per firm per year (USD in thousands per year, 2009 prices) by sector, formality, and 
reference group
 Manufacturing Trade Services Garments Overall
Informal
 Mean 428 305 807 404 497
 Median 51 56 46 24 49
Semi-formal
 Mean 1,711 1,412 1,406 1,380 1,526
 Median 189 176 178 177 182
Formal
 Mean 7,564 4,259 8,042 3,075 6,698
 Median 651 415 407 901 519
Total
 Mean 3,944 2,390 4,257 1,941 3,535
 Median 256 225 212 323 237
African sample: means
Informal 230 110 153 31 150
Semi-formal 612 387 469 666 501
Formal 5,835 2,663 7,774 1,972 5,457
Totals 3,375 1,254 3,922 990 2,766
Source: ICA surveys
sales or the median values, which are typically about a tenth as large as 
the mean values. Crudely, sales in formal firms are about three times as 
large as in semi-formal firms, which are in turn about three times as large 
as in informal firms. The patterns may also be seen visually in Figure 5.1, 
which shows the kernel densities for the log of annual sales per firm, by 
degree of formality.
The geographic information in Table 5.4 shows that the volume of 
sales by African firms is typically smaller than that of firms elsewhere, 
particularly for informal and semi-formal firms. However, African for-
mal firms are almost as large as formal firms elsewhere in each of the four 
sectors considered here.
Age of firms
On average, the firms surveyed by the ICA have been in operation for 
15 years (13 years for informal firms and 17 years for formal firms). 
Interestingly, the difference in age is small, reflecting the tenaciousness 
of informal firms, and the fact that most of them will not transition 
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to full formal status. Informal and semi-formal firms in our African 
sample are particularly young (9 and 11 years, respectively), reflecting 
perhaps the recent nature of sustained economic growth there. It is 
also worth noting that microenterprises in Africa are only 9 years old, 
on average.
Owners and managers
The information on the education of the manager/owner in the ICA 
surveys is scant and unreliable. However, there is some information on 
other aspects of the owners and managers. On average, the top manager 
had almost 16 years of experience (either at the firm or elsewhere). This 
figure was slightly higher in formal than informal firms (16.1 versus 
14.4 years), and somewhat lower in the African sample (13.3 years) and 
among African microenterprises (12.4 years) than elsewhere. However, it 
is striking how little variation there is overall in the average.
About one firm in three has at least one female owner. Female owners 
are less common in Africa (30%) and in the informal sector (also 30%) 
than in the formal sector (37%). It is rare for the top manager to be a 
woman: only one firm in six is led by a woman, and only one in nine in 
Africa. However, informal firms are more likely to be run by a woman 
than formal enterprises.
Figure 5.1
Distribution of sales per firm, by informality
Source: ICA surveys
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Ownership structure
Publicly listed companies are exceptionally rare in the African sample, 
where most of the countries in question do not have stock exchanges. 
Limited liability companies are also less common in Africa, where the 
dominant form of the firm is a sole proprietorship.
Not surprisingly, informal firms also tend to be sole proprietorships, while 
most formal firms have limited liability. But it is noteworthy that just 8% of 
formal firms outside Africa, and 2% in Africa, are publicly listed. Evidently, 
the ownership stake of the principal owner is remarkably high, even for for-
mal firms, where it averages 74%. In this respect, African firms resemble their 
counterparts elsewhere. On the other hand, the concentration of ownership is 
not any higher for microenterprises than for other firms.
Financing
One of the most common complaints of business people is that they can-
not get enough access to credit. Although almost three-fifths of firms had 
access to credit, the proportions varied from 22% for informal firms, to 
39% for microenterprises, and 72% for formal sector firms. Complaints 
by informal firms about the lack of credit may be justified, although our 
definition of informal—no bank account and no internal accounts—all 
but guarantees the results shown here.
The data presented in Table 5.5 show how firms finance their working 
capital needs. In all cases, at least two-thirds of the financing is generated 
internally. For informal firms, the figure is close to four-fifths of the total.
Also of some importance is supplier credit, which in most cases provides 
at least a tenth of these financing needs. Bank credit is also important for for-
mal, but not informal, firms, providing a further tenth of funding. All other 
listed sources of funding are of minor importance. African microenterprises 
are as likely to tap bank finance as their larger peers, but are substantially less 
likely to use supplier credits, relying instead more heavily on internal funds.
When is a Firm Formal?
We now ask what variables are most closely associated with a firm being 
formal. This issue has been addressed before (Gelb et al. 2009; LaPorta 
and Shleifer 2008; Ingram et al. 2007), but our sample is larger and more 
complete than those of most other studies. Among the most common 
findings in the literature are that formality is associated with:
•	 Firm size: larger firms are more likely to be in the formal sector.
•	 Education/managerial talent: the managers of formal sector firms 
tend to have more education and experience.
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Table 5.5
Breakdown of financing of working capital by source (percent)
Informal Semi-formal Formal
African sample
Internal funds 79.2 77.5 66.0
Bank (private or state-owned) 1.3 6.2 12.4
Family/friends 2.1 0.9 0.6
Non-bank financial institution 0.5 1.3 1.9
Supplier credit/customer advance 13.5 12.4 17.7
Other (including informal sources) 3.5 1.6 1.4
Non-African comparators
Internal funds 81.0 69.6 59.8
Bank (private or state-owned) 3.9 14.0 23.0
Family/friends 2.4 2.7 4.0
Non-bank financial institution 2.5 0.9 1.0
Supplier credit/customer advance 6.9 10.5 9.8
Other (including informal sources) 3.2 2.3 2.4
Other countries
Internal funds 80.9 74.5 67.7
Bank (private or state-owned) 2.4 9.3 13.5
Family/friends 2.9 2.6 1.4
Non-bank financial institution 0.4 1.1 1.0
Supplier credit/customer advance 12.3 10.6 14.5
Other (including informal sources) 1.1 1.7 1.9
African microenterprise sample
Internal funds 87.6 83.1 75.5
Bank (private or state-owned) 1.0 6.5 13.3
Non-bank financial institution 2.7 2.5 2.1
Supplier credit/customer advance 4.1 3.3 6.6
Other (including informal, family) 4.6 4.6 2.5
Source: ICA surveys. Includes information for firms for which the components of financing sum to 
100%. The columns here do not necessarily sum to 100%, due to rounding.
•	 Access to land: this is a reason for becoming formally established 
because informal firms may not have the legal standing required to 
own land.
•	 Corruption: it is widely considered that corruption works against 
firms entering the formal sector because they become more vulner-
able to the whims of bureaucrats.
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•	 Access to external finance: the most important single reason to go 
formal may be to have better access to the financial sector.
•	 Access to public services such as roads, water, and electricity: formal 
firms typically have good access to these services.
•	 Taxation: typically, formal firms pay higher taxes.
In most of these cases, there is the thorny issue of causality. For 
instance, do well-educated people bring their firms into the formal sec-
tor or do formal sector firms attract well-educated people? For now, our 
interest is in establishing the correlates of being formal—and, by implica-
tion, the inverse, which are the variables that are associated with being in 
the informal sector.
We use a data-mining technique, TreeNet, to attempt to unravel 
some of these effects. This is a non-parametric technique that makes no 
assumptions about the distributions of the variables, and is robust to 
missing values, which are common enough in the dataset. This method 
thus provides a more solid alternative to the more traditional approach 
of multinomial logistic regression. A brief description of the methodol-
ogy can be found in Appendix 2.
Our target variable is the measure of informality, which has three cat-
egories: formal, semi-formal, and informal. As predictor variables, whose 
availability is constrained by the questionnaires used in the ICA surveys, 
we use the size of the firm (measured by the number of full-time equiva-
lent employees), the years of experience of the top manager working in 
the firm, whether the top manager is female, the extent to which the edu-
cation of the workforce is an obstacle, whether corruption is an obstacle, 
and whether access to finance is an obstacle. Additionally, we use several 
other controls, including the main sector of the firm’s activity, the year 
in which the firm was established, capital per worker employed, the per-
centage of sales directed to exports, and whether the firm communicates 
with clients and suppliers by email or uses a website.
The most interesting results arising from the TreeNet analysis are 
shown in Figure 5.2, where each of the eight panels displays the partial 
effect (when other predictors are held constant) of the predictor in ques-
tion on the propensity for a firm to be in the formal sector. The relative 
importance of each variable is shown next to each graph, with an index 
of 100 representing the most important. 
The top panel in Figure 5.2 shows that the probability of a firm being 
in the formal sector rises steeply as size increases to about 50 employees, 
tapers off, and then increases again.
In other words, size and formality go together strongly. The second 
panel shows that firms that use email are more likely to be formal. In the 
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Access to finance is an 
obstacle. Importance = 89
Note: -7 missing, 0 no 
obstacle, 1 minor, 2 mod-
erate, 3 major, 4 severe.
Access to land is an 
obstacle.  
Importance = 92
Note: -7, -9 missing, 0 no 
obstacle,  
1 minor, 2 moderate, 3 
major, 4 severe.




Partial effects of predictors on the probability that a firm is formal
Source: ICA surveys
Email communication 
(yes = 1).  
Importance = 97
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Corruption is an obstacle. 
Importance = 81
Note: -7, -9 missing,  
0 no obstacle, 1 minor,  
2 moderate, 3 major,  
4 severe.




worker, 2009 prices). 
Importance = 74
Education of workforce  
is an obstacle.  
Importance = 76
Note: -7, -9 missing,  
0 no obstacle, 1 minor, 2 
moderate, 3 major,  
4 severe.
Figure 5.2 (Continued)
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next panels, we see that the more firms perceive it to be difficult to have 
access to finance (third panel) or land (fourth panel), the less likely they 
are to be formal.
In fifth and sixth panels of Figure 5.2, we see that firms that report 
corruption as a minor, rather than a major, obstacle are more likely to be 
formal. We also see that firms that were established longer ago are more 
likely to be formal, although the number of firms in the sample that were 
established before 1960 is quite small. The final two panels in Figure 5.2 
are the least influential (of the variables displayed) correlates of formal-
ity. In the second to last panel, higher capital intensity is associated with 
a greater incidence of formality. The final graph is interesting, in that 
it shows that firms that report that the education of the workforce is a 
severe obstacle to the firm’s development are more likely to be formal.
Performance of Informal Firms                         
Are formal firms more, or less, dynamic and productive than informal 
businesses? This is the central issue that we address in this section, look-
ing first at growth and then at productivity. In the latter part of this 
section, we examine some of the possible explanations for any productiv-
ity differential, including capital intensity, the propensity to export, and 
the use of information technology.
Growth
Most of the ICA surveys asked firms for information on employment 
and sales at the time of the survey and for the three previous years. This 
allows one to compute two different measures of the growth rate of the 
firm over time.
The first measure shown here is the annualized percentage change in 
employment over the three years prior to the survey; the numbers are 
summarized in Table 5.6. Overall, the growth in employment was robust, 
averaging 5.7% per annum (p.a.) for all the firms covered. Expansion was 
particularly rapid in the African firms in the sample (7.0%) and among 
informal firms in the African sample (8.2%). For the sample as a whole, 
the growth of enterprise employment appears to be unrelated to the 
degree of formality of the firm. At a minimum, lack of formality is not 
seriously hobbling enterprise employment growth—fortunately, given 
the enormous need to create jobs in Africa (Fox and Gaal 2008).
These growth rates refer to firms that were included in the ICA 
surveys. By definition, these are the successful firms, in the sense that 
they have not collapsed or shrunk into insignificance. This selection bias 
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Table 5.6
Mean growth rate of employment and sales over previous three years
Informal Semi-formal Formal Overall
Employment
African sample 8.2 7.6 6.3 7.0
Non-African comparators 5.9 4.2 4.6 4.5
Other countries 4.8 6.5 6.4 6.2
Total 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.7
Memo items
Senegal/Burkina Faso/Benin 8.1 8.0 6.7 7.5
Francophone African sample 7.1 6.2 4.9 5.8
African microenterprise sample –10.6 1.4 0.1 –1.0
Real value of sales
African sample 9.3 4.6 5.4 5.4
Non-African comparators 0.6 2.1 5.0 3.1
Other countries 3.4 8.2 10.0 8.4
Total 3.2 5.1 7.1 5.8
Memo items
Senegal/Burkina Faso/Benin 0.3 4.0 6.1 4.3
Francophone African sample 11.6 4.1 4.6 5.3
African microenterprise sample 6.0 13.5 13.0 12.7
Source: ICA surveys. Top panel based on 43,916 usable observations out of a total sample 
of 51,262 firms. African microenterprise sample: 732. Bottom panel based on 37,395 usable 
observations out of a total sample of 51,262 firms. African microenterprise sample: 362. 
Mean annual growth rate of sales overall: 5.82%.
means that these numbers do not, as a general rule, give an accurate sense 
of the growth in enterprise employment overall.
The second measure of growth looks at firm sales. The values of sales 
at the time of the survey, and three years prior to the survey, were first 
deflated using a local consumer price index, as wholesale price indexes 
were not available for most countries.
The real growth rate of firm sales, at an annual 5.8% overall, mir-
rors that of employment growth. By this measure, growth in the African 
countries in our sample was slightly below the overall average, although 
higher than in the non-African comparator sample, as the bottom panel 
of Table 5.6 shows. Informal firms in the African sample posted very 
rapid growth in sales (9.3% p.a., and 11.6% for Francophone African 
countries), in sharp contrast with the experience in the non-African 
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comparator group (0.6% p.a.). This suggests that informality may be less 
of a restraint on growth in the African sample than it is elsewhere.
Productivity
There is substantial literature on the question of how productive informal 
firms are. For instance, Gelb et al. (2009) found that labour productiv-
ity was similar for formal and informal firms in East Africa, but not in 
South Africa. Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) found that productivity is 
higher in formal firms in Dakar, Cotonou, and Ouagadougou, even after 
controlling for the sector in which the firm operates. As noted above, the 
standard argument is that formalization brings access to finance, land, 
and electricity, which raise a firm’s productivity. On the other hand, 
there are costs to being in the formal sector, including higher taxes and 
more onerous labour regulations, which may mean that only inherently 
productive firms can afford to ‘go formal’.
The actual measurement of productivity is quite problematic (Charmes 
2006), and some authors simply use output per worker (e.g., Gelb et al. 
2009). We experimented with the measurement of total factor productivity, 
but the measures are relatively unstable, and require substantial amounts 
of information. Further, this information is often missing, thereby reduc-
ing the sample size. The compromise is to look at value added per worker 
per year. We measure value added by subtracting the cost of intermedi-
ate inputs (including utilities and transport) from sales. The numbers are 
converted to US dollars using current exchange rates, and then put into 
2009 prices using the US consumer price index. A relatively small num-
ber of firms have negative value added, and we exclude these cases from 
the results reported here. We also exclude all cases where value added per 
worker exceeds 10 million USD. There are just a handful of such cases and 
we consider them to be atypical, or perhaps even miscoded.
The numbers for all firms in our sample are summarized in Table 5.7, 
which shows mean value added per worker in the top row of each group, 
followed by the median. The results are in line with expectations. Most 
strikingly, mean value added per worker rises as one goes from informal 
firms (18,126 USD) to semi-formal firms (42,601 USD) to formal firms 
(62,187 USD). This information alone does not allow us to determine 
whether this greater formality is associated with higher productivity, with 
greater capital intensity, or perhaps even with more monopoly power.
It is also clear from Table 5.7 that mean value added per worker is low-
est in the garment sector and highest in trade and services. This pattern 
holds strongly for semi-formal and formal firms, but not among infor-
mal firms, where manufacturing value added is relatively low. On the 
other hand, median value added per worker per year is just 1,962 USD 
for informal garment firms.
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Table 5.7
Value added per worker per year (USD, 2009 prices) by sector and formality
Manufacturing Trade Services Garments No. of firms
Total sample
Informal
 Mean 9,941 20,896 30,536 14,556 3,232
 Median 3,368 5,174 5,297 1,962
Semi-formal
 Mean 28,976 54,383 54,606 18,908 15,571
 Median 6,293 11,614 10,940 4,087
Formal
 Mean 51,436 74,845 73,201 20,358 15,589
 Median 11,387 18,933 15,111 6,260
Total
 Mean 35,850 58,790 60,477 18,969 34,392
 Median 7,583 13,336 11,854 4,759
African sample
Informal
 Mean 5,844 8,770 8,227 2,611 583
 Median 2,850 2,162 1,611 1,540
Semi-formal
 Mean 12,281 17,590 29,880 9,755 2,668
 Median 4,631 6,581 4,999 2,821
Formal
 Mean 28,806 45,754 51,662 11,065 3,200
 Median 11,233 12,409 12,741 7,133
Total
 Mean 20,611 27,728 38,145 9,150 6,451
 Median 7,133 7,951 7,237 3,293
Francophone African Sample
Informal
 Mean 4,511 4,852 7,943 1,531  264
 Median 2,307 2,219 1,399 1,182
Semi-formal
 Mean 11,842 15,510 24,722 2,919 1,088
 Median 2,883 4,236 4,756 2,193
Formal
 Mean 48,116 44,214 62,337 3,842 829
 Median 8,422 11,893 12,895 3,685
Total
 Mean 25,903 21,239 38,894 2,649 2,181
 Median 4,032 5,199 5,937 1,851
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These patterns also hold for the firms in the African sample, with an 
important caveat: African firms have labour productivity that is only half 
as high as the worldwide levels, for each category of firm (informal, semi-
formal, and formal), and within each of the four sectors examined here 
(see Figure 5.3). When the median levels of labour productivity are used, 
firms in the Francophone African countries are even smaller than the 
broader African group. However, the mean value added per worker in 
the Francophone sample is in line with that of the full African sample, 
suggesting that in the Francophone countries there is greater dualism, 
with some very large and productive firms coexisting with many rather 
small firms with low labour productivity.
The remarkably low levels of value added per worker in African gar-
ment firms is striking, and especially in the Francophone area, where the 
Figure 5.3
Distribution of the log of value added per worker, by formality: for standard ICA surveys (top) 
and for microenterprises (bottom)
Source: ICA surveys
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mean value is under $4,000, even in the formal sector, and less than half 
this in informal garment firms. A number of countries, including Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Bangladesh, have seen economic growth fuelled by the rapid 
expansion of productive garment factories, but this model of economic 
development is not evident in the African countries represented here.
Wages
Theoretically, firms in a competitive labour market would be expected 
to hire workers to the point where compensation equals the marginal 
revenue product of labour. Thus, information on wages and benefits 
paid to employees provides an alternative, and arguably better, measure 
of (marginal) labour productivity. The relevant data are summarized in 
Table 5.8.
Table 5.8
Mean wages and benefits paid per worker per year (USD, 2009 prices) by sector and formality
Manufacturing Trade Services Garments Total
African sample
Informal 2,217 1,077 1,127 1,266 1,432
Semi-formal 3,619 1,813 2,163 2,890 2,559
Formal 6,535 3,578 4,725 3,956 5,149
Total 5,071 2,428 3,277 2,996 3,647
Non-African comparators
Informal 2,849 1,726 8,489 3,828 3,666
Semi-formal 3,581 3,351 6,844 2,488 4,244
Formal 5,488 5,011 3,510 1,894 4,496
Total 4,140 3,894 5,442 2,364 4,282
Other countries
Informal 2,566 3,087 4,553 1,826 3,339
Semi-formal 5,689 8,321 8,164 3,109 7,178
Formal 6,541 18,124 8,574 8,600 10,306
Total 5,722 11,370 7,926 5,111 8,009
Memo items:
Microenterprises
Informal 3,431  480 1,304  494 3,055
Semi-formal 2,114 2,577 2,267  901 2,194
Formal 5,241 4,148 2,464 2,118 4,284
Total 2,849 3,119 2,226 1,002 2,794
Source: ICA surveys
Note: Sample size is 34,392 firms out of a maximum possible total of 51,262. Sample confined to 
firms with value added per worker greater than zero and less than US$10 million. 
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Some very clear themes emerge from Table 5.8. First, on average, com-
pensation paid by formal firms is generally higher than in the informal 
sector.2 There are a number of possible explanations for this: perhaps 
formal firms use more educated labour (so they do not necessarily pay 
higher wages for any given class of labour skills); or maybe the tax and 
administrative burdens on formal firms mean that only the most produc-
tive firms can survive in the formal sector; or perhaps there are barriers 
to entry into the formal sector, so formal sector firms have some monop-
oly rent that they share with their workers.
A second theme is that, on average, wages are lower in the African 
sample than elsewhere, though this is not the case if one focuses just 
on formal sector firms. One possibility is that formal sector firms are 
relatively heavy users of skilled labour, which commands a strong wage 
premium in the African sample, as such skills are still relatively scarce.
Capital and labour intensity
We now need to try to explain the evident differential in labour produc-
tivity between informal and formal firms, and for this we first look at 
capital intensity, and then at the roles of exporting and of technology.
Value added per worker will generally be higher when the capital-
to- labour ratio is higher—in other words, when production is relatively 
capital intensive. The mean capital per full-time equivalent worker is 
206,000 USD (in 2009 prices) (see Table 5.9), but this likely reflects the 
effect of some highly capital-intensive firms, such as utilities. The median 
amount of capital per worker is just 4,932 USD, but it is less than half of 
this level in the African countries in our sample (and less than a fifth as 
high in the Francophone African sample), and far lower in informal than 
formal firms. By any standard, the amount of capital in informal firms in 
the African sample is very low, at just 370 USD per worker.
The flip side of capital intensity is labour intensity. Labour costs repre-
sent about half of total costs, and this proportion varies little across region or 
between formal and informal firms. A more detailed breakdown does show 
that labour costs represent roughly three-quarters of total costs in the services 
sector, and that this proportion does not vary much over region or formality.
Investment
We have shown clearly that informal firms have less capital per worker 
than their formal sector counterparts. It is sometimes argued that 
2Oddly, for the comparator countries, informal sector wages are inversely related to formality for 
services and garments. It is unclear why this is the case; it may reflect the limitations of the ICA 
database in capturing the informal sector.
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informal firms might be expected to invest less, and less often, than for-
mal firms, because they lack access to funding. This is partially due to a 
lack of collateral, and because there are limits to how large an informal 
firm can grow.
We marshal the relevant numbers in Table 5.10, which shows invest-
ment per firm in US dollars in 1999 prices. Investment spending is hugely 
skewed to the right, and a few very large projects raise the mean values 
far above the median. Thus, if the purpose is to focus on a ‘typical’ firm, 
it is more appropriate to refer to the median rather than the mean values.
From Table 5.10 we see that the median investment spending per firm 
is 22,950 USD per year, ranging from 3,791 USD in informal firms to 
38,608 USD in formal firms. This ten-to-one ratio mirrors the median 
level of sales, which is ten times higher in formal than informal firms 
(see Table 5.3), so it is by no means clear that informal firms are relative 
under-investors. Investment by firms in the African sample is compara-
tively modest, especially as measured by median investment.
Table 5.9
Mean and median capital per full-time equivalent worker (USD, 2009 prices)
Informal Semi-formal Formal Total
African sample
 Mean 2,511 18,206 17,366 16,031
 Median  370 1,404 4,799 2,383
Non-African comparators
 Mean 27,019 443,830 463,089 398,685
 Median 1,395 5,305 6,546 4,932
Other countries
 Mean 9,719 25,322 43,222 30,279
 Median  745 4,867 8,723 5,229
Total
 Mean 16,553 251,975 208,095 206,045
 Median 1,395 5,305 6,546 4,932
Memo: African microenterprise sample
 Mean n.a. 4,044 5,082 4,077
 Median n.a. 1,747 4,485 2,541
Memo: Francophone African sample
 Mean 1,659 3,450 8,480 4,607
 Median 381 707 2,149 893
Source: ICA surveys. Memo: Based on a sample of 14,976 firms, out of a maximum possible total of 
51,262 (i.e., 36,286 missing values).
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Table 5.10
Investment levels and rates
Investment levels (USD per firm, 2009 prices)
Informal Semi-formal Formal Total
African sample
 Mean 30,617 67,276 355,358 209,427
 Median 1,383 4,236 30,740 10,795
Non-African comparators
 Mean 146,001 1,521,812 2,156,685 1,755,318
 Median 5,000 24,302 31,486 26,098
Other countries
 Mean 94,970 138,898 732,810 406,971
 Median 5,404 18,339 49,621 27,724
Total
 Mean 95,404 615,506 1,181,265 849,127
 Median 3,791 16,202 38,602 22,950
Investment rate as a percent of total capital
African sample  31.5 25.6 26.3 26.5
Non-African comparators  17.3 17.3 17.9 17.6
Other countries  29.7 30.4 30.5 30.4
Total  25.4 22.6 23.3 23.2
Memo items
Senegal/Burkina/Benin  31.6 21.1 17.6 23.2
Francophone African sample 25.7 31.6 37.6 32.5
African microenterprise sample  n.a. 15.0 48.4 24.5
Source: ICA surveys. Top panel based on 39,247 observations out of a maximum possible total 
of 51,262. Cases with investment above 100 million USD are excluded. Bottom panel based on 
a sample of 11,165 firms out of a maximum possible total of 51,262. Cases where investment 
exceeds 500% of capital are excluded.
We can combine the information on investment and capital stock to 
present investment as a percentage of the capital stock, as done in the 
bottom panel of Table 5.10. The overall mean proportion is 23%, and this 
does not vary much between informal and formal firms. By this measure, 
the African firms in our sample are dynamic (or optimistic) relative to the 
non-African comparator sample (26% versus 18%). The informal firms 
in the African sample are particularly vigorous, with investment equiva-
lent to 32% of the reported value of capital (but 26% in Francophone 
Africa), despite relatively modest access to credit. This helps to explain 
our earlier finding that the growth of informal firms is not less than that 
of formal businesses.
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Propensity to export
It is possible that formal firms are more productive because they are 
more likely to be striving to compete on world markets. This is at best a 
partial explanation, because most firms do not export any of their goods 
or services, which helps explain why exports represent just 8.2% of total 
sales in our whole sample (see Table 5.11). The figure is half this level 
(4.2%) for the African sample and is lower in informal than formal firms 
(3.2% and 11.3%, respectively).
As expected, exporting is more important for firms in manufacturing 
and garments than in retail/wholesale trade or services. Formal sector 
firms in the garment industry are particularly oriented to exporting: over 
two-thirds of sales by formal sector garment firms in the non- African 
comparison group consist of exports. By this standard, the garment 
Table 5.11
Value of exports as a percentage of total sales, by sector and formality
Informal Semi-formal Formal Overall
African sample
 Manufacturing 2.7 3.9 9.5 6.6
 Trade 2.1 1.1 2.5 1.8
 Services 0.1 1.0 3.4 2.0
 Garments 2.1 8.6 18.9 9.7
Non-African comparators
 Manufacturing 6.0 10.8 14.2 11.9
 Trade 1.5 2.1 2.9 2.4
 Services 2.4 3.7 5.3 4.4
 Garments 12.4 40.0 68.2 52.1
Other countries
 Manufacturing 3.5 8.7 15.1 10.8
 Trade 1.2 1.9 3.9 2.5
 Services 0.9 4.4 8.2 5.6
 Garments 9.4 17.4 33.3 21.9
Total 3.1 6.5 11.3 8.2
Memo: African microenterprise sample
 Manufacturing 3.8 3.8 10.1 5.0
 Trade 2.3 3.6 8.9 5.0
 Services 0.0 0.1 10.6 2.4
 Garments 0.0 0.0 15.0 2.6
For exporters only 46.9 47.8 45.7 46.5
Source: ICA surveys
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industry in the African sample is a laggard. Less than 10% of its sales 
go to exports, which means that the industry is essentially serving the 
domestic market.
Firms that do export quickly come to rely heavily on exports. Exports 
account for almost half of sales by those firms that export anything at all, 
though the figure is close to a third for African exporters.
Use of information technology
Productivity may also be linked to the use of technology. Three-fifths of 
all firms use email, with a lower proportion in Africa (about half) than 
elsewhere. The information on the proportion of firms using email to 
communicate with clients and supporters is somewhat approximate 
because email has spread rapidly, and its use expanded rapidly between 
2005 (the year of the first surveys) and 2009 (the year of the most recent 
surveys in our study).
Informal firms make far less use of email than formal firms. This is probably 
not a characteristic of informality per se, but of the relative lack of technological 
sophistication, and resources, of informal firms. A similar pattern appears in 
the use of the Web to be in touch with clients and suppliers. One firm in three 
uses the Web, but the rate is only about half this high in Africa, and a mere 
11% among informal firms. As a general proposition, it is not clear whether 
email and Web use leads or lags other features of business development, but 
the technological lag in Africa is evident.
Approximately one firm in seven has an international quality certifi-
cation. The rate is slightly lower in the African sample than elsewhere, 
where only one in twenty informal firms has such an imprimatur.
Firm Perceptions of Barriers and Constraints
The ICA surveys typically ask respondents to indicate which obstacles, 
from a long list, are the most important, second most important, and 
third most important. This is helpful in providing some perspective 
on the ranking of constraints facing firms. In Table 5.12, we show the 
propor tion of firms that mention the problem as either a first, second, or 
third most serious obstacle, and we have sorted the obstacles from those 
that received the most mentions (access to finance, tax rates, electricity, 
and so on) to the least mentioned. Not every survey listed all the obsta-
cles shown in Table 5.12, and this lack of cross-country consistency does 
make the results somewhat harder to interpret. For the most part, there 
is little difference in the rankings by formal and informal firms, although 
some differences are noted below.
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Table 5.12











Access to finance 30.9 51.1 38.1 22.7 56.7
Tax rates 30.3 37.4 32.3 27.2 45.6
Electricity 27.5 52.5 37.0 17.8 58.6
Practices of informal competitors 25.8 34.2 32.7 21.6 46.0
Corruption 21.0 23.9 31.9 16.0 21.6
Political instability 18.8 10.9 30.2 15.7 4.2
Inadequately educated workforce 16.4 14.6 21.2 14.9 8.3
Crime, theft, disorder 15.8 29.6 18.5 12.5 8.0
Macroeconomic instability 12.9 6.2 19.4 12.1 0.0
Tax administration 12.6 14.7 18.5 9.0 18.5
Access to land 9.4 19.6 14.8 5.0 19.8
Labour regulations 9.1 6.5 12.7 7.9 2.1
Transportation 9.1 22.5 10.6 5.9 24.1
Business licensing and permits 7.6 15.0 8.6 6.1 7.7
Customs and trade regulations 7.0 11.1 10.1 5.0 15.6
Court system/dispute resolution 3.2 2.3 4.1 3.1 1.2
Telecommunications 1.5 3.3 1.9 1.0 1.7
Regulatory policy uncertainty 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0
Political and macroeconomic 
framework
0.4 0.0 0.9 0.3 2.9
Functioning of the courts 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.0
Other 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0
Regulation of prices and margins 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.5
Zoning rules 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.4
Source: ICA surveys
Dissatisfaction about access to finance is widespread, as is typical in 
such surveys. African respondents, in particular, complain about a lack 
of access to credit. Informal firms are substantially more concerned 
about access to credit than are formal sector firms. One interpretation 
is that formality (measured here as having a bank account and having 
audited accounts) opens the door to credit, while another is that success-
ful firms simultaneously use credit and become formal, so that causality 
flows from a third source. Survey responses to this question are notori-
ously difficult to interpret, as firms always want cheaper credit, but their 
willingness and ability to repay are often doubted by lenders.
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Tax rates and, to a much lesser extent, tax administration, are seen as 
serious problems, particularly in Africa, although to a somewhat lesser 
extent for the informal sector. As with responses to perceptions about 
access to credit, this is not easy to interpret: are taxes really too high or 
too arbitrary, or are respondents not used to having to pay taxes? In most 
of the world, business permits and licensing are irritants more than a seri-
ous problem. However, an interesting exception is the Senegal/Burkina 
Faso/Benin group, where these are viewed as problems, especially by 
formal firms. Customs and trade regulations are not seen as a major prob-
lem anywhere, except perhaps among formal firms in Senegal/Burkina 
Faso/Benin. Informal firms are especially unconcerned, perhaps because 
they are less likely to be exporters or importers. On paper, many African 
countries have tough labour laws, but in practice this does not appear to 
pose problems to firms, especially informal firms. Unsurprisingly, formal 
firms are somewhat more likely than others to see labour regulations as a 
problem, albeit a modest one. Restrictions on hours of operation are not 
at all a concern in Africa—unexpectedly—and they affect informal firms 
just as much as other firms. Restrictions on pricing and mark-ups are 
viewed as somewhat more serious, but, in Africa at least, such regulations 
do not pose real problems.
Concerns about infrastructure vary. Electricity is a serious problem, 
particularly in Africa, for both formal and informal firms. This confirms 
what is known anecdotally, but points to a major correctable weakness 
in the business environment in many countries. A weak electricity sup-
ply hits informal firms only slightly more than formal ones. On the other 
hand, telecommunications are viewed as less of a problem in the African 
sample than elsewhere, and less among informal than formal firms. 
These surprising results may reflect lower expectations in Africa and 
among informal firms, or perhaps communications are simply not much 
of an obstacle anymore, particularly for small firms, given the spread 
of mobile telephony. On the other hand, African microenterprises do 
report problems with telecommunications. Concerns about transporta-
tion are somewhat higher in the African sample than elsewhere and are 
quite serious in the Senegal/Burkina Faso/Benin subsample. However, 
even in Africa, transportation is not viewed as one of the more serious 
obstacles facing businesses.
Unexpectedly, macroeconomic stability is viewed as less of a problem 
in Africa than elsewhere in the world. This could potentially be attribut-
able to the relative price stability of the numerous CFA countries, but 
then the high concern with macroeconomic stability in Senegal/Burkina 
Faso/Benin looks more puzzling. Africa may have an image as the con-
tinent of political instability, but businesspeople there do not seem to be 
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too concerned: the problem of political instability is viewed as far more 
serious elsewhere, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Informal firms are slightly less worried about political instability than 
are formal firms. Perhaps informal firms are less visible targets in times 
of political uncertainty.
On the other hand, corruption is generally seen as a more serious 
problem than political instability. Even here, African firms view it as less 
of a problem than in most other areas of the world, although African 
microenterprises see it as a serious obstacle. The striking exception here 
is the East Asia and Pacific region, where corruption is not seen as much 
of an obstacle to business. These findings do not necessarily imply that 
there is no corruption, but they do infer that it is not unduly intrusive, 
and it may perhaps even be helpful, to firms.
The court system is often viewed as an obstacle to the development 
of enterprises by tying up disputes for years, for instance, or rendering 
judgments (e.g., on payments) too slowly. In practice, the court system is 
not widely seen as a problem in the ICA surveys, especially in Africa; per-
haps there are other mechanisms at work when disputes arise. However, 
while the courts may seem benign, crime, theft, and disorder are seen as 
relatively serious problems, particularly among formal firms in Africa. 
Possibly, formal firms are easier to target. Additionally, access to land is 
seen as a larger problem by the African sample than elsewhere, and quite 
a serious problem in Senegal/Burkina Faso/Benin. In the African sample, 
zoning restrictions are not seen as a problem, although it is noteworthy 
that informal firms are more likely to see a problem here than are formal 
firms. Ultimately, while land may be difficult to get, once a firm has the 
land it can be used for almost anything.
Unexpectedly, African firms are less likely to feel constrained by an 
inadequately educated workforce than firms elsewhere in the world; 
informal firms are also relatively unconcerned by the educational levels 
of workers. It is not clear how best to interpret this finding. One possibil-
ity is that there is a strong pool of relatively well-educated (but possibly 
unemployed) workers in Africa, so finding skilled labour is not unduly 
difficult. Another possibility is that African firms are doing simple work, 
and do not need as much skilled labour. A third view is that African 
firms do not adequately grasp the importance of a well-educated work-
force. Without further information, it is hard to choose between these 
interpretations.
Informal sector competitors, who are presumably less fettered by 
regulations and are no doubt seen as competing unfairly, are seen as a 
significant obstacle, even by other informal sector operators. The reasons 
behind this concern are unclear, but it is possible that informal sector 
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firms are viewed as having an ‘unfair’ advantage by being less subject to 
taxes and regulations.
Conclusions
Throughout this chapter, we have presented a series of comparisons 
between formal and informal firms, and between firms in Africa, in com-
parator countries, and African microenterprises. All the data came from 
ICA surveys, undertaken between 2005 and 2009.
Informal firms are defined as businesses that neither keep formal 
accounts nor have a bank account, formal firms do both, and semi- 
formal firms do one but not the other. Even using this relatively narrow 
 definition—the best we could do given data limitations—we find pat-
terns that are by now quite familiar. Compared to their formal or even 
semi-formal peers, informal firms are smaller and younger, their man-
agers are less experienced, they are more likely to be privately owned, and 
they are largely internally financed.
Informal firms perform poorly in a static sense, in that they have lower 
value added per worker and pay lower wages. This reflects their lower 
level of capitalization and the fact that they are less likely to export, or to 
use email or the Web. Yet, if performance is measured by growth, then 
informal firms do as well as, if not better than, formal firms. The simplest 
explanation is that despite financial and perhaps other constraints, they 
invest as heavily, relative to their capital stock, as formal firms do.
There are certainly barriers to growth and efficiency. Informal firms 
complain especially about poor access to finance and the poor quality and 
availability of electricity. Yet, informal firms can also be nimble, seeming 
relatively unperturbed by the constraints imposed by labour laws, busi-
ness permitting, telecommunications, and the legal system.
In their article, La Porta and Shleifer (2014) argue that there are three 
main views of the informal sector. One sees it as an “untapped reservoir 
of entrepreneurial energy” (La Porta and Shleifer 2014, p. 109), the oppo-
site view is one of “parasites competing unfairly with law-abiding formal 
firms” (La Porta and Shleifer 2014, p. 109), and the third, which they 
favour, is a dualistic story where “development comes from formal firms” 
led by better-educated entrepreneurs whose more-productive firms 
eventually displace the low-technology informal businesses (La Porta and 
Shleifer 2014, p. 110). Using our definition of informality, we find infor-
mal enterprises to be as dynamic as their formal  counterparts—including 
in Africa, even Francophone Africa—in that they invest proportionately 
as much and grow at least as fast. There is entrepreneurial energy, but 
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it is not untapped or even particularly suppressed. Informal firms do 
not complain unduly about the burden of regulation. Mainstream firms 
do complain about the practices of ‘parasitic’ informal competitors, but 
enough informal firms complain about taxes that they cannot all be 
free riders. The dualism of the business sector can be overstated: there 
appears to be a continuum, from small enterprises producing cheap and 
simple goods and services to large sophisticated firms. Certainly, most 
small businesses, whether formal or informal, do not grow to be very 
large, but there is a middle ground, somewhere between informal and 
formal, that is too substantial to overlook.
African firms are somewhat smaller than their counterparts in coun-
tries elsewhere that have a similar level of development, and especially 
so in Francophone Africa. The typical manager of an African firm is 
less experienced than elsewhere, and less likely to be female. Very few 
African firms are publicly listed, and informal and semi-formal firms 
have low levels of capitalization, poor access to credit, and low levels 
of labour productivity. On the other hand, formal African firms have 
levels of labour productivity and wages that are on a par with formal 
firms in the comparator countries, and they are growing at least as 
rapidly as firms elsewhere in the world, despite serious complaints 
about electricity and some concerns about transportation, crime, theft, 
and disorder.
In one important area, African firms are clearly lagging. Garment 
firms in Africa are very small, poorly capitalized, have low productiv-
ity, and almost exclusively serve their domestic markets. This is in sharp 
contrast with the larger, more productive, outward-looking garment 
factories that are common in less-developed countries outside Africa. 
Perhaps, to borrow from David Morawetz’s celebrated phrase (1981), we 
need to ask why the Emperor’s New Clothes are Not Made in Africa. The 
significance of high unit labour costs and labour market regulations is 
addressed in Chapters 6 and 7.
From a policy perspective, it would be wrong to overlook or ignore 
informal firms. They demonstrate real dynamism, and, for this reason, 
they merit support from the institutions of government at least as much 
as their larger and more-established formal peers.
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APPENDIX 5.1
ICA Surveys by Category
Country Survey year Sample size Country Survey year  Sample size
African sample 7,965 Non-African sample 19,260
Ghana 2007 494 Bolivia 2006 613
Angola 2006 425 Colombia 2006 1,000
Cape Verde 2006 98 Peru 2006 632
Gambia 2006 174 Paraguay 2006 613
Tanzania 2006 419 Ecuador 2006 658
South Africa 2007 937 El Salvador 2006 693
Senegal 2007 506 Guatemala 2006 522
Madagascar 2009 445 Albania 2009 175
Mauritius 2009 398 Georgia 2008 373
Côte d’Ivoire 2009 526 Uzbekistan 2008 366
Mali 2007 619 Kazakhstan 2009 544
Benin 2009 150 Moldova 2009 363
Kenya 2007 781 Macedonia 2009 366
Burkina Faso 2009 393 Kyrgyz Rep. 2009 235
Cameroon 2009 363 Nepal 2009 368
Zambia 2007 603 Bhutan 2009 250
Niger 2009 150 Laos 2009 360
Ethiopia 2006 484 Philippines 2009 1,326
Algeria 2007 600
African microenterprise sample 912 Morocco 2007 659
Burkina Faso 2009 123 Indonesia 2009 1,444
Cameroon 2009 120 Pakistan 2007 935
Cape Verde 2009 115 Bangladesh 2007 1,504
Côte d’Ivoire 2008 92 Moldova 2009 363
Madagascar 2008–2009 113 India 2005 2,286
Mauritius 2008–2009 86 Vietnam 2005 1,150
Nepal 2009 145 Laos 2009 360
Togo 2009 118 Cambodia 2007 502
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APPENDIX 5.2
Methodology for Data Analysis (TreeNet)
Brief description of the TreeNet methodology
The objective of a TreeNet analysis is to obtain a more precise under-
standing of any non-linear relationships between the propensity for a 
firm to be in the formal sector and a set of ‘predictors’, as well as of any 
interactions among the predictors. Indeed, TreeNet is recommended as 
a tool to be used once the main predictors have been identified and data 
quality issues treated (Salford Systems 2012). Although the direct inter-
pretation of a TreeNet model is difficult, the graphs that arise from the 
procedure, and which display the impact of each predictor separately, are 
straightforward enough (Salford Systems 2012).
The main idea of the TreeNet methodology is as follows. Let us first 
note that a decision tree can be viewed as a function of the predictors 
(referred to as a step-function) that is constant on each terminal node. To 
simplify the exposition, first consider a continuous target variable Y. A 
simple tree based on two predictors X1 and X2, represented in Figure A2.1, 
yields the following step function:
= ≤1 2 1 1( , ) if Tree X X Y X a
= > ≤1 2 2 1 2( , ) if  and Tree X X Y X a X b
= > >1 2 3 1 2( , ) if  and Tree X X Y X a X b
where 1Y , 2Y , 3Y  are the means of the target variable on each of the three 
terminal nodes 1, 2, and 3.
The idea of the TreeNet procedure is to use not just one step func-
tion corresponding to one tree as an approximation of the true function 
which links Y to a set of predictors X, but instead to propose a sum of 
such step functions, each corresponding to a tree with a fairly small num-
ber of nodes. Each added tree acts as a ‘boost’ to the performance of the 
previous approximation. So, the approximation proposed by TreeNet is 
of the form:
β β β= + + + +1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( )M MF X Y tree X tree X tree X
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In this expression, the βi, as well as the splits in the successive trees, 
are determined by a gradient descent algorithm (see Friedman 2001), 
which at each added tree aims to minimize the mean square error of the 
approximation. To avoid the risk of overfitting, the number of trees 
involved in the approximation is controlled by cross-validation or evalu-
ation of the approximation on a test sample. In the case of a categorical 
target variable, as for example formality (three levels: informal, semi-for-
mal and formal), the mean square error is replaced by a suitable error 
function in the gradient descent algorithm (see Friedman 2001).
Figure 5A2.1
Simple decision tree with two predictors
Source: Authors
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CHAPTER 6
The Failure of Structural Transformation  
in Francophone Africa and the Rise of  
the Informal Sector
Nancy Claire Benjamin and Ahmadou Aly Mbaye
Introduction
In many developing countries, rapid economic growth and poverty 
reduction have been the result of successful structural transformation—
the shift of production from low to higher productivity sectors, mainly 
agriculture to manufacturing (Rodrik 2016). In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
the much-improved growth performance over the last two decades has 
not been accompanied by a corresponding gain in formal employment 
and poverty reduction. Figure 6.1 shows the average annual growth rates 
and cumulative reduction of the poverty rate over 1970–2014. While 
North Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and to a lesser extent Latin America 
had impressive declines in poverty, all regions of SSA had minimal or no 
poverty reduction, despite sizeable GDP growth rates.
This reflects the fact that in SSA, much of the counterpart of the 
declining share of output and employment in agriculture is the rise of 
the service sector, which is mostly in the informal sector. The informal 
sector has become the dominant employer in SSA and accounts for about 
half of the total value added in SSA. Furthermore, the low productivity 
observed in informal activities relative to formal activities suggests that 
the overall productivity factors would increase by shifting them to formal 
activities.
A further important feature of successful structural transformation is 
that growth results from reallocation of factors between sectors in addition 
to any growth within sectors. Figure 6.2 shows that in African countries, 
unlike in Asia, there is little growth attributable to ‘between sector’ real-
location over the period from 1990 to around 2015. For most countries 
in our sample, the ‘within sector’ component of productivity growth is 
higher than the ‘between sector’. For resource rich countries like Nigeria 
and Mozambique, growth has been very high but without any structural 
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transformation. An extreme case of this general trend is Nigeria, where 
the structural transformation term is actually negative, as the economy’s 
dependence on oil has increased. Even Botswana’s impressive growth is 
entirely due to the ‘within sector’ component, reflecting the high reliance 
on the mining sector. For many resource-poor countries like Senegal 
and Malawi, growth has been much less impressive, as ‘between sector’ 
growth has been too low to compensate for low ‘within sector’ growth.
The distribution of productive factors matters for both structural 
transformation (between agriculture and the other sectors) and infor-
mality (between formal and informal business models). At the crux of the 
two distributions is the issue of productivity, and, thereby, the ways that 
transformation and informality affect economic growth.
The main messages include the following: relative returns to factors 
in the urban and rural sectors in Africa have given rise to substantial 
rural-urban migration, where employment opportunities for migrants 
and non-migrants alike are overwhelmingly in the informal economy. 
Thus, the informal sector is already the draw for transformational out-
migration from agriculture. The main challenge is the modernization of 
Figure 6.1
Annual GDP growth and cumulative poverty reduction in various regions, 1970–2014
Note: Percent changes are compound annual growth rate and unweighted regional averages
Source: Authors’ calculation from Penn World Tables (Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre 2019a)
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Figure 6.2
Decomposition of economic growth into structural change (between sectors) and within-sector 
growth, 1990–2010s
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GGDC database (Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre 2019b)
informal economic activity. The informal sector is quite diverse, with a 
strong majority of small subsistence firms, but also an influential layer 
of large, sophisticated, informal firms. These informal actors represent a 
large cadre of clients for business services and social services, but experi-
ence difficult relations with government and lack institutional support. 
Policy should focus on what constrains rapid modernization of the 
informal economy and thus inhibits access to the benefits of modernity, 
including higher productivity. Instead, policies often concentrate rents1 
into a small number of hands, raising factor costs for formal firms and in 
turn reducing the incentives for modern, international firms to provide 
an engine of modernization for the informal economy. Much of the data 
used in this chapter is drawn from the surveys described and presented 
in Chapters 2 and 4.
1The term “rents” refers to cases where people earn an income which is not commensurate with 
their level of effort nor the level of risk involved in the endeavour.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the first section 
reviews the dominant characteristics of the informal sector in Africa, the 
second describes some key aspects of the institutional environment in 
Francophone Africa and their implications for the informal sector and 
structural transformation, the chapter then addresses impediments to 
growth and formal employment, the following section analyzes the impli-
cations from the previous section’s analysis for structural transforma tion, 
and the chapter concludes with recommendations.
The Informal Economy
As noted in earlier chapters, in SSA, the informal economy is highly 
diverse. Chapters 2 and 4 stress the importance of distinguishing large 
from small informal firms in describing behaviour and identifying 
obstacles in the investment climate. While the vast majority of informal 
firms are very small, large informal firms play a major role. A firm that 
chooses to be informal in a country with weak regulatory enforcement 
can become quite large and may have strong incentives to do so.
Both formal and informal firms need relationships of trust to secure 
inputs, get credit, and market their products. When formal institutions 
fail to provide effective property rights, firms can, to some extent, inter-
nalize these relationships of trust if they are large enough. Sometimes, 
becoming ‘large enough’ can take the form of informal religious and eth-
nic networks. These can substitute for official institutions that should 
(but often fail to) support arms-length trading in the formal sector 
(Golub and Hansen-Lewis 2012).
As discussed in previous chapters, informal employment is overwhelm-
ing in West Africa. The informal economy employs most of the workers 
from vulnerable groups, including women and youth. By and large, the 
urban informal sector has open entry and provides employment for 
those leaving agriculture, which is the core migration underlying struc-
tural transformation. Finally, the vast majority of small businesses and 
microenterprises operate in the informal economy. Inevitably, given the 
lower productivity of workers in the informal sector, their contribution 
to GDP is less than proportional to their numbers, but still large.
Rural-urban migration
Rural-urban migration is one of the most important determinants of the 
rise of the informal labour force in the developing world. Becker (2004) 
documents the magnitudes of such internal migration trends in develop-
ing countries and finds them to be astonishingly high in some instances. 
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For Africa, Kessides (2006) finds that the urban population has almost 
doubled in 15 years, mostly due to such migrations. As the classic Harris 
and Todaro (1970) model explains, migrants will flock to urban areas 
even if prospects of formal jobs are low, given that the wages in these 
jobs are so much higher than in rural areas. Most migrants end up in the 
urban informal sector rather than outright unemployment. Bhattacharya 
(2002) emphasizes, however, that the urban informal sector can be quite 
dynamic and is not simply a pool of surplus labour. As discussed in 
Chapter 4 and other literature, there are large disparities in access to basic 
services (education, health, and other infrastructural services) and earn-
ing opportunities between rural and urban areas that drive rural- urban 
migration in Africa. Fox and Gaal (2008) find that average earnings in 
informal services are higher than in agriculture by at least 50% in the 
majority of the African countries they studied.
Employment trends
Table 6.1 shows Senegal’s employment in certain broad sector categories 
for 2011 and 2015, with estimates based on household surveys. The figures 
reflect the fundamental trend of structural transformation: employment 
declines in agriculture, but it also declines in other tradable goods sec-
tors, namely, industry, and a concomitant rise in non-tradables, ‘Other 
services’. Given the steep requirements for becoming a global competi-
tor in manufacturing, the performance in the other services sector will 
become increasingly important in Africa. This is also a sector where lack 
Table 6.1
Household survey employment estimates in Senegal 
(percent)
Sector Formal/Informal 2011 2015
Agriculture Formal 0.8 0.3
Informal 55.1 36.1
Industry Formal 2.8 1.3
Informal 10.7 7.8
Trade Formal 1.2 1.9
Informal 16.5 18.0
Other services Formal 2.5 5.6
Informal 10.3 29.0
Total Formal 7.4 9.1
Informal 92.6 90.9
Source: Senegal Statistical Agency (ANSD 2011 and 2015) 
and authors’ calculations
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of quality control and regulatory oversight can be especially damaging to 
informal operators.
Using these employment figures to make rough estimates of labour 
productivity, it appears that the gap between formal and informal pro-
ductivity is growing over time in most sectors.
Informal incomes
The lower productivity in the informal sector also translates into lower 
wages. Figure 6.3 shows very large earnings differentials between formal 
and informal workers, which are well documented across countries and 
geographical regions (Gasparini and Tornarolli 2007), particularly for 
Africa (Benjamin and Mbaye 2012). Chen et al. (2005) observe that eco-
nomic growth has not resulted in improved standards of living in the 
informal sector. Braude (2005) found that education levels were much 
higher in the South African formal sector than the informal sector. These 
educational differentials undoubtedly contribute to differences in earn-
ings between workers in the two sectors, albeit with substantial variation 
among informal workers.
Figure 6.3
Average monthly wage by formal/informal status, FCFA
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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High-paying public or formal sector jobs are protected, but also 
rationed. Figure 6.3 shows that Libreville in Gabon, an oil exporter with 
the highest per capita GDP among the countries represented, has the 
highest wages for employees of formal firms. However, the employees of 
small informal firms in Libreville are paid no more than the correspond-
ing employees in five other Francophone African cities. The incomes of 
employees of small informal firms show the greatest degree of uniformity 
across the locations studied.
Productivity
Low productivity growth is a further manifestation of the rising role of 
the informal sector and the lack of structural transformation in Africa. 
Figure 6.4 shows Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth has been mini-
mal or even negative in SSA.
Part of the explanation for the low productivity growth in Africa is 
that informal firms usually have lower productivity than formal firms. 
Figure 6.4
Growth decomposition for Africa by decade 
Note: Data included for 13 countries until 1980 and for 28 countries through 2014
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the Penn World Tables (Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre 2019a)
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Thus, as the formal sector stagnates while the informal sector expands, 
economy-wide productivity growth is reduced. This is also the case 
in West Africa, as confirmed in Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) and in 
Chapter 9. Large informal firms, described in Chapter 2, have produc-
tivity levels that are usually between those of formal and small informal 
firms and sometimes even higher than that of formal firms. In general, 
the closer to formal a firm is, the higher productivity it tends to have. The 
fact that large informal firms’ productivity sometimes rivals that of the 
formal sector confirms Gelb et al.’s (2009) finding that the institutional 
environment deters many firms from formalizing.
There is some empirical evidence to suggest that this wide range of 
productivity across firms can compound the difficulties of programs 
designed to raise productivity growth (Aghion et al. 2005). Some policies 
try to foster productivity growth by increasing competition. However, 
this approach may not be effective where there is a wide variance in 
firms’ attributes and productivity.
Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) examine TFP in addition to labour 
productivity. TFP controls for capital intensity, yet they find the same 
positive correlation between TFP and formality as for labour productiv-
ity. This shows that differences in capital intensity alone cannot explain 
differences in labour productivity between formal and informal firms.
Interviews and surveys in West Africa reveal that large informal 
firms, in particular, usually have fragile structures. They have sizeable 
sales and a large number of temporary workers but are run like a fam-
ily firm insofar as they have a small number of permanent employees, 
no specialized departments, such as human resources or finance, and 
seldom survive the death of the owner or a falling-out with political 
patrons.
The informal sector’s modus operandi and organizational structure 
are not conducive to productivity growth. These features include weak 
management structures, lack of transparency, reliance on rents associ-
ated with political and social connections, and sub-optimal allocation 
of productive factors (including reliance on family sources for credit). 
Informality also inhibits modern management skills and worker train-
ing, limiting growth potential and access to the world market. The fact 
that these informal firms pay little tax and can avoid regulations gives 
them an unfair competitive advantage over formal firms, thus discour-
aging domestic and foreign investment, although relations between 
formal and informal firms can also be complementary, as discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Furthermore, tax evasion by the informal sector in 
general, and large informal firms in particular, entails a substantial loss 
of fiscal revenues.
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Institutional Environment
The crucial role of the institutional environment in fostering the informal 
sector is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Here we provide further evidence 
that the business environment remains quite hostile in Francophone 
African countries. Table 6.2 shows the time and costs involved in starting 
a business in Francophone Africa and in some more successful compara-
tor countries. Costs remain very high in Francophone Africa and well 
above those of the comparator emerging economies by most measures. 
The number of steps required to start a business is not markedly different 
between the two groups, but the time involved and costs in Francophone 
Africa are much higher. Likewise, the number of taxes affecting busi-
nesses, and the tax rates on income, are high in almost all Francophone 
African countries. Labour market regulations are also perceived as oner-
ous, as discussed in the following chapter. Furthermore, many of these 
nations face marked political instability and corruption.
Infrastructure
As seen in Chapter 4, firm managers have a dim view of the quality of 
infrastructure and public services. The countries under study rank 
poorly in the World Bank Investment Climate Assessment for the crite-
ria of ‘obtaining access to electricity’ and in ‘numbers of days of electrical 
Table 6.2
Costs of starting a business and paying taxes in selected Francophone African countries and 
comparators, 2019
Economy














Total taxes  
(% gross profit)
Benin 5 8 3.5 57 270 57.4
Burkina Faso 3 13 42.5 45 270 41.3
Cameroon 5 13 24.6 44 624 57.7
Gabon 7 31 6.1 50 632 47.1
Senegal 4 6 32.0 58 441 45.1
Botswana 9 48 0.6 34 120 25.1
Chile 7 6 5.7 7 296 34.0
Malaysia 9 13 11.6 8 188 39.2
Mauritius 4 5 0.9 8 152 22.1
Vietnam 8 17 5.9 10 498 37.8
Source: World Bank (2019) Doing Business
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outages per year’. Table 6.3 further illustrates the lack of competitive elec-
trical infrastructure in the countries of interest. Electricity prices in West 
and Central Africa are among the highest on the continent. However, 
as a ratio of GDP per capita, these prices are some of the highest in the 
world. The combination of low reliability, poor quality, and high prices 
is a substantial impediment to investment. Moreover, the percentage of 
paved roads is low.
Financing
Even when commercial banks in West Africa are willing to lend to 
smaller firms, informal firms have a strong preference for other sources 
of financing, as shown by the low uptake on lines of credit offered by 
govern ment and aid agencies. Chapter 4 reported an overwhelming 
reliance on personal savings, retained earnings, or loans from family 
members, even for formal firms.
Bank loans are expensive for all countries in West and Central Africa, 
as also seen in Chapter 4. Formal firms frequently pay 15% interest, while 
Table 6.3




Price as a Percentage 





Benin 0.22  10.5
Burkina Faso 0.23  14.7
East/Southern Africa











Source: Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies (2019)
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informal firms report paying 20% or more, despite very low inflation 
rates. Further, many firms report difficulty in repaying loans, particularly 
informal firms.
Labour
Formal wages are high relative to productivity in West Africa, particu-
larly compared to the major exporters of East Asia. Golub et al. (2018) 
studied African competitiveness vis à vis China. In Table 6.4, overall 
productivity is proxied by GDP per capita, given the unavailability of 
employment data. Compared to per capita GDP, manufacturing wages 
are very high in SSA relative to a number of other countries. In 2010, 
most Asian countries, including China, had average annual manufac-
turing wages roughly equal to per capita income. The same is true in 
other regions. In SSA, however, wages are typically several times per cap-
ita GDP. The only exception is Mauritius and, to a lesser extent, South 
Africa. These high formal sector wages in Africa are far above informal 
sector wages, as previously noted.
High Factor Costs: Causes and Consequences
Predictably, expensive infrastructure, high capital costs, and high formal 
sector wages lead to a large share of firms operating in the informal sec-
tor, where the main advantage is paying lower wages and lower taxes. 
Given the low international competitiveness revealed by the cross- 
country wage comparisons, export-oriented manufacturing production 
is almost non-existent. Formal firms are primarily foreign multinationals 
serving the domestic market that have no choice but to pay formal wages 
and formal taxes, but also benefit from import protection and other spe-
cial advantages.
Mbaye, English, and Golub (2015) confirm that formal firms in Senegal 
in import-competing industries such as sugar, vegetable oil, and wheat 
flour benefit from protected rents, either in the form of high import 
taxes, monopoly rights to import key inputs, or privileged access to 
govern ment contracts. The traditional saying is, “governments tax elites 
and elites tax the rest through high prices.” Large informal firms often 
benefit from rent protection as well. In particular, where the regulatory 
regime distinguishes a legal, regulated segment of a sector, large informal 
operators may benefit from protected rights to exploit the unregulated 
segment. This can include informal rights to smuggling routes, protected 
rights to engage in untaxed retail commerce, or informal rights to sup-
plement the rationed public transport (with vans or motorcycle taxis). 
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Table 6.4




Relative to Per 
Capita GDP Level in USD
Relative to Per 
Capita GDP
sub-Saharan Africa
Burundi NA NA 3,261 14.9 
Cameroon 3,088 5.3 NA NA 
Ethiopia 771 6.3 807 2.4 
Ghana 1,832 4.9 NA NA 
Kenya 2,118 5.2 2,854 3.6 
Malawi 436 2.8 2,045 5.7 
Mauritius 3,254 0.8 6,285 0.8 
Senegal 3,680 7.8 6,450 6.5 
South Africa 7,981 2.6 12,331 1.7 
Tanzania 2,296 7.5 1,581 3.0 
North Africa
Egypt 2,028 1.3 3,453 1.2 
Morocco 4,123 3.2 6,654 2.4 
Tunisia 4,066 1.8 5,455 1.3 
Latin America
Brazil 5,822 1.6 10,918 1.0 
Colombia 4,096 1.6 4,680 0.8 
Mexico 8,048 1.2 7,310 0.8 
Asia
Bangladesh NA NA 680 1.6 
China 1,016 1.1 4,770 1.1 
India 1,356 3.0 2,619 1.8 
Indonesia 929 1.2 1,897 0.6 
Malaysia 4,405 1.1 6,548 0.7 
Vietnam NA NA 1,727 1.3 
Eastern Europe
Czech Republic 3,964 0.7 12,673 0.7 
Latvia 3,689 1.1 9,191 0.8 
Poland 5,829 1.1 10,162 0.8 
Source: Golub et al. (2018)
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In some cases, the informal participation of government officials in the 
business may help ensure this protection.
There are two main implications of these observations. First, the rents 
associated with protected sectors, even in poor countries, are worth the 
efforts of formal firms to capture a portion of them. Second, when certain 
firms have access to artificially high rents, labour will tend to demand its 
share (Azam and Ris 2001). Thus, high formal manufacturing wages, in 
part, reflect overall protected rents in the sector.
This kind of rent distribution is not unusual in developing countries. 
When a certain share is allocated to a small number of elite firms and 
their workers, adding high wages to the other expenses of formal opera-
tions discourages the entry of new formal or modern enterprises, the 
sector stagnates. An interesting example can be found in the literature de-
bunking the myth that the Dutch suffered from Dutch disease following 
the exploitation of natural gas fields in the 1960s and 70s. The subsequent 
stagnation of the traditional manufacturing sector in the Netherlands 
was found not to derive from a foreign exchange windfall, but rather 
from policies that raised social welfare benefits leading to higher wage 
taxes and an economy-wide increase in labour costs (Kojo 2015; Kremers 
1986). While the Dutch policy may have instigated an economy- wide 
labour cost increase, in West Africa the high wages occur in the public 
sector and the formal private sector. Oil production in Central Africa has 
undoubtedly contributed to high public sector wages.
The message for entrepreneurs is clear: either cultivate and capture 
rents or operate in the informal sector. The message for multinational 
firms is also clear: do not come to these countries to manufacture with 
cheap labour because the formal labour is not cheap. From the list in 
Table 6.4, only Mauritius, with manufacturing wages close to GDP per 
capita or overall productivity, has a strong record as a manufacturing 
exporter, and Ethiopia only recently so. The message is also a familiar one 
in West Africa: control of rents is more lucrative than raising productivity.
Given the strong advantage of paying the lower informal wage, it is 
understandable that formal firms hire people informally (off the books) 
in addition to their formally registered workers. Maintaining a formal 
veneer makes the company eligible for public contracts, cheaper credit, 
and more reliable infrastructure, while informal hiring provides access 
to workers at a lower wage and lower wage taxes. This occurs frequently 
in the construction sector where formal companies bid on projects, but 
informal workers provide much of the labour. Labour surveys in North 
Africa indicate that a majority of the people who report being informally 
employed are in fact working for formal companies (Gatti et al. 2014). 
Evidence from our surveys in Central and West Africa shows that formal 
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firms pay a significant number of workers less than the minimum wage; 
in Cameroon, around 10% of formal sector workers earn less than the 
official minimum wage of 36,000 FCFA per month.
In sum, international competitiveness is hampered by a number of 
constraints. The business environment is generally hostile, and it can be 
nearly impossible to operate in the formal sector without political con-
nections. Infrastructure and public services are poor and factor costs are 
high. Competitive wages and eased labour market regulations are neces-
sary to attract foreign investment in export-oriented manufacturing and 
other traded goods and services. Thus, formal firms are concentrated in 
protected import-competing and non-tradable sectors, and exports of 
labour-intensive manufactured goods are non-existent.
Why Formal Firms are not Better Engines for Jobs  
in the Informal Economy
The abundant literature on foreign direct investment spillovers demon-
strates that instances can certainly be found in which formal firms serve to 
improve the fortunes of informal enterprises. However, the relationships 
between formal and informal firms need to be examined in detail in order 
to understand the optimal conditions to make this happen, and how often 
this occurs. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that relations between formal 
and informal firms can sometimes be fiercely competitive and sometimes 
cooperative in the form of outsourcing, but seldom of a nature that con-
tributes to progress and development in the informal economy.
The sectors where we observe the most formal/informal competition 
over market share are those where government policy (i.e., a ban, regula-
tion, tax, or subsidy) has created a kind of dual regulatory regime that 
is exploited by informal operators. In pharmaceuticals, formal quality 
standards allow room for informal products that may be cheaper, but 
lack quality control. Bans on the imports of used cars into Nigeria cre-
ate opportunities for informal smuggling from Benin. Nigerian subsidies 
on gasoline lead to extensive smuggling into all neighbouring countries, 
including Benin. While all these activities create employment opportuni-
ties, the jobs are typical of informal commerce and do not appear to be 
a solid basis for development. And, where the business relies on publicly 
protected rents, formal/informal competition over these rents squelches 
any incentives for collaboration that would allow formal firms to con-
tribute to modernization of the informal sector.
Narula and Pineli (2016) show that positive spillovers from multina-
tional enterprises depend on the incentives they face. In West Africa, 
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formal firms limit their subcontracting to informal firms largely to dis-
tribute their own products rather than produce for export. For example, 
multinationals hire local distributors to market imported fabric. Formal 
cement-makers hire informal companies to distribute their product and 
telecommunications companies hire locals to sell prepaid phone cards. 
Those who have these jobs prefer them over most alternatives available 
in informal commerce, but they are hardly the path to prosperity.
As discussed in Chapter 4, surveys in West Africa show that while 
large firms frequently sell products to small firms, a much smaller share 
(as low as 2% in Dakar) buy from small firms. Thus, by and large, foreign 
firms are not outsourcing production of their products to Africa; they are 
outsourcing marketing of their own products in Africa.
As also noted in Chapter 3, among the more modern services, the IT 
sector is an area with high potential outsourcing from major operators to 
smaller ones. However, our interviews revealed that such outsourcing is 
limited by the weak capacity of SMEs and corruption in both public and 
the private sector procurement.
Implications for Structural Transformation
Structural transformation typically consists of workers migrating out of 
agriculture, many at first move into manufacturing, and later increasingly 
into services as manufacturing plateaus. Evidence shows (Herrendorf, 
Rogerson, and Valentinyi 2014) that the plateau in manufacturing 
employment occurs at about the same level of GDP per capita in today’s 
developing countries as it did in developed economies. However, the level-
ling off, or even contraction of manufacturing, is occurring at much lower 
levels of national income in Africa than for other developing countries 
(Rodrik 2016). The exodus from agriculture continues, but these migrating 
workers largely end up in low-productivity informal manufacturing and 
services, and connections to the modern sector are not strong. Informal 
urban incomes exceed those of subsistence agriculture but are still well 
below formal sector earnings.
Henderson et al. (2018) have pointed out that developed countries that 
underwent structural transformation 100 to 200 years ago did so at a time 
when transportation costs were still high, and thus local demand gave 
rise to local production. At present, lower transport costs and globalized 
production have landed cheap consumer goods at everyone’s door, limit-
ing the need for local production. As Fox et al. (2013) and others have 
observed, current demographic trends indicate that the modern sector 
in Africa will not be able to absorb the migration out of agriculture for 
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decades to come. Thus, informality plays an important role in present- day 
structural transformation, not only in absorbing the bulk of transitioning 
workers, but also in providing clues as to why modernization is not keep-
ing pace and where policy can be most constructive.
Many of the pertinent issues come under the domain of governance and 
economic management. West African governments have not been suc-
cessful in providing reliable infrastructure at reasonable prices. The sagas 
of several network utilities provide abundant evidence that rent-seeking 
interferes with service delivery. In the capital markets, poor contract 
enforcement leads to high borrowing costs. Similarly, government acts 
as the gatekeeper to formal, legal operations of firms in their countries, 
leading to high formal wages and stagnation of formal manufacturing. It 
also leads to a kind of dual regulatory regime where formal firms follow 
formal rules and informal firms, unable to meet these standards, are only 
partially regulated. Some institutional arrangements are designed specifi-
cally to accommodate informal firms, such as the presumptive tax regime 
that is practiced in most Francophone African countries (described in 
Chapter 2). However, loose enforcement of accounting standards and 
lax cross-checking across different agencies lead to abundant abuses of 
these regimes (Benjamin and Mbaye 2012). In particular, large informal 
firms with high revenues find ways to pay minimal taxes under the lower 
presumptive tax regime.
The informal economy is excluded from public services that bene-
fit the formal regime. Health insurance and pensions are particularly 
lacking. Certification of skills for workers is a problem, especially in con-
struction. Lagging certification of standards for services is also a barrier 
to modernization, particularly for the information technology sector.
The informal sector has low barriers to entry and opportunities for 
those with little education and no capital. However, this open entry 
generates large numbers of firms operating at low productivity, with 
ownership or management structures that fail to incorporate modern 
systems. Even the large and sophisticated informal firms, close in pro-
ductivity to formal firms, still tend to operate like family firms in ways 
that keep them below the efficiency levels of their formal counterparts.
Recommendations
While the characteristics of the informal economy can help point out 
some weak links in the modernization process, it can also indicate points 
of entry where policy can help improve the level of earnings in the sec-
tor, the largest employer in the Francophone African economies. The 
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most direct approach is to raise the skills of informal workers by provid-
ing better basic education and vocational training. Training in business 
management for SMEs has a decidedly mixed record, but, in certain tar-
geted sectors, it could help.
Policy regarding formalization should focus on large informal firms (as 
also discussed in Chapter 8). These already have the capacity to function 
like formal firms, and a more rule-based regulatory enforcement could 
induce them to shift to formal firm status. It is difficult for any government 
to implement a viable development strategy when many major players are 
allowed to operate outside the system. Stricter rules should also apply to 
government officials involved in public or private businesses.
In between the large informal firms that could be formalized and the 
microenterprises that need basic assistance, there is a large segment of 
firms that are not able to follow formal rules and still need public goods 
and services. Important aspects of these firms’ performance (i.e., pro-
ductivity, profitability, employment, and longevity) can be improved 
along the informality spectrum, rather than following a simple formal- 
informal dichotomy. While all these aspects of firm performance are 
important, the issues of productivity and employment have the greatest 
social impact. For these firms, policy should focus less on registration 
and taxes and more on what inhibits modernization and access to the 
benefits of modernity.
When presented with the option of being formal or informal, these 
semi-informal firms have little reason to opt for formality. Yet surveys 
and interviews tell us that there are many intermediate bargains they 
would be willing to make. While firms want better governance and better 
public services, governments want better tax compliance (as do compli-
ant tax-paying firms). A public-private bargain can enhance both public 
performance and private participation in the formal regulatory regime, 
including contributions to public finances. The dialogue on this mutual 
need for reform must include broad participation from the informal 
economy and not be confined to constituents focused on defending the 
status quo.
Most informal firms would be willing to pay a little more in taxes if 
they could be guaranteed an increase in public services. Where trust in 
the public sector is low, government may need to make the first move. 
The specific services that small informal businesses seek most vary across 
locations and across sectors, so learning about the type of public service 
improvements that are most highly sought by informal firms and work-
ers remains an important task.
Morocco, for example, has launched a public program that subsidizes 
social insurance for informal workers (Mbaye and Gueye 2014). While 
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government ends up with the bill for social insurance, it encourages 
informal workers to formally register so at least the government knows 
about them.
In the capital markets, it is important to recognize that most for-
mal credit instruments do not match the high-risk nature of informal 
businesses, hence the weak response to microcredit programs and 
the stronger preference for more personal sources of financing. The 
high-risk character of informal business income and their lack of collat-
eral need to be considered when finding ways to increase access to credit.
Finally, governments need to alter the structure of protected rents 
and wages. The relative incentives of productivity growth versus rent 
capture need to be rebalanced. Structural transformation in the current 
globalized economy requires a new view of how developing countries can 
provide a welcoming environment for modernizing forces while ensur-
ing the welfare of its informal workers.
The informal economy has, and will continue to have, a substantial 
role in structural transformation in Africa. However, while it continues 
to absorb workers migrating out of low-productivity agriculture, it will 
also limit the potential for growth and productivity until modernizing 
forces exert more influence. The large or sophisticated firms can be 
expected to formalize as governments are more systematic in ensuring 
the benefits to those that do so. Formal wages may continue to decline 
toward per capita GDP, and this might make more African locations 
competitive for international grade manufacturers. Regardless, gov-
ernments should focus on improving the regulatory environment for 
non-retail services, including IT, as these sectors can make impor-
tant contributions to modernization. Experience in providing public 
services to the middle layer of informal businesses and their workers 
should improve their civic participation and generate efficiencies from 
extending the coverage of the regulatory framework. However, institu-
tions that restrict allocations of rents will need to be checked to avoid 
counteracting modernization.
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CHAPTER 7
The Role of Labour Market Regulation  
in Deterring Formal Employment, with a 
Focus on Senegal
Stephen S. Golub, Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, and Hanyu Chwe
Introduction
Disappointing job creation in SSA, despite improved economic growth, 
is drawing greater attention to the labour market. Research has high-
lighted the paucity of formal employment and large disparities between 
formal and informal sector incomes (Golub and Hayat 2015; Mbaye and 
Benjamin 2015; Mbaye et al. 2015; Roubaud and Torelli 2013). Formal 
private sector wage employment has grown too slowly to offset declines 
in public sector employment and to keep up with labour force growth, so 
employment remains overwhelmingly informal, with very low wages, no 
benefits or job security, and hazardous working conditions. Formal wage 
employment is much lower for women than men. Furthermore, African 
manufacturing sectors tend to suffer from high relative unit labour costs, 
i.e., elevated wages relative to productivity compared to other regions 
(Golub et al. 2018). The question arises as to whether labour market reg-
ulations play a role in limiting formal sector employment creation.
While labour market regulation has been studied extensively in devel-
oped countries, and more recently in India and Latin America, few 
studies have examined the nature and consequences of labour market 
regulation in SSA.
It is certainly plausible that labour market regulations impede formal 
employment creation and thus contribute to the dominance of informal 
employment in SSA. Most of the previous literature and Chapter 5 of this 
book find that labour market restrictions are less important for the busi-
ness climate than other institutional constraints such as infrastructure, 
finance, and corruption. However, this does not mean that they do not 
play a role, particularly with regard to employment.
We begin with a review of the previous literature on labour market 
regulations with a focus on the implications for formal versus informal 
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employment in developing countries. The next section computes and 
analyzes indicators of labour market restrictions for 189 countries, show-
ing that labour market restrictions are generally high in Francophone 
Africa. Since there is insufficient data on formal versus informal employ-
ment to conduct a statistical analysis of the effects of regulations on 
employment, we proxied formal employment by exports of labour-
intensive manufactured products. We found no statistically significant 
effects of labour regulations on manufactured exports, consistent with 
previous studies. To probe further, we carried out a case study of Senegal, 
which has some of the most restrictive labour market regulations in the 
world. Our interviews with firm managers indicate that labour regula-
tions do curtail their formal employment, although they are not the main 
constraint. We conclude that labour market regulations contribute to a 
paucity of formal sector jobs in Senegal and likely in other Francophone 
African countries, but that these regulations are less important than the 
overall business climate.
Literature Review on Labour Market Regulations in 
Developing Countries
Objectives and types of labour market regulation
Virtually all countries, even the poorest ones, have legal statutes regu-
lating some aspects of employment relations. In fact, as we will show, 
some of the lowest income countries have the most stringent labour mar-
ket regulations. The intention is to protect workers, under the implicit 
assumption that employers wield excessive power and can abuse employ-
ees. While these regulations are well intentioned and, in some cases, 
beneficial, protection of existing jobs can deter creation of new jobs 
and impede productivity growth. In developing countries, where for-
mal employment is scarce, particularly for younger people and women, 
the trade-off between protecting incumbent workers and generation of 
employment opportunities is particularly acute.
Two general types of concerns motivate labour market regulations: 
1. ‘Moral’ imperatives to safeguard workers’ fundamental human 
rights and 
2. ‘Economic’ goals of promoting the well-being of workers (Golub 
1997). 
The former is covered by the International Labour Organization’s 
(ILO) core Conventions, which ILO member nations can opt to ratify 
and enforce. ILO Conventions include rights to collective bargaining 
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and bans on forced labour, child labour, and discrimination. Economic 
considerations, on the other hand, refer to minimum wages, mandated 
benefits, and some aspects of working conditions. The levels of mini-
mum wages, fringe benefits, and paid vacations in a country necessarily 
depend on overall labour productivity in that country, unlike fundamen-
tal rights that should not vary with economic circumstances.
There are some hazy areas of overlap between these two goals. For 
example, banning all forms of child labour may be unrealistic or even 
impossible for some poor countries. Ensuring workplace safety is like-
wise a matter of degree. While there is no excuse for locking fire exits, as 
infamously occurred in 2012 in Bangladesh, reducing workplace hazards 
is expensive and the level of acceptable risk depends on the ability to pay 
for health and safety improvements. Ultimately, given labour productiv-
ity, there is a trade-off between safety and remuneration of employees. 
Nevertheless, moral and economic considerations are clearly separable 
in principle. In this chapter, we focus mostly on the economic rather than 
the human rights aspects of labour market regulation.
A related debate concerns the effectiveness of labour market regula-
tions. Do they constitute market distortions, impeding employment 
and productivity, or create institutions that overcome market failures 
(Freeman 2009)? We address the nature and consequences of labour 
market regulation through quantitative analysis and case studies.
Labour market regulations take several forms, including:
•	 Minimum wages
•	 Restrictions on temporary hiring and contracts
•	 Stipulations on working conditions including paid vacations, fringe 
benefits, and occupational health and safety
•	 Restrictions on layoffs
•	 Protections for unions and collective bargaining.
Previous studies usually focus on some subset of these categories of 
regulations. Minimum wages and restrictions on layoffs, also known 
as employment protection legislation (EPL), are usually the two topics 
receiving the most attention.
Quantifying labour market regulations
Since the 1990s, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has computed a measure of EPL. The OECD EPL 
index is limited to restrictions on layoffs for OECD members and selected 
other non-member emerging economies. Botero et al. (2004) were among 
the first to formulate and implement a comprehensive quantitative index 
of employment laws for countries around the world. They identified and 
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compiled detailed data for a large group of countries on four categories 
of employment regulation: contracts, cost of increasing working hours, 
cost of firing workers, and dismissal procedures. These sub-indices each, 
in turn, aggregated several indicators. Botero et al. (2004) studied the 
sources of differential regulations and found that countries with French 
and Scandinavian legal heritages tend to have more stringent regulations, 
supporting the hypothesis that countries’ regulatory styles are based on 
the ‘transplantation of legal systems’.
The Botero et al. (2004) measures were the foundation for the World 
Bank’s Doing Business (DB) indicators of labour market restrictions 
called the ‘Employing Workers Indicator’ (EWI), providing information 
on and ranking countries by the extent of their labour market restric-
tions. The EWI measures were in some respects quite similar to those 
of Botero et al., but they were more comprehensive in terms of coun-
try coverage, types of restrictions considered, and time period. The EWI 
measures and our use of them are described below. The EWI measures 
came under strong criticism from the ILO and labour unions, who 
argued that labour market legislation should be viewed from the angle 
of protecting worker rights, rather than as a cost of doing business and 
an impediment to labour market flexibility. In 2011, after considerable 
debate, the World Bank removed the EWI indicators from its system of 
rankings but continued to publish the underlying data on labour mar-
ket restrictions with some modifications to the set of sub-indicators 
 presented (Murphy 2014).
Aleksynska and Schindler (2011) also created a database of labour 
regu lation covering 1980–2007 for the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). While the longer time series of the IMF database relative to the 
DB measure is an advantage, this database is more circumscribed than 
Botero et al. (2004) and DB’s EWI in terms of content of the indica-
tors, limited to minimum wage and employment protection, and only 
includes advance notice requirements and severance payments in the 
latter.1 Furthermore, the IMF database has not been updated to include 
more recent data, and data are missing for some countries.
Effects of labour market restrictions
The effects of labour market regulations in OECD countries have been 
studied extensively. Djankov and Ramalho’s (2009) survey of the effects 
of labour market regulations notes that studies of developing countries’ 
labour market regulations largely began in 2004, making use of the 
1The IMF database also includes unemployment insurance generosity, but that is not an  indicator 
of labour market regulation.
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newly available World Bank DB data. Studies on developing countries 
have multiplied. We focus on three reviews of the literature: Djankov 
and Ramalho (2009), Natataraj et al. (2012), and Betcherman (2015). All 
of these literature reviews are limited to articles in refereed professional 
journals.
Djankov and Ramalho (2009) discuss studies of India, Latin American 
countries, and cross-country comparisons. They find that the majority of 
studies reviewed support the hypothesis that labour market regulations 
have adverse effects on employment and productivity. These effects are 
particularly strong for India and more mixed for Latin America. Cross-
country studies also tend to find that labour market regulations reduce 
investment and employment. Djankov and Ramalho (2009) also present 
their own cross-country analysis, which shows a statistically significant 
positive correlation between the DB EWI indicators with both the share 
of the informal economy in total GDP and the level of unemployment. 
Vandenberg (2010) also uses the DB EWI measures to examine labour 
regulations, finding little effect on unemployment. Vandenberg’s study 
was limited to 90 countries, of which only seven were African.
Natataraj et al. (2012) limit their review to low-income countries 
(LICs) and former LICs. They note that few studies of labour market 
regu lation in LICs have been conducted. Their combination of quali-
tative and quantitative analyses finds that minimum wage increases 
contribute to heightened self-employment and informal employment, 
and decrease formal employment, particularly for women, with little net 
effect on overall employment.
Betcherman (2015) conducts a more recent literature review of the effects 
of minimum wages and EPL, arriving at more ambiguous conclusions than 
Djankov and Ramalho (2009) and Natataraj et al. (2012). Betcherman finds 
that the negative impact of both minimum wages and EPL on unemploy-
ment is usually more muted than previous surveys  indicated—if efficiency 
effects are found, they are modest at best. In the case of India, for exam-
ple, Betcherman (2015) supports the previous research finding that EPL 
reduces employment but argues that other constraints such as electricity, 
tax administration, and corruption are more important.
A problem with these studies is that they often focus on unemploy-
ment. In Africa, especially, unemployment statistics are of poor quality 
and the distinction between unemployment and underemployment is 
very hazy. In many low-income African countries, recorded unemploy-
ment is low. This reflects the fact that most Africans are simply too poor 
not to work. The problem is not so much unemployment as underem-
ployment in the informal sector (Golub and Hayat 2015). It would be 
desirable to assess the effects of labour market restrictions on formal 
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versus informal employment, but there is insufficient data to carry out 
systematic studies within and between countries.
Indeed, very few African countries are included in the literature 
reviews described above. Fallon and Lucas (1991, 1993), which included 
Zimbabwe along with India, and Andalón and Pagés (2009) on Kenya 
are among the few exceptions. The few available cross-country stud-
ies of African labour market regulations (Rama 2000; Fox and Oviedo 
2013) suggest that minimum wages and labour market restrictions are 
not a major constraint on employment creation in Africa, unlike in other 
regions, despite often highly restrictive statutory provisions.
Rama (2000) found that formal sector wages in Francophone African 
countries (those using the FCFA) are very high relative to the level of per 
capita GDP and about double those of comparator countries with similar 
levels of per capita GDP. Minimum wages in FCFA countries are also 
higher than in other countries at similar levels of development, but ‘only’ 
by about 50% and are not high enough to account fully for the very high 
wages in these countries. Fox and Oviedo (2013) use the DB EWI data 
along with firm-level data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys. They 
find that the DB indicator is not strongly correlated with employment 
creation within SSA. This finding fits well with results from the World 
Bank Enterprise Surveys that labour market regulations are viewed as 
considerably less onerous than other aspects of the business environment 
such as infrastructure, access to finance, and corruption, as reported in 
Chapter 5 of this book. On the other hand, Fox and Oviedo (2013) also 
point out that firms say that they would boost hiring if labour market 
regulations were relaxed.
These findings of Rama (2000) and Fox and Oviedo (2013) suggest that 
labour market conflicts may be of lesser importance than other obsta-
cles such as infrastructure or corruption, but these conflicts could still 
matter. Furthermore, some domestic firms, particularly in the informal 
sector, may be able to routinely disregard labour market statutes. Formal 
firms, especially foreign investors, however, may feel compelled to abide 
by local laws, due to lesser recourse to authority in the host country as 
well as pressures from labour rights activists at home. Therefore, they 
may simply eschew investing in countries with such laws even if they are 
not enforced often. Moreover, these laws may be enforced more vigor-
ously for large formal firms or those lacking in political or kinship group 
connections.
Bhorat and Cheadle (2009) use the DB indicators to compare South 
African labour market regulations to those of other countries, combin-
ing this quantitative analysis with an in-depth qualitative study of South 
African laws. Our approach is quite similar but focuses on Senegal rather 
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than South Africa. In our previous work (Golub and Mbaye 2002), we 
found that large formal firms in Senegal cite legal conflicts with labour 
unions over dismissals and work rules as a significant problem. It is, 
therefore, worthwhile to review statutory regulations, the way they are 
enforced, and the perceptions of firms regarding these regulations in 
greater detail.
Indicators of Labour Market Regulations in African 
Countries
Comparisons of regulations across countries
Given that it is more comprehensive and up to date than other databases, 
we used the World Bank DB EWI indicators to compare levels of labour 
market regulation across countries. As noted above, the World Bank no 
longer ranks employment regulation and has modified its labour market 
indicators over time, but still publishes the raw data. The raw DB EWI 
data cover five major categories of labour market regulations: difficulty 
of hiring, rigidity of hours, difficulty of redundancy, redundancy cost, 
and research questions (the latter referring to availability of social insur-
ance and courts specializing in labour disputes). Each of these categories 
contains multiple sub-indicators. We reclassified the DB data into four 
categories: minimum wages, hiring, working conditions, and dismissal; 
each of which was given an equal weight of 0.25 in the overall labour 
market index we constructed. We considered variations in this ‘base-
line’ equal weights scenario. Table 7.1 presents the sub-indicators and 
their weights within each of the four categories. Despite the rather large 
number of sub-indicators covered, the DB database does not include 
some important labour market features such as the mandated social 
insurance contributions of employers and protection of unions and col-
lective bargaining. As noted above, however, the DB database is the most 
comprehensive available. Indicators of labour market restrictions are 
available from 2006 to 2014 for 189 countries.
All sub-index scores were adjusted to a 0 to 1 scale, where 0 represents 
no regulation and 1 the highest level of regulation in any country and 
then aggregated them using the weights in Table 7.1. Thus, composite 
scores close to zero indicate less stringent regulations and scores close to 
1 indicate more stringent regulations.
Table 7.2 shows our comprehensive score on the DB labour mar-
ket indicators in 2014, using the weights shown in Table 7.1, for 
selected countries. We experimented with alternative weights on the 
four main sub-indicators, but this did not greatly alter the country 
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Table 7.1
Construction of the labour market restrictions index
Indicator Weight
Minimum wage 0.25
Ratio of minimum wage to value added per worker 1
Hiring 0.25
Fixed-term contracts prohibited for permanent tasks 0.5
Maximum length of fixed-term contracts, including renewals 0.5
Working conditions 0.25
Standard work day 0.250
Maximum working days per week 0.250
Premium for night work (% of hourly pay) 0.063
Premium for weekly holiday work (% of hourly pay) 0.063
Major restrictions on night work 0.063
Major restrictions on weekly holiday work 0.063
Paid annual leave (average*) 0.250
Dismissal 0.25
Maximum length of probationary period 0.143
Dismissal due to redundancy allowed? 0.143
Third party notification if one worker dismissed? 0.036
Third party approval if one worker dismissed? 0.036
Third party notification if nine workers dismissed? 0.036
Third party approval if nine workers dismissed? 0.036
Retraining or reassignment obligation before redundancy? 0.143
Priority rules for redundancies? 0.071
Priority rules for reemployment? 0.071
Notice period for redundancy dismissal (average*) 0.143
Severance pay for redundancy dismissal (average*) 0.143
*Average of 1-, 5-, and 10-year tenures.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank 2013a: Doing Business 2013 database.
rankings or the statistical correlations of the rankings with other eco-
nomic variables.
Table 7.2 shows that there is a great deal of variation in the scores 
and rankings within regions. Among developed countries, Anglo-Saxon 
economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom have very 
low scores and rankings. However, France has a very high ranking, sug-
gesting that France is one of the most tightly regulated labour markets 
in the world (185th out of 189 countries). Overall, labour regulations in 
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Africa and Latin America are more restrictive than in Asia and in devel-
oped countries, but individual country rankings vary widely within each 
region.
African countries can be separated into three groups by language/ colonial 
legacy: Anglophone, Francophone, and Other. This division reflects the 
findings of Botero et al. (2004) that legal origin is an important determinant 
of labour market regulations, as is suggested by the wide disparity between 
the scores for France and the United Kingdom as reported in Table 7.2.
Indeed, as found in Fox and Oviedo (2013), Table 7.3 confirms that 
Anglophone African countries tend to have much lower scores and ranks in 
labour market regulatory stringency than Francophone countries. ‘Other’ 
countries are in between, although closer to Francophone countries. Again, 
however, there is considerable variation, with some Anglophone countries 
having high scores (e.g., Zimbabwe) and some Francophone countries 
exhibiting low scores.
Table 7.3 also presents a subjective measure of labour market regula-
tory pressure, the proportion of firm managers that rank labour market 
Table 7.2
Indexes and rank of labour market regulation, selected regions and countries*
Index Rank Index Rank
Developed Countries Asia
France 0.58 185 Pakistan 0.53 177
USA 0.18 24 Indonesia 0.51 175
United Kingdom 0.16 12 India 0.28 71
Africa China 0.27 68
Central African Rep. 0.60 188 Bangladesh 0.24 55
Senegal 0.60 187 Malaysia 0.18 21
Angola 0.54 180 Myanmar 0.11 5
Zimbabwe 0.51 173 Latin America
Kenya 0.37 130 Panama 0.51 174
Cameroon 0.36 123 Argentina 0.48 160
Ethiopia 0.34 114 Brazil 0.46 155
South Africa 0.33 108 Mexico 0.34 116
Ghana 0.25 59 Chile 0.26 65
Uganda 0.14 7 Colombia 0.19 28
*Indicator on a 0–1 scale, with 0 being least regulated; rank is out of 189 countries with 1 
being least regulated.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank 2013a: Doing Business 2013 database.
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Table 7.3
Indexes and rankings of labour market regulation, and share of firms rating labour market regula-
























as a Major  
Constraint  
(percent)
Anglophone Countries Francophone Countries
Botswana 0.21 41 14.0 Benin 0.35 121 15.6
Gambia 0.24 58 3.5 Burkina Faso 0.28 74 26.0
Ghana 0.25 59 3.6 Burundi 0.20 39 2.0
Kenya 0.37 130 20.8 Cameroon 0.36 123 21.5
Lesotho 0.22 46 11.3 Central Afr. Rep. 0.60 188 8.5
Liberia 0.30 91 2.6 Chad 0.42 146 28.4
Malawi 0.33 105 4.6 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.55 181 10.4
Mauritius 0.30 92 8.8 Congo, Rep. 0.57 184 24.5
Namibia 0.16 15 4.3 Côte d’Ivoire 0.37 128 6.1
Nigeria 0.21 43 3.4 Djibouti 0.43 149 14.5
Sierra Leone 0.29 84 11.4 Equat. Guinea 0.55 182 NA
South Africa 0.33 108 5.9 Gabon 0.34 112 16.4
South Sudan 0.28 72 10.9 Madagascar 0.53 178 4.6
Sudan 0.33 111 13.5 Mali 0.44 151 6.4
Swaziland 0.19 29 9.9 Niger 0.54 179 5.3
Tanzania 0.37 127 31.7 Senegal 0.60 187 4.5
Uganda 0.14 7 18.5 Togo 0.48 164 3.1
Zambia 0.33 107 6.2 Average 0.45 146 12.4
Zimbabwe 0.51 173 9.6
Average 0.28 78.8 10.2 Other Countries
Angola 0.54 180 26.1
Ethiopia 0.34 114 1.6
Guinea 0.31 94 2.5
Guinea- Bissau 0.48 163 3.5
Mauritania 0.41 145 29.4
Mozambique 0.56 183 6.0
Rwanda 0.29 82 8.9
Average 0.42 137 11.1
*Indicator on a 0–1 scale, with 0 being least regulated; rank is out of 189 countries with 1 being least regulated; 
firms identifying labour regulations as a major constraint as a ratio of all interviewed firms.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank 2013a: Doing Business 2013 database.
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regulation as a major constraint on their business. In most cases, the per-
centage of such firms is very low, about 10% of all firms interviewed. This 
ratio is slightly higher in Francophone African countries, with a ratio of 
about 12%, as compared to Anglophone countries with a ratio of 10% and 
other countries with a ratio of 11%. Within each subgroup of African coun-
tries, there is considerable variation. In addition, examination of Table 7.3 
suggests that the subjective measures of labour market restrictiveness do 
not correlate well with statutory measures of regulation. For all countries 
in the sample, the correlation coefficient between our statutory and subjec-
tive measures of regulation is only about 0.12.
Effects of labour market regulations on exports
It would be desirable to assess the effects of labour market regulation 
on the creation and existence of formal sector jobs, but measuring for-
mal or informal employment is very difficult. Instead, we examined the 
effects of labour market regulations on exports of manufactured goods, 
and more specifically exports of clothing, on the grounds that export-
led growth is a proven path to formal job creation (Golub and Hayat 
2015). We scaled exports by working-age population. The independent 
variables were our measures of labour market regulation controlling for: 
per capita GDP, the overall DB indicator of the business climate covering 
all aspects of starting and operating a business other than labour regula-
tions, a measure of real exchange rate over- or under-valuation, and a 
dummy variable for Africa.
Table 7.4 presents the results of the regressions. All the control vari-
ables were correctly signed and significant for both total manufacturing 
exports and clothing exports, except for the Africa dummy variable in 
the former. However, the labour regulation variable was incorrectly 
signed and insignificant in both cases. These results did not change using 
alternative weights on the various components of the labour regulation 
variable. The regression analysis therefore provides no evidence that 
tighter labour market regulations impede export-led growth.
Case Study: Senegal
The complexity of this issue suggests that a close study of particular 
countries’ institutions and policies would complement a cross-country 
comparison. Senegal is chosen as a case study both because it is an impor-
tant and interesting case, and one with which the authors have familiarity 
and contacts that enabled us to obtain a better understanding of the 
nature and enforcement of regulations. Despite a favourable geographic 
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Table 7.4
Regression analysis of exports of all manufactured products and clothing as a ratio of working-
age population, developing countries*
Total manufacturing exports  
divided by working-age population,  
in 2013 dollars, in logs
Clothing manufacturing exports 
divided by working-age population, 
in 2013 dollars, in logs
































R-squared value 0.74 0.54
N 84  82
Source: Authors’ calculations based on: World Bank 2013b: World Development Indicators 2013 
(English); World Trade Organization 2013: Time Series Statistics Database; and labour market 
regulation indicators reported in Table 7.2 and described in the text.
Notes: Statistics in parentheses: * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01 and *** = p<0.001
*Only for non-OECD countries and countries with working-age populations greater than 
1 000 000
**Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate divided by the nominal exchange rate (2013) based on 
data from World Bank World Development Indicators.
location, ethnic harmony, as well as a lack of natural resources and their 
‘curse’, Senegal has been unable to generate much formal employment 
growth in industry and services. Consequently, poverty remains very 
high; it was estimated at 47% in 2011 (Ministère de la Jeunesse 2014).
In our earlier research on Senegal’s investment climate (Golub and 
Mbaye 2002), we found some indications that labour market regula-
tions were an important obstacle to Senegalese investment but did not 
investigate this issue in depth. This section provides an updated and 
more thorough investigation of Senegalese labour market performance 
and the role of regulation therein. Our analysis is based on documents 
and interviews conducted in June 2015 with a wide range of stakehold-
ers in the Senegalese economy to obtain their perspective on barriers to 
employment in industry and services. The interviewees included repre-
sentatives from large domestic and foreign businesses, small and medium 
 enterprises, government agencies, and labour unions.
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Senegal’s Labour Code (Code du Travail) begins with its overarching 
objectives in article L.1:
The right to work for each citizen is sacred. The state pledges its 
full efforts to assist citizens in finding employment and main-
taining it once they have obtained it.
Unfortunately, Senegal’s Labour Code and institutions focus on pre-
serving a small and stagnant pool of existing formal sector jobs, and the 
country has failed dismally in creating remunerative employment oppor-
tunities for the vast majority of its labour force.
Demographics, labour force, and employment in Senegal
Rapid population growth is having a major impact on Senegal’s labour 
supply. The growth rate of the population between 2010–2015 averaged 
2.9%, similar to other countries in Sahelian West Africa and among 
the highest in the world. Senegal’s population is quite young, having a 
median age of 19 in 2011 (Ministère de la Jeunesse 2014). The surging 
numbers of young people entering the labour market and sluggish labour 
demand are creating conditions of massive unemployment and under-
employment. In 2005, an estimated 35% of urban youth (ages 15–24) and 
50% of rural youth were not employed or in school.
The working-age population numbers approximately nine mil-
lion. In developing countries, it is difficult to separate the working-age 
population into strict categories, such as presence in the labour force, 
employment, and unemployment given that much of the adult popula-
tion is engaged in informal sector work, which is often a form of disguised 
unemployment. ANSD (2011) estimated that the labour force numbers 
approximately 5 million, of which slightly more than half is rural. The 
low participation rate (below 60%) reflects the fact that many people, 
particularly women, work without pay in the household. The particularly 
high dependency on intra-household transfers within the extended fam-
ily is characteristic of Senegalese society (World Bank 2007; Pfefferman 
1968). The participation rate for women of 45% is far below the average 
in Africa, whereas the participation rate for men of about 78% is close to 
the average for the continent.
Less than 10% of the labour force is employed in the formal sector, 
although estimates vary depending on the definition of formal employ-
ment (Benjamin and Mbaye 2012). For example, the Ministère de la 
Jeunesse (2014) lists formal modern sector private employment at 
109,000 (p. 27) and urban informal employment at 2.2 million (p. 42) in 
2011. Elsewhere in the same document, the number of employees cov-
ered by social insurance is estimated at 245,000 (p. 93). About half of 
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the working-age population resides in rural areas where employment 
is overwhelmingly (98%) informal. Figure 7.1 shows the approximate 
breakdown of the labour force into formal employment, informal unem-
ployment, and unemployment. Unemployment, defined as those without 
work but actively seeking it, amounts to about 10% of the labour force or 
about 500,000 people. Formal employment is roughly 400,000 and about 
4 million are informally employed. A large proportion of the 4 million 
remainder of the working population, mostly women, is engaged in 
unremunerated household work.
Furthermore, the situation has, if anything, deteriorated over the last 
30 years. According to Terrell and Svejnar (1990), private modern sector 
employment was about 100,000 in 1980, suggesting that private formal 
sector employment has stagnated over the past 30 years. This finding is 
consistent with the demise of large industrial enterprises such as tex-
tiles, groundnut oil processing, and tuna canning in the 1990s and 2000s 
(Golub and Mbaye 2002), roughly offset by growth in the services sector.
Improved economic growth in Senegal, led by non-tradable sectors 
such as construction, commerce, communications, and information tech-
nology, has moderately boosted formal employment. Figure 7.2 shows an 
increasing trend of new registered employment contracts signed between 
2001 and 2014. However, about two-thirds of these contracts are tem-
porary. In contrast, in 1980, about 60% of employment contracts were 
Figure 7.1
Breakdown of Senegal’s labour force into informal employment, formal employment, and 
 unemployment, 2011
Source: ANSD (2011) and authors’ calculations
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indefinite (Terrell and Svejnar 1990). Moreover, the number of gross 
new contracts substantially overstates net employment creation because 
some new contracts are renewals of existing contracts and some of the 
existing contracts may be terminated.
Figure 7.3 shows the total number of workers enrolled in the Institution 
de Prévoyance Retraite du Sénégal (IPRES) [Retirement Pension Fund 
of Senegal] retirement program, which is, in principle, mandatory 
for formal sector firms, both in levels (left axis) and as a ratio of the 
working-age population (right axis), for  1980–2012. In the early and 
mid-1980s, the number of IPRES participants rose from about 140,000 
to 180,000, and then dropped steadily for about a decade in the after-
math of the economic crisis and the devalu ation of the FCFA. In the late 
1990s, as the economy recovered, the number of enrolees started rising 
again, reaching an estimated 300,000 in 2012. As a ratio of the working-
age population (ages 15–64), the level of IPRES participants is very low, 
as also shown in Figure 7.3. This share peaked in the mid-1980s at a little 
above 5%, fell sharply over the next decade to a low of 2.5%, and then 
rose steadily over the 2000s, reaching about 4% in 2012—still very low 
and well below the ratio of the 1980s peak. In the mid-2000s, according 
to World Bank (2007), only 14,000 of some 175,000 IPRES participants 
were covered by the more generous supplemental plan. At that time, 
access to family allowances and disability compensation, managed by 
the Caisse de Sécurité Sociale, was slightly higher at 245,000. The vast 
majority of workers have no official social security coverage of any kind, 
relying instead on informal and  traditional family as well as religious 
networks.
Figure 7.2
New registered employment contracts and labour force growth in Senegal
Source: Data provided by Senegal’s Directorate of Employment
174  Golub, Mbaye, and Chwe
Only about 15% of workers receive a regular salary. The rest are self-
employed, paid in kind, or paid by the task. In short, the current stock 
and new supply of formal sector jobs with regular wages and benefits are 
far below the level and growth of the labour force, respectively.
There are marked disparities in pay between formal and informal jobs 
in Senegal as well as other West African countries (Golub and Hayat 2015; 
Benjamin and Mbaye 2012; Roubaud and Torelli 2013). As illustrated in 
Table 7.5, informal sector workers’ earnings average one-quarter of those 
in the public sector and one-third of the formal private sector wages. The 
vast majority of the labour force is engaged in the informal sector, with 
low pay, minimal benefits, no union representation, or job security, and 
often dangerous working conditions. Opportunities and working condi-
tions for women are even worse than for men. While a small number of 
larger informal firms pay better than their smaller counterparts, most 
workers are engaged by small informal enterprises. Thus, having a for-
mal job with benefits such as paid vacation, protection against abusive 
treatment, access to retirement programs, and health insurance can be 
considered a rare privilege.
For young people especially, the labour market situation is very 
difficult. While education levels have been rising, in 2011, 46% of young 


















































































Number of workers enrolled in the IPRES retirement program, total and as a ratio of the 
 working-age population
Source: Data provided by the Institution de Prévoyance Retraite du Sénégal (IPRES)
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higher levels of education are rarely able to secure formal sector jobs. 
Recorded unemployment actually rises with the level of education, with 
university graduates having an unemployment rate of 31% in 2011, up 
from 16% in 2005. Due to a combination of lack of employment oppor-
tunities and the lack of skills of many young people, the labour force 
participation rate for young people is well below the national average at 
only 42% in 2011 (54% for men and 33% for women). Of young people 
classified as outside the labour market, 40% are ‘discouraged workers’ 
who have ceased looking for work due to poor prospects. Those who do 
have jobs are overwhelmingly in the informal sector. However, the clas-
sification of workers as out of the labour force or in the informal sector 
is often quite arbitrary, as noted above. The key point is that prospects 
of formal employment are even bleaker for young people than the rest 
of the workforce. As the Ministère de la Jeunesse (2014, p. 69) notes, 
the Labour Code and Collective Agreements disregard or even impede 
employment opportunities for young people.
Senegalese labour market institutions
Senegal’s Labour Code, as in many Francophone African countries, is 
modelled on France’s code. The 1961 Code, adopted upon Senegal’s inde-
pendence, was very similar to the 1952 French Overseas Labour Code 
that governed labour regulations in France’s African colonies. Pfefferman 
(1968, p. 94) observes that the 1952 Code was in some respects even more 
restrictive than France’s version. “Social concern almost always predom-
inated over economic considerations with French MP’s who were often 
ill-informed about colonial matters …”. ‘Rigid and complex administra-
tive regulations’ were implemented, which he rightly noted are difficult 
to modify once put in place.
Despite several partial liberalizations, most notably in 1997, Senegal’s 
Labour Code retains quite stringent provisions on employment contracts, 
layoffs, and working conditions. Using the measure of restrictiveness of 
labour market institutions discussed above, Senegal ranks 187th in the 
Table 7.5




Formal private sector 169
Informal sector  59
Source: Adapted from Roubaud and Torelli (2013, Table 1.14)
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severity of labour market regulations, with a score that is almost identical 
to that of France. Table 7.6 shows a breakdown of the overall restrictive-
ness score into the four main categories of our indicator: hiring, layoffs, 
working conditions, and minimum wages relative to labour productivity. 
Senegal ranks as very highly regulated on all sub-indexes and particularly 
so on the level of the minimum wage and hiring regulations.
Hiring
The 1961 Code stipulated that hiring be centralized through the Service 
de la Main d’œuvre, a government employment agency (Terrell and 
Svejnar 1990). While that requirement was not fully enforced and was 
removed in 1988, Senegal retains one of the highest levels of restrictions 
on hiring in the world according to our index, and the restrictiveness of 
these provisions was confirmed in nearly all our interviews. One of the 
most significant provisions of the Labour Code, covered in Chapter 3, 
concerns restrictions on contracts. The Code specifies several permis-
sible forms of contracts, the most important of which are fixed-term, 
seasonal, and open-ended. The overall objective is to promote long-term 
job security by limiting the extent to which firms can hire on a tempo-
rary basis and lay off workers. In particular, limitations are placed on 
use of seasonal and especially fixed-term contracts and termination of 
these contracts. Seasonal contracts must be limited to very short and 
non-consecutive time periods for tasks that are seasonal in nature, and, 
in principle, workers should get a new contract every day they work. 
Likewise, fixed-term contracts are to be confined to situations where the 
tasks involved are temporary in nature (Article 44). If the provisions of 
fixed-term and seasonal contracts are violated, the worker is automati-
cally defaulted to an indefinite-term contract.
Fixed-term contracts are for a maximum of two years and can be 
renewed only once (Article 42). The Office of Labour and Social Security 
Inspections must be notified of all fixed-term contracts of more than 
three months.
Hiring provisions have been partially relaxed. In 2008, a govern-
ment decree granted exceptions to the number of renewals of fixed-term 
Table 7.6
Senegal’s rankings on Doing Business labour regulation indicators (1 = least restrictive, 189 = 
most  restrictive)
Overall Minimum Wage Hiring Difficulty Working Conditions Layoffs
187 181 170 140 136
Source: World Bank Doing Business Indicators (2013a) and authors’ calculations
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contracts for certain job classifications and specific sectors.2 The general 
exceptions include activities related to maintenance and repair; security; 
sports, theatre, and other public shows; surveys and polling; forestry; ship 
repairs; and anything that depends on short-term financing. In addition, 
fixed-term contracts are liberalized for some types of work within con-
struction, agriculture, telecommunications, and tourism. However, this 
decree specifies that any such waivers of the Labour Code’s provisions 
cannot be intended to or have the effect of displacing permanent jobs, 
subject to penalties. Furthermore, managers assert that these exceptions 
to the Labour Code’s provisions on fixed-term contracts are usually not 
upheld in practice when challenged at the Labour Tribunal.
In 2009, a decree permitting ‘temporary contracts’ for workers provided 
by temp agencies was established but again with numerous restrictions and 
limitations.3 In February 2015, President Sall signed law 2015–14 modifying 
the Labour Code to introduce provisions on internships.
Layoffs
Terminations of fixed-term contracts before their term ends are not 
permitted except for flagrant violations, mutual agreement of employer 
and employee, or unusually severe external circumstances. Failure of 
firms to adhere to these stipulations results in liability for damage claims 
by workers. Although restrictions have been eased on terminations of 
indefinite- term contracts for ‘economic reasons’ since the 1990s, layoffs 
of workers on indefinite term contracts remain subject to complex pro-
cedures, advance notice, review by labour inspectors, and challenge, in 
many cases leading to litigation at the employment tribunal. Layoffs of 
shop representatives (‘délégués du personnel’) require authorization from 
the Minister and firings of these representatives are subject to particu-
larly tight restrictions and heavy fines for violations.
Many managers decry the lack of flexibility in layoffs even in cases 
of gross incompetence, preventing hiring more qualified or motivated 
workers, and the inability to sanction poor performance undermines 
productivity.
Working conditions
The Labour Code also provides numerous specific prescriptions on 
working hours, overtime pay, paid vacation, compensation for relocation 
2Ministerial Order No. 1887 (March 2008) provided a list of sectors of activity in which it is 
customary not to use a contract of indefinite duration.
3Order No. 2009-1412 established special protections for the employees of temporary work 
agencies and the obligations to which these enterprises are subject.
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costs, health and safety, and many other workplace conditions. For 
example, Senegalese workers are entitled to nearly 10 more days of leave 
than those in France, and 20 more than in the United States and China 
(World Bank 2007). In addition to national holidays, employers must 
provide two paid vacation days per month to any employee with a year of 
seniority of more (Articles 148–150).
In addition to strict limitations on temporary contracts and complex 
recruitment procedures, the Labour Code imposes restrictions on alter-
ing workers’ job classifications and employment locations. Employers are 
required to provide nutrition to workers and their families in the event 
that the worker is unable to procure food (Article 107). Where collective 
bargaining has not superseded national regulations, the government is 
entrusted with setting minimum wage scales, differential pay for over-
time, holiday and night work, as well as seniority and merit bonuses 
(Article 109).
Labour inspectors from the Directorate of Labour Inspection and 
Social Security (DLISS) are authorized to carry out unannounced visits to 
firms to assess compliance with the Labour Code (Article 197). Although 
officials say the number of inspectors and vehicles is insufficient to ade-
quately monitor compliance, the number of inspections rose sharply in 
2014 to nearly 1,600, up from about 600 in previous years. Officials from 
DLISS claim to oversee the informal sector, but the bulk of inspections 
and disputes concern formal sector firms and workers.
Compliance with the provisions of the Labour Code is highly 
variable, even among foreign investors. According to some of our 
 interviews, Chinese and Lebanese investors usually completely ignore 
labour market regulations, whereas European firms tend to comply 
quite scrupulously. Firms also resort to temp agencies for some tasks, 
despite the 5–10% higher cost, to avoid intrusive regulatory oversight.
Minimum wages
As in many African countries, Senegalese formal sector wages are high 
relative to per capita GDP and levels in countries with similar income 
levels in other regions (World Bank 2007; Golub and Hayat 2015; Golub 
et al. 2018). The differentials between formal and informal sector labour 
incomes are very large. The World Bank (2007) reports that median formal 
sector salaries were about 100,000 FCFA per month (200 USD); whereas, 
for informal workers, it is 34,000 FCFA per month (about 60 USD).
Senegal’s overall minimum wage for non-agricultural work is set at 
209.10 FCFA per hour, or about 40,000 FCFA (about 80 USD) per month. 
Thus, the minimum wage is generally not binding for the formal sector 
but would be for the informal sector were it applied (which it is not).
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However, collective agreements (‘Conventions collectives’) at the 
industry level set minimum wages that generally exceed the national 
minimum wage, with a grid of step-ups based on experience and skills. 
These wage and salary scales are supposed to be updated regularly, but 
the current rates were established in 2009. For most industries, for the 
lowest level of experience, the collective agreements establish minimum 
monthly wages of around 60,000 FCFA per month and/or hourly rates of 
about 350 FCFA.4
Most of the managers and human resource personnel we interviewed 
do not view the national minimum wages as a constraint, but opinion is 
more divided on the pay scales set by collective bargaining agreements. 
Some managers state that minimum wages are too high in some sectors, 
but surprisingly, in a few instances, others argue that they are too low and 
that firms must pay bonuses and supplements (‘primes’ and ‘sursalaires’) 
over the specified grids to retain their skilled workers. Several suggest 
that the collective conventions are out of date and should be renegotiated.
Mandatory social insurance contributions
Mandatory social insurance contributions, more so than wages, are 
 particularly elevated in Senegal. The main levies are for: 
1. retirement, managed by a private agency, the IPRES, under 
 government supervision,
2. family allowances and disability compensation, managed by the 
Caisse de Sécurité Sociale, and
3. health insurance. 
For firms that comply with all required payroll contributions, the cost 
can amount to 25–30% of base salary (Table 7.7). Counting employee 
contributions, the ratio rises to about 40%.
Most managers we talked to view these payroll taxes as very onerous. 
However, only a small number of formal sector firms participate, meaning 
just a few workers are covered by any of these social insurance programs, 
and even fewer are covered by all of them as indicated earlier.
Labour unions and collective bargaining
Most of the formal workforce is unionized, and most industries have 
their own unions. A few umbrella organizations group industry-level 
unions into larger entities. The Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs 
du Sénégal (CNTS) and the Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes 
4Ministry of Public Service, Labor, Employment and Professional Organizations, Senegal. (2009). 
New Salary Scales. 
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du Sénégal (UNSAS) are the most important. The CNTS encompasses 65 
industry-level unions and has some 65,000 members. UNSAS has 56,000 
members from 54 unions.
The major umbrella unions are politically powerful. They constitute 
an important component of the tripartite social dialogue along with busi-
ness representatives and government officials. The situation has not been 
fundamentally altered since the 1980s, and the “trade unions are, and 
have been, generally aligned with powerful political groups and some-
what divorced from the workers’ interests” (Terrell and Svejnar 1990, 
p. 50).
Unions recognize the paucity of employment opportunities but favour 
increased import protection and crackdowns on informal firms that flout 
regulations, rather than deregulation of the labour market. Many firms 
cheat, failing to declare the majority of their employees. Union repre-
sentatives claim that Chinese- and Lebanese-owned firms are far less 
compliant in respecting the Labour Code than European investors.
Conflicts between labour and management
Many firm managers made clear that they recognize the necessary role 
of unions but decried their politicized and confrontational function 
in Senegal. Strikes have become increasingly infrequent in Senegal, 
but conflicts between labour and management are quite common 
and, according to some firms, have been increasing in frequency and 
severity. Several firm managers deplored the confrontational attitude 
of unions, although some also said that good relations with workers 
could be attained through cooperation with unions.
Table 7.7
Senegal social insurance mandatory payroll contributions (percent of gross wages)
Overall Rate Employer Share Employee Share
Retirement (IPRES)
Public Pension Plan 14 8.4 5.6
Supplementary Plan 6 3.6 2.4
Social Security
Family Allowances 7 7
Occupational Injury 1 to 5 1 to 5
Health Insurance 6 3
Vocational Training Tax 3 3
Total 37 to 41 26 to 30 11
Source: World Bank (2007), interviews
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The Labour Code prescribes procedures and compensation in the event 
of violations of labour protections. Workers can bring alleged abuses to 
the attention of labour inspectors at the DLISS. Before taking legal action, 
workers and employers can attempt to find agreement through arbitra-
tion procedures, with the oversight of inspectors, or workers can opt to 
take the case directly to the Labour Tribunal. If arbitration fails, cases 
are usually referred to the Tribunal, although a few cases are dropped by 
the plaintiffs. Many cases do go to the Tribunal, but, even if they do not, 
the threat of costly litigation hangs over the arbitration process.
Table 7.8 shows the number of cases going to arbitration and to the 
Tribunal in 2008 and 2011–2014, the years for which information is 
available. The total number of arbitration cases has varied around 1,000 
annually in this period, with the highest level in 2014. Of these arbi-
tration cases, approximately half have been resolved successfully and 
slightly less than that were not resolved. Most of the latter were referred 
to the Tribunal.
Overall assessment
Labour relations were not usually cited as the main obstacle to greater 
formal sector employment in Senegal during our interviews, but are 
widely viewed as a significant problem. Generally, labour relations are 
ranked as less important than infrastructure, particularly power, access 
to finance, corruption and red tape, and access to land. Two main factors 
Table 7.8
Indicators of labour market conflict
 2008 2011 2012 2013 2014
Activities of labour inspectors
Organizations inspected 452 458 592 644 1587
Number of arbitration cases 930 866 634 983 1078
Cases not successfully arbitrated 526 780 417 619 983
Cases forwarded to the Tribunal NA NA 457 526 806
Payments to workers
Severance payments (thousand USD) NA 1304 4911 8315 9456
Arbitration payments (thousand USD) 578 339 669 685 674
Social dialogue
Election of worker representatives overseen 128 119 NA 125 137
Authorized layoffs of worker representatives 18 9 29 28 12
Refused layoffs of worker representatives NA 11 25 27 13
Source: Direction Générale du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale (2014)
182  Golub, Mbaye, and Chwe
explain the relative lack of concern about labour market rigidities: other 
constraints are even more onerous and many firms disregard or violate 
the rules. Nevertheless, a majority of the firms interviewed are frustrated 
by the rigidity of labour regulations and the antagonistic relationship 
between unions and management.
Many firm managers have decried the archaic nature of the Code, 
saying it needs to be more flexible to adapt to modern realities. While 
the provisions of the Labour Code are frequently flouted, for larger for-
mal firms the risks of doing so can be significant. As discussed above, 
workers can sue employers, with the assistance of unions, at the Labour 
Tribunal, generating substantial costs and adverse publicity. The Code 
enshrines a confrontational dynamic between labour and management, 
with conflicts often litigated at the Labour Tribunal, resulting in high 
costs to firms. The functioning of labour unions also contributes to the 
often-adversarial relationship between workers and employers.
Based on our interviews, the greatest concerns of firms are the inflexi-
bility of contracts and the confrontational tactics of unions. Mandatory 
social insurance contributions are also viewed as high. Many firms claim 
they are constrained by their inability to renew fixed-term contracts, and, 
as a result, curtail hiring and training of workers. Firm managers cite 
low profitability, fluctuating revenues, changing consumer preferences, 
and rapid technological change as factors that require more flexible 
labour structures. Some firms also view the restrictions on layoffs and 
other regulations as impediments, but these were less widely cited than 
the rigidities associated with contracts. In addition to the restrictions 
imposed by some provisions of the Labour Code, the way that alleged 
violations of these rules are used by unions to take or threaten legal 
action is equally important. On the other hand, some managers have 
observed that enlightened practices by employers to treat workers fairly 
and engender a spirit of cooperation have reduced conflicts.
The inflexible and adversarial nature of formal labour market func-
tioning is in the end harmful not only to business profitability but also to 
the creation of employment. As some of our interviewees have pointed 
out, there is an absence of creation of large formal firms. Domestic 
manu facturing factories have largely disappeared. While there are mul-
tiple causes of the dismal performance of the Senegalese labour market in 
creating remunerative employment opportunities, our interviews left no 
doubt that labour relations is a contributing factor. The excessive focus 
on preservation of existing jobs and employee privileges has contributed 
to the near absence of formal jobs.
Human resource managers with experience in other countries reported 
that problems with rigid regulations and confrontational unions also 
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occurred in other Francophone countries, but are worse in Senegal. The 
situation is much better in Anglophone African countries such as Ghana 
and Tanzania in their view. Our indicators of labour market restrictions 
confirm this assessment.
A complete overhaul of the Labour Code is not feasible, but increased 
flexibility in hiring is essential. Some reforms easing the use of fixed-term 
contracts have occurred, but these are not really applied. Lack of trust 
between labour and employers is equally salient. The government should 
undertake a new social dialogue to create a less confrontational attitude 
from unions, as well as management, and one that is more welcoming to 
new investments.
According to most of the managers we spoke to, the Labour Tribunal is 
biased toward the interests of labour, and workers win the overwhelming 
majority of cases. Several managers stated that the proportion of labour 
victories was 98%, although a few firms claimed that careful documen-
tation of cases led to better outcomes. Labour unions and government 
officials agreed that workers won the vast majority of cases at the Labour 
Tribunal, but attributed that to the unions only taking on strong cases or 
workers almost always being in the right.
Firms are often hit with damage awards of about 5 million FCFA 
(about 10,000 USD) to individual workers, and sometimes to many work-
ers at once, resulting in payments of as much as 70 million FCFA (over 
100,000 USD). For wrongful firing of a staff representative, fines have 
reached 200 million FCFA (400,000 USD). Unions collect a percentage of 
these fines (around 20%), providing a strong interest in pursuing firms.
The threat of costly litigation leads firms to pay out large settlements. 
Table 7.8 shows voluntary severance payments to employees by firms 
and payments agreed at arbitration. Data on fines paid resulting from 
convictions at the Tribunal are not available. The figures show that sever-
ance payments are quite large, reaching nearly 10 million USD in 2014, 
up sharply from 2011, and amounting to about 2% of total formal sector 
labour compensation. The level of fines imposed by DLISS is consider-
ably smaller but still quite onerous for some firms, according to our 
interviews.
As noted above, the DLISS must approve layoffs of workers’ represen-
tatives. Table 7.8 shows that about half of employer requests are granted, 
and the other half rejected.
Employers generally call for reforms of certain provisions and more 
flexible implementation rather than complete overhaul. Unions fiercely 
resist liberalization of the Labour Code, claiming that it leads to job inse-
curity. Incremental reform may be all that is feasible under the present 
circumstances.
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Some firms argue that good managerial practices, treating employees 
as ‘social partners’, and regular communication with them minimizes 
conflicts. In this view, the problems associated with the Labour Code are 
manageable if employers gain workers’ trust. This view is in the minor-
ity, however, with most decrying the lack of flexibility and high costs 
the Labour Code imposes. Nevertheless, the point that managers can do 
their part to move toward more cooperative labour market relations is 
important.
Conclusions
Labour market regulations can be justified as a protection of worker 
rights but can also dissuade formal employment creation. We have used 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to describe 
and analyze labour market regulations in Africa. The quantitative 
analysis used the World Bank Doing Business indicators to develop a 
synthetic measure of labour market regulation with four sub-indexes 
on: minimum wages, hiring, firing, and working conditions. We found 
that African countries tend to have high levels of regulation relative to 
Asian developing countries, with Francophone countries generally more 
regulated than Anglophone countries. There is considerable variation 
within these groups, however. A regression analysis failed to uncover 
an effect of labour market regulations on export competitiveness in 
 manufacturing— a proxy for formal employment creation. Instead, 
we found that measures of the general business climate and exchange-
rate overvaluation had strong and statistically significant influences on 
manu factured exports.
To delve deeper into the nature and effects of labour market regula-
tions, we carried out a case study of Senegal. According to our indicators, 
Senegal has one of the most heavily regulated labour markets in the 
world, so, if these regulations matter at all, their effects should be dis-
cernible in Senegal.
Senegal’s Labour Code and labour unions focus on protecting existing 
jobs rather than creating new ones, lowering productivity and creating 
disincentives for hiring. Thus, Senegal’s institutions support a small frac-
tion of the workforce to the detriment of a vast number of unemployed 
or underemployed in the informal sector. As such, the Labour Code is 
a manifestation of and contributor to the marked dualism of Senegal’s 
labour markets: a small minority of workers in formal enterprises benefit 
from detailed protections about benefits, paid vacations, working hours, 
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relocation restrictions, etc., on a par with those in France, while the vast 
majority in the informal sector have no protection at all.
Our interviews in Dakar confirm that many firm managers do view 
inflexible labour market regulations and confrontational labour relations 
as a significant problem. The most problematic aspects of the Labour 
Code and its enforcement involve limitations on temporary contracts. 
The ability of disgruntled workers to bring cases to the Labour Tribunal is 
also an important source of costs and frustration for employers. Beyond 
legal statutes, the confrontational character of labour relations under-
mines productivity and competitiveness. It is incumbent upon both 
employers and unions to foster a more cooperative approach to labour 
relations that will ultimately benefit both groups.
While managers in Senegal consider labour market regulation an 
impediment, few rank it as among the most important obstacles to invest-
ment and formal employment creation. Poor infrastructure, lack of access 
to finance, corruption, and land use dominate labour market issues. In 
this regard, the case study helps explain why there is no statistical rela-
tionship between labour market regulations and export competitiveness, 
despite the nearly universal complaints about the Labour Code.
In summary, labour market regulation is not among the most impor-
tant impediments to competitiveness and formal employment creation 
in Africa. Nevertheless, the case study shows that it protects fundamental 
labour rights, to the detriment of investment and formal employment crea-
tion, and thus contributes to the predominance of informal employment.
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CHAPTER 8
What Policies Can Support Small  
Informal Businesses in Africa?
Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Félix Zogning, and Fatou Gueye
Introduction
There is profound disagreement among economists and policymak-
ers on whether the informal sector should be repressed or assisted, as 
discussed in detail in Mbaye (2014), Benjamin and Mbaye (2012), and 
some of the other chapters in this book. Some stress the negative effects 
of the informal sector such as tax evasion and unfair competition with 
the formal sector. Others point to the role of the informal sector as a 
provider of employment of last resort. Many of these analyses do not 
consider the heterogeneous nature of the informal sector, in particular 
the distinction between large and small informal firms. Thus, Mbaye 
(2014) favours a targeted strategy with different policies toward large 
versus small informal firms. Overall, in the case of larger firms, sanctions 
to enforce formalization are often in order. For smaller informal firms, 
however, providing assistance makes better sense. In this chapter, we will 
examine policies directed toward the small informal sector, particularly 
the family, individual, and micro businesses that are so prevalent in the 
countries under study.
The business censuses conducted in Cameroon and Senegal show that 
small informal businesses represent more than 95% of total private enter-
prises. Self-employment represents more than 80% of total employment 
in Francophone Africa. These jobs are characterized by an extreme level 
of vulnerability and underemployment. Helping small firms develop 
will boost technological progress, productivity, and employment. This 
 chapter addresses the following issues regarding the small informal sec-
tor: policies and institutions to support entrepreneurship, the role of 
professional organizations, the role of the Francophone legal system 
OHADA, and lessons from Morocco.
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Supporting Entrepreneurship
One of the main weaknesses of the informal sector is the lack of effective 
support for development of entrepreneurial skills and attitudes. Given the 
overwhelming proportion of SMEs, support to the private sector should 
feature a coherent strategy to support these firms, almost all of which are 
informal. Throughout the world, on average, more than three out of five 
SMEs do not survive to their third anniversary (Zogning and Mbaye 2015). 
The rate of failure is considerably higher in West Africa. Benjamin and 
Mbaye (2012) report that in Benin only 25% of the informal firms sampled 
in 2007 were still in business two years later. Among the many reasons 
for this higher failure rate in West Africa, we repeatedly see insufficient 
financing, a lack of planning, over-indebtedness, poor cash management, 
a lack of experience, weak customer service, non- compliance with regula-
tions, and an inability to innovate (Mbaye et al. 2015).
More generally, the high failure rate indicates that most informal 
entrepreneurs lack the skills and attitudes to develop, operate, and grow 
their businesses to attain the standards of a modern enterprise. A suc-
cessful entrepreneurial policy should centre on the following points: 
vocational training adapted to the requisite skills, incubating institutions 
that nurture business creation, financing in the form of loans and grants 
at different stages of the business life cycle, and support services. In the 
remainder of this section, we provide a detailed explanation of each of 
these components of a coherent policy package.
Vocational and entrepreneurial training
For most SMEs, especially those in the informal sector, business organi-
zation revolves around a single person who is both owner and manager. 
This owner/manager may be highly skilled in certain technical tasks, for 
example car repair or plumbing, but may have no idea of how to run a 
business.
A few African countries, including South Africa, Benin, Ethiopia, and 
Senegal, are planning to establish training programs for entrepreneurs in 
the informal economy. Such programs must accompany an overhaul of 
formal education, which fails to provide job-relevant skills, resulting in a 
mismatch between skills employers seek and those that employees offer.
The lack of relevant vocational and entrepreneurial training is a signifi-
cant obstacle to informal business development in Africa. Table 8.1, 
derived from the surveys described in Chapters 2 and 4, shows that 
between 40% and 63% of entrepreneurs in the small informal sector were 
self-taught. Entrepreneurs in the formal economy and large informal 
enterprises had higher levels of vocational training than small informal 
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Table 8.1







business Self-taught Other Total
Libreville Formal 22.0 11.6 2.4 11.6 52.4 100
Large informal 28.9 4.4 6.7 33.3 26.7 100
Small informal 14.0 0.7 7.0 42.0 36.4 100
Total 19.6 6.3 4.8 26.7 42.6 100
Douala Formal 43.6 24.0 8.4 18.8 5.2 100
Large informal 32.7 4.1 0.0 40.8 22.4 100
Small informal 12.8 2.6 24.5 55.6 4.6 100
Total 35.2 17.4 11.9 29.4 6.1 100
Yaounde Formal 38.0 17.5 5.2 35.0 4.3 100
Large informal 38.5 11.5 3.8 46.2 0.0 100
Small informal 19.9 3.5 9.9 63.7 2.9 100
Total 32.1 12.6 6.7 44.9 3.6 100
Source: Authors’ survey and calculations
firms. For example, in Douala only 13% had vocational training whereas 
80% were either self-taught or received on-the-job training.
African countries lack adequate vocational and entrepreneurial train-
ing, both in terms of availability and quality (Mbaye 2002). Many authors 
pointed out that the overly general training provided in formal education 
systems in Africa is of very little use to informal actors.
Vocational training for the informal sector actors should be very 
practical and provide the skills specific to their occupation. It should 
encompass well-designed workshops that mimic actual workplaces, 
individualized training, coaching and follow-up visits, and placement 
in relevant internships. Entrepreneurs would thus acquire the necessary 
tools to successfully launch and manage an SME. The training should 
provide the opportunity to test and refine the business idea with the help 
of experienced professionals. The training should also help each partici-
pant conduct their market analysis and develop their marketing strategy, 
operating structure, human resources, and financial plan. Each partici-
pant must spend much of the time in the field gathering the information 
needed for their project and benefiting from feedback and coaching in 
analyzing and processing this information. Meetings and seminars with 
business professionals should be provided. These meetings with special-
ists in taxation, accounting, and notarial and business laws would allow 
future entrepreneurs to become more familiar with the administrative, 
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legal, and financial procedures, and the challenges associated with start-
ing a business. Such training must be accessible to a broad spectrum of 
potential entrepreneurs, including those with minimal education and 
prior general training. Trainees should leave with a complete and well-
designed business plan, ready to start his or her business with a viable 
project.
In addition to the ‘hard’ skills developed by well-designed vocational 
training programs, complementary ‘soft’ skill abilities must be fostered. 
As Fox and Kaul (2017) similarly argue, in order to be effective, infor-
mal education needs to develop both cognitive (reading, numeracy, and 
problem solving) and non-cognitive knowledge that relates to a set of 
attitudes and behaviours important to business. Among these are per-
severance, self-esteem, self-control, motivation, ability to communicate 
effectively and interact with the rest of society, and to engage effectively 
with business networks.
Through surveys conducted in different southern African countries 
for four years, Friedrich et al. (2006) examined the differences in success 
between entrepreneurs in the same industry. Some of these entrepre-
neurs had taken or been taking a training program to provide them with 
entrepreneurial initiative, planning, operations, and innovation skills. 
The training program was offered using a ‘problem-based learning’ 
approach, which links learning to activity, and is based on the assump-
tion that skills and behavioural patterns can be learned. Their results 
show that it is these entrepreneurs who have made much better progress 
in their commercial performance.
Business incubator and accelerator programs
While vocational training for entrepreneurs addresses the lack of experi-
ence and managerial competence of entrepreneurs, it does not answer 
the perennial questions of financing and high set-up costs. New entre-
preneurs start out in an environment in which few factors are under 
their control. It usually takes a long time to develop a clientele. During 
the initial period in which most businesses make little to no income, the 
unavoidable costs of rent, labour, marketing, and capital can lead to seri-
ous cash-flow problems in the absence of an adequate financial plan. A 
business incubator can help newly created enterprises address some of 
these challenges by providing them with pooled physical facilities, pro-
fessional advice, and management tools to help them get through this 
challenging period in their development. The services offered by the 
incubators generally include low rents with access to workspaces with 
electricity, telephone, and internet at lower costs, and improved access 
to finance. The incubator is able to provide these facilities and services 
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at reduced cost for several reasons: governments, donors, or NGOs may 
provide subsidies; economies of scale from encompassing a large number 
of firms; and, in the case of financing, the incubator’s credibility increases 
bank confidence. The incubators also provide helpful technical support 
and professional services (market research, bookkeeping, tax returns, 
etc.), mentorship (learning from seasoned entrepreneurs), and network-
ing opportunities with other entrepreneurs within the same incubator.
Business incubators can have a significant long-term impact on the 
economy because they enhance entrepreneurial culture, support new 
businesses with high growth potential, help to establish closer ties with 
other entrepreneurs in the same sector and transmit knowledge from 
partner research centres and universities, and thus considerably increase 
the rate of survival and success of SMEs. In Canada, where incubators 
flourish, they exhibit a success rate of 87%.1 In Africa, there is no compa-
rable available data, but there is every reason to believe that the effects of 
incubators would be even more favourable, provided that the incubators 
are effective.
The business incubator model has changed significantly over time. 
Throughout the 1990s, incubators shifted focus from providing physi-
cal and financial resources toward a broader range of more intangible 
high value-added services. More recently, this shift is exemplified by the 
rise of accelerator programs (Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, and Van Hove 
2016). Like incubators, accelerators support and develop new businesses. 
While incubators are usually non-profit entities, including universities 
and national and local government agencies, accelerators are for-profit 
venture capital organizations that provide financing, technical and logis-
tical support, and expertise in return for stakes in the business; whereas 
incubators typically feature an open-ended timeline and are concerned 
with the longevity of businesses, accelerators operate on a time-limited 
basis, with a focus on growing companies quickly and sustainably (Zajicek 
2017). Accelerators can be understood as holistic business advisory ser-
vices, often bearing a strong resemblance to traditional management 
consulting practices but adjusted to fit small- and medium-sized organi-
zations (Sepulveda 2012).
The role of these incubators and accelerators in the performance of 
new businesses has been tested under similar policies in South America, 
as illustrated by the work of Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee (2017). It 
shows that incubators equipped with basic financing services, co-working 
spaces, and additional entrepreneurship training significantly increase 
1Key factors in developing effective, successful, and sustainable business incubators. See pced.
uwaterloo.ca/index.php/pced/article/download/10/6.
194  Mbaye, Zogning, and Gueye
the performance of new businesses. The results are significantly relevant 
for young people who are in the midst of starting their first business.
In Africa, incubators and accelerators have both risen in popularity. 
Increased smartphone adoption, lower overall internet costs, and the 
large size of the African market has drawn significant investment from 
high-profile investors and tech giants such as Facebook and Google, 
leading to the rapid development of what are locally known as ‘tech 
hubs’ across Africa; as of early March 2018, a total of 442 active incuba-
tors, accelerators, and co-working spaces were recorded on the continent 
(Bayen and Giuliani 2018), representing a 40% increase in the last two 
years alone.
Although tech hubs, accelerators, and incubators are relatively new 
additions to the African continent, past experiences from around the 
world provide a source of policy recommendations. For example, some 
of what incubators provide to entrepreneurs may be inconsistent with 
the needs of nascent firms; ventures might develop in a manner not opti-
mal for the business environment they occupy, such that survival is only 
possible inside the incubator but not outside of it (Cohen 2013). Recent 
developments suggest that organic, multi-stakeholder ecosystems work 
better than initiatives led by government, the private sector, or academia 
alone (World Bank Group 2016; Kelly and Firestone 2016). As a gen-
eral observation, large government assistance programs for SMEs have 
proven unsuccessful since mass-scale, template approaches fail to address 
heterogeneous business needs; entrepreneurs are best assisted either by 
other entrepreneurs or established industry experts (Fal 2013). Specific 
to Africa, while the sheer number of tech hubs represent a considerable 
opportunity for improving the entrepreneurial environment, the absence 
of close links to academic centres of innovation is seen as a missed oppor-
tunity, preventing cross-pollination of ideas and skills (Adegoke 2018).
Improving access to credit 
Financing constraints are a significant obstacle to SME development in 
Africa. Mbaye, Diop, and Gueye (2017) found that in Benin only 15.6% 
of SMEs had access to bank loans, versus 59.5% of large enterprises.2 The 
corresponding figures are 14.2% and 70.6% in Senegal and 17.6% and 
56.9% in Niger. Likewise, small firms are subject to much more onerous 
collateral requirements than large firms. Collateral is required for 95.6% 
of small enterprises versus only 58.8% of large enterprises in Benin; in 
Niger, the corresponding proportions are 100% and 72.4%. The level of 
2This study used World Bank data where SMEs are defined as firms with 5–19 employees and 
large enterprises have 100 or more.
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collateral required for smaller firms is also higher. In Benin, it averages 
209.6% of the loan value for small enterprises versus 127.4% for large 
enterprises. In Burkina Faso, the corresponding proportions are 127.4% 
and 88.4%.
Our survey data, presented in Figure 8.1, and in more detail in 
Chapter 4, show access to credit, distinguishing between formal, large 
informal, and small informal firms. A tiny proportion of small infor-
mal enterprises in West and Central Africa have access to bank credit. 
For example, in Douala, 2% of small informal enterprises have access to 
credit versus 5% in Dakar.
Interest rates are high in West and Central Africa, and small infor-
mal enterprises are faced with particularly high rates, as also discussed 
in Chapter 4 in more detail. Formal enterprises in Dakar, Cotonou, and 
Libreville generally pay rates of about 15%, while formal enterprises in 
Yaounde and Douala face rates over 20%. In Libreville, informal enter-
prises must deal with rates of about 20%, while rates in Yaounde and 
Douala can be as high as 50%.
Unfortunately, most projects aiming at easing the financing constraint 
weighing on SMEs in general, and on the informal sector in particular, 
are surprisingly ineffective (Fox and Kaul 2017; Blattman et al. 2018). 
Blattman et al.’s (2018) evaluation of microfinance programs in con-
flict areas finds that grant funding is more effective than loans. Fox and 
Figure 8.1
Proportion of firms that have received bank financing
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Kaul (2017) also recommend cash transfers as a means of funding SMEs 
instead of credit. From an operational point of view, zero-rate loans 
could, in our opinion, constitute a more sustainable alternative.
The Role of Professional Organizations
Government policies are mainly oriented toward the formal sector. One 
important reason for the neglect of the informal sector is that it is diffi-
cult to craft policies for informal activities when little is known about the 
sales, characteristics, aspirations, and challenges of informal businesses. 
The failure of African governments to implement policies adapted to 
small enterprises in the informal sector has not been covered exten-
sively in the literature; the few exceptions include McKenzie (2015) and 
Zogning and Mbaye (2015). As discussed in Mbaye and Gueye (2014), 
and further below in the Moroccan case, the government’s neglect of 
small firms can be attributed to several factors, including the inadequacy 
of support services.
More importantly, tax collection agencies are usually the most power-
ful government institutions, and they typically have little interest in the 
informal sector beyond increasing the tax base. Often, the tax author ities 
offer reduced tax rates to informal firms to encourage payment. However, 
offering tax cuts to entrepreneurs who do not pay any taxes seems a rather 
strange approach. Moreover, prioritization of tax collection over assis-
tance only adds to the informal firm managers’ wariness of government.
Professional organizations can play a more constructive role than the 
government in some respects. They are often much less bureaucratic and 
corrupt than public servants and agencies that oversee the informal sec-
tor and SMEs. Unfortunately, our surveys show that very few informal 
firms belong to professional associations, especially in Central Africa, 
where only about 2% of informal firms in Yaounde and Libreville are 
members, and 4% in Douala. The figures are slightly higher in West 
Africa, especially in Dakar where it is 19% (Table 8.2).
As a first step toward designing more targeted policies, professional 
organizations could survey informal sector firms to ascertain their geo-
graphical and sectoral distribution. For one thing, this would be helpful 
in bringing to light the very significant role that the informal sector plays 
in many industries. Better knowledge of the informal sector would also 
facilitate the design of more targeted policies, especially for improving 
quality control. Publicly available registers of informal firms would also 
enable these firms to network, exchange information, and collaborate.
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To promote quality and professionalism in the informal sector, it is 
imperative that rating systems for vocational training programs be devel-
oped and disseminated. Professional organizations can play a key role in 
this regard by fostering the emergence of more modern training systems. 
The governments should support and, when needed, finance training 
programs endorsed by professional organizations. Belonging to a pro-
fessional organization or association provides a positive signal to the 
potential partners of SMEs.
OHADA and the Informal Economy in Francophone Africa
Business law in Francophone Africa is governed by the Organization for 
the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA: Organisation 
pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires) treaty. 
Increasingly, its regulations are being modified to be more relevant to the 
informal sector. This treaty underpins business law in 17 African coun-
tries: the eight countries in the Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest 
Africaine (UEMOA), the six countries in the Communauté Économique 
et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), and Comoros, Guinea, and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. From both an accounting and legal 
perspective, this treaty has introduced a number of provisions to pro-
mote formalization of SMEs and better manage the informal sector. 
These provisions concern, among others, the concept of ‘entrepreneur’, 
the reform of limited liability corporations (LLCs), the introduction of 
simplified joint stock corporations, and the notarial deed of incorporat-
ing a company.
Table 8.2
Proportion of firms that belong to a professional association (percent)
City Formal Large informal Small informal Total
Dakar 29.7 40.0 19.0 25.0
Cotonou 35.3 28.9 13.0 20.7
Ouagadougou 18.0 21.2 7.5 10.4
Douala 39.8 11.1 4.1 18.8
Yaounde 14.8 30.0 2.2 8.5
Libreville 20.0 5.3 2.3 6.2
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
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Aspiring entrepreneurs
OHADA has provisions for very small entrepreneurs and would-be 
entrepreneurs. Thus, OHADA considers entrepreneurs who use the 
informal sector as a starting point to test the market or a product before 
launching it in the more challenging formal business environment.
Section 30 of the Uniform Act indicates that “the entrepreneur is an 
individual, a natural person who, upon making a simple declaration as 
provided for in this uniform Act, engages in a professional, civil, commer-
cial, artisanal or agricultural activity.” The status of ‘aspiring entrepreneur’ 
is maintained if sales do not exceed 30 million FCFA for wholesale/retail 
distribution, 20 million FCFA for handicrafts and similar enterprises, and 
10 million for other services. If the business sales exceed these thresholds 
for two consecutive years, the firm must shift to corporate status. In addi-
tion, an aspiring entrepreneur can use the minimum cash flow system, 
which is a relatively simplified form of cash accounting under the pre-
sumptive lump-sum tax regime. In May 2015, Benin became the first of 
17 countries in OHADA to implement the aspiring entrepreneur status, 
following a one-year pilot project that involved 3,600 informal micro-
enterprises (2,400 in the sample group and 1,200 in the control group). 
Moving from informal status to aspiring entrepreneur is not only free but, 
more importantly, simplified through the Guichet unique de formalisa-
tion des entreprises (Single Window for Business Formalization). Since 
the pilot project demonstrated that making formalization free or easy was 
not a sufficient inducement to push small enterprises to formalize, the 
authorities in Benin granted those with aspiring entrepreneur status con-
siderable benefits. In addition to making formalization easier, they offered 
business management training at accredited management training cen-
tres, access to banking services and mediation with tax authorities, and a 
tax system adapted to their level of operation.
The reform of LLCs and creation of SAS (Société par Actions 
Simplifiée or simplified joint-stock company)
The minimum capital for an LLC was previously set at FCFA one mil-
lion, according to the provisions of OHADA. The underlying reason for 
this capital requirement was to provide security to third parties transact-
ing with the enterprise. However, this requirement became a barrier to 
formalization. At the same time, this one million in capital did not really 
provide any guarantee of solvency because firms borrowed against it or 
ended up spending it; nor did it suffice to gain access to bank credit. 
The Uniform Act on Commercial Company Law, as revised in 2013, 
sharply reduced the capital requirement for distribution services compa-
nies. Similarly, this revision made notarization of the creation of an LLC 
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optional. These measures sought to encourage informal entrepreneurs to 
formalize.
The SAS was introduced for the same reason. The requirements for 
forming an LLC are rather stringent and rules regarding adding members 
to the partnership and changes in capital are quite rigid, as are the part-
ners’ responsibilities regarding social obligations. The SAS is therefore 
more flexible than LLC and stock corporations. The capital requirement 
is therefore variable, which facilitates the entry of new investors into the 
capital structure. Furthermore, investors are not responsible for social 
obligations exceeding their equity contribution. The company can also 
have just one shareholder. The flexible governance of this type of com-
pany allows it to function without a board of directors, and even without 
an auditor, as long as it does not exceed specified sales thresholds.
Despite all these well-intentioned and seemingly appropriate reforms, 
there is little indication of their effectiveness. The fundamental reason 
is that OHADA is limited to the legal and regulatory framework. The 
business environment involves a wider range of issues including the 
quality of infrastructure and state capacity to implement the OHADA 
dispensations. The discrepancy between official statements and their 
implementation is a recurrent problem in Africa. Investment in infra-
structure, corruption, administrative delays, especially at Customs, fall 
completely outside OHADA’s scope.
In Ethiopia, where the informal sector still accounts for a large share of 
employment, business law reform has produced interesting results, since 
2000, in a previously rigid business environment. This has stimulated the 
creation of productive start-ups and skilled jobs. This implementation 
of a business-friendly environment is one of the factors that is mak-
ing the Ethiopian economy one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world and enabling it to regain a high productivity balance (Brixiová and 
Ncube 2015).
Lessons from Morocco on Assisting Small Informal Firms
The size of the informal sector in Morocco is not well known, as is true of 
other African countries; it is estimated at around 40% of GDP. The infor-
mal economy encompasses nearly all sectors as in the other Francophone 
African countries. In September 2015, we conducted a series of semi-
structured interviews and focus groups with accountants, formal and 
informal businesses, and government officials in Morocco.
Our investigations revealed important similarities to countries in West 
Africa, but also significant differences. The Moroccan government’s view 
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is that the informal sector should be formalized because it fails to comply 
with all social and hygiene standards, as well as tax obligations, among 
others. This perspective differs from that of Francophone SSA, where the 
goal of formalization is not paramount. In Morocco, numerous govern-
ment agencies are involved in a national effort to contain the informal 
sector. But the strategy is more to assist businesses rather than punish 
them, except for large informal enterprises. Morocco also has the lump-
sum presumptive tax regime and, as in West Africa, large informal firms 
take advantage of this by massively underreporting sales. Enterprises 
which we designate as the ‘gros informel’ [large informal enterprises] in 
SSA are known as ‘faux forfaiteurs’ [false flat raters] in Morocco. This 
designates economic operators that exceed the sales threshold for the 
lump-sum tax regime, but that underreport their sales to be eligible 
for the lump-sum regime. For this segment of the informal sector, the 
govern ment adopts a crackdown rather than an inducement, as illus-
trated by the vast campaign against faux forfaiteurs launched in 2013. 
The effectiveness of the intelligence services in Morocco is such that any 
informal activities are brought to the attention of the police, who then 
decide whether to report them to the tax authorities or not. Another dif-
ference from the rest of Africa is that the Moroccan agricultural sector is 
not fully informal. Indeed, many farms are known to the tax authorities 
and pay their taxes.
The Moroccan government created a special legal category of ‘auto- 
entrepreneur’, equivalent to the ‘aspiring entrepreneur’ in the OHADA 
system, whereby taxes are reduced to a much lower level when the enter-
prise is below a certain sales threshold. As an inducement to register and 
pay this tax, small entrepreneurs receive social security benefits such as 
health insurance and retirement plans. Registration is also simplified 
with a one-stop-shop process, there are no capital requirements for the 
business, and there is an amnesty on all past due tax liabilities. For the 
government, the advantages are that it receives some tax revenue and, 
perhaps more importantly, it has greater knowledge and control over 
the informal sector. This system is much more effective than that in 
Francophone Africa where firms have no incentive to register—the only 
effect is to raise their taxes. The Moroccan system makes it advantageous 
for firms to register and is mutually beneficial.
The auto-entrepreneur regime covers all sectors of the economy, but 
is particularly important for small merchants. For commercial, handi-
craft and industrial activities, the tax rate is 1% of sales, and the eligibility 
threshold is equivalent to about 50,000 EUR. For other services, the tax 
rate is 2% and the threshold is lower, at about 10,000 EUR. Firms get a 
single tax identifier for all tax administration purposes and a separate 
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identifier for customs. However, there is a connection between the cus-
toms and tax databases, such that when someone enters the customs file 
for clearance, the tax authorities see it immediately.
In addition to these efforts to formalize firms, the Moroccan govern-
ment is making significant efforts to improve the general business climate 
through investing in infrastructure, facilitating access to banking, and fos-
tering better relations with the private sector. Unlike the countries of SSA, 
which mostly offer only short-term credits, in Morocco, banks make long-
term loans for investment financing. To improve vocational training, the 
National Initiative for Human Development (INDH: Initiative nationale 
pour le développement humain) was established with an initial fund of about 
100 million EUR to boost skills, foster cooperatives for small firms, and 
raise general and computer literacy. Women’s empowerment has been pro-
moted. There are proportionately more women in the formal sector than 
in the informal sector, unlike in Francophone and other African countries. 
Women are approaching parity in the Moroccan public sector.
Nevertheless, despite some real improvements, firms still face a chal-
lenging business environment in some respects. Credit is still difficult 
to access and labour regulations remain problematic for many employ-
ers. There is no doubt that greater progress in the business environment 
would lead to further growth of the formal sector.
Upgrading and formalization for street vendors  
and small road-side shops
There are an estimated 276,000 street vendors in Moroccan cities, provid-
ing income for nearly 1.3 million people. About 90% of street vendors 
are self-employed; 60% of them report having worked in this business 
for over 10 years. Of these vendors, 70% have no more than elementary 
schooling (Mbaye and Gueye 2014). The Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Investment jointly established a new program to encourage 
registration of street vendors, focusing on the following measures:
1. Provide some designated spaces with the equipment and services 
required for this business
2. Promote upgrading of equipment to improve the health of and 
food safety for both vendors and consumers
3. Like other small informal operators, street vendors must register 
and then they are eligible for a special legal and tax status
4. To raise participation in this program, training and awareness ses-
sions are held for street vendors.
Similarly, a program to upgrade small roadside shops (rawaj in Arabic) 
has been established. These shops are much like street vending in that 
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they operate at a very small scale, except that they have a stall. The pro-
gram aims to raise quality, hygiene, and safety for consumers; improve 
the stalls’ visual appearance; and strengthen the vendor’s knowledge. To 
this end, between 2008 and 2012,3 the Rawaj financed the modernization 
of stalls for around 2,500 EUR per vendor. The bulk of the expenditure 
is for equipment upgrading, toward which the Rawaj program covered 
75% and the vendor 25%. The remaining funds are devoted to advice and 
training. By the end of 2012, over 22,000 points of sale were modernized, 
reaching 90% of the target of 25,000. This modernization was carried out 
in all regions of Morocco, resulting in significantly increased sales and 
improved bookkeeping.
The Moroccan model is certainly not a panacea for the rest of the 
continent. The business environment reforms have not yet been fully 
implemented; the informal sector therefore remains pervasive. To our 
knowledge, there has been no systematic evaluation of the program to 
determine its full effects. However, Morocco deserves credit for devis-
ing and implementing a well-thought-out and comprehensive strategy 
for small informal enterprises. This approach could be a model for the 
countries of SSA.
Conclusion
The informal sector is highly diverse. In particular, large informal firms 
could quite easily formalize, but choose not to do so; whereas, small 
informal firms are in dire need of assistance and provide employment of 
last resort for many people. In this chapter, we have focused on policies 
directed toward the latter. This is of crucial importance given the over-
whelming predominance of small informal firms and their pre carious 
status. We reviewed the regulatory environment in Francophone African 
countries and the OHADA legal system, variants of which are in force in 
all these countries. While there are some provisions that address SMEs, in 
general, relatively little attention is devoted to small informal businesses. 
The main preoccupation of the authorities is just to tax them more, with 
little or any effort to provide services and encourage them to formalize 
through carrots rather than sticks.
We have proposed a number of steps to assist small informal operators. 
Business incubator and accelerator programs, whereby the government, 
NGOs, or donors bring together a number of small firms to provide 
3The new offer that covers the 2013–2014 period consists of financing equipment for 2,300 EUR 
and expertise and training for 200 EUR.
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coaching and various types of support, have proven effective in developed 
and some developing countries. While data is lacking on their effectiveness 
in Africa, there is reason to believe they can be even more beneficial due to 
the severe constraints facing entrepreneurs. Professional associations can 
also play a larger role in gathering information about the small informal 
sector and coordinating assistance programs. Grants or loans with zero 
interest rates have been found to be more effective in spurring SME devel-
opment than loans at market rates. Governments should work with the 
private sector to explore and implement such measures.
We also investigated Morocco’s policies related to the small informal 
sector. While much remains to be done in Morocco in terms of improving 
the business climate, the country provides a fascinating and encouraging 
model for sub-Saharan African countries. Rather than harass small firms 
in a vain effort to raise tax revenues, the Moroccan government provides 
attractive inducements for small firms to register and pay a minimal tax. 
Firms that register are enrolled in the social security program, which pro-
vides very significant benefits such as medical coverage and retirement 
income. Moreover, the Moroccan government has established several tar-
geted programs directed at the most vulnerable informal activities, street 
hawking and road-side shops. These programs fund improved facilities 
and equipment, along with training to raise health and safety levels for 
both the vendors and their customers. Countries in Francophone Africa 
under study here would do well to learn from Morocco’s and other coun-
tries’ experiences and begin to implement similar programs.
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Introduction
This chapter applies the methodology described in Chapter 2 to study 
firm-level productivity in Cameroon using the stratified sample of for-
mal and informal firms in Yaounde and Douala, including both large 
and small informal firms. We show that productivity is higher among 
large informal firms than among small informal firms and rises with the 
degree of formality along the continuum. This result is similar to that 
in West Africa (Benjamin and Mbaye 2012). In addition, the sector of 
operation is significantly correlated with productivity.
Whichever way informality is defined, it is overwhelming in 
Cameroon. The informal sector accounts for 50.5% of GDP and close 
to 95% of total employment (Figure 9.1). The informal sector also 
disproportionately employs the most vulnerable segments of the popu-
lation, including the less educated, less connected, and geographically 
disadvantaged. A viable strategy for inclusive growth in Cameroon 
must therefore take the informal sector into account. However, while 
the government has announced ambitious employment objectives, 
through a succession of reports and strategy documents, there is not 
an integrated approach that includes the informal sector. Furthermore, 
despite its importance as a job provider, the informal sector has not 
been the object of any explicit program. The government seems to have 
preferred to handle this sector indirectly through programs targeting 
related issues rather than directly addressing specific constraints facing 
informal firms and their employees. In addition, although various local 
government interventions aim to assist urban informal businesses, 
many municipalities are still trying to contain or repress the informal 
economy.
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Informality and Productivity
Most previous studies show that productivity is negatively correlated 
with informality. Fajnzylber et al. (2011) found that formality increased 
firm employment by 40–50% in Brazil and increased the probability of 
having a fixed location by 30–50%, leading to large increases in revenues 
and profits. Analogously, in Vietnam, Rand and Torm (2012) found that 
firms that formalized had greater growth of profits and investments than 
similar firms that remained informal. McKenzie and Sakho (2010) found 
evidence in Bolivia that firms that become formal have greater sales and 
remit higher tax proceeds to the government. Branstetter et al. (2010) 
and Bruhn (2011) find that the relaxation of entry regulations leads to 
an increase in registration of enterprises, although mostly of ‘marginal’ 
firms that are small and have low survival rates.
Steel and Snodgrass (2008) found that the productivity differential 
between formal and informal firms is due mainly to differential access 
to public services. Gelb et al. (2009) compared the productivity of formal 
firms and informal firms using surveys on the investment climate for 
several countries in southern and eastern Africa. Their results confirm 
that formal sector firms are on average more productive than informal 
ones but the gap between formal and informal firms is much lower for 
Figure 9.1
Structure of value added and employment by formal/informal status in the Cameroonian 
economy
Source: INS (2015)
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East African countries than for those in Southern Africa. They attribute 
this to the difference in the quality of the business environment and the 
enforcement of regulations. The weakness of the state in East Africa 
reduces the benefits of formalization and thus undermines incentives for 
more productive informal firms to formalize, thereby lowering the gap 
between formal and informal firm productivity.
La Porta and Shleifer (2008) analyzed productivity differentials 
between formal and informal firms using World Bank informal sector 
surveys for India and 13 African countries. Their most salient finding was 
that the productivity of formal firms is substantially greater than that of 
informal firms, although most strongly so in India. However, once they 
controlled for expenditure on inputs, human capital of the top manager, 
and firm size, registration had little additional impact on productivity. By 
contrast, Perry et al. (2007) found a residual negative impact of informal-
ity on productivity, even when there was control for other characteristics. 
La Porta and Schleifer (2008), Haan (2006), and Gelb et al. (2009) all 
found substantially lower education levels in the informal sector, result-
ing in differences in skills, productivity, and earnings. On the other hand, 
Perry et al. (2007) found that the connection between informality and low 
productivity is more nuanced in Latin America. According to this study, 
informal entrepreneurs are well aware of their lack of access to capital 
and skilled labour. Therefore, they tend to operate in sectors where it is 
possible to produce more efficiently on a small scale.
Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) corroborate the negative correlation 
between informality and productivity of firms in West Africa when 
informality is broken down into degrees along a continuum of firm 
characteristics as described in Chapters 2 and 4. Mourji (2010) found a 
similar correlation in Morocco and Backiny-Yetna (2013) found increas-
ing degrees of formality to be correlated with higher tax payments in 
Niger.
The picture is less clear-cut in Cameroon than in some of the above 
studies. Figure 9.2 displays boxplots of the logarithm of productiv-
ity against levels of formality ranging from 0 to 5, where 0 is the most 
informal level and 5 the most formal, as explained in more detail below.1 
The figure does show productivity rising when formality increases, but 
only modestly. This issue will be explored in detail in this chapter using 
econometric methods to control for other determinants of productivity.
1In this chapter, unlike previous chapters, higher values of the indicator reflect increasing levels 
of formality.
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analytic approach
In our analysis, the dependent variable is (the logarithm of) productiv-
ity, and a non-parametric analysis is used to correlate productivity with 
varying degrees of informality. The non-parametric method of gradient 
boosting (Friedman 1999) is used to explain the logarithm of productiv-
ity in terms of a number of variables including the formality level, and of 
random forests (Breiman 2001) for obtaining an acceptable instrument 
for formality. A random forest model was found to provide an instru-
ment for formality, which is much more predictive than that obtained 
by a linear regression. As a result, whether formality is used directly as a 
predictor in a model for productivity or whether its instrument is used 
instead makes essentially no difference to the gradient boosting model of 
productivity. Of course, it is not entirely clear whether using an instru-
ment for formality is necessary in a gradient boosting model, but the 
question would arise if a classical linear model was used.
Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) found that these multiple approaches 
provided useful results and helped confirm the results obtained with lin-
ear models where endogeneity may affect regression parameters, when 
it is not certain that even the use of an instrument would address the 
problem, particularly if the instrument is weak, as is commonly the case.
Figure 9.2
Boxplot of (log) productivity by formality levels (0 = most informal, 5 = most formal) in 
 Cameroon
Source: Authors’ calculations
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As explained in Chapter 2, data were collected on firms using a strati-
fied sample of enterprises, with nine strata for both cities covered (Douala 
and Yaounde). Firms were divided into three subsets: formal enterprises, 
large informal enterprises, and remaining informal enterprises, and three 
sectors: industry, commerce, and other services. Within each stratum, 
enterprises were randomly selected, in suitable number, so that the dis-
tribution of the sample into its nine sub-samples is representative of the 
city as a whole while also oversampling large informal and formal firms.
The variables used to explain productivity alongside formality levels 
are listed below:
•	 socio-demographic characteristics of the head of the enterprise: age, 
gender, marital status, level of education, illiteracy, etc.
•	 characteristics of the sector in which the firm operates: capital inten-
sity, exposure to competition, extent to which the firm is affected by 
trade liberalization and deregulation, export orientation, etc.
•	 evolution of the business: growth of sales, investments, technology 
upgrading, etc.
•	 perceptions of business regulation and the institutional environ-
ment: cost of labour, taxes, the ease of obtaining permits, etc.
The data used in this chapter included six of the seven firm-level cri-
teria of informality described in Chapter 2: size, registration, honesty of 
accounts, fixity of the workplace, access to credit, and tax status. The one 
criterion of social security was not included to make the results compa-
rable to those of Benjamin and Mbaye (2012), where only the above six 
criteria were used. Also, large informal firms may have some employees 
who are covered by social security. Thus, whether workers are covered by 
social insurance does not constitute a major difference between formal 
and large informal firms.
These six criteria can be combined to create indicators of levels of 
formality depending on how many of the six a particular firm meets. 
The two extremes of purely informal firms satisfying none of the crite-
ria and purely formal firms satisfying all six criteria are relatively rare in 
Cameroon.
A non-parametric model of productivity
In this section, a non-parametric model for productivity in terms of 
informality levels, controlling for a number of variables, is proposed.
Definition and computation of productivity
To compare productivity levels between the formal and informal sectors, 
two alternative measures of productivity are computed using the survey 
214  Benjamin, Gueye, Haughton, Mbaye, Tchakoute, and Tinga Yepdo
data: labour productivity and total factor productivity (Harrigan 1997; 
World Bank 2003; Golub and Mbaye 2002).







 where Q is output, and L is the number of employees for firm i, 
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α + β = 1. TFP can be estimated using a log-linear version of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function, where ε is random error.
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  TFP is usually computed as the constant term in Equation 3. 
Equation 3 would then be run separately for each of the three subgroups 
in the sample (formal, large informal, and small informal sectors). This 
provides measures of average TFP for the various firms in the three 
categories, assuming the production functions for the individual firms 
are of the Cobb-Douglas type with constant returns to scale.
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Recall that β represents the capital share of income.
Estimations of TFP, using regressions like Equation 3, have given rise 
to several criticisms in the literature: 
1. TFP is computed under the assumption of constant returns to 
scale, which might lead one to unduly attribute to technological 
variation the effect of scale on input efficacy; and 
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2. The computation assumes that factor shares in total costs are iden-
tical across sectors, which is not always the case since technol-
ogy may vary across firms and industries (Harrigan 1997; World 
Bank 2003). 
The World Bank (2003) research team tested the first hypothesis 
regarding returns to scale using the Wald test, as well as an alternative 
specification of the TFP equation, and ruled out the scale effect in both 
cases for Senegal; we assume that the scale effect would be ruled out 
in Cameroon as well. To allow for different production functions and 
technologies across firms, factor shares were calculated at the firm level. 
Equation 4 indicates that LP is a function of TFP and capital intensity, 
while Equation 5 shows the same relationship in rates of change. A rise in 
capital intensity will lead to a rise in LP, holding A constant. These equa-
tions suggest that productivity differentials between sectors could be due 
to efficiency/technological differences (TFP) or differences in capital- 
labour ratios. Differences in capital-labour ratios could in turn reflect 
different levels of access to finance between formal and informal firms, 
or between large and small firms.
This chapter focuses on gross labour productivity (GLP), i.e., using 
gross sales as a measure of output rather than value added, and examines 
the extent to which it is associated with informality levels. When the dis-
tribution of GLP was examined, it was found to be strongly right skewed. 
After a logarithmic transformation, the shape dramatically changed and 
displayed a normal distribution (Figure 9.3). Thus, we focus henceforth 
on the log of productivity (Logprod).
We now briefly describe our non-parametric methodology, an exten-
sion of the Classification and Regression Trees algorithm introduced by 
Friedman (1999) and implemented by Salford Systems under the name 
TreeNet.
Gradient boosting TreeNet model: methodology
The TreeNet method is based on a gradient boosting technique for 
approximating functions introduced by Friedman in a 1999 seminal 
paper. A decision tree can be viewed as a function of the predictors 
(referred to as a step-function) that is constant on each terminal node. 
First, consider a continuous target variable Y as is the case in this chapter. 
The procedure can be modified when the target variable is binary.
The concept of the TreeNet procedure is to use not just one step func-
tion corresponding to one tree as an approximation of the true function 
which links Y to a set of predictors X, but instead to propose a sum of 
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such step functions, each corresponding to a tree with a fairly small num-
ber of nodes. Each added tree acts as a ‘boost’ to the performance of the 
previous approximation.
To summarize, the approximation proposed by TreeNet is of the form:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 2    M MF X Y tree X tree X tree Xβ β β= + + +…+
In this expression, the βi as well as the splits in the successive trees 
are determined by a gradient descent algorithm (see Friedman 1999) 
which, at each added tree, aims to minimize the mean squared error of 
the approximation. To avoid the risk of overfitting, the number of trees 
involved in the approximation is controlled by cross-validation or evalu-
ation of the approximation on a test sample. In the case of a binary target 
variable, the mean squared error is replaced by a suitable error function 
in the gradient descent algorithm (see Friedman 1999).
We next discuss a non-parametric approach to constructing an instru-
ment for informality levels.
Figure 9.3
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Construction of an instrument for informality levels  
via random forests
One important potential problem is the likelihood that we have a bidirec-
tional causality link between informality and productivity, which could 
induce an endogeneity bias. To address this potential problem, main-
stream literature recommends the use of an estimated informality level 
(an instrument) that is as close to actual informality levels as possible but 
is not correlated—conditionally on other covariates—with the error in a 
regression of productivity. In order to construct the instrument, the fol-
lowing variables are used: a) the number of employees at firm creation, 
b) the gender of the firm manager, c) the number of salaried women at 
firm creation, and d) the number of non-salaried staff at firm creation.
A decision of whether to use predicted values of informality from 
standard regression analysis or from exploratory random forest analysis 
followed. Boxplots of predicted informality levels by actual informality 
levels are given for both options in Figure 9.4. It is clear that a random 
forest approach yields much better predictions than standard regression 
analysis.
Variable importance in the TreeNet model
Table 9.1 displays the importance of the 13 most important variables in 
our gradient boosting model; the most important variable (scaled impor-
tance of 100) is ownership status of the firm. The sector of the firm is very 
important, as are the capital intensity, age of firm, demographics of the 
head of firm, exporting activity, etc. When other variables are controlled, 
informality (instrumentalized) is the 13th most important variable. 
Figures 9.9 to 9.18 display, ceteris paribus, the relationship between a 
change in each independent variable and the corresponding change in 
labour productivity, beginning with informality (instrumentalized). This 
discussion focuses on the most informative relationships, especially the 
one between productivity and informality.
Quite interestingly, extreme levels of formality (very formal or very 
informal) appear to be associated with less productivity, ceteris paribus 
(Figure 9.5), though these effects are quite small (the scale in the verti-
cal axis in Figure 9.5 is graded in steps of .01). It is, however, possible 
that an interaction exists between the sector of the firm and informality. 
In other words, the impact of informality on productivity may depend 
on the sector. Our discussion returns to this issue below.
Figure 9.6 reveals that the public works and construction sector 
(13 firms in the sample, see Table 9.2) is associated with higher produc-
tivity, as are the sectors of trade and transportation to a lesser extent. 
These effects are quite large when compared to the effects of informality.




Comparative analysis of the level of formality predicted from random forest and linear  
regression (vertical axis), using four variables: gender of head (ID0), number of employees at 
firm creation (MO1AA), number of female salaried staff at firm creation (MO1AB), and number 
of non-salaried staff at firm creation (MO1BA). Actual formality levels on the horizontal axis  
(0 most informal, 5 most formal). 
Note: Given this analysis, a model of productivity varying with informality levels (replaced by their 
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The TreeNet methodology allows convenient examinations of inter-
actions between pairs of variables. Figure 9.7 gives a three dimensional 
graph of the joint effect of informality and sector on productivity, and 
Figure 9.8 displays slices of this graph, one for each of the seven sectors.
The main insight is that firms in the public works and construction 
sector tend to exhibit high productivity, which does not depend much on 
informality. Most firms in that sector are quite formal.
The sizeable trade sector and the other services sector display the trend 
discussed above, with higher productivity for moderate formality lev-
els. However, the transportation sector displays a dip in mid-range and 
extreme formality levels. Interestingly, the picture is more complex—
and flatter in general—in the restaurant sector. Note that the scales of 
the vertical axes are different for each of the slices in Figure 9.8, making 
Figure 9.8 useful for a more detailed picture of the dependence of pro-
ductivity on informality for each sector separately, but not for comparing 
productivity across sectors. This is better accomplished with Figure 9.7.
Firms owned by those who are self-employed or that are owned by 
a relative or another individual are negatively linked to log productiv-
ity, while incorporated companies show a strong positive relationship to 
productivity (Figure 9.9).
table 9.1
Importance of the 13 most important variables in a gradient boosting model for productivity
Short-form Name Importance Variable
IG7 100 Ownership status
INTENSITECAP 72.2 Capital intensity
CI2 72.12 Main difficulty
IG3 70.58 Sector of firm
ID1 58.85 Age of the head of the enterprise
CFC4A 48.51 Exports
IG8 47.44 Number of firms owned
AGE 47.1 Age of firm
IG9 46.85 Time needed to launch activity
ID2 35.8 Marital status of head
FEM 33.3 Proportion females in firm
IS3B 32.23 Number of electricity cuts
FORMALITEINS 31.57 Formality level instrument
Source: Authors’ calculations
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table 9.2
Breakdown of firms in the sample by sector
Sector Frequency Percent
Valid 1: Construction; public works 13.0 3.0
2: Other industries 103.0 23.8
3: Trade 157.0 36.3
4: Transport 29.0 6.7
5: Catering 30.0 6.9
6: Other services 92.0 21.3












Sector of firm (IG3)
Source: Authors’ calculations
222  Benjamin, Gueye, Haughton, Mbaye, Tchakoute, and Tinga Yepdo
Sector:








Interaction of the informality instrument and sector
Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 9.8 (Continues)
Interaction of the informality instrument and sector
Source: Authors’ calculations
Public works and construction
Informality Instrument


























Productivity increases very rapidly as capital intensity begins to rise 
(Figure 9.10).
The age of the firm’s owner is strongly related to productivity (ceteris 
paribus). Productivity increases sharply with age up to age 30 and then 
tapers off (Figure 9.11).
Productivity increases as the age of the firm increases and remains 
constant for firms older than 30 years (Figure 9.12).
Firms headed by someone with a partner (married or not, monoga-
mous or not) are associated with higher productivity (Figure 9.13), and 
Figure 9.14 seems to reveal an intriguing trend of decreasing productivity 
as the proportion of female employees increases, ceteris paribus. Both 
these demographic effects are small; the scales in Figures 9.13 and 9.14 
are graded in steps of .01.
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Conclusion
This study draws on the method and data described in Chapters 2 and 4 
for formal and informal firms in two cities in Cameroon, Yaounde and 
Douala, to analyze the connections between informality and productivity. 
Previous studies have found a negative correlation between informality 
and productivity. The findings in this chapter somewhat nuance this 
result for Cameroon. We use a more sophisticated instrumental tech-
nique to control for a number of other factors that may be correlated 
with informality. While the econometric estimates corroborate the visual 
evidence that productivity is higher among large informal firms when 
compared with small informal firms and rises with the degree of formal-
ity along the continuum, the effects are quite small. Moreover, when 
controlling for various firm characteristics and the sector of operation of 
the firm, the effects of informality are even smaller. The policy implica-
tion is that cracking down on the informal sector by itself may do little 
to boost productivity. The ultimate reason for low productivity growth 
is not informality in itself but deeper issues in the institutional environ-
ment that inhibit structural transformation and give rise to the informal 









Marital status of manager (ID2)
Source: Authors’ calculations



































The Informal Sector in Cameroon: Practices and Productivity  231
references
Backiny-Yetna, P.R. (2013). Politiques publiques et pauvreté : Trois études 
de cas d’évaluation des performances de ciblage et d’analyse d’impact 
[Public Policy and Poverty: Three Case Studies of Targeting Performance 
Assessment and Impact Analysis]. Thèse, École doctorale de Dauphine en 
 partenariat avec Laboratoire d’économie de Dauphine, Paris.
Benjamin, N., and Mbaye, A.A. (2012). The Informal Sector in  Francophone 
Africa: Firm Size, Productivity, and Institutions.  Washington, DC: 
World Bank and Agence Française de Développement.
Branstetter, L.G., Lima, F., Taylor, L.J., and Venâncio, A. (2010). Do 
Entry Regulations Deter Entrepreneurship and Job Creation? Evi-
dence from Recent Reforms in Portugal. The Economic Journal 
124(577):805–832.
Breiman, L. (2001). Random Forests. Machine Learning 45(1):5–32. 
https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~breiman/randomforest2001.pdf.
Bruhn, M. (2011). License to Sell: The Effect of Business Registration 
Reform on Entrepreneurial Activity in Mexico. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 93(1):382‒386.
Fajnzylber, P., Maloney, W.F., and Montes-Rojas, G.V. (2011). Does 
formality improve micro-firm performance? Evidence from the 
Brazilian SIMPLES program. Journal of Development Economics 
94(2):262‒276.
Friedman, J.H. (1999). Greedy Function Approximation: A Gradient 
Boosting Machine. IMS 1999 Reitz Lecture, Stanford. https://statweb.
stanford.edu/~jhf/ftp/trebst.pdf.
Gelb, A., Mengistae, T., Ramachandran, V., and Shah, M.K. (2009). To For-
malize or Not to Formalize? Comparisons of Microenterprise data from 
Southern and East Africa. Center for Global Development Working 
Paper 175. Washington, DC: CGD. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/
files/1422458_file_Ramachandran_Informal_Firms_FINAL_0.pdf.
Golub, S.S., and Mbaye, A.A. (2002). Obstacles and Opportunities for 
Senegal’s International Competitiveness: Case Studies of the Peanut 
Oil, Fishing and Textile Industries. World Bank Africa Region Work-
ing Paper 37. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://pdfs.semantic 
scholar.org/e611/2bb11b540ae296c679b7827c6bfd725ee16f.pdf.
Haan, H.C. (2006). Training for Work in the Informal Micro-enterprise 
Sector: Fresh Evidence from Sub-Sahara Africa. Dordrecht, Nether-
lands: Springer.
Harrigan, J. (1997). Technology, Factor Supplies and International 
Specialization: Estimating the Neoclassical Model. The American 
 Economic Review 87(4):475–494.
232  Benjamin, Gueye, Haughton, Mbaye, Tchakoute, and Tinga Yepdo
Institut National de la Statistique du Cameroun (INS). (2015). Les comptes 
nationaux de 2015 [The national accounts of 2015]. Yaounde: INS. 
http://www.statistics-cameroon.org/news.php?id=351.
La Porta, R., and Shleifer, A. (2008). The Unofficial Economy and 
 Economic Development, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/the-unofficial-economy-and- 
economic-development/.
McKenzie, D., and Sakho, Y.S. (2010). Does it Pay Firms to Register for 
Taxes? The Impact of Formality on Firm Profitability. Journal of 
Development Economics 91(1):15‒24.
Mourji, F. (2010). La TPE au Maroc : Modalités d’intégration dans le 
secteur formel [The TPE in Morocco: Modalities of integration in 
the formal sector]. Étude pour le compte du ministère des Affaires 
économiques et de la Coopération allemande GTZ, document de 
travail. Casablanca: Laboratoire de Statistique Appliquée à l’Analyse 
et la Recherche en Économie (LASAARE). [Study on behalf of the 
 Ministry of Economic Affairs and German Cooperation GTZ, 
 Working Document. Casablanca: LASAARE].
Perry, G.E., Maloney, W.F., Arias, O.S., Fajnzylber, P., Mason, A.D., 
and Saavedra-Chanduvi, J. (2007). Informality: Exit and Exclusion. 
 Washington, DC: World Bank.
Rand, J., and Torm, N. (2012). The Benefits of Formalization:  Evidence 
from Vietnamese Manufacturing SMEs. World Development 
40(5):983‒998.
Steel, W.F., and Snodgrass, D. (2008). Raising Productivity and  Reducing 
Risks of Household Enterprises: Diagnostic Methodology  Framework, 
WEIGO Network. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. (2003). Senegal – Policies and Strategies for Accelerated 
Growth and Poverty Reduction: A Country Economic  Memorandum. 
Report No 28143-SE. Washington, DC: World Bank. https:// 
openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/14716.
Cameroon’s Informal Cross-Border Trade  233
CHAPTER 10
Cameroon’s Informal Cross-Border  
Trade1
Stephen S. Golub and Georges Kobou
Introduction
Cameroon is well situated to serve as a trading hub in Central Africa, as 
it borders Africa’s largest economy, Nigeria, with which it shares a long 
North-South frontier of about 1,700 kilometres, and five other coun-
tries: Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Republic of the Congo, Central 
African Republic, and Chad (Figure 10.1). With the exception of Nigeria, 
Cameroon and its neighbours are all members of the Communauté 
Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC). As for many 
other African countries, notwithstanding regional trade agreements such 
as CEMAC, and Cameroon’s strategic location, official trade statistics 
suggest that Cameroon engages in little trade with its neighbours. Table 
10.1 shows the share of Cameroon’s official trade flows with its neigh-
bours, averaged over 2000–2012.
Official exports to CEMAC countries as a group are under 10% of 
Cameroon’s total recorded exports. Official exports to Nigeria are also 
very low at about 1.4% of total exports. Imports from CEMAC countries 
are minuscule, at about 2.5% of Cameroon’s total imports, and mostly 
from Equatorial Guinea. Official imports from Nigeria are larger, averag-
ing 13% of total imports, but highly variable and almost entirely consisting 
of oil. Official non-oil Cameroonian imports from and exports to Nigeria 
are vastly underestimated (World Bank 2013), as are Nigeria’s oil exports 
to Cameroon. The low level of official interregional trade in part reflects 
the low levels of income and poor transport networks. Most importantly, 
1This study draws on capable field research by two sets of students in 2014 and 2016. Titan 
Labemba, Cédric Foyet Kamga, Mohammed Abdoullahi Maiwoda, Samuel Mbiagzi Ndjeudji, 
and Dimitri Tchakounte Tchumimi capably carried out surveys conducted in border regions 
in 2014. Yves Momo, Dominique Salla, Bertrand Nyambe Bonono, Raoul Michel Guiole, and 
Hugues Brice Djoumessi Zambou visited border regions to provide updates in 2016. We also 
thank Ahmadou Aly Mbaye for his support and comments.
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however, these statistics do not reflect informal trade flows, which arise 
from institutional factors, which are described in this chapter.
Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) can involve two types of  illegality: 
in the goods themselves (e.g., narcotics) or in the manner of trading 
(evasion of customs duties and regulations). Both types of illegal trade 
Figure 10.1
Cameroon and its neighbours
Source: Authors
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Table 10.1
Share of Cameroon’s official exports and imports with neighbouring 
countries (percent of total trade), 2000–2012 annual average
Exports Imports
CEMAC
Central African Rep. 0.8 0.0
Chad 2.5 0.0
Congo 1.6 0.6
Equatorial Guinea 1.5 1.6
Gabon 2.6 0.2
CEMAC Total 9.1 2.5
Nigeria 1.4 13.3
Total Neighbours 10.5 15.8
Source: UN Comtrade (2018) and authors’ calculations
occur in Cameroon. Violent social conflicts in neighbouring countries, 
epitomized by the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria, have 
been fed by armaments transiting through Cameroon. In Cameroon as 
elsewhere in Africa, however, the bulk of ICBT is in ordinary consumer 
products that are not in themselves illegal. Such trade in legal goods has 
varying degrees of illegality in terms of its intentions and compliance 
with tax and regulatory statutes. The extent of compliance itself varies, so 
illegality is a matter of degree. The terms used to describe this trade are 
suggestive of its heterogeneity: unrecorded, informal, unofficial, parallel, 
underground, smuggling, contraband.
Several previous studies have examined ICBT between Cameroon 
and its neighbours (Herrera 1995; Bennafla 2002; Nkendah 2013; World 
Bank 2013), but these studies are either somewhat dated, or focus on 
a limited part of cross-border trade. World Bank (2013) focuses on 
Cameroon’s non-oil trade with Nigeria, while Nkendah (2013) is limited 
to Cameroon’s agricultural exports to other CEMAC countries.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of unofficial 
cross-border trade between Cameroon and its neighbours, particularly 
Nigeria. We will focus on key border regions, products, and kinship 
groups, using both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The analysis 
is based on secondary literature, press reports, interviews, and a survey 
carried out in four different border regions: one with Equatorial Guinea 
at Kyé-Ossi, and three with Nigeria, Banki in the Far North, Sabongari 
in the North-West, and Idenau in the South-West (Figure 10.1). These 
surveys were carried out in August 2014 with a duration of one week. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the underlying causes of ICBT 
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in Cameroon; the next sections discuss Cameroon’s unofficial trade with 
Nigeria and CEMAC, and the roles of kinship groups. Chapter 11 of 
this book examines the effects of a new road on ICBT in North-West 
Cameroon.
Sources of Cameroon’s ICBT
A confluence of factors contribute to the prominence of ICBT in Africa, 
including Cameroon. These factors are long traditions of regional trade 
preceding the colonial era; artificial borders imposed by the colonial 
powers, largely maintained as African nations became independent in 
the early 1960s; strong ethnic and religious ties uniting people across 
borders; uncoordinated and often highly interventionist policies in the 
newly independent states, particularly with regard to trade policies, price 
controls, and subsidies; weak state institutions, which inhibit enforce-
ment of these policies and widespread corruption; and inability of 
governments to control movements of people and goods across arbitrary 
and porous borders (Golub 2015).
Cameroon’s geography, history, and trading traditions
Cameroon’s geography and history have shaped distinct trading tradi-
tions in different parts of the country. Cameroon is sometimes described 
as a microcosm of Africa as it encompasses coastal regions in the South, 
grasslands in the West, tropical forests and mountains in the Centre, and 
near-desert savanna in the North. The Adamoua Mountains form a nat-
ural barrier, separating the northern and southern parts of the country 
into two distinct entities. This North-South divide, along with longstand-
ing historical East-West trading traditions in West and Central Africa 
predating the colonial period, leads to widely different trading traditions 
in the largely-Muslim North and Far-North regions versus the mostly 
Christian regions south of the Adamoua region.2
Major roads and rail did not connect Douala to the major cities in the 
North, such as Garoua and Maroua, until about 1980 (Herrera 1995). The 
construction of roads linking northern and southern Cameroon did not 
fundamentally alter the longstanding ties between the Sahelian regions of 
Nigeria and Cameroon. The North and Far-North borders with Nigeria 
are savanna and are more porous than the forests and highlands south of 
the Adamoua Mountains, and thus smuggling that avoids official border 
crossings is easier in the North.
2Confusingly, a region named North-West is in the southern half of the country.
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Trading in the North and Far-North, as discussed below, is largely 
controlled by Muslim Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups, and is predominantly 
with Northern Nigeria and Southern Chad, where these same ethnic 
groups also operate. Trading with Nigeria is also prevalent in the south-
ern half of the country, particularly in the South-West and North-West 
regions, with the Ibo and Bamiléké kinship groups playing important 
roles. The South region is also involved in trading with Gabon and 
Equatorial Guinea, to which it is adjacent.
Cameroon is typical of the arbitrary and ambiguous nature of colonial 
and post-colonial borders in Africa. The Germans colonized the area in 
the 1880s, with German Kamerun encompassing present-day Cameroon 
and parts of Eastern Nigeria. After Germany’s defeat in World War I, 
the French and British took over, with the French gaining most of the 
country (‘French Cameroons’) and the British controlling a sliver of the 
country’s West (‘British Cameroons’) bordering Nigeria. The British 
Cameroons was governed by the British as a de facto part of Nigeria, 
with free movement of people and goods between them (Konings 2005). 
A large number of migrants from Nigeria, predominantly Ibo, moved 
into British Cameroons, especially the southern part. French Cameroons 
became independent in 1960. In 1961, the northern two-thirds of British 
Cameroons (‘Northern Cameroons’) voted to join Nigeria while the 
southern one-third (‘Southern Cameroons’) opted to join Cameroon, 
largely due to resentment against Nigerian control. The former Southern 
Cameroons nevertheless remained Anglophone in contrast to the rest 
of Cameroon, which is Francophone. This historical legacy set the stage 
for the strong connections between present-day Nigeria and Cameroon, 
operating in distinctly different ways in the North and South of both 
countries. Ethnic groups also straddle the border, notably the Fulani and 
the Hausa in the North, and the Ibo in the South, discussed below.
The border between Nigeria and Cameroon has sometimes been 
a source of tension, particularly the peninsula of Bakassi (Konings 
2005). Both Nigeria and Cameroon claim sovereignty and clashes 
have frequently broken out, with tensions particularly high in the early 
1990s. In 2002, the International Court of Justice ruled in Cameroon’s 
favour, but Nigeria never fully accepted this ruling. Recently, unrest 
has occurred in English-speaking Cameroon over simmering resent-
ments that the government discriminates in favour of the Francophone 
population.3
3See “A Bilingual Cameroon Teeters After English Speakers Protest Treatment” (9 February 2017), 
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/africa/a-bilingual-cameroon- 
teeters-after-english-speakers-protest-treatment.html.
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Divergence of economic policies and prices
Notwithstanding the historical connections between Cameroon and 
Nigeria, these two countries have pursued divergent economic policies, 
leading to pricing disparities that spur smuggling. Cameroon joined the 
other Francophone Central African countries in CEMAC, with a cus-
toms union and a common currency pegged to the French franc and then 
the Euro. Nigeria, on the other hand, has pursued an independent mon-
etary policy, frequently leading to high inflation with large exchange rate 
fluctuations. Since the late 1960s, Nigeria’s currency, the naira, has been 
inconvertible into other currencies. Prior to the mid-2000s, Nigeria had 
a highly controlled and overvalued official exchange rate and a much 
cheaper and volatile parallel exchange rate. Cross-border traders used 
the parallel exchange rate to covert nairas to FCFA. Nigeria is a member 
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but 
ECOWAS has no agreements with CEMAC, and ECOWAS has made 
little progress in harmonizing trade policies, largely because of Nigeria’s 
reluctance to cede sovereignty.
Nigeria has engaged in highly discretionary and often protection-
ist trade policies, including tariffs of 100% or more and import bans 
on  ‘sensitive’ products such as rice. These tariffs and import bans are 
frequently modified and not fully applied, but nevertheless inhibit offi-
cial trade and raise domestic prices in Nigeria relative to those of its 
Francophone neighbours. While Cameroon’s trade policies are not as 
extreme as those of Nigeria, Cameroon has elevated import taxes on final 
products. CEMAC customs duties for many goods are set at 30% and, 
inclusive of value added taxes (VAT) and other special taxes, the statutory 
import taxation cumulates at 57%. In addition, Cameroon sometimes 
institutes discretionary customs valuations, especially on goods from 
Asia, further raising actual rates of protection (World Bank 2013).
Nigeria also keeps gasoline prices far below world levels. The price dif-
ferences between Nigeria and Cameroon resulting from these divergent 
policies are the main proximate cause of smuggling, as discussed below.
Weak states and strong informal sectors
ICBT is an integral part of the informal sector. The pervasiveness of ICBT 
reflects a vicious circle of weak governments that are unwilling and/or 
unable to control smuggling and other forms of tax evasion, corruption, 
and lack of state legitimacy. Smart (2013) points out that the inabil-
ity to eradicate smuggling (‘illegal persistence’) reflects social attitudes 
regarding the legitimacy of government rules as much as the economic 
distortions created by those rules usually stressed by economists. As 
Roitman (2004) puts it, the illegal becomes licit and even legitimate in 
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the face of the generalized corruption of the state. The general perception 
that governments are corrupt undermines tax morale (Perry et al. 2007) 
and reduces the sense of obligation to comply with civic and legal obliga-
tions. Cameroon and Nigeria have been notorious for their widespread 
corruption, even if some moderate progress has occurred in their rank-
ings on world corruption indicators. Violent social conflicts in several of 
Cameroon’s neighbours, most recently the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Northern Nigeria, spill over into Cameroon, further destabilizing social 
order. In Cameroon, smugglers obtain legitimacy as part of the struggle 
against oppression and for survival (Roitman 2004).
Porous borders
The combination of geographical contiguity and weak border enforce-
ment makes border crossing relatively straightforward. Nigerian 
authorities estimate that there are over 1,400 illegal entry points along its 
borders, compared to 84 legal border crossings.4
Poverty and unemployment
Again in Cameroon, as in many other African countries, the relatively 
prosperous post-independence decades of the 1960s and 70s were sup-
ported by unsustainable fiscal and trade policies, setting the stage for the 
deep crises of the 1980s. The structural adjustment policies of the 1980s 
and 1990s led to severe cutbacks in government spending and bankrupt-
cies in the private sector, resulting in falling formal employment and 
incomes. Informal sector activities, including ICBT, have filled the gap 
through a combination of consumers seeking inexpensive goods and 
entry of unemployed workers into trading. For example, most of the 
street vendors of smuggled gasoline from Nigeria are young men seeking 
employment of last resort.
Kinship networks
Kinship networks play a major role in ICBT in Africa (Golub 2015), both 
substituting for and undermining official institutions. Numerous ethnic 
groups operate in Cameroon, not all of which are active in cross-border 
trade (Bennafla 2002). The most prominent are the Ibo in the South-West, 
the Bamiléké in the West, and the Hausa-Fulani in the North, although 
the spheres of these groups and others overlap. The role of these groups is 
described in more detail below.
4See Nigeria’s porous borders (Business Day, 28 April 2014). https://businessday.ng/editorial/
article/nigerias-porous-borders/.
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Trade with Nigeria
Trade patterns
Nigeria is the dominant economic power of the region and correspond-
ingly has loomed large in Cameroon’s recorded and unrecorded trade 
since the 1970s petroleum boom in Nigeria, as documented in World 
Bank (2013) and Herrera (1995). These studies report that petroleum 
products have been by far the largest of Nigeria’s exports to Cameroon. 
These studies also report that Nigeria exports a large variety of gener-
ally low-quality manufactured products to Cameroon, consisting both 
of goods made in Nigeria and, increasingly, re-exported imports from 
Asia, especially China, for those goods are not subject to elevated import 
protection in Nigeria. Some of the goods passing through Nigeria on 
the way to Cameroon, notably used cars, enter Nigeria through Benin. 
The products Nigeria exports include auto parts, textiles, clothing, 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals, bicycles, and motorcycles. Cameroon’s 
exports to Nigeria also consist both of domestically produced and re- 
exported goods. The main domestically manufactured good exported by 
Cameroon to Nigeria is soap, which is aided by the price ceiling on palm 
oil in Cameroon and Nigeria’s high import duties on soap and palm oil. 
Cameroon’s re-exports consist of some other products heavily protected 
in Nigeria, especially rice. Agricultural produce and livestock flow in both 
directions along the Cameroon-Nigeria border, depending on location, 
seasonal factors, etc. The composition of unrecorded products moving 
across borders change as a function of evolving price differentials in the 
two countries. There are also reports that Nigerian cashew nuts are being 
smuggled into Cameroon in large quantities.5
ICBT between Cameroon and Nigeria is concentrated in three areas 
of Cameroon: the North and Far-North, the North-West and South-
West, and the coastal area in the South. We carried out surveys in the 
three most important border markets in each of these regions: Banki, 
Sabongari, and Idenau, respectively. Figure 10.1 shows the location of 
these three border towns and the larger cities in the interior to which 
these markets are connected.
Banki
The most important northern corridors connect Maiduguri in Nigeria 
to Cameroon’s cities of Maroua or Garoua. Trade between Nigeria and 
5See Nigeria: Rundown on cashew situation (International Trade Centre, 3 February 2015). 
http://www.intracen.org/itc/blogs/market-insider/Nigeria-rundown-on-cashew-situation/.
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Chad also transits through Cameroon in this region. The roads are in 
very poor condition (World Bank 2013). Numerous markets straddle the 
borders of these three countries, reflecting the high level of trade and 
historical connections among the region’s people. Typically, however, 
border towns, such as Banki and Keroua, are much smaller than the big 
cities the roads link in Northern Nigeria and Northern Cameroon—
Kano and Maiduguri in Nigeria and Maroua and Garoua in Cameroon. 
The activities in these market towns ebb and flow depending on develop-
ments in the bigger cities, the quality of the roads linking them, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the degree of predation by local customs and 
police authorities (Bennafla 2002).
The Boko Haram insurgency has had a major impact on trade in the 
Far North. Boko Haram has used the porous border in the Far North 
with Cameroon to smuggle arms into Northern Nigeria. In September 
2013, 5,400 AK-47 rifles were seized on a truck in Maroua, and, in 
January 2014, a man was caught in Cameroon transporting 655 guns 
to Nigeria. Women carry smaller numbers of weapons and bombs on 
their backs, disguised as babies, for which they receive sizable sums 
of money.6 While trade in armaments is booming, trade in ordinary 
products has been disrupted by the Boko Haram insurgency. To limit 
Boko Haram movements, Nigeria closed the border with Cameroon in 
November 2011. After Cameroon shut down Koranic schools and extra-
dited Boko Haram suspects to Nigeria, the latter reopened the border 
in 2012, but with  stepped- up security checks, reinforced when a French 
family was kidnapped in February 2012. These measures have greatly 
impeded ICBT in the region. One trader in Maroua said, “Tight bor-
der security and checks are making business impossible for us… Today 
all the goods must be checked before entry and taxes are so high.”7 
Impediments to trading in smuggled Nigerian gasoline, known as ‘zoa 
zoa’ in this region, have caused the price to rise from 400 to 600 FCFA 
per litre. The cattle trade has also been adversely affected. A cattle trader 
complained: “More than 1,000 cattle are traded into Nigeria weekly 
from Cameroon. Less than half the normal cattle supply into Nigeria is 
possible and only through very difficult terrain.” Customs receipts have 
also dropped precipitously.8
6Boko Haram: Coffers and Coffins; A Pandora’s Box - the Vast Financing Options for Boko Haram 
(Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, March 2014).
7Boko Haram threat chokes trade with Cameroon (The New Humanitarian, 29 April 2013). 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/97942/boko-haram-threat-chokes-trade-with-cameroon.
8Ibid.
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Sabongari
South of the Adamoua Mountains, most of Cameroon’s trade with Nigeria 
uses the road connecting Onitsha (Nigeria), Bamenda (Anglophone 
Cameroon controlled largely by the Ibo ethnic group discussed below), 
and Bafoussam (in Francophone Cameroon, dominated by the Bamiléké) 
(Herrera 1995). Until recently, the road conditions on the Cameroonian 
side were poor, severely impeding trade in the rainy season. This road 
was upgraded as discussed in detail in the following chapter. Survey 
findings reported here were carried out in the rainy season before the 
upgrade and observed trade was consequently seasonally low in this area.
Idenau
Goods also travel by sea, with ships transporting 15–20 trucks between 
Nigeria and Cameroon per day (World Bank 2013). The Cameroonian 
coast between Douala and Idenau also offers numerous points for dock-
ing smaller boats arriving from Nigeria.
Seasonal weather patterns affect the flow of trade. The sea becomes 
very dangerous and some roads are nearly impassable in the rainy sea-
son, although traders can adjust in part by using smaller vehicles that are 
more suited to flooded roads. On the other hand, some rivers become 
more navigable in the rainy season (Herrera 1995). Non-weather 
related seasonal factors are also at play: the beginning of the school 
year and Christmas are associated with increased flows of school uni-
forms and gift items, respectively. The bulk of trade between Nigeria 
and Cameroon in our surveys went through Idenau, since trade in the 
North has been severely disrupted by Boko Haram and trade levels in 
the North-West were low due to normal seasonal factors. On-site field 
research found that re-exported and domestically produced rice was the 
main product exported to Nigeria until recently. With a Cameroonian 
ban on rice exports in effect since late 2016, rice trading fell sharply but 
still continues.
Magnitude of trade
The World Bank (2013) provides detailed estimates of the value of 
non-oil trade between Nigeria and Cameroon using several on-site esti-
mation methods: information from customs, observations at markets, 
and counting the number of trucks crossing borders at various loca-
tions while estimating the average value of their loads. This study finds 
that official statistics massively underestimate trade. Table 10.2 summa-
rizes the World Bank findings. Official import statistics in Cameroon 
and Nigeria indicate that Cameroon exports less than 2 million USD 
and imports 8 million USD worth of non-oil goods from Nigeria, for 
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a total of about 10 million USD. The World Bank team estimated the 
value of Cameroon’s actual non-oil exports to Nigeria at 226 million 
USD, of which 76 million USD are goods produced in Cameroon, and 
the value of Cameroon’s imports at 769 million USD, of which 176 mil-
lion are made in Nigeria. That is, actual trade, inclusive of re-exports, is 
about 100 times the official estimates! Even these figures are underesti-
mates, as they do not include petroleum products, by far Nigeria’s largest 
unofficial export, and make no allowance for small-scale smuggling by 
motorcycles that entirely evade official border posts, especially in the Far 
North during the dry season.
The World Bank (2013) also provides a breakdown of the value of 
trade by region. The northern region of Cameroon, particularly the Far-
North crossing at Limani connecting Maiduguri and Maroua, accounts 
for about half of all non-oil trade. About 10% of the trade passes through 
the South-West, mainly via Ekok/Mfum linking Onitsha and Bamenda. 
The remaining 40% is estimated to transit by sea.
The findings of our surveys confirm in some respects those of the 
World Bank (2013), but differ in others. Table 10.3 shows the magni-
tude and composition of trade on an annualized basis extrapolated from 
one week of observations in August 2014. Total trade value of just above 
800 million USD is remarkably close to the World Bank estimate. Our 
surveys included petroleum products, while the World Bank excluded 
this sector. Petroleum products were a very small part of total trade in 
our surveys, as shown in Table 10.3. However, unlike the World Bank 
(2013), our surveys found that Cameroonian exports to Nigeria of 
500 million USD exceeded Cameroonian imports of 300 million USD. 
Also, as noted above, the bulk of trade observed during the week our 
surveys were carried out was via the sea route from Idenau, whereas the 
World Bank (2013) reports that trade in the North and Far North is very 
large. These discrepancies could reflect the conditions at the particular 
time our surveys were carried out. Also, we are unable to separate domes-
tically produced goods from re-exports.
Table 10.2





Official data 8 2
World Bank (2013) total, including re-exports 789 226
World Bank (2013) domestically produced goods only 176 62
Source: World Bank (2013)
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Like the World Bank (2013), we find that rice is by far the larg-
est Cameroonian export to Nigeria. Soap and agricultural produce 
are also found to be significant Cameroonian exports. Surprisingly, as 
just noted, our surveys did not detect a substantial volume of petro-
leum imports from Nigeria, in contrast to the known importance of 
this product in Cameroonian imports, as discussed below. This could 
reflect several considerations: most petroleum imports are smuggled 
through the bush rather than via official border posts, the Boko Haram 
insurgency is severely inhibiting trade in the Far North, the normal 
reduction of trade in the rainy season, and the recent decrease in Nigerian 
subsidies. As expected, vehicle spare parts, other manufactured goods, 
food products, and pharmaceuticals are important Nigerian exports. 
Overall, our results should be treated with caution in view of the short 
timeframe during which the data were collected. Nevertheless, like the 
World Bank (2013), our findings suggest that actual trade with Nigeria 
greatly exceeds officially recorded bilateral trade and amounts to approxi-
mately 3% of Cameroonian GDP.
Rice
In Nigeria, some import-competing goods face very high tariffs or even 
outright import bans, including used cars, clothing and textiles, used 
clothes, rice, vegetable oil, and frozen poultry. These import restrictions 
are more stringently enforced at Nigerian seaports than at land crossings, 
providing an incentive to import the goods into neighbouring countries 
and then re-export to Nigeria. Since the mid-1970s, Benin and Togo 
have deliberately sought to maintain low trade barriers so as to serve as 
entrepots for re-exports to Nigeria. Indeed, the volumes imported into 
Benin and Togo of goods that are heavily protected in Nigeria greatly 
exceed national consumption and are known to be re-exported to Nigeria 
(Golub 2012; Benjamin, Golub, and Mbaye 2015). To a lesser extent than 
Benin and Togo, Cameroon is also a source of smuggling into Nigeria, 
particularly for rice.
Rice is the largest item imported into Cameroon for re-export to 
Nigeria, according to the World Bank (2013) and our surveys. Both 
Nigeria and Cameroon produce rice, but output is far lower than domes-
tic consumption, with imports filling the gap. Figure 10.2 shows rice 
imports per person in Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, and Togo. Despite the 
fact that Nigeria is a major consumer of rice, with domestic production 
accounting for only a small part of consumption, Nigeria’s recorded per 
capita imports are well below those of its neighbours. Benin’s rice imports 
per capita dwarf those of the other countries in Figure 10.2, but it can 
be seen that Cameroon and Togo’s imports in recent years consistently 
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exceeded Nigeria’s, suggesting that imports into these countries are in 
large part intended for Nigeria. This interpretation is validated by the 
fact that much of the imports into Nigeria’s neighbours consist of par-
boiled rice, a favourite of Nigerian consumers but not of those in Benin 
and Cameroon.9 In 2016, imports of rice dropped sharply in Cameroon, 
as in Benin and Togo, in response to the steep recession in Nigeria asso-
ciated with plunging oil prices.
As for Benin and Togo, Cameroon’s re-exports of rice are driven by 
differences in trade policies. As noted above, rice is one of the most heav-
ily protected goods in Nigeria, as the government has sought to boost 
domestic production by curtailing imports through tariffs of 100% or 
more and import bans. Cameroon, on the other hand, eliminated import 
duties on imported rice in 2008, during the global run-up in commod-
ity prices. Thus, there is a very large discrepancy in import protection 
and import prices. In late 2011, the retail price of rice in Nigeria was the 
equivalent of 462 FCFA per kg compared to 330 FCFA per kg in Douala 
(World Bank 2013). Without smuggling from Benin, Togo, and Nigeria, 
the price discrepancies would undoubtedly be much greater.
9Benin Republic, Cameroon crash import duty on rice to cash in on Nigeria’s folly (Ships & Ports, 
11 February 2014). shipsandports.com.ng/benin-republic-cameroon-crash-import-duty-on- 
rice-to-cash-in-on-nigerias-folly/.
Figure 10.2
Rice imports per capita (USD) in Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, and Togo
Source: UN Comtrade (2018), World Bank World Development Indicators, and authors’ 
calculations
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In 2013, rice smuggling into Nigeria reached unprecedented levels as 
the government raised the import taxes from 50 to 110% (10% import 
duty and 100% ‘rice levy’). Only one rice ship unloaded at Lagos port 
compared to over 500 in 2012. Nigeria’s customs revenues from rice 
plummeted to almost zero, too. Meanwhile, Benin’s port of Cotonou 
recorded an astounding increase in rice imports to 2.2 million metric 
tons, tripling from an already high 2012 level of 65,000 tons.10 Although 
not as dramatic as in Benin, Cameroon also saw a 50% jump in rice 
imports in 2013, from 550,000 tons in 2012 to 820,000 tons in 2013, 
which can only be explained in the context of Nigeria’s high import taxes, 
given that Cameroon’s consumption is about 300,000 tons, and domestic 
production about 100,000 tons.11
Gasoline
Historically, the largest informal export from Nigeria to Cameroon 
has been refined petroleum products, especially gasoline. Differential 
domestic pricing policies for gasoline and other petroleum products are 
the main driver of informal trade, with low prices in Nigeria providing a 
great incentive to smuggle gasoline into neighbouring countries. Nigeria 
has long delinked domestic and world prices of fuel and set very low 
domestic prices, whereas the Francophone countries have to a greater 
extent aligned domestic prices with world prices, particularly since the 
late 1980s. Figures 10.3 and 10.4 show the prices of gasoline and diesel 
fuel in the two countries since 1991.
The Nigerian government’s pricing policy has oscillated in response 
to conflicting political pressures to keep prices low versus improv-
ing the government fiscal balance. Fluctuations of the exchange rate 
have also been very large. Consequently, the gap between Nigerian 
and Cameroonian gasoline prices has also varied greatly. As world oil 
prices rose following the second oil shock in the early 1980s and then the 
Nigerian parallel exchange rate plummeted in the late 1980s, the discrep-
ancy between Nigerian and world prices of gasoline ballooned (Herrera 
1997). Between 1980 and the early 1990s, the ratio of the official price 
of Nigerian gasoline to Cameroon’s official price fell from about 40% to 
under 10% and smuggling of Nigerian gasoline into Cameroon became 
10 Ibid.
11Cameroun – Consommation: Selon l’Institut national de la statistique (INS), 728,443 tonnes de riz 
ont été importées en 2017 pour 183.7 milliards de FCFA [Cameroon – Consumption: According 
to the National Institute of Statistics (INS), 728,443 tons of rice were imported in 2017 for 183.7 
billion FCFA] (Cameroun-Info.Net, 14 September 2018). http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/
cameroun-consommation-selon-linstitut-national-de-la-statistique-ins-728-443-tonnes-de-riz- 
327582.html.
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endemic. In 1994, the Nigerian government raised prices, pushing up the 
ratio to a still low 20% (Herrera 1998). Since 2000, the Nigerian govern-
ment has raised domestic prices, lowering the subsidy of the Nigerian 
price to about half the world level.12 However, the cost of the subsidies 
has become more explicit as production problems at local refineries have 
forced the Nigerian government to import gasoline at world prices and 
resell at lower controlled domestic prices. This led the Nigerian govern-
ment to double the domestic price of gasoline from $1.70 to $3.50 
on 1 January 2012. Social unrest forced the government to partially 
12Fuel Prices Nigeria, Energypedia. https://energypedia.info/wiki/Fuel_Prices_Nigeria.
Figure 10.4
Average official diesel fuel prices in Cameroon and Nigeria, 1991–2019 (USD/litre)
Source: World Development Indicators and Globalpetrolprices.com
Figure 10.3
Average official gasoline prices in Cameroon and Nigeria, 1991–2019 (USD/litre)
Source: World Development Indicators and Globalpetrolprices.com
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reinstate the gasoline subsidies two weeks later, with the price set at 
$2.27 per  gallon (World Bank 2013).
Smuggled gasoline is omnipresent in some parts of Cameroon, sold 
under the evocative nicknames of ‘fédéral’, ‘zoa-zoa’, ‘bush wine’, and 
‘funge’ (Herrera 1997). In Northern Cameroon, about two-thirds of 
petroleum products consumed are smuggled in from Nigeria. South 
of the Adamoua region, the presence of contraband gasoline is more 
variable and has declined. The volume of these exports fluctuates con-
siderably over time depending on the extent to which Nigeria and 
Cameroon’s pricing policies diverge and the magnitude of Cameroon’s 
efforts to crack down on smuggling when its national refinery is par-
ticularly threatened. For commercial motorcyclists and other informal 
sector workers, the cheaper Nigerian gasoline is a necessity for survival 
as they eke out a meagre living. The quality of this gasoline is often poor, 
as  traders adulterate it to raise their profits.
When Cameroon raised the price of a litre of gas from 185 to 280 
FCFA in July 1988, a massive influx of ‘fédéral’ forced the government 
to lower the price back to 190 FCFA in April 1989 as the national refin-
ery SONARA faced bankruptcy when its sales plummeted. In the early 
1990s, smuggled Nigerian gasoline represented about 30% of national 
consumption, dropping below 10% in the mid-1990s as Nigeria raised its 
price and Cameroon clamped down on smugglers (Herrera 1997).
Petroleum products are shipped from Nigeria through a large variety 
of routes and types of vehicles in both the South and North of Cameroon. 
The travel is often very arduous, with the traders taking poor quality 
roads over rough terrain. A reporter accompanied traders on the moun-
tainous route between Gembu in Nigeria to Sabongari in North-West 
Cameroon in 2011.
It is a nightmare crossing the muddy Mayo Wukari, taking a 
down course meander through the green mountains. The journey 
from Gembu…to Mbamnga to Bang, and to neighbouring villages 
and towns in Cameroon, where the smuggled fuel is sold, takes 
two to five dreary days, depending on how lucky the driver is. The 
antiquated Steyr mini trucks load up to 80 of 60-litre gallons, and 
they move at a snail speed wobbling through the muddy valleys, 
and laboriously climbing the slippery hills. If the driver is unlucky 
and he suffers a breakdown, he spends longer time getting to the 
market…At Mayo Wukari, the journey becomes pretty tough. 
The 80 gallons of petrol are offloaded. Painstakingly, 20 to 40 of 
the gallons are tied on an elastic rubber rope and floated across 
the river…After spending half a day crossing the murky river, the 
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dreary journey continues. But this time, about 20 gallons are left 
behind to lessen the weight, so that the Steyr truck would be able 
to pass through the roughest part of the road. After Bang where 
the terrain is a bit plain, the 60 gallons are dumped, and a U-turn 
is made to get the remaining 20 gallons at the riverbank.13
The price differentials between Nigeria and Cameroon are sufficient 
to make this arduous and dangerous trip profitable. Herrera (1995, p. 70) 
provided an illustration of the costs and profits of a dealing in ‘fédéral’: 
purchase price of 40 litres of gasoline in Nigeria at the parallel exchange 
is 28 FCFA per litre and selling price is 65 FCFA, but profit of only 12 
FCFA after deducting costs of transport (12 FCFA) and bribes (18 FCFA).
On the Nigerian side, the trade is well organized with high-level offi-
cials widely known to be complicit in the operation. The driver in the 
above story explains that ‘he is only a middleman in the business…the 
real smugglers are big men in Gembu, Jalingo and Abuja’. In Cameroon, 
however, the retailers are independent small-scale operators, nicknamed 
‘Koweïtians’, young men averaging 20 years of age with at least a primary 
school education yet unable to find remunerative regular employment or 
fund higher levels of studies, who take on the dangerous job of illegally 
selling ‘fédéral’ as a temporary measure to make a living. There are no 
associations organizing and protecting traders.
The ‘Koweïtians’ load their gasoline into jerricans of 10–50 litres. 
The only other equipment necessary for entry into selling ‘fédéral’ are a 
funnel and a cloth to filter impurities, for a total capital outlay of some 
15,000 FCFA ($30).
The traders are also at constant risk of conflict with the authorities, 
resulting in confiscation of their goods and worse. Most often, though, it 
is a matter of paying off officials, which amounts to a larger share of total 
costs than transport, as noted above. A 2008 Inter Press Service (IPS) 
article describes the interactions of traders and customs officials:14
The uncountable security checkpoints on both sides of the divide 
only serve as a cover-up. One smuggler – who for obvious rea-
sons declined to give his name – told IPS that he offers bribes at 
every checkpoint. “You must ‘settle’ or bribe them, else they seize 
your fuel and sell it,” he said, adding that they have devised all 
13Nigeria: The Rough Road to Fuel Smuggling Across Taraba-Cameroon Border (Daily Trust, 27 
October 2011). http://allafrica.com/stories/201110270559.html.
14See TRADE-CAMEROON: Borders – Where Two Economies Meet (Inter Press Service News Agency, 
13 November 2008). http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/11/trade-cameroon-borders-where-two-
economies-meet/.
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kinds of tactics to escape being tracked by the security chain, lest 
bribes drain their trip of profit in the end.
“But it is a chop I chop business,” a nearby custom official was 
overheard saying. The numerous security control points reveal 
the true story. A junior police officer confided that he works 
for his boss on the supply chain. He said everybody is involved. 
“From top to bottom, all of us are living on it,” he declared, add-
ing that he is building his third house, despite having been in 
police service only for six years. How else would one explain the 
fact that retailers are visible after every 500 metres, while custom 
officials claim they are fighting to stop the trade.
“Once the fuel is on the street, you cannot seize or stop them 
from selling it,” claims Customs Field Operations Officer 
Toudjani Abouya, adding that officers risk being burnt if they 
should venture to seize fuel on the streets. But another smuggler 
who begged to remain anonymous told IPS that many security 
officials are also involved in the smuggling. “Some of us are 
working for them,” he intimated.
At times, the Cameroonian government permitted sale of ‘fédéral’ in a 
few geographically isolated departments, but it is now illegal everywhere 
in the country. When the difficulties of the SONARA became particularly 
acute in the early 1990s, the government ordered the army to take charge 
of the efforts to control the trade. While not stopping the smuggling alto-
gether, the brutality of the army’s repression led to a sharp decline. At 
present, ‘fédéral’ is mainly present in the North and Far North regions, 
but also in Adamoua, the South-West, and the North-West.
The massive parallel economy in fraudulent fuel sales encapsulates all 
the complexities and dilemmas facing West African economies. On the 
positive side, as is the case for other informal services, the informal dis-
tribution of petroleum is a massive source of employment in a situation 
where formal sector jobs are few and far between. For young graduates 
who cannot get jobs in the government, farmers barely able to survive in 
subsistence conditions, and numerous others without viable alternatives 
for earning a decent living, the informal sector is their only recourse.
There are, however, serious downsides. Illicit and unregulated sales 
of gasoline pose large threats to public health, environ mental sustain-
ability, and fiscal stability. As reported by the vendors them selves, 
these products are of very dubious quality, and may be dangerous to 
vehicle engines. Mixtures that are made of different petroleum prod-
ucts are not subject to any control or inspection. The fuel is often 
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adulterated and the frequent use of containers for different kinds of prod-
ucts leads to dangers, even if there is no deliberate mixing of incompatible 
products. Using a low-quality, adulterated, or inappropriate fuel damages 
engines, increasing maintenance costs. The petroleum products are also 
handled in the open air, which results in significant levels of pollutants. 
Moreover, as petroleum products are highly flammable and very little 
precaution is taken in handling them, tragedies involving explosions and 
fires in ships, motor vehicles, and tricycles are common. Frequent spills 
also lead to chemical residues seeping into the ground and destroying 
fauna and flora.
The financial losses incurred by the state oil companies due to reduced 
sales are also considerable, even if it is very difficult to get an exact level 
due to lack of data on the volume of informal transactions.
The oscillation between violent crackdowns by the state and tacit collu-
sion, or even participation by officials at all levels, damages the credibility 
of the government and undermines legitimate development policy. In 
order to break this vicious circle of poverty, illegal behaviour, and state 
connivance and/or violent crackdowns, the best approach would be to 
remove the underlying causes of informal trade by harmonizing pric-
ing policies among neighbouring countries. However, there is little that 
Cameroon can do to induce Nigeria to eradicate distortions. At the same 
time, as described in Chapter 8, the government should develop alter-
native formal training and employment opportunities for the masses of 
desperate young people, while enforcing the rule of law fairly.
Trade with Other CEMAC Countries
Cameroon’s ICBT with other CEMAC countries is less intense than with 
Nigeria and involves mainly agricultural produce and livestock (Nkendah 
2013; Bennafla 2002). Nevertheless, Cameroon is the main trading part-
ner within CEMAC for the other members given its relatively large size 
and diversified economy, in comparison to its neighbours. According to 
Bennafla (2002), Cameroon also exported a smaller value of manufac-
tured products to its CEMAC partners as of the late 1990s.
Due to the lesser importance of trade with CEMAC compared to 
Nigeria, our surveys were confined to Cameroon’s border with Equatorial 
Guinea at Kyé-Ossi. Kyé-Ossi is the most significant market on the south-
ern border of Cameroon, gaining in relative importance since the 1990s 
due in part to its location as the vertex where Cameroon, Gabon, and 
Equatorial Guinea meet (Bennafla 2002). Total trade between Cameroon 
and Equatorial Guinea in our survey was a mere 9 million USD, about 
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1% of Cameroon’s trade with Nigeria, almost all of which consisted of 
agricultural exports from Cameroon.
Bennafla (2002) and Nkendah (2013) report that Cameroon has a 
chronic surplus in agricultural products with Equatorial Guinea and 
other CEMAC countries. Chad and Central African Republic tend to 
be exporters of livestock; Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Congo import 
produce from Cameroon but export very little produce in return except 
a few products such as plantains. Equatorial Guinea, however, engages 
in significant re-export of alcoholic drinks imported from its former 
 colonizer Spain, which was confirmed in our surveys.
Trade in agricultural products between Cameroon and Gabon can 
occur either by land or sea, both of which have been subject to recurrent 
problems. An obstacle on the Douala-Libreville land trajectory is cross-
ing the Ntem River. The ferries are poorly maintained and frequently 
out of order, and the pirogues15 charge erratic and often exorbitant 
prices (Bennafla 2002). Consequently, when the ferry is out of service, 
 traders often opt for shipping by sea, but this too is often expensive and 
unreliable. When the ferry reopened in 1995 after several years out of 
service, traders returned to the land route.
Goods from Nigeria transit through Cameroon on their way to other 
CEMAC countries, particularly through the bustling market at Mbaiboum 
that supplies Bangui in the Central African Republic with Nigerian as well 
as Cameroonian goods. Ibo from Southern Nigeria and Fulani, Hausa, 
and others from Northern Nigeria, and Cameroon serve Chadian and 
Central African Republic buyers at Mbaiboum (Bennafla 2002).
Douala serves as an entry and exit point for goods in transit to and 
from Chad, Central African Republic, and Congo. In the dry season 
(November to June), trucks can accomplish the trips quite rapidly, 
with about 4 days between Douala and the capital of Chad, N’Djamena, 
and a week to 10 days between Douala and Bangui in Central African 
Republic. In the rainy season, however, the roads are often impassable 
and these trips can take a month. Bilateral quota agreements between 
Cameroon and its land-locked neighbours specify the shares of trucks 
in transit trade at 65–35% for Chad-Cameroon, and 60–40% for Central 
African Republic-Cameroon, but Cameroon’s share tends to exceed its 
quotas due to insufficient availability of trucks in the other two countries 
(Bennafla 2002). Chad can also be reached via Nigeria, but the insecurity 
in Nigeria, particularly in the port of Lagos, favours Douala despite lower 
costs of land transport in Nigeria.
15A small wooden boat for traditional subsistence (artinasal) fishing.
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Nkendah (2013) provides estimates of the value of informal exports 
of agricultural products from Cameroon to other CEMAC coun-
tries (Nigeria was not covered), using data collected by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) in 2008. These data 
were collected by observing the volume of products passing through 
border posts at various Cameroonian borders for 12 months in 2008, 
supplemented with survey questionnaires. Nkendah (2013) found that 
Cameroon’s total unrecorded exports of informal agricultural products 
to CEMAC countries amounted to 38 billion FCFA (about 75 million 
USD), just below the value of Cameroon’s recorded exports of these 
same goods. Equatorial Guinea is the largest destination of unrecorded 
Cameroonian exports, with a share of 41.2%, followed by Chad (29.5%), 
Gabon (12.4%), Congo (11.5%), and Central African Republic (5.6%).
Interviews and surveys were carried out at the large market in 
Kyé-Ossi in Cameroon, bordering on both Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. 
The situation is little changed from that described in Bennafla (2002). 
Cameroon imports manufactured products from Equatorial Guinea that 
are re-exported (alcoholic drinks, food products, pharmaceuticals, plas-
tic products, shoes, and clothing, etc.) and exports mainly agricultural 
products to both Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. 
Traders and Kinship Groups
The spread of ICBT in Central Africa reflects a pervasive phenomenon in 
Africa of the marginalization, indeed near disappearance, of the formal 
sector, reflecting the weaknesses of African states and their lack of social 
legitimacy. As Bennafla (2002) stresses, African states are still present, 
and their role remains significant at the borders, but governmental prac-
tices have also become increasingly informal and officials at all levels are 
often in collusion with traders.
Certainly, there are many small operators working independently 
seeking incomes and employment of last resort in unregistered border 
trading, due to its low costs of entry. However, much of what is called 
informal trading is paradoxically often highly organized into national and 
even international networks. In an environment characterized by weak 
rule of law and widespread corruption and even banditry, traders seek to 
reduce uncertainty through networks of social relations. By far the most 
powerful and longstanding such relationships derive from ethnic and 
religious kinship groups. Religious and ethnic bonds create an alternative 
to state institutions in providing the ‘social capital’ market transactions 
require: trust, contract enforcement, finance, and information (Golub 
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2015). Trading across borders imposes risks over and beyond those 
involved in doing business within a country. Kinship groups established 
on both sides of national borders are well positioned to mitigate these 
risks. While Bennafla (2002) cautions against overstating the role of kin-
ship groups, noting that traders often interact with others outside the 
group, her own analysis of the operation of these groups shows how 
important they remain.
Three main ethnic groups are known to control the bulk of ICBT 
in Cameroon: the Fulani-Hausa centred in the North, the Bamiléké in 
the West and South, and the Ibo in the South-West and North-West 
 provinces (Nkendah 2013; World Bank 2013; Herrera 1995). Figure 10.5 
shows their regions of origin in Cameroon and neighbouring countries. 
As described below, these groups’ operations extend well beyond their 
native regions to other parts of Cameroon and into other Central African 
countries. Nkendah’s (2013) survey of agricultural trade in CEMAC 
countries found that 27% of traders were Fulani-Hausa, 52% were 
Bamiléké or other Grassfields, and 13% were Ibo, leaving only 8% for 
other groups. If Nigeria were included, the Bamiléké share would likely 
be lower in favour of a larger proportion for the Fulani-Hausa and Ibo.
Our surveys analyzed the membership of traders in kinship groups. 
Table 10.4 shows the distribution of the number of traders by kinship 
group in each of the four regions surveyed and in aggregate. As expected, 
the Hausa-Fulani are the overwhelming majority in the Far North area 
of Banki. In other regions, the composition of traders is more balanced 
between several groups. The Bamiléké have a strong presence in all four 
surveyed border regions. The Ibo are less numerous than expected, but 
have a presence in all three of the Cameroonian border regions with 
Nigeria in our surveys, although not at the border with Equatorial Guinea. 
Several other ethnic groups are also involved, notably the Bamoun, Beti, 
and Sawa, but their activities are more localized to one or two border 
posts. Overall, in all four surveyed regions combined, Hausa-Fulani are 
the most prevalent at 41%, followed by Bamiléké at 17%, with the Ibo 
accounting for only 8% of the traders surveyed.
The proportion represented by the various groups is quite different 
when assessed according to the value of trade rather than the number 
of traders, as shown in Table 10.5. The role of the Ibo is much greater. 
Despite their low numbers, the Ibo control 48% of the value of total trade 
in the survey, by far the largest of the groups in Table 10.5. The Bamiléké 
are second at 27%, followed by the Fulani-Hausa at 13%. The implication 
is that Ibo traders are engaging in much higher shipment values while 
Hausa-Fulani activities involve very small volumes per border crossing. 
The large-scale trades carried out by the Ibo are predominantly occurring 
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Figure 10.5
Cameroon’s main trading groups
Source: Authors
at Idenau. The Bamiléké are also heavily involved at Idenau both in value 
terms and the number of traders.
Table 10.6 shows that the number of women involved in ICBT is quite 
important for the two Grassfield groups, the Bamiléké and Bamoun. 
However, the Bamoun are very small players in terms of value of trade. 
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Table 10.4




Guinea border All locations
Banki Idenau Sabongari Kyé-ossi Total
Share by kinship 
groups (percent)
Bamiléké 5 29 8 13 55 17
Bamoun 0 0 0 31 31 10
Beti 0 7 0 23 30 10
Fulani-Hausa 60 15 47 7 129 41
Ibo 7 14 5 0 26 8
Sawa 0 19 0 1 20 6
Others 0 1 20 2 23 7
Total 72 85 81 77 315 100
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Table 10.5





Guinea border All locations
Banki Idenau Sabongari Kyé-ossi Total
Share by kinship 
groups (percent)
Bamiléké 0.8 214.0 1.0 2.4 218.1 27
Bamoun 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 4.5 1
Beti 0.0 11.2 0.0 1.2 12.4 2
Fulani-Hausa 41.8 33.3 29.9 0.9 105.9 13
Ibo 1.6 374.0 12.8 0.0 388.5 48
Sawa 0.0 73.9 0.0 0.2 74.1 9
Others 0.0 10.9 0.3 0.1 11.3 1
Total 44.2 717.4 44.0 9.3 814.9 100
Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Not surprisingly, given the restricted role of women in Muslim cul-
tures, the Fulani-Hausa had a smaller share of women traders. The 
representation of women among the Ibo traders was found to be even 
lower, although the small proportion of Ibo in the sample might par-
tially account for this. Again, the distribution of trade by value rather 
than number of traders provides a rather different picture, as shown in 
Table 10.7. Female traders account for just 3% of total trade value despite 
the fact that they constitute 23% of traders for the sample as whole. This 
reflects the fact that women are generally relegated to small-scale retail 
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activities in domestic and cross-border trade, particularly selling local 
produce, that is often cooked, and a few household supplies. However, 
the 1970s women’s roles are gradually changing among the Bamiléké and 
other groups. Women have had increasing opportunities to operate in 
larger-scale and longer-distance trading beginning in the 1980s due in 
part to the greater educational attainment of girls (Bennafla 2002).
On the Cameroonian side of the borders where our surveys were con-
ducted, the majority of traders reported themselves as Cameroonian 
citizens. Nevertheless, about one-third of the traders were found to be 
Nigerian. All the Ibo and about a third of the Fulani-Hausa described 
themselves as Nigerian.
Table 10.6
Survey distribution of number of traders, by kinship group 
and gender (percent)









Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Table 10.7
Survey distribution of value of trade, distribution by kinship 
group and gender (percent)









Source: Authors’ surveys and calculations
Cameroon’s Informal Cross-Border Trade  259
We now examine the operation of the three main kinship groups in 
more detail.
North and Far North: Fulani-Hausa Muslim groups
In the regions north of the Adamoua mountain range, various Muslim 
kinship groups, most prominently Hausa and Fulani, straddle the 
Nigeria-Cameroon-Chad borders and dominate cross-border trade. 
These Muslim traders also extend to other parts of Cameroon and 
Central Africa and all through Sahelian West Africa (Grégoire 1993). For 
example, a large group of Hausa traders operate in Bangui in the Central 
African Republic and some Fulani traders reside in Gabon (Bennafla 
2002). They are the modern descendants of a long trading tradition 
among Sahelian populations. The Hausa, mostly based on the Nigerian 
side, and Fulani, largely residing in Cameroon, are both heavily involved 
in ICBT between the two countries, with a certain division of labour. 
The World Bank (2013) reports that Fulani transport imported rice from 
Douala to major cities in the North such as Maroua and Garoua, which 
is then sold to Hausa traders who bring it across the border into Nigeria.
In the Sahel, Islam and trading have long gone together. These traders 
have for the most part eschewed the state educational system in favour 
of Koranic schools, limiting their access to formal sector jobs. Even more 
important, shared beliefs and values unite the traders and cement trust, 
ensuring respect of agreements without any formal contracts. A similar 
phenomenon underlies the success of the Mouride Islamic brotherhood 
in Senegal (Golub and Hansen-Lewis 2012). Pilgrimage and trading are 
intertwined.
The older generation of Fulani and Hausa traders began with almost 
nothing, starting out as street vendors or other petty traders and grad-
ually accumulating savings that enabled them to invest in their own 
businesses. Even as some of them succeed and grow into large enter-
prises, their management style remains highly personalized and not very 
different from the multitude of small informal operators operating in 
these locations. A younger generation of traders is far more educated and 
sophisticated in their management, with many of them having attended 
universities and travelled abroad (Bennafla 2002).
As noted above, women play little role in these Muslim trading groups, 
given the subordinate role of women more generally in most Islamic cul-
tures, including the Fulani and the Hausa.
The Bamiléké and other ‘Grassfields’ operators
The Grassfields refers to the highlands in the South-West of Cameroon, 
covering parts of four regions, mainly the West and North-West. The 
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dominant ethnic groups are the Bamenda, Bamoun, and Bamiléké, with 
the latter being, by far, the most important in commerce. The Bamiléké 
are famous for their aptitude in business and trade. They dominate 
trading in their region and ICBT with Gabon, primarily in agricultural 
produce (Nkendah 2013; Bennafla 2002; Herrera 1995). The Bamiléké 
are also involved in other regions, but to a much lesser extent, and in 
roles that are subservient to the Fulani and Hausa north of the Adamoua 
and to the Ibo on the southern border with Nigeria.
The commercial success of the Bamiléké has received considerable 
attention and is ascribed to diverse factors. Several studies (Champaud 
1981; Warnier 1993) identify Bamiléké cultural traditions that value and 
promote worldly success. In particular, given the high population den-
sity of their native West region, heads of household do not split property 
evenly among their heirs. Instead, one son, not necessarily the eldest, is 
secretly designated as the heir of the family homestead and land hold-
ings, with the outcome revealed only upon the father’s death. The other 
sons, and increasingly daughters, must make their way in the world, often 
gravitating toward commerce in other parts of Cameroon and abroad, 
especially Gabon, as they strive to match the respect and status within 
their family of their chosen brother.
In a manner similar to other successful itinerant trading diasporas such 
as the Mourides in Senegal (Golub and Hansen-Lewis 2012), newly arrived 
Bamiléké travellers are housed and assisted by members of their group 
who are already established in the area. Like the Mourides, living frugally, 
saving their initially meagre earnings and through participating in their 
famous tontines, they strive to acquire enough capital to open their own 
businesses. Tontines are a longstanding and widely used source of infor-
mal business financing for the Bamiléké. Participants in the tontine deposit 
funds into a pool each month, with the proceeds going to each member on 
a rotating basis. Tontines also serve as a cultural and social gathering point 
for Bamiléké. Another similarity with the Mourides is the ease with which 
Bamiléké integrate into the global capitalist system while still adhering to 
their traditions. The Bamiléké migrants have had great business success 
in agricultural plantations, urban industry, and commerce in Cameroon. 
Bamiléké businessmen are prominent in all of Cameroon’s major cities 
and those of other CEMAC countries (Champaud 1981; Herrera 1995).
In contrast to the Mourides, however, the Bamiléké migrant’s network 
tends to be more circumscribed to the extended family rather than the 
ethnic group as a whole. Likewise, in their businesses, the Bamiléké tend 
to operate individually rather than in cooperation with other members 
of the group, unlike their Ibo competitors described below. Few African 
societies are so encouraging of individual achievement (Champaud 1981).
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Herrera (1995) adopts another perspective on the Bamiléké’s over-
representation and success in business and commerce in Cameroon, 
ascribing it to historical factors rather than cultural traits. According to 
this view, the Bamiléké’s region was less adversely impacted by colonial-
ism than others.
These migrants maintain close ties with their family of origin in the 
Grassfields of Cameroon, aspiring to return having achieved commer-
cial success. Even when they grow, Bamiléké businesses often remain 
largely informal, completely controlled by the owner himself, such as the 
case of ‘Celestin M.’, a self-made man and one of the largest traders at 
the Cameroon-Gabon-Equatorial Guinea border, profiled by Bennafla 
(2002, pp. 130–131).16 Like the Muslim traders described above, how-
ever, the sons of these entrepreneurs often have Western education and 
are beginning to modernize some aspects of Bamiléké businesses while 
retaining the core elements that contribute to their success.
The Ibo in Southern Cameroon and Nigeria
As noted earlier, substantial migrations of Ibo from Nigeria to the 
Southern Cameroons occurred in the colonial era. These migrations 
entailed enduring frictions with the native population of Cameroonians, 
despite their common Anglophone language and similar cultural heritage 
(Konings 2005). It was in part resentment against Nigerian immigrants 
that led this part of the British Cameroons to vote to join Cameroon rather 
than Nigeria in the 1961 plebiscite. Paradoxically, however, immigration 
continued to increase after Southern Cameroons became the South-West 
and North-West regions of Cameroon, in part because the creation of the 
border, along with the divergent monetary and trade policies followed in 
Nigeria and Cameroon, boosted opportunities for trading, at which the 
Ibo excel.
The Ibo are perhaps even more renowned than the Bamiléké for their 
aptitude in trading. Although their cultural traditions are in some respects 
quite different than the Bamiléké, some of the drivers of their success are 
similar. Limited availability of land in their native region drives the Ibo 
to migrate in search of economic opportunities, and their work ethic and 
frugality are conducive to success. The Ibo are more egalitarian than the 
Bamiléké and work together to a much greater extent through organized 
structures such as commercial associations (Bennafla 2002; Herrera 
1995). Their trade associations enable them to benefit from economies 
of scale in purchasing, shipping, clearing customs, and marketing. The 
16Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) observe a similar phenomenon in West Africa. Large informal firms 
typically behave much like small informal firms rather than formal enterprises.
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backing of the group means that entrepreneurs need lower start-up capi-
tal and face lower payments at border crossings.
As for the Bamiléké, in addition to cultural factors, the Ibo’s suc-
cess derives from the legacy of colonialism. The Ibo were converted to 
Christianity and schooled in English relatively early in the 19th century, 
and became allies of the British colonial administration (Bennafla 2002). 
As early as the 1920s, the British encouraged the Ibo to settle in what was 
then the Southern Cameroons but governed as part of Nigeria. Thanks to 
their higher levels of education and ties to the British, the Ibo gained the 
upper hand over the local Bamenda ethnic group. When this area became 
part of modern Anglophone Cameroon in 1961 as described above, the 
Ibo were well established. The Biafra war in Nigeria (lasting from 1967 to 
1970), when the Ibo-dominated province of Biafra unsuccessfully sought 
to secede from Nigeria, led to a further exodus of Ibo toward Cameroon 
and other Central African countries. These migrations from Nigeria to 
Cameroon have situated the Ibo as strategic actors in cross-border trade.
As of the late 1980s, Nigerian immigrants in Cameroon were esti-
mated to be about 1.3% of the population, but 8.5% of those engaged in 
commerce, the vast majority of them Ibo (Herrera 1995). In addition to 
their aptitude for commerce, the Ibo increasingly concentrated on infor-
mal trading due to their exclusion from government employment and 
the formal private sector as xenophobic tensions escalated the ‘Ibo scare’ 
(Konings 2005). The Ibo presence is particularly strong in Bamenda, the 
major commercial centre in Anglophone Cameroon, in the North-West 
region. Kumba in the South-West is also a significant trading centre with 
a dominant Ibo presence. Herrera’s (1995) surveys found that Nigerians 
controlled more than half the shops distributing Nigerian imports of 
manufactured consumer goods in Bamenda and Kumba. Merchants 
from Douala and Yaounde come to Bamenda, and to a lesser extent 
Kumba, to source for their stores.
The most prominent Ibo organizations are the Bamenda Organized 
Traders Association (BOTA) and the Kumba Organized Traders 
Association (KOTA), founded in the late 1970s (Herrera 1995). BOTA 
and KOTA initially stood for Bamenda Onitsha Trade Association and 
Kumba Onitsha Trade Association, but the names were modified in the 
late 1980s to downplay the Nigerian connection as the immigrant Ibos 
sought to maintain a low profile to reduce rising hostility from native 
Cameroonian ethnic groups. BOTA’s and KOTA’s mottos are ‘unity 
and help’ and ‘unity and progress’, respectively. Ibo traders meet at the 
Anglican Church to discuss business strategies. The head of BOTA has 
considerable authority as the de facto chief of the Ibos in Cameroon, and 
negotiates the rates traders pay at various border posts with customs. 
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BOTA and KOTA also act as an agent for traders in arranging tran-
sport and other services. In addition, these organizations provide social 
insurance to members, distributing funds to bereaved family members 
following a death, and foster social connections among members, thus 
strengthening the group’s solidarity. This solidarity is essential for the Ibo 
to survive in Cameroon in the face of enduring hostility. In Cameroon, 
however, organized support agencies, like BOTA and KOTA active in 
Nigeria, do not operate.
Cooperation and conflict between kinship groups
In most cases, various ethnic groups mingle without major problems 
in border zones, but conflicts can flare up and reveal underlying eth-
nic and nationalistic tensions (Bennafla 2002). The mix of cooperation 
and conflict between immigrant and local trading networks has been 
particularly significant in the North-West and South-West regions 
of Cameroon where the Ibo presence is strong (Herrera 1995). In 
Bamemda and Kumba, the Ibo and Bamiléké have developed a division 
of labour in the distribution chain of informally traded products. The 
Ibo control the wholesale trade of manufactured goods produced or 
imported into Nigeria, such as plastic products and generic pharma-
ceuticals, with the Bamiléké’s role in these products confined at most 
to retailing on the edges of the main markets. On the other hand, the 
Bamiléké and other local groups play a larger role in the value chain 
of goods that are or have been subject to import bans or very high 
taxes in Nigeria, especially rice, but also wheat, vegetable oil, and new 
and used clothes. Bafoussam, the commercial centre of the Bamiléké’s 
native West region, is the hub for the distribution of used clothes in 
Cameroon. Herrera (1995) confirmed that used clothes are cheaper 
in Bafoussam than in Bamenda. This division of labour among ethnic 
groups continues into the present, reflecting some continuity in the 
factors driving cross-border trade.
The commercial success of the Ibo in Bamenda and Kumba has 
been the source of considerable tension. It reached a peak in the early 
1990s with the escalation of the dispute between the two governments 
over the Bakassi Peninsula and the aftermath of the economic crisis 
and structural adjustment policies that resulted in widespread formal 
sector job losses and consequent influx of displaced workers into infor-
mal trading. Responding to and stoking anti-immigrant attitudes, the 
Cameroonian authorities took a number of measures in 1993 to restrict 
the activities of Ibo traders and raise fees for them. Newspapers ran 
exaggerated stories about the dominance of the Ibo and their allegedly 
predatory practices.
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The Bamiléké largely control Cameroon’s exports of agricultural 
products to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea (Nkendah 2013). In a rever-
sal of the situation in Bamenda and Kumba, the Ibo play a secondary 
role in Gabon as vendors of the products imported by the Bamiléké. The 
Ibo are present in the North of Cameroon as well, but again in niche 
roles as retailers of Nigerian manufactured goods rather than wholesal-
ers. Ibo stores in Northern Cameroon are generally on the edges of the 
main areas in markets such as Banki, Keroua, and Mbaiboum, which are 
dominated by Muslim traders (Bennafla 2002).
Tensions also occur over different nationalities’ share of trucking with 
agreements often specifying market shares of different nationalities in 
shipping to border regions. Trucks cannot normally cross the border, 
and goods must be unloaded and reloaded onto a truck in the recipient 
country. Even within CEMAC, which in principle allows for freedom of 
movement within the region, in practice trucks are confined to national 
borders (Bennafla 2002).
Conclusion
ICBT is an integral part of the informal sector, and the causes, conse-
quences, and policy implications of ICBT are broadly similar to those 
for informality of the domestic economy. The preponderance of trade 
between Cameroon and its neighbours is informal.
ICBT encompasses a spectrum of activities in terms of illegality and 
organization. Traders range from small-scale independent ‘Koweities’ 
selling smuggled gasoline to wide-ranging kinship networks extending 
over several countries, including some very wealthy merchants. Most 
ICBT is in legal products and even crosses borders at official border posts 
and traders pay ‘taxes’, but these taxes bear little resemblance to official 
rates and informal side payments to customs officials, police, and other 
authorities are usually larger than official payments.
The causes of this trade are complex, involving a combination of unco-
ordinated economic policies in countries sharing artificial and porous 
borders inherited from the colonial era, kinship groups straddling these 
borders, weak administrative capacities, and corruption of customs and 
the police, large numbers of underemployed people seeking to survive, 
and long traditions of short- and long-distance trading.
The consequences of ICBT are likewise complex, with a mix of positive 
and negative effects on economic development. Informal trading creates 
work for large numbers of people with no prospects of wage employ-
ment, and provides inexpensive goods to households with low incomes. 
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It also creates an alternative form of regional integration from below, 
much deeper and more active than official integration within CEMAC. 
Smuggling, like the rest of the informal sector, has serious drawbacks too. 
It deprives the government of revenue, undermines formal enterprises 
that comply with legal tax obligations, and contributes to a culture of 
illegality and opposition to state authority.
In both Nigeria and Cameroon, smuggling and informal imports 
have been highly detrimental to efforts to promote import-substitution 
industrialization, as smuggling undercuts attempts to protect domestic 
industries. This is not entirely undesirable insofar as industry in Central 
and West Africa is often woefully inefficient. This situation underlines the 
necessity for Cameroon and other countries of the region to develop effi-
cient export-oriented industries that can compete internationally without 
high subsidies and import barriers. Export competitiveness, however, 
requires the institution of a ‘development state’ that prioritizes improve-
ments in the business climate to foster long-term investment rather than 
predation and protection of special interests, the ultimate cause of the per-
vasive informalization of African economies, including their trade.
A positive agenda for encouraging investment is more promising than 
cracking down on informal trade with Nigeria. The latter largely depends 
on Nigeria adopting more sensible policies while the former is much 
more in Cameroon’s control. In terms of the availability of resources, 
there is no need to eradicate informal trade with Nigeria for Cameroon 
to expand formal production of goods and services. There are plenty of 
underemployed people who will gladly switch to better-paying and less 
hazardous formal sector jobs if these were to be created. The binding 
constraint is the adverse business climate that deters foreign and domes-
tic investments in productive activities.
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CHAPTER 11
Road Infrastructure, Corruption, and  
Cross-Border Trade: The Case of  
the Mamfe-Ekok Road Linking  
Cameroon and Nigeria
Stephen S. Golub, Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Dominique Sébastienne  
Salla, and Marina Tsikouras
Introduction
The previous chapter described informal cross border trade (ICBT) 
between Cameroon and neighbouring countries. This chapter analyzes 
the institutional environment affecting ICBT through a case study of one 
of the major corridors for ICBT. The focus is on impediments to trade 
from hard and soft infrastructure. Traders face choices on whether to 
operate formally or informally. The quality of infrastructure and trade 
facilitation conditions this choice as well as affecting the magnitude and 
benefits from ICBT (Jouanjean et al. 2015; Lesser and Moise-Leeman 
2009).
Poor road infrastructure is a major impediment to economic growth 
and regional integration in SSA (Ondiege et al. 2013; Jerome and Nabena 
2016; Adejumobi 2016). A 2008 study by the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) showed that poor infrastructure lowered SSA annual growth by at 
least 2% (Ravenhill 2016). Lack of investment in and maintenance of the 
road network contributes to the low level of formal, and even informal, 
cross-border trade between Cameroon and its neighbours, described in 
the previous chapter and by the World Bank (2013). In Cameroon, only 
22.7% of roads were paved in 2011.1 The velocity of freight movement 
averaged only 6 kilometres per hour (Ranganathan and Foster 2011). 
Deficient ‘social infrastructure’ (i.e., institutional weaknesses result-
ing in opacity, corruption, and bureaucratic complexity) also hobbles 
1Transportation in Cameroon. Cameroon Data Portal: Open Data for Africa. http://cameroon.
opendataforafrica.org/vywxftd/transportation.
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cross-border trade in Africa in general (Beuran et al. 2015; Barka 2012) 
and in Cameroon in particular (World Bank 2013).
The World Bank (2013) provided a detailed analysis of the effects of 
transport infrastructure and corruption for ICBT between Cameroon 
and Nigeria. In road transport, governance failures manifest in long 
delays in crossing borders and numerous checkpoints along roads at 
which traders suffer harassment and must make unofficial payments to 
proceed. The World Bank (2013) estimated that these payments consti-
tute about half of total shipping costs along the Bamenda-Ekok corridor 
linking Cameroon and Nigeria. Such unofficial payments are not a 
signifi cant cost throughout SSA but are well above the continental aver-
age in Cameroon and Nigeria.
Most of ICBT between Cameroon and Nigeria centres on 10 major 
corridors. This chapter focuses on the Onitsha/Enugu-Bamenda corridor 
in Eastern Nigeria and Western Cameroon. This road, particularly the 
part between Mamfe and Ekok in the Manyu Division in the Southwest 
Province of Cameroon, was previously considered one of the world’s 
worst roads due to near complete inaccessibility during rainy seasons. 
It underwent construction and rehabilitation from 2010 until late 2016 
under the AfDB’s Cameroon-Nigeria Transport Facilitation Programme 
project (African Development Bank 2008). The AfDB is the lead organi-
zation implementing the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) Short Term Action Plan for Infrastructure, through its Trade 
and Transport Facilitation Programme projects. The AfDB’s programs 
involve improvements in both physical and social infrastructure.
The World Bank (2013) provided a preliminary analysis of the 
Onitsha-Bamenda Road project, highlighting the importance of both 
improving the road and its governance. This study suggested that these 
two aspects would be complementary, as better road quality would entail 
both more rapid movement of goods and a reduced number of unoffi-
cial payments due to greater transparency. The World Bank (2013) also 
advocated simultaneous institutional reforms to lower corruption. These 
reforms would raise trader incomes and are of particular importance for 
raising women’s participation in ICBT, as their profit margins are typi-
cally lower than for men.
Now that the road is completed, the effects can be studied. One of the 
authors of this chapter, Dominique S. Salla, carried out two one-week 
field visits to the region in February and May 2017, observing the situation 
and interviewing traders, government officials, and other stakeholders. 
As expected, travel times and transport costs decreased sharply, boost-
ing trade and incomes in the region. Surprisingly, however, the number 
of checkpoints and fees extorted from traders rose sharply, rather than 
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falling, partially offsetting the rise in profitability of trading. Some of the 
interview respondents provided a simple explanation: the higher quality 
roads made it easier to establish checkpoints. A deeper explanation is 
also possible: government officials were able to extract higher fees from 
traders, absorbing a significant fraction of the lower costs of transport. In 
a highly competitive environment, where the cost of entry into trading 
is low, corrupt government officials can extract all the benefits of lower 
costs.
While the situation is not that extreme in practice, our findings sug-
gest that the benefits of improvements in physical infrastructure, in 
terms of boosting trade and income, may be lost unless simultaneous 
efforts to reign in corruption also are instituted. Our results should be 
treated with caution as we operated with a limited budget over a short 
period of time. Furthermore, the political crisis in the region at the 
time of our interviews, involving conflicts between Anglophone and 
Francophone speakers, could also have contributed to the greater num-
ber of  checkpoints—although even if so, the crisis does not justify greater 
extortion from traders. Despite the limitations of this study, the intrigu-
ing and novel result that corrupt practices actually increase with better 
roads is important and merits further study.
Background on the Region and the Road
An overview of the region
Figure 11.1 shows the road from Mamfe in Cameroon to the Nigerian 
border at Ekok. The distance between Mamfe and Ekok is 70 kilometres. 
Ekok is just inside Cameroon; Mfum is the Nigerian town on the other 
side of the border.
As noted in the previous chapter, the Bamenda and the Bamiléke 
groups are prevalent in South-West Cameroon and are involved in the 
organization of cross-border trade. Agriculture is the dominant economic 
activity in the area (60% of GDP), followed by trade and  government 
service.
The Mamfe-Ekok Road
Prior to the beginning of the construction period in 2010, the corridor 
between Bamenda and Ekok was in poor condition, a dirt road that was 
almost completely impassable in the rainy season. Even in the dry season, 
transport between Ekok and Mamfe took about two days (Ministry of 
Public Works 2013). High transport costs, resulting from the poor road 
conditions, severely impeded trade (World Bank 2013).
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The multiplicity of border posts and additional checkpoints con-
tributed to lengthy travel times and high costs. The crossing at Ekok 
and Mfum has two border posts for each respective country. Delays at 
the Mfum border post generally inhibited the large-scale importation 
of goods from Cameroon into Nigeria. Traders entering Nigeria from 
this post had to leave their goods at Mfum, travel eight hours roundtrip 
to Calabar to have the goods assessed and pay the corresponding fee, 
return to Mfum to present documents to customs agents there, and 
retrieve their goods to continue to Nigeria. Such convoluted proce-
dures and lack of harmonization of trade policy lead to lengthy delays, 
increased transit costs, and ultimately reduced exports for Cameroon 
(World Bank 2013). 
Along the route, various unofficial control points, with seemingly lit-
tle policy value, extracted additional fees from traders and other people 
using the road. Along the road from Ekok to Bamenda in Cameroon, 
the World Bank (2013) reported 12 control points, or a roadblock every 




2For more information, see http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0016- 
71692007000200003.
Road Infrastructure, Corruption, and Cross-Border Trade  273
truck passing on the road. The checkpoints were a mix of permanent 
and temporary, with the latter erected when traders are expected to come 
through. The checkpoints are manned by police officers, customs agents, 
gendarmerie, army officers, or other government officials. Sometimes 
these groups operate together and sometimes independently. The World 
Bank (2013) suggests that poor road conditions exacerbate informal 
rent3 extraction, as slow movement along the poorly maintained roads 
allows trucks to be ‘easily stopped’ by authorities seeking rent extraction. 
Lack of computerized customs valuation systems also facilitates corrupt 
practices.
Other non-tariff barriers inhibit the free flow of trade, including 
impediments to cross-border trucking as trucking must be operated 
by nationals from the respective country (i.e., a Cameroonian trucker 
cannot freely pass into Nigeria). Typically, trucks must stop at the bor-
der, and unload and reload goods onto a truck in the next country. This 
leads not only to increased direct loading and reloading costs but also 
to increased overall transport costs resulting from traders’ need to con-
tract with two transport agents, coordinate shipments, and hire ‘crossers’ 
or ‘specialized service providers to help move goods across the border’ 
(World Bank 2013).
This AfDB Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme, initiated 
in 2008, aimed to complete the Lagos-Mombasa section of the Trans-
African Highway. The particular section under study, the 443 kilometre 
Bamenda-Enugu corridor, straddles the Cameroonian Bamenda-Mamfe-
Ekok corridor on the RN 6 (203 kilometres), Nigerian road sections 
(240 kilometres), a bridge over the Muyana River in Cameroon, and a 
border bridge over the Cross River. In addition to the AfDB, the Japan 
Bank Investment Corporation (JBIC), the World Bank, and the govern-
ments of Nigeria and Cameroon provided financing. The JBIC loan was 
mostly used to fund the cost of road work between Mamfe and Ekok. The 
project was expected to directly benefit users of transport services, along 
with an additional 11 million people (3 million in Cameroon and 8 mil-
lion in Nigeria) in the region.
Specific objectives of the project included the development and paving 
of 90 kilometres of new roadway, the reconstruction of 109 kilometres of 
existing roads, improved maintenance, and the construction of highway 
structures. In terms of institutional improvements, the project featured 
the creation and operation of a common border checkpoint for the two 
countries to reduce transit times spent at customs at both the Nigerian 
3The term “rent” refers to cases where people earn an income which is not commensurate with 
their level of effort nor the level of risk involved in the endeavour.
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and Cameroonian sides of the border. The number of checkpoints along 
the entire Bamenda-Onitsha corridor was to be reduced from about 
30 to 2 (World Bank 2013). Other ancillary features included the reha-
bilitation and construction of social and market infrastructure, such as 
market sheds, drying areas for agriculture, and school buildings. Other 
key objectives included cutting back the number of checkpoints and 
controlling the axle load of vehicles (African Development Bank 2008; 
World Bank 2013).
The World Bank (2013) projected (based on trader estimates) a 
reduction of anywhere from 40 to 70% of the transport costs on the 
200-kilometre stretch from Ekok to Bamenda, going from about 
650,000 FCFA in the rainy season and 350,000 FCFA in the dry season to 
about 200,000 FCFA year-round, boosting production, trade and income 
in the area. The reduction in the number of checkpoints would further 
lower costs, although the World Bank study noted that there were no 
efforts to implement these changes as of 2013, and, as we discuss below, 
the number of checkpoints has actually increased.
Analysis of the Impact of the Road
The 70-kilometre stretch between Mamfe and Ekok was completed 
at the end of 2016. We relied on both news sources and primary field 
research conducted in February and May 2017 to evaluate the results of 
the completion of this road segment. The research consisted of in-depth 
interviews with traders, customs officials, carriers, freight forwarders, 
and other market participants (mainly wholesalers and retailers) along 
the Mamfe-Ekok corridor in Mamfe, Ekok, and Eyumodjock, for a week 
in both February and May of 2017. Interviews were conducted with 
41 people, of which 82.2% were male and 17.8% were female.
News reports suggest some positive economic impacts from the road 
improvements. Some people (even those from the major cities) have 
moved to areas near the new road to take advantage of the new economic 
opportunities, including more people crossing the border into Cameroon 
to buy fruits and vegetables (Kindzeka 2015).
Several interview respondents reported an increase in the number of 
‘newcomers’ arriving in the region, typically because of the increased 
economic and trading opportunities provided by the completion of the 
road. They noted the increase in vehicles, new homes, and the number 
of people in the region since the road was finished. An official census to 
reflect such activity remains outdated (from 2010 or earlier) and thus 
cannot corroborate the anecdotal evidence provided by respondents.
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Some interviewees reported price inflation in the region for hous-
ing and consumer goods, including food products, resulting from the 
increased demand stemming from the growing population and rising 
incomes. In the stretch between Mamfe and Ekok, apartments once rent-
ing at 5,000 FCFA per month cost 20,000 FCFA and higher, according 
to one trader. Several respondents also noted the high prices of food and 
other goods in Eyumpdjock (a town midway between Ekok and Mamfe), 
although some cite other reasons for rising prices. An examination of 
regional price indexes did not show a significant increase in this region 
compared to others in Cameroon. Employment was also reported to be 
growing.
Reduced travel times and costs
Interviews confirmed that travel time has dropped dramatically. As 
noted previously, the World Bank (2013) projected reduced travel 
times of about 40 to 70% for the 200-kilometre section from Ekok to 
Bamenda. Results from the interviews confirmed that transport costs for 
the Ekok-Bamenda route fell by 50 to 90%, even more than the World 
Bank estimates. The travel from Eyumodjock to Mamfe previously took 
anywhere from 5 hours to a day depending on the season; since the com-
pletion of the road, the same journey takes approximately 20 minutes, 
according to a government official working in Eyumodjock since 2002, 
and about 40 minutes according to Google Maps.
Table 11.1 summarizes the responses of interviewees on the change in 
transport costs, comparing costs from before the completion of the road 
to costs estimated by traders in February 2017. All respondents reported 
lower transport costs, but magnitudes varied based on several factors, 
including the length of the journey, the number of years of experience 
of the trader, the relationship between the trader and the driver, and the 
means of transport (smaller vehicle, large trucks, ‘motos’, etc.). The esti-
mates in the table reflect broad averages.
Prevalence of checkpoints
Several (nine) respondents noted an increased number of checkpoints 
and agents seeking bribes. The higher number of checkpoints implies an 
increase in fees, reducing profits of traders and others involved in related 
activities, and pushing up the prices of goods for consumers.
Table 11.2 shows a comparison of the number of checkpoints 
observed in 2017 on the Ekok-Bamenda 200-kilometre corridor in 
2013 and 2017, with a breakdown into two segments: Ekok-Mamfe and 
Mamfe-Bamenda. The 2013 numbers are from the World Bank (2013) 
and the 2017 numbers are from our field research. The World Bank 
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Table 11.1












Mamfe - Ekok 61 Rainy 10,000 – 15,000 2,500 – 3,000 70 to 80
Dry 4,000 – 8,000 25 to 63
Eyumodjock - Mamfe 45 Rainy 10,000 – 15,000 2,000 80 to 87
Dry 4,000 – 8,000 50 to 75
Eyumodjock - Ekok 16 Rainy 5,000 500 – 1,000 80 to 90
Dry 2,000 50 to 75
Bamenda - Ekok 200 Rainy 20,000 – 23,000 6,000 70 to 74
Dry 12,000 – 18,000 50 to 67
Source: Costs pre-construction (World Bank 2013) and costs post-construction (interviews con-
ducted in February and May 2017). The decrease in costs (percent) reflects a conservative range, 
using both the higher and lower costs pre-construction and the higher cost post-construction, 
wherever there is a range.
Table 11.2













Ekok - Bamenda Total 200 16 – 18 12 Every 11 – 12 
Ekok - Mamfe 70 8 4 Every 9
Mamfe - Bamenda 130 8 – 10b 8 Every 13 – 16 
a The breakdown of the number of checkpoints between the two segments is not available for 
2013 and is estimated on a pro-rata basis.
b Our field researcher counted eight while interviewees reported 10.
Source: World Bank (2013) and interviews and observations in 2017.
(2013) did not break down the total into the two segments and we 
pro-rated based on the distance of each segment.4,5 In 2013, there were 
12 checkpoints over the Ekok-Bamenda route. In 2017, we estimated 
16–18 checkpoints, an increase of 33 to 50%.
4The number of posts between Ekok and Mamfe in 2013 is an interpolated estimate of the number 
of control posts, since the World Bank did not specify the number of control posts between Ekok 
and Mamfe specifically. If the distance between Ekok and Bamenda is about 200 kilometres, and 
World Bank 2013 counted 12 posts, then there is a post about every 15 kilometres. If the road 
from Ekok to Mamfe is about 70 kilometres, then one can assume there are about 4 checkpoints 
on this shorter stretch of land.
5From the stretch from Bamenda to Mamfe, the field researcher counted 8, while interview 
respondents counted 10.
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Checkpoint fee costs and charges
The World Bank hypothesized that 
… improved road conditions are likely to reduce transport costs, 
while fewer control points and more transparent procedures will 
reduce informal trade costs… In addition, where procedures 
are clear and less costly, traders will face fewer incentives to use 
small crossings where road conditions are bad … 
(World Bank 2013, p. 52)
However, our research findings, while preliminary, suggest the opposite: 
upgrading the road increased the number of checkpoints and bribes.
Charges at checkpoints, typically benefitting the official soliciting the 
payment (as opposed to being used as state tax revenues), vary based 
on location, vehicle type, amount of goods being transported, ethnic-
ity of the transporters, existing trade relationships and participation in 
merchant networks, the type of goods being transported, or the whim 
of the demander/official asking for the payment (World Bank 2013; 
our interviews). Results from the field research reveal a range, usually 
between 1,000 to 20,000 FCFA and occasionally 100,000 FCFA in cer-
tain circumstances, according to one trader. A truck driver claimed fees 
at Eyumodjock ranged from 2,000 FCFA to 15,000 FCFA if lacking the 
proper vaccination card, to 10,000 FCFA at customs posts. Fees vary 
depending on the nature of the goods, particularly if transporting goods 
subject to import or export bans, such as rice. One trader cited fees of 
1,000 to 2,000 FCFA to the police and 500 FCFA at border posts. A trader 
in rice, a good subject to an import ban in Nigeria, reports much higher 
figures of 3,000 FCFA at checkpoints and 5,000 FCFA at customs posts.
One male trader observed that the poor quality of the road in the past 
limited the ability of various government agents, including police offi-
cers, gendarmes, and customs agents to establish checkpoints, citing the 
incongruity of demanding surcharges while travellers pushed cars in the 
mud. Another respondent, a female trader, corroborated the increase in 
number of checkpoints, also associating the lack of checkpoints in the 
past to the poor road conditions.
Traders find the rise in checkpoints and fees to be very burdensome. 
One retailer with 30 years of experience in trading in Mamfe called the 
increase in number of checkpoints “deplorable,” claiming that the high 
frequency of the checkpoints impedes his cross-border merchandising 
trips and the job prospects of drivers, who remain less likely to under-
take trips along the road due to frequent stops and bribe requirements. 
One wholesaler even describes the Mamfe-Ekok route as “the route of 
theft” on which police, gendarmes, and customs agents “steal” from the 
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traders through extracting hefty surcharges rife with elements of bribery 
and corruption.
Fee collection reflects the dual objectives of meeting the revenue goals 
set by the regional government and the desire to collect informal pay-
ments for personal enrichment. As described by the World Bank (2013) 
and corroborated through our field research, local customs agents fall 
under the jurisdiction of the regional administration, with regional and 
national customs agents setting the revenue objectives for particular bor-
der posts, as is the case at the Ekok border.
Some traders interviewed in the study confirmed the prevalence of 
corrupt practices rather than customs objectives in setting surcharge 
rates, as the World Bank (2013) documented in detail. A wholesaler 
noted that when passing the customs post with goods valued at about 
3 million FCFA, customs agents demanded from him a fee of 90,000 
FCFA but gave him a receipt showing a payment of only 20,000 FCFA, 
with the difference in amounts going “into their [the customs agent’s] 
pocket.” According to this wholesaler, smuggling is rampant at this bor-
der post. The wholesaler suggested that, even though the customs agents 
say certain goods cannot pass, they “turn a blind eye” once the smuggler 
provides an adequate bribe. Typically, if presented with an ‘inadequate’ 
bribe or if the informal payment is ‘poorly negotiated’, customs agents 
will alert local media of their capture of smugglers.
Naturally, customs agents have a more favourable view of the situation. 
While traders and their suppliers and agents decry informal payments 
as expensive, cumbersome, and corrupt, customs officials defend the 
checkpoint and customs duties as a means of recouping revenue lost 
from smugglers’ evasion of taxes. Customs agents also cited the positive 
effects of fees on imports on promoting production and consumption of 
domestic products. Customs officials further claimed that some traders 
plead with them for low estimates of the value of the merchandise on 
their receipts, so they can present them to the officials at checkpoints as 
the latter often base their demands for bribes on the stated values of the 
goods on customs receipts. While defending their work, customs officials 
viewed the role of other agencies less favourably. One customs official 
complained that “everyone wants to do customs’ work” and acknowl-
edged that the “numerous checkpoints make traders less willing to pay 
customs duties, which is regrettable.”
Effects of increased checkpoint fees on trading profits and  
choice of route
The World Bank (2013) showed that prior to the upgrading of the road, 
the profit margins of traders were generally very low. With the improved 
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road between Mamfe and Ekok, the AfDB and the World Bank expected 
transport costs to decrease, thereby leaving traders and other participants 
in inter-state commerce with increased revenues and profits. However, 
this analysis failed to consider the effect of the increase in the number of 
checkpoints and resulting fees on profit margins.
We computed a rough estimate of the net effect of lower transport 
costs and higher unofficial fees on the profitability of transport between 
Mamfe and Ekok in the rainy season, both before and after the construc-
tion of the road, conservatively assuming fees of 1,000 FCFA per 
checkpoint encountered.
The number of checkpoints on the Mamfe and Ekok segment (as 
opposed to the larger Mamfe-Bamenda corridor), before completion of 
the highway, was not available but can be estimated at about four or 
five. If estimated on a pro-rata basis based on the length of the road, 
as in Table 11.2, the number is four. If proportional to the number of 
checkpoints in 2017, the number would be six. Assuming a checkpoint 
fee of 1,000 FCFA and using an estimate of 10,000 FCFA for transport 
costs, the total cost to the trader pre-completion of the road, in the 
rainy season, amounted to about 14,000–16,000 FCFA. Post comple-
tion of the road, with transport costs around 2,500 to 3,000 FCFA and 
eight checkpoints over the same distance from Mamfe to Ekok, the total 
cost to the trader amounted to about 11,000 FCFA. The net decrease in 
costs thus is only about 3,000–5,000 FCFA, well below the reduction 
in transport costs of over 7,000 FCFA. In other words, unofficial fees 
absorbed a sizeable portion of the surplus from the new road, perhaps 
as much as 50%. This estimate is tentative, but nonetheless is highly 
suggestive of the ability of government officials to extract rents from 
traders. Anecdotes from traders, while also inconclusive, point in the 
same direction. Furthermore, this calculation does not take into con-
sideration the aggravation and lost time when stopped at checkpoints. 
Taking this factor into consideration would reduce the net gains from 
taking the modern road further.
It is possible that our results were affected by the onset of the 
Anglophone crisis in November 2016. However, most of the road con-
struction was completed prior to this time and the traders’ comments 
referred to the general changes over time since the project began and 
they did not cite an increased number of checkpoints as resulting from 
the crisis. Traders and customs officials did agree that the strikes and vio-
lence had led to a steep decline in trade. Officials estimated that customs 
posts collected somewhere between 20–25 million FCFA per day prior 
to the crisis; this amount has dwindled to under 5 million FCFA per day 
since the onset of the crisis.
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The fact that a number of respondents stated that traders increasingly 
opted for other routes due to the checkpoints confirms that the increased 
costs associated with them may be enough to deter use of the new road. 
Like the customs official quoted above, traders reported that they are 
willing to pay some customs duties, but when they are too numerous 
and too costly, they may either exit or more likely travel on alternative 
routes. While we do not have data to quantify the volume of trade that 
is eliminated or diverted to less formal routes, our interviews provided 
suggestive evidence that the effects are substantial. We provide below 
four separate statements of traders that vividly illustrate the impact of 
the checkpoints on trading.
“The [Anglophone] crisis hasn’t had an impact on the number 
of checkpoints. Due to these numerous checkpoints, traders are 
avoiding the road…What bothers us is that we don’t see what the 
police and gendarmerie are accomplishing. They are duplicating 
each other. Why multiply the number of checkpoints on a small 
sliver of the road to verify that the vehicle documents are in order 
and the identity of passengers. The police and gendarmerie are 
doing the work of customs officials, wanting to know what mer-
chandise we are transporting, checking our receipts and releases. 
Some traders who previously were afraid to take the maritime 
route [to Nigeria] have decided to risk drowning to avoid the 
multiplying checkpoints. The maritime traffic has picked up 
relative to the land route except when boats are not functioning. 
Traders’ profits are plummeting due to the ‘settlements’ at various 
checkpoints. I know several who have exited the business.”
“You can see for yourself that the station [for departures] is 
deserted. The business is dead. Traders are discouraged by the 
elevated number of checkpoints and prefer to go by boat now.”
“There are numerous checkpoints and this dissuades traders. The 
police, customs officials, and gendarmes demand a lot of money.”
“I deplore the number of checkpoints (police, gendarmerie, 
army, customs, etc.). If you go to Nigeria to buy containers like 
those I sell, the number of times you are stopped will make you 
sorry you did.”
The new road might have been expected to boost formal trading or at 
least payment of customs duties. Instead it may have the opposite effect 
to the extent that traders have to adopt informal strategies to avoid pay-
ing the increased number of fees.
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Effects on women
As noted by the World Bank (2013), men dominated the cross-border 
trade activity in the Mamfe-Ekok region. This prevalence in cross- border 
trade activity was attributed to the conditions of the road prior to con-
struction and rehabilitation. Drivers preferred men to help push cars 
when stuck on the pre-construction mud roads; women participating in 
trade typically rode on motorcycles, or ‘motos’. Women typically also 
travelled into Nigeria no further than Ikon, a town close to the border 
not far from Mfum, while men went further west into the heart of the 
country. The greater prevalence of women may be due to the reduced 
need for men to push vehicles through the mud, and, if so, this occur-
rence constitutes a positive effect of the new road.
Conclusion
Deficient infrastructure, including roads, is widely regarded as a pri-
mary impediment to formal and informal cross border trade in Africa. 
Social infrastructure—governance and institutional strength—is also 
important. The AfDB transport projects in Africa aim both to improve 
the quality of roads and the institutional environment governing 
them. The World Bank (2013) hypothesized that improved roads link-
ing South-West Cameroon and Nigeria would contribute to reduced 
corruption by increasing transparency and thus entail reduced costs 
for traders. We found the reverse to be true: reduced transport costs 
were partially offset by higher unofficial fees collected at checkpoints, 
considerably reducing the growth of trade and incomes of traders, and 
leading them to seek alternate, more informal routes.
Our findings are based primarily on field research carried out in 
South-West Cameroon in 2017 on the Mamfe-Ekok section of the road 
linking Onitsha in Nigeria and Bamenda in Cameroon. Improvement of 
the Mamfe-Ekok Road did have a number of discernible positive effects. 
These benefits include reduced travel times and transport costs, more 
employment opportunities, and facilitation of the inclusion of women 
in trade. However, much of the reduction in cost was absorbed by the 
increased number of checkpoints and the fees extracted by corrupt gov-
ernment officials. While our calculations are preliminary, we found 
that as much as half of the reduction in costs was transferred to officials 
manning checkpoints. This effect is related to the failure of the project 
to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and corruption. As an example, no 
 progress has been made on the planned joint border post for Cameroon 
and Nigeria at Ekok-Mfum.
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Upon reflection, this perverse outcome is consistent with an economic 
analysis and the setting in Central Africa. With a rather elastic supply of 
trading due to pervasive underemployment and a severe lack of account-
ability of public officials, customs agents, and police are in a strong 
bargaining position to divert much of the cost reduction to themselves, at 
least in the short run. In the long run, traders can shift to alternative, albeit 
more expensive routes, and/or curtail their activities, to the detriment 
of the standard of living of local people and the wider goal of boosting 
regional economic integration and economic growth. Indeed, interview-
ees reported a tendency for trade to shift to maritime routes, although 
some of these effects may be due to the political crisis pitting Anglophones 
in South-West Cameroon against the Francophone central authorities.
This finding suggests a larger point: the benefits of physical infra-
structure for boosting trade and reducing informality can only be fully 
reaped if social infrastructure is addressed simultaneously. Although 
investments in infrastructure, such as roads and power, are critical, they 
must be accompanied by improved governance or officials may be able 
to appropriate much of the reduced costs.
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CHAPTER 12
Gender and the Labour Market  
in Cameroon
Jacques Charmes and Rosalie Njonkam
Introduction
Female labour force participation is lower than that of males in most 
countries. There are various reasons for this: in countries where female 
labour force participation rates are relatively high, the main reason for 
the gender differential is maternity, a relatively long period when women 
devote most of their time to their young child. Time dedicated to domes-
tic duties and care of household members (so-called unpaid work) is 
almost always the reason women have less time to devote to economic 
activities. In some countries with high female labour force participation 
rates, this may have a strong impact on time dedicated to total work (paid 
and unpaid), while in other countries a part of these domestic activities 
can be delegated to paid domestic workers. In other countries where 
social norms are particularly strict, maternity can have a stronger impact 
on female labour force participation rates: this is particularly the case in 
Northern African countries and in some sub-Saharan African countries 
of the Sahel as well as in the Middle East and South Asia, where female 
labour force participation rates are especially low. Unpaid care work in 
relation with paid work in the labour force has garnered a good deal of 
attention (Antonopoulos and Hirway 2010; Hirway 2017; Charmes 2015, 
2017) and several reports by international institutions have featured this 
topic (UN2 2015; UNDP 2015; UN Women 2015).
Lower female labour force participation rates are also due to 
greater involvement in informal activities (ILO 2013; Charmes 2012). 
Furthermore, women’s informal activities take place at home or out-
side enterprise premises more often than men’s and consequently may 
be more invisible. These activities are more likely to be merged with 
domestic activities (an example is the processing of agricultural or food 
products, some of which will be consumed by the household while the 
rest will be sold on the market).
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It is interesting to look at these issues in the case of Cameroon, where 
recent data collection allows more in-depth analyses of the role of women 
in the labour market.
Three main sources can be used to analyze gender and the labour mar-
ket in Cameroon: 
1. the 2005 Survey of Employment and the Informal Sector (Enquête 
sur l’Emploi et le Secteur Informel, EESI), updated in 2010, with 
an initial employment survey (INS 2006) and updated in 2010 
(EESI 2, INS 2011); 
2. the 2007 Cameroon Household Survey (l’Enquête Camerounaise 
Auprès des Ménages, ECAM 3) (INS 2007), updated in 2014 and 
completed the same year with a section on time use; and
3. the 2009 General Enterprise Census (Recensement Général des 
Entreprises, RGE) (INS 2010). 
These three surveys provide an overview of the macro- and meso- economic 
framework for which the results of the 2012 Survey on Formal and Informal 
Enterprises (Enquête sur les Entreprises du Formel et de l’Informel, EEFI) 
(INS 2012c) for Yaounde and Douala can be a useful supplemental source 
of information for a clearer understanding of the specific characteristics of 
the interaction of gender and informal employment.
Female Participation Rates Lower than Those for Males,  
but Still Well above Global and Regional Averages
The participation rate is the ratio of the labour force (employed and 
unemployed) to the working-age population (i.e., those 15 years of age 
and over). As Table 12.1 shows, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has a very 
high female participation rate, far above the world average of 51.2% in 
2010, compared to the male participation rate, which is typically below 
the world average. East Africa is by far the region with the highest female 
(77.3%) and male (84.5%) participation rates, well above the world aver-
age; the gender gap is also lowest there, at 7.7 points. Of all the regions in 
SSA, Southern Africa has the lowest participation rates, below the world 
average.
Central Africa is behind East Africa (by nearly 10 points), with a high 
female participation rate (67.4%) and a narrow gender gap (7.2 points). 
West Africa is next, with a female participation rate of 53.5% but a very 
wide gender gap (17.3 points). Female participation rates there have been 
growing rapidly since the 1990s, while the gender gap has dropped from 
30.9 points in 1990 to 21.3 points in 2000, and then to 17.3 points in 2010.
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These figures are estimates from the International Labour Office 
(ILO) prepared using national data (population censuses and house-
hold surveys). Table 12.2, developed based on the database created by 
the ILO, shows the extreme variability of national data for the survey 
years available. As these years differ from country to country, we have 
presented the results by distinguishing two periods for each country: the 
oldest—period 1—applies to the 1990s or the very early 2000s (for some 
countries), and the most recent—period 2—applies to the 2000s, or even 
2010. The years follow the country name. The countries are ranked by 
female participation rate in the most recent period available.
Very high female participation rates (and narrow gender gaps) are 
observed in Central Africa, with Rwanda leading the way (86.4% in 
2001, a rate higher even than the male rate of 84.5%), in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (70.5% in 2005), and Congo (67.5% in 2005 as 
well). Gabon, however, had a participation rate of just 39.9% in 2010 (but 
also a very low male rate of 58.2%).
Some of these figures raise legitimate questions about reliability: 
too great of a dependence on survey methods or an insufficient grasp 
of labour force concepts suggest that greater harmonization of surveys 
would be useful, particularly as concerns the measure of employment. 
Many countries have never conducted an employment survey; employ-
ment is measured in those countries only through multi-purpose survey 
modules or population censuses. Moreover, survey periods (during 
the year) can give very different results because of seasonal swings in 
employment.
Figure 12.1 presents labour force participation rates for the most recent 
year for all African countries (except the Central African Republic): coun-
tries are ranked by female participation rate in increasing order. Although 
there may be discrepancies with Table 12.2 due to more recent data for 
Table 12.1
Female and male participation rates over the past two decades
Region
Women Men
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
West Africa 46.7 51.6 53.5 77.6 72.9 70.8
Central Africa 64.5 67.7 67.4 76.9 75.1 75.1
East Africa 75.7 75.3 77.3 85.9 85.1 84.5
Southern Africa 36.2 45.7 45.7 65.5 62.6 62.1
World 52.2 52.0 51.2 80.5 78.6 77.2
Source: LABOURSTA, www.ilo.org
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some countries shown in Table 12.2, it is interesting to note that Cameroon 
falls in the middle. Northern African countries, in comparison, have the 
lowest female participation rates and the highest gender gaps (left-hand 
side of the figure), and the Eastern and Southern African countries (on the 
right-hand side) have the highest female labour force participation rates 
and the lowest gender gaps (including Zambia and Rwanda, where female 
labour force participation rates are higher than those for males).
Most African countries have fairly high female participation in the 
labour force (compared with other regions). It is this type of general 
characteristic that should inform the gender analysis of labour markets.
An analysis of national data for Cameroon helps clarify some of the 
questions raised above (see Table 12.3). We see that defining partici-
pation from age 10 (rather than 15) considerably reduces participation 
rates among both men and women. While the effort to measure child 
labour explains such a choice, age 15 should nonetheless be used for the 
sake of international comparisons. Additionally, in these cases, the gen-
der gap becomes very small in rural areas (2 points), where virtually as 
many women as men participate in the labour force; however, the gap 
was still 6 to 7 points in 2010 for age 10 and over.
Overall, the gender gap is close to 7 points nationally for the 15 to 
64 age group and 15 points in urban areas. Given the general profile 
depicted by this indicator, it is possible that the gap observed in urban 
areas is due to a poor understanding of some of the informal activities 
carried out by women, who tend to do those activities at home or from 
home, making them difficult to separate from purely domestic duties.
Table 12.4 shows participation rates based on the broad concept of 
unemployment. This broader definition excludes the active job search 
Table 12.2
Participation rate by gender over the past two decades in Central Africa
Country (year)
Women Men
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Rwanda (1996/2001) 85.6 86.4 88.4 84.5
DRC (2005) 70.5 72.3
Congo (2005) 67.5 71.6
Chad (1993/2011) 64.7  48.5 80.8  77.1
Cameroon (1996/2010) 61.0 64.2 77.1 74.1
Gabon (1993/2010) 55.0 39.9 70.8 58.2
Source: LABOURSTA and ILOSTAT database, www.ilo.org.
Note: The countries are ranked by the most recent female participation rate in decreas-
ing order (women, period 2)
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criterion in order to include ‘discouraged unemployed persons,’ which 
further reduces the gender gap because female unemployment rates are 
still higher than male unemployment rates.
Female Unemployment Rate Higher than Male Rates and 
Underemployment Rates Even Higher
As Figure 12.2 and Table 12.5 show, the female unemployment rate is 
generally higher than the male rate (the only exceptions are for rural 
areas in both the 2005 and 2010 EESI, which again is due to the inclusion 
of the 10- to 14-year-old population).
In urban areas, especially in Yaounde and Douala, the gender gap in 
the unemployment rates is very high (from more than 10 points to more 
than 14 points in the 2007 ECAM, and 5 to 8 points in the 2010 EESI).
The gender gap is also considerable (but less than for unemployment; 
see Figure 12.3) in relation to underemployment (defined as weekly work 
hours involuntarily lower than the hourly volume established by law, and 
as insufficient income, that is, earnings that are lower than the minimum 
Table 12.3








Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total
Douala 52.4 69.7 61.2 63.2 79.3 71.4 54.4 70.7 62.4
Yaounde 47.7 63.2 55.5 62.2 78.1 70.2 51.0 64.0 57.3
Urban 51.6 66.1 58.9 64.2 79.1 71.6 52.2 67.2 59.5
Rural 77.4 80.2 78.8 89.2 91.2 90.2 72.6 79.0 75.7
Cameroon 68.3 74.8 71.5 79.5 86.2 82.8 64.2 74.1 69.0
Source: INS, EESI 1, ECAM 3, EESI 2 (INS 2006, 2007, 2011, 2012a, 2012b)
Table 12.4
Participation rate by gender and location in Cameroon 
(age 15–64) in 2007
Location Women Men Both sexes
Douala 70.1 81.3 75.8
Yaounde 71.2 80.5 75.9
Urban 70.4 81.0 75.7
Rural 90.0 91.7 90.8
Cameroon 82.4 87.3 84.7
Source: INS, ECAM 3 (INS 2007)
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income established by law). According to the 2007 ECAM (INS 2007), the 
phenomenon affects more than two-thirds of the labour force and over 
three-quarters of working women (Table 12.6). More prevalent in rural 
areas (over three-quarters of the rural labour force is underemployed) 
than in urban areas, the female underemployment rate exceeds the male 
rate by more than 15 points in rural areas and by close to 23 points in 
urban areas (up to 25 points in Yaounde). The differences in definition 
of working age between the 2007 and 2010 surveys have less impact than 
they do on the participation and unemployment rates.
Female Employment is Characterized by a Higher Rate of 
Informality and Vulnerability Status (Contributing Family 
Workers and Own-Account Workers)
Western and Central Africa are the sub-regions of Africa (and of the 
developing world) where informal employment is most common, as 
shown in Table 12.7 below.
Table 12.5
Unemployment rate as defined by the ILO by gender and location in Cameroon
Location
2005 EESI 1  
(10 years +)
2007 ECAM 3  
(15–64 years)
2010 EESI 2 
(10 years +)
Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total
Douala 15.1 10.6 12.5 23.5 10.1 16.2 13.4 5.7 9.1
Yaounde 19.2 11.4 14.7 24.1 9.3 16.2 13.0 7.4 10.0
Urban 13.2 8.8 10.7 18.0 7.8 12.6 10.8 5.8 8.1
Rural 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.4
Cameroon 4.6 4.2 4.4 7.0 3.8 5.4 4.5 3.1 3.8
Source: INS, EESI 1, ECAM 3, EESI 2 (INS 2006, 2007, 2011, 2012a, 2012b)
Table 12.6








Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total
Douala 53.7 62.2 34.3 47.2 44.3
Yaounde 53.7 66.3 41.7 53.1 56.3
Urban 59.6 67.0 44.3 54.9 55.7
Rural 82.9 84.1 69.1 77.0 78.8
Cameroon 83.6 68.3 75.8 78.8 60.2 69.6 78.0 63.7 70.6
Source: INS, EESI 1, ECAM 3, EESI 2 (INS 2006, 2007, 2011, 2012a, 2012b)
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Table 12.7
Employment in the informal economy as a share of total employment 






























Southern and South-Eastern Asia 69.7
Notes: Averages are not weighted by region. Numbers appearing in 
italics reflect employment in the informal sector only and do not include 
informal employment outside the informal sector.
Source: Charmes (2012) updated with more countries
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With 79.5% of the non-farm population occupied in the informal 
economy, Cameroon’s proportion of informality is well above the sub-
Saharan African and even the Western and Central African averages.
In 2007, 95.9% of female jobs were informal, 68.6% of them were 
in agriculture, and only 4.1% were formal (Table 12.8). The 2010 EESI 
paints a slightly different picture: 93.8% of female jobs were informal 
(including 57.9% in agriculture), leaving 6.2% formal jobs. The discrep-
ancy between the two surveys is again due to the difference in the survey 
age of participation (15 years in ECAM 3 versus 10 years in EESI 2). 
Informal non-agricultural employment accounts for 27 to 36% (in 2007 
and 2010, respectively) of female jobs, compared to 30 to 39% of male 
jobs. Although the published data cannot be used to strictly distinguish 
non-agricultural employment (since the public sector and the formal pri-
vate sector may include agricultural components), it can be estimated 
that 87.8% (in 2007) and 85.3% (in 2010) of non-agricultural female jobs 
were informal, whereas informal employment represented only 71.5% of 
non-agricultural male jobs (75.5% in 2010).
The breakdown by industry (Table 12.9) shows the significance of 
agriculture and the importance of the (non-commerce) services sector 
for both women and men. In 2010, the share of industrial jobs was higher 
in female as well as in male employment, exceeding jobs in commerce.
Lastly, Table 12.10 shows the breakdown by employment status. In 
the 2007 survey, 86.6% of female jobs fell under the own-account or 
contributing family workers category (compared to 74.7% of male jobs), 
whereas in the 2010 survey (INS 2011), 87.2% of female jobs had this 
status, compared to 66.6% for men. The gender gap in wage employment 
Table 12.8







Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total
Public 4.9 2.2 5.4 3.8 4.3 7.2 5.8
Formal  
private
4.7 1.9 6.5 4.2 1.9 5.3 3.7
Agricultural 
informal




35.2 27.3 29.6 28.5 35.9 38.9 37.5
Cameroon 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: INS, EESI 1, ECAM 3, EESI 2 (INS 2006, 2007, 2011, 2012a, 2012b)
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Table 12.9







Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total
Primary 55.7 69.1 59.4 64.2 58.1 48.9 53.3
Industry 14.1 8.4 10.0 9.2 12.2 12.9 12.6
Commerce 10.4 10.3 9.3 9.7 11.6 10.6 11.1
Services 19.8 12.3 21.4 16.9 18.1 27.5 23.0
Cameroon 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: INS, EESI 1, ECAM 3, EESI 2 (INS 2006, 2007, 2011, 2012a, 2012b)
Table 12.10







Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total
Wage  
employees
18.0 12.3 22.7 17.6 11.3 28.6 20.4
Own-account 
workers
53.0 46.6 46.1 46.3 50.0 44.3 47.0
Contributing 
family workers
29.0 40.0 28.6 34.2 37.2 22.3 29.5
Employers - 1.1 2.6 1.9 1.6 4.8 3.3
Cameroon 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: INS, EESI 1, ECAM 3, EESI 2 (INS 2006, 2007, 2011, 2012a, 2012b)
and employer statuses is very wide, and it worsened in 2010. Similarly, 
the reverse gap in own-account or contributing family workers statuses 
among women worsened between the two surveys.
Some characteristics of Cameroonian enterprises by gender, 
according to the 2009 General Enterprise Census (RGE)
The RGE (INS 2010) covered all units located in fixed and permanent 
business premises, excluding street vendors, taxis, and motorcycle taxis 
(thus omitting more than three-quarters of informal workers, who, 
according to the 2005 EESI (INS 2006), do not work in fixed business 
locations). This census identified 93,969 enterprises (including 35.1% in 
Douala and 23.9% in Yaounde), representing 386,263 permanent jobs 
(including 47.1% in Douala and 21.3% in Yaounde), 43,495 temporary 
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jobs, and an overall turnover of FCFA 10.2 billion (59.7% in Douala and 
14.1% in Yaounde). Women account for 31.7% of business owners and 
27% of permanent jobs.
In the tables below, the total number of enterprises and jobs may dif-
fer from aggregate figures, as non-responses to certain criteria were not 
considered.
The RGE makes it possible to better assess the place that female busi-
ness owners hold by not mixing own-account workers and employers and 
by excluding agriculture; the fact that women account for more than 30% 
of all entrepreneurs demonstrates their real place in the Cameroonian 
economy. However, like most of the other surveys examined, the place 
given to gender analyses remains limited. In particular, the survey results 
for turnover and added value are not connected with the entrepreneur’s 
gender.
Table 12.11 shows that there are more women in sole proprietorship 
businesses than in corporations: the former represents 94.8% of female-
run enterprises and 87.8% of male-run enterprises.
As expected, the proportion of female business owners decreases 
as the size of the enterprise increases: they account for 30.5% of enter-
prises with fewer than five employees, 16% of enterprises with five to 
nine employees, 12.6% of enterprises with 10 to 49 employees, and only 
5.2% of enterprises with 50 or more employees (see Table 12.12 below).
EEFI 2012 results
The Survey on Formal and Informal Enterprises (EEFI) for Yaounde and 
Douala presents an opportunity for more nuanced gender analysis. It 
allows for a comparison of the respective situations of women and men, 
business owners and employees, in each major sector of the economy: 
formal, large informal, and small informal (see definitions in Chapter 2) 
across two major cities.
The numbers presented in the tables are those of a self-weighted sam-
ple; although their structures are significant, they cannot be aggregated.
Table 12.11









Percent of sole 
proprietorships among 
all enterprises
Women 25,467 30.6 24,150 33.4 94.8
Men 54,808 69.4 48,149 66.6 87.8
Total 80,275 100.0 72,299 100.0 90.1
Source: INS, 2009 RGE (INS 2010), according to Table 12.5, p. 161
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Table 12.12





employees Percent 5–9 Percent 10–49 Percent 50+ Percent Total
Women 23,814 30.5 995 16.0 411 12.6  31 5.2 25,251
Men 46,389 59.4 3,493 56.3 1,835 56.2 432 71.9 52,149
Total* 78,069 88.6 6,207  7.0 3,267  3.7 601 0.7 88,144
Source: INS, 2009 RGE (INS 2010)
Note: * The ‘Total’ category includes those ‘not determined’.
Table 12.13 shows the breakdown of business owners by sector and 
gender, and Table 12.14 shows the breakdown of jobs according to the 
same criteria.
Completely absent from the construction sector as business owners, 
women have an increasing presence going down the hierarchy of sectors 
(from formal to large informal and then small informal: 3.7%, 24.4%, and 
41.5%, respectively) and moving from industry to services. Apart from 
Table 12.13
Breakdown of business owners by gender, firm status, and industry





Formal Industry 1 43 44 2.3
Construction 0 6 6 0.0
Commerce 2 28 30 6.7
Services 1 27 28 3.6
Total* 4 105 109 3.7
Large informal Industry 6 36 42 14.3
Construction 0 4 4 0.0
Commerce 12 31 43 27.9
Services 14 29 43 32.6
Total* 33 102 135 24.4
Small informal Industry 17 26 43 39.5
Construction 0 6 6 0.0
Commerce 29 35 64 45.3
Services 37 49 86 43.0
Total* 83 117 200 41.5
Source: 2012 EEFI, weighted sample (INS 2012c)
Note: * The ‘Total’ category includes those ‘not determined’. Consequently, it is higher 
than the industries total.
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Table 12.14
Breakdown of employment by gender, firm status, and sector





Formal Industry 1,866 8,072 10,511 17.8
Construction 18 115 133 13.5
Commerce 521 1,847 2,899 18.0
Services 984 4,480 7,041 14.0
Total* 3,408 14,586 20,675 16.5
Large informal Industry 70 217 285 24.6
Construction 2 8 10 20.0
Commerce 39 109 148 26.4
Services 174 456 679 25.6
Total* 288 801 1,136 25.4
Small informal Industry 31 67 94 33.0
Construction 0 26 26 0.0
Commerce 57 52 106 53.8
Services 58 77 133 43.6
Total* 146 223 360 40.6
Source: 2012 EEFI, weighted sample (INS 2012c)
Note: * The ‘Total’ category includes those ‘not determined.’ Consequently, it is higher 
than the industries total.
the large informal sector, their number is greater in commerce than in 
the rest of services; women’s parity is closest (45.3%) in the small infor-
mal sector of commerce, followed by the small informal sector of the rest 
of services. The proportion of women business owners is  systematically 
the lowest in industry (2.3%, 14.3%, and 39.5%, respectively). For the 
small informal sector, it is not impossible that this proportion has been 
underestimated, since women’s involvement in commerce can often 
reflect a second, home-based activity (particularly in agriculture and 
food product processing).
The same hierarchy is observed in employment (Table 12.14), where 
the proportion of women employed in enterprises increases with the 
degree of informality, rising from 16.5% in the formal sector to 25.4% in 
the large informal sector, and to 40.6% in the small informal sector. Aside 
from construction, where their jobs are limited to administrative fields, 
their numbers are relatively high in commerce (18%, 26.4%, and 53.8%, 
respectively, on an increasing scale of informality). The small informal 
commerce sector is the only one where parity is exceeded and where 
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Table 12.15
Employment structure by gender, firm status, and sector (percent)
Firm Status Sector Women Men Both sexes combined
Formal Industry 54.8 55.3 50.8
Construction 0.5 0.8 0.6
Commerce 15.3 12.7 14.0
Services 28.9 30.7 34.1
Total* 100.0 100.0 100.0
Large informal Industry 24.3 27.1 25.1
Construction 0.7 1.0 0.9
Commerce 13.5 13.6 13.0
Services 60.4 56.9 59.8
Total* 100.0 100.0 100.0
Small informal Industry 21.2 30.0 26.1
Construction 0.0 11.7 7.2
Commerce 39.0 23.3 29.4
Services 39.7 34.5 36.9
Total* 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: 2012 EEFI, weighted sample (INS 2012c)
Note: * The ‘Total’ category includes those ‘not determined’.
women can be said to dominate (53.8%), followed by the small informal 
services sector (43.6%, excluding commerce).
Looking at the job structure (Table 12.15), we see that industry is the 
largest provider of employment for women in the formal sector (54.8% 
of formal jobs) as well as for men (55.3%).
Of course, these statistics do not take jobs in administration or in the 
primary sector into account.
In the large informal sector, the services industry dominates among 
both women (60.4%) and men (56.9%); whereas, in the small informal 
sector, services and commerce are head-to-head at 39.7% and 39%, 
respectively, for women, with services clearly dominating for men 
(34.5%), followed by industry (30%).
Generally speaking, low school attainment (primary education or less) 
is the predominant characteristic of employment in the three  sectors. 
There is, however, an interesting phenomenon: while secondary- or 
higher-level workers account for 1.1% of formal jobs and 0.4% of the 
large informal sector, they represent 4.2% of jobs in the small informal 
sector, confirming the safe haven role of this sector in the labour market 
in both Douala and Yaounde, particularly for women (6.8%, compared 
to 4% for men).
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Table 12.16 shows employment status in the various sectors. While 
women represent 6.7% of business owners and 26.2% of employment 
in the formal sector, they account for 31% of employers in the large 
informal sector, 22.2% of its own-account workers, 38.9% of its paid 
employees, and 70.8% of its paid apprentices. In the small informal sec-
tor, this structure is even more pronounced, as women account for 37.9% 
of employers, 48.8% of own-account workers, 26.3% of paid employees, 
and 46.7% of contributing family workers.
With respect to the average number of hours worked in the last month 
of participation, and if full-time is taken to mean around 200 hours per 
month (five 8-hour days per week), we see (in Table 12.17) that the formal 
sector is slightly below full-time (which may be due to annual vacation 
Table 12.16
Breakdown of employment by firm status, gender, and employment status
Firm Status Employment Status




Formal Manager/owner 1 14 15 6.7
Self-employed 0 1 1 0.0
Employee 167 470 637 26.2
Paid apprentice 4 4 8 50.0
Partner 0 1 1 0.0
Total 172 490 662 26.0
Large informal Manager/owner 18 40 58 31.0
Self-employed 2 7 9 22.2
Employee 102 160 262 38.9
Paid apprentice 1 5 6 16.7
Contributing family workers 3 5 8 37.5
Paid apprentice 17 7 24 70.8
Partner 1 0 1 100.0
Total 144 224 368 39.1
Small informal Manager/owner 39 64 103 37.9
Own-account worker 40 42 82 48.8
Employee 15 42 57 26.3
Paid apprentice 1 3 4 25.0
Contributing family workers 9 10 19 47.4
Paid apprentice 5 3 8 62.5
Total 109 164 273 39.9
Source: 2012 EEFI (INS 2012c)
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and sick leave), the large informal sector very much above (114%), and 
the small informal sector higher still (120%).
In the formal sector, the parity index is below 100%, meaning that 
women work fewer hours than men, which may be voluntary, in order 
to take care of domestic duties, or involuntary (underemployment). The 
only exception is commerce, where the parity index is 102.4%.
In the large informal sector, women work more than men across all 
sectors (the index is 105.9%), particularly in industry (115.7%), if con-
struction is excluded where their numbers are low. Above all, it is in this 
industry that women work the most: 291 hours per month (1.46 times 
more than 200 hours).
In the small informal sector, although the average is well above the 
norm (120%), the parity index is at 85.6%, especially in commerce (73.7%) 
and industry (83.3%), bringing women closer to the 200-hour norm. Since 
the small informal sector is characterized, particularly for women, by 
a large proportion of own-account workers, it is likely to be seen as a 
form of adaptation, reconciling time spent in paid work with time spent 
in unpaid work (domestic duties and child care). The 2014 ECAM 4 
results tell us more about the burden of these duties, which weigh almost 
Table 12.17
Average number of hours worked in the last month by gender, sector, and firm status





Formal Industry 176 176 176 100.0
Construction 222 258 252 86.0
Commerce 201 196 197 102.4
Services 196 209 205 93.8
Total 188 193 192 97.4
Large informal Industry 291 251 262 115.7
Construction 170 144 151 118.2
Commerce 209 203 205 102.5
Services 217 197 208 110.2
Total 236 223 228 105.9
Small informal Industry 203 244 229 83.3
Construction 0 224 224 —
Commerce 204 276 243 73.7
Services 237 252 246 93.8
Total 218 255 240 85.6
Source: 2012 EEFI (INS 2012c)
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exclusively on women, and on these modes of reconciliation. The sur-
vey’s module on time-use had the following results: women spend 
212 minutes per day in unpaid care work, against only 74 minutes for 
men (2.9 times more), and spend 203 minutes in paid work (against 284 
for men). As a result, they spend 415 minutes per day, or approximately 
7 hours, in total work (against 358 minutes, or approximately 6 hours, 
for men) (Charmes 2017).
It is worth discussing these results to determine whether they are in 
line with the national data presented at the beginning of this chapter 
regarding underemployment. According to various ECAM and EESI 
surveys, the underemployment rate among women is very high, and 
much higher than that among men. The EEFI data above pertain only to 
underemployment in connection with hours of work and should be com-
pared with data on remuneration. The first thing to determine is whether 
women are more involved than men in secondary activities, which would 
mean that their primary activity is insufficient to meet their needs or the 
needs of their households.
Table 12.18 shows the multiple job-holding rate observed in the EEFI 
survey.
Table 12.18
Having a secondary occupation during the year by gender, sector, and firm status (percent)
Firm Status Sector Women Men Both sexes Parity index
Formal Industry 0.3 0.2 0.2 185.4
Construction 5.6 2.6 3.0 213.0
Commerce 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0
Services 0.1 0.1 0.1 113.8
Total 0.2 0.2 0.2 114.1
Large informal Industry 4.3 4.6 4.6 93.0
Construction 0.0 25.0 20.0 0.0
Commerce 5.1 6.4 6.1 79.9
Services 1.1 2.6 2.1 43.7
Total 2.4 3.9 3.3 62.8
Small informal Industry 9.7 6.0 7.4 162.1
Construction 7.7 7.7 0.0
Commerce 12.3 9.6 11.3 127.7
Services 5.2 7.8 6.8 66.4
Total 8.9 7.6 8.3 116.8
Source: 2012 EEFI (INS 2012c)
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The multiple job-holding rate is higher among women than men in the 
formal sector (114.1%) and in the small informal sector (116.8%), but it is 
considerably lower in the large informal sector (62.8%). It is much higher 
in industry, with 185.4% for the formal sector and 162.1% for the small 
informal sector. This could be reflective of a seasonal effect, since women 
are often involved in agricultural and food product processing activities, 
which are subject to strong seasonal swings. A high multiple job-holding 
rate is a sign of insufficient income from the primary activity.
These findings show the importance of analyzing the data on remuner-
ation, particularly wages. Tables 12.19 and 12.20 (and related figures) 
show that the gender disparity is very strong in the small informal sec-
tor (the average female wage is only 73.9% of that of men), especially in 
industry (72.3%).
Overall, the parity index is above 100% in the formal sector (105.1%) 
and the large informal sector (106%), but this hides very large dispari-
ties. In the formal sector, women are better paid than men in industry 
(110.6%) and especially in non-commerce services (135.8%), whereas the 
opposite is true in commerce (75.8%).
Table 12.19
Average employee remuneration in the last month by gender, sector, and firm status
Firm Status Sector Women Men Both sexes Parity index (percent)
Formal Industry 271 245 252 110.6
Construction 80 193 173 41.4
Commerce 207 273 256 75.8
Services 498 366 400 135.8
Total 299 285 288 105.1
Large informal Industry 58 69 66 84.0
Construction 80 — 80 —
Commerce 109 150 138 72.7
Services 3,572 8,586 5,474 41.6
Total 1,754 1,654 1,693 106.0
Small informal Industry 45 62 61 72.3
Construction — 91 91 —
Commerce 65 47 49 138.1
Services 38 45 41 83.6
Total 43 58 54 73.9
Source: 2012 EEFI (INS 2012c)
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In the large informal sector, the disparities are even more glaring: 
remuneration is 62 times higher in services than in industry for women, 
and more than 88 times higher for men. In services, where remuneration 
is highest, women’s average wage is only 41.6% of men’s average wage, 
while disparities are lower in industry, where remuneration is lowest 
(84% in industry and 72.7% in commerce). It is the distribution of female 
employment between industries that falsely makes it appear that women 
do not suffer from wage disparity in the large informal sector.
The breakdown of employees by wage bracket (Table 12.20 and 
related figures) shows very different breakdowns by gender depending 
on the sector. While the formal sector has slightly more women in the 
lowest wage brackets, the number decreases in the two highest brack-
ets, where the curves intersect to the detriment of women and where the 
Table 12.20
Breakdown of workers by wage bracket, gender, and firm status (percent)
Firm Status Wage bracket Women Men
Formal Less than FCFA 28,500  0.6  0.4





FCFA 400 000 and + 17.9 22.6





[200,000–400,000]  7.0 11.6
CFA 400,000 and +  0.9  2.5




[100,000–200,000]  5.9 18.3
[200,000–400,000]  0.0  5.6
FCFA 400,000 and +  0.0  0.7
Source: 2012 EEFI (INS 2012c)
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numbers are highest for both sexes. In the large informal sector, how-
ever, the highest numbers are observed in the second bracket for women 
(with considerably more women than men in this bracket) and in the 
third bracket for men (with considerably more men than women in this 
bracket). In all higher brackets, there are more men than women.
Figure 12.4
Breakdown of workers by wage bracket, gender, and firm status (percent)
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The pattern is similar in the small informal sector: there are far more 
women than men in the first two wage brackets, with those numbers 
decreasing considerably in higher brackets. This is reflective of an uneven 
distribution among industries, with women concentrated in the lowest-
paying activities.
Conclusion
From a gender perspective, the Cameroonian labour market is around 
the African average, with a relatively high female labour force participa-
tion rate and high gender gaps in unemployment and underemployment 
rates. The country is near the top of the African average and even of 
the Western and Central African averages (which are the highest in 
the world) in terms of informality, and the prevalence of informality is 
more important for women than men. In-depth gender analysis of the 
Cameroonian labour market is thus of utmost importance.
Although they provide disaggregated results by gender, Cameroon’s 
major household surveys are not a good tool for gender analysis in the 
labour market, as only a handful of variables can be analyzed from the 
survey results. In addition, changing definitions of the labour force in 
terms of minimum age complicate the analysis. A harmonized analysis of 
data is necessary, especially of data collected in the past decade. A more 
disaggregated analysis of the EEFI survey nevertheless reveals extremely 
high female participation rates, multiple job-holding rates, and resulting 
high underemployment rates. This underemployment, whether volun-
tary or not, points to the burden of domestic duties, which seem to be 
very unequally divided between women and men.
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While the duality of African economies is well recognized in economic literature, only a fewcomprehensive studies have examined the formal and informal economies using thesame instruments. The research presented in this book uses a unique dataset carefully
collected on both formal and informal firms, and an analytical approach based on a continuum of
formality/informality characteristics, to analyze both private entrepreneurship and employment.
Focusing on Francophone Africa, with particular emphasis on Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Gabon, and Senegal, the book also includes comparisons with other countries in Africa and in
developing regions. The formal economy is shaped by institutions largely determined by their
French colonial legacy, reflected in traits such as stringent labour market regulation. This, coupled
with weak governance and high factor costs, prevents firms from growing and, thereby, incentivizes
informality. Meanwhile, the informal sector is the major source of income and employment, typically
accounting for about half of aggregate output and 90 percent of employment. Informal firms
embody traditional economic practices, nurtured by deeply entrenched customs and well-
established kinship networks, often spanning national borders. The book sheds light on some
important and previously understudied aspects of the sector, using case studies, surveys and
original data, and interviews. It also makes well targeted policy recommendations, taking into
account firm heterogeneity and differentiated responses to various policy stimuli.
This book is recommended for undergraduate and graduate students studying economic
development in Africa, and economics researchers at universities and think tanks.
About the editors
Ahmadou Aly Mbaye is a Professor of Economics, and former Dean of the Faculty of Economics
and Management, at the University Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD). Stephen S. Golub is Franklin and
Betty Barr Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College. Fatou Gueye is an Associate Professor
of Economics at UCAD.
This book makes a novel and significant contribution to the understanding of informality in Africa. 
It generates a unique dataset on the wide spectrum of formal/informal firms to understand how the
two sets of firms cooperate or compete in various value chains and how this interaction shapes jobs
and productivity. It also explores the barriers to firm growth and recommends compelling policy options
to address them. 
— Brahima Coulibaly, Vice President of Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution
This book is an important contribution to the economic literature on the informal economy. 
It provides a nice peek inside the black box of the informal firms in Francophone Africa and their complex
interactions with formal firms. It spotlights ‘large’ informal firms thriving in a weak institutional and
governance environment, especially in resource-rich countries. A must read for every policymaker,
specialist, and student of development worldwide. 
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